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Adgezal Mamedov

Mental Portraitology in International Relations

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Scientific Editor:

I. Mammadov- Doctor of Historical Sciences, professor of BSU

Aferin Abbasova - PhD in Psychology

Editor: Mammadali Rasulzade - Philologist in English language and literature

Author's assistant: Leyla Jamalzade

This course covers a wide range of topics, including contemporary diplomacy, current geopolitical trends, and the impact of national character on international relations. The book explores psychoportraitology, mental portraits, and their implications on geopolitics. Mental portraitology in international relations is a vital and rapidly developing field of study that analyses the interaction between geographical, mental, political and other factors with the aim of using the results of this analysis to shape development strategies.

Note: ©This book is based on the author's previously published books "Psychological Portraits of Politicians" and "Psychological Portraits of Kremlin Leaders".

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Introduction


In contemporary scholarship, the examination of the psychological characteristics of political leaders and the impact of these traits on their political behavior has become increasingly vital for comprehending societal dynamics. It is not coincidental that prominent theorists assert the primacy of the psyche, as it constitutes the foundational element of every individual's social existence and determines its trajectory.

Nevertheless, an exclusively analytical approach that isolates discrete mental processes has proven inadequate for capturing the intricate and interdependent nature of psychological phenomena.

It is critical to underscore the vast potential inherent in the intellectual, emotional, and physiological capacities of the human organism. The cultivation, optimization, and context-specific application of these capacities represent essential conditions for personal development and self-actualization. An individual, though born with a specific genetic endowment, embarks upon life oriented toward the future, devoid of experiential knowledge or established perspectives regarding the self and the external environment.

Within human psychology lie numerous latent capacities—hereditary and psychophysiological in nature—that only become manifest through interaction with external stimuli and the individual's active engagement. Consequently, biographers of historical figures assign considerable importance to these elements, analyzing the circumstances of a leader's birth, ethnic origins, and native language. These indicators are utilized to interpret the behavioral and ideological patterns observable in the leader's life and actions.

More recently, in efforts to interpret the national characteristics of leaders, scholars have increasingly moved away from stereotypical generalizations in favor of historically grounded analyses of the populations they represent, including investigations into collective memory and genealogical codes. These mental frameworks influence a leader's cognitive orientation. Despite efforts at transcendence, an individual cannot relinquish their culturally embedded mentality, as it is deeply enmeshed in the nervous system and informs the construction of their worldview. A substantial portion of this mentality operates beyond conscious awareness, serving as the substratum of psychological life. Even when certain elements rise to conscious cognition, they remain resistant to transformation—not due to experiential entrenchment per se, but because human functioning is intrinsically mediated by mental awareness.




Dean Keith Simonton

Taking these insights into account, contemporary research has increasingly focused on how such psychological constructs influence the institutional foundations of the state, particularly through the exploration of collective and individual mental identifications. In parallel, the psychological profiles of political actors who have shaped historical trajectories—within the context of sociopolitical and economic variables, including international relations—have become subjects of rigorous inquiry. One of the earliest formal initiatives in this field emerged in the United States during the 1940s, spearheaded by Professors R. Donley and D. Winter. Presently,

similar institutions operate across the globe—in the United States, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Russia. The analytical outputs of these centers are integrated into specialized curricula designed for professionals engaged in foreign affairs, including diplomats, intelligence analysts, political scientists, and political economists. Pioneering work in this domain has been conducted by American researchers such as D. Winter, D. McClelland, A. Stewart, H. Iendt, P. Light, Dj. Barber, M. German, D. Simonton, S. Walker, R. Donlin, and others.

As previously indicated, one central objective in the development of psychological portraiture is to assess the extent to which national leaders can shape the political orientations of their states. In pursuit of this objective, specialized centers in leading nations conduct methodologically rigorous studies of political psychology. Prior to establishing bilateral or multilateral relations, policymakers in countries such as the United States often consult psychological assessments of foreign leaders, produced by interdisciplinary teams of psychologists, anthropologists, psychiatrists, and related specialists. This methodological approach has become a cornerstone in the strategic formulation of foreign policy in historically institutionalized states.



D. McClelland

Notably, during periods of political instability or critical junctures in societal development, new and unorthodox leaders may rise to prominence, often capturing public support in surprising ways. In this regard, psychological evaluation frameworks facilitate anticipatory analysis, allowing for the prediction of political developments before they materialize.

Universal psychodiagnostic frameworks have emerged for constructing the psychological portraits of political figures, with varied methodologies tailored to the specific case under consideration. In each instance, the structural modeling of personality and the analytical composition of the portrait are contingent upon the objectives and scope of inquiry defined by the portraitist.

To effectively undertake such tasks, the portraitist must possess not only expertise in psychology but also foundational knowledge in medical science. The construction of psychological portraits necessitates the consideration of both normative personality traits and pathological deviations. The core structure of personality—typically shaped in early developmental stages—is a decisive variable in psychological analysis. These foundational personality components constitute a valuable analytical instrument within the social sciences.

Among the range of psychological attributes, one stands out as particularly salient: the drive for leadership. The emergence and degree of development of this trait depend significantly on the individual's early ability to cognitively orient themselves within their environment. Spatial and temporal contexts are indispensable for the development of consciousness and self-awareness; individuals come to understand themselves and their world exclusively within such frameworks.

An individual, born with a defined genetic architecture, begins life with a future-oriented perspective, absent any subjective experience of the past or established self-concept.

Accordingly, much of human psychology is inherited and exists as dormant psychophysiological capacities, which only actualize under conducive environmental conditions and personal agency. This reality underpins the rationale for biographical inquiry into leaders' origins, cultural backgrounds, and linguistic heritage. These variables often yield explanatory power concerning the specificities of a leader's behavior and ideational leanings. Certain theorists contend that a deeper understanding of national traits in leadership requires engagement not with superficial cultural stereotypes, but with historical narratives and genealogical structures, which significantly contribute to the auto-

programming of the psyche. These factors are critical in shaping a leader's mental and cognitive architecture.

The position of American ethnographer Edward Hall aligns with this view. He posited that “national culture is not simply a custom that can be worn or changed like a suit. No matter how hard a person tries, they cannot escape their culture because it penetrates to the roots of their nervous system and determines how they perceive the world. Most of culture remains hidden and lies beyond conscious control, forming the foundation of human existence. Even when small parts of culture become part of conscious life, it is difficult to change them, not because they have been experienced and lived by people, but because people cannot act or interact in any meaningful way other than through the medium of culture.”

It is equally important to acknowledge the significant influence of familial socioeconomic status, environmental conditioning, psychological trauma, complex decompensation, physical limitations, and other personal factors in shaping cognitive and emotional patterns.

Regardless of an individual's efforts to escape their past, residual psychological information persists throughout life—this phenomenon is a psychophysiological constant of human nature.

Therefore, the historical legacy of a leader's people and their genealogical code—manifesting in latent psychophysiological potential—plays a foundational role in the formation of that leader's cognitive worldview.

I would like to emphasize that, in recent years, scholarly interest in the psychological dimensions of leadership has notably intensified. I have personally engaged in the study of psychological portraiture for an extended period. This scholarly endeavor is complex and has required sustained archival research. Through the meticulous examination of primary documents and corroborating evidence, I have sought to reconstruct accurate psychological profiles of political figures. The results of this scholarly undertaking are now presented herein.

Ethnopsychological human nature

Anthropological material plays a significant role in addressing certain historical questions, particularly those concerning the ethnogenesis of nations and their psychological customs. Furthermore, ethnographic and archaeological data often reveal cultural differences—either in the past or present—between groups that differ in anthropological type. Thus, the study of anthropological material can assist in understanding the national characteristics of historical leaders. Anthropology is indispensable for comprehending such traits, as the genealogical history of every leader is marked by anthropological features.

Consider, for example, the peoples of Madagascar. Linguistically and culturally, they are distinctly different from African populations, yet they closely resemble the peoples of Indonesia, especially the Batak of Sumatra. The anthropological type of the main population of Madagascar clearly indicates their migration from an island in the Malay Archipelago. In this case, anthropological findings corroborate established facts from the disciplines of linguistics and ethnography. Additionally, groups on the same island of Madagascar can be identified whose origins are determined exclusively through anthropological data. For instance, the Negroid population in certain areas speaks an Indonesian language but, according to anthropological evidence, has roots on the African mainland.

The arrival of Asian Turkic nomads in southern Ukraine was marked by a notable shift in physical type, as illustrated by skeletal remains uncovered in a 15th-century Tatar cemetery in Tyagin, near Kherson. Conversely, anthropological analysis may also lead to the rejection of large-scale migration hypotheses. For example, the near-complete absence of Mongoloid traits among the Turkic-speaking Azerbaijanis challenges the theory that the Turkic language spread in eastern Transcaucasia due to an invasion by Mongoloid-type conquerors.

The presence of a physical type significantly different from the majority population allows historians to infer the arrival of either the ancestors of the majority or the minority group. It is crucial to distinguish between two fundamentally different concepts: nation and race. A nation is defined by a shared language, territory, economic life, and psychological makeup. In contrast, race refers to a group of people unified by common physical traits, typically originating from a particular geographical region. Consequently, terms such as “English race,” “French race,” “Italian race,” “German race,” “Japanese race,” and “Chinese race” are scientifically inaccurate.

Numerous examples support this position. Northern Italians are taller, more brachycephalic (broad-headed), and less dark-eyed and dark-haired compared to

Southern Italians. Similarly, France's population is anthropologically diverse: Northern French individuals are taller and have lighter hair and eyes than their Southern counterparts. Inhabitants of Auvergne exhibit cranial features markedly different from those in Périgord and Provence.

In England, the population of the eastern counties is generally taller and more lightly pigmented than the population of Wales. Due to systematic anthropological research, Poland is considered one of the most thoroughly studied countries in Europe. Studies reveal that the population of western Poland tends to be significantly taller, lighter-eyed, lighter-haired, and more leptorrhine (narrow-nosed) than that of the eastern regions.

The lack of a fundamental connection between race and language is evident in numerous instances. Individuals of any race raised from childhood in a specific country will naturally adopt that country's language as their native tongue. Many cases demonstrate that language boundaries do not align with racial ones. Among Turkic-speaking peoples, we find Azerbaijanis (of a southern Caucasoid type), Yakuts (representative of the Mongoloid race), and Chuvash people (who exhibit Uralic racial characteristics).

In Russia, several prominent Russian nobles and princes bear surnames of Turkic origin, highlighting the deep interconnection between Slavic and Turkic ethnic groups. Like others, Turkic peoples are not immune to globalization. While we can only make general assumptions about the influence of territorial characteristics on political, cultural development, and democratic processes, it is clear that a relationship exists between geography and history.

Historically, nomadic Turkic tribes formed robust state systems, often engaging in warfare with neighboring civilizations such as the Chinese. Yet, these tribes were also educated and had written languages. The vast region between Lake Baikal and the Black Sea served as a cradle for both Slavic and Turkic peoples. Over time, this area became a melting pot where both warlike and peaceful traits were forged. These characteristics persist among modern Slavic and Turkic populations, despite extensive intermingling with Aryan, Hamitic, and Semitic groups.

A significant portion of Turkic peoples eventually embraced Islam. Even prior to their conversion, they adopted the crescent symbol from the Chinese and placed it on their emblems and flags. During this period, they practiced star worship and Buddhism. Around 50 B.C., the Hunnic state in China (associated with the Turkic tribe Hunyu) split into northern and southern branches. The southern faction assimilated with the Chinese, while the northern state fell in 84 A.D. due to raids

by Siberian Tungus tribes. A segment of the Huns migrated westward to the Aral Sea under the leadership of Chi-Chi, conquering the Wu-Sen kingdom at the foot of the Tian Shan. These new Turkic tribes introduced novel cultural and religious elements, including Buddhism.

Anthropological and historical records of these Turkic tribes align with Mongol-Altai characteristics, including large, round skulls and small, deep-set eyes. Despite the aspirations of some Turkic leaders to adopt Western culture, remnants of Buddhist influence remain visible—especially in their reverence for sacred sites and the practice of pilgrimage. While most Turks today follow Islam, others adhere to different religions: the Chuvash and Gagauz are Christians; the Tuvans practice Buddhism; and the Karaim people observe Judaism.

All religions inherently carry deep moral traditions. A review of Azerbaijani history, beginning with the Gutians, reveals a highly developed ancient culture. The Gutians expanded toward the left bank of the Volga, the Urals, Central Asia, and Siberia, reaching as far as Yakutia. Place names containing the element “kut” trace their migration, such as Surgut, Krasny Kut (Saratov region), Krasnokutsk (Pavlodar, Kazakhstan), Urgut (Samarkand, Uzbekistan), Irkutsk, the Urkut River, Ust-Kut (Irkutsk region), and Yakutsk (capital of the Republic of Sakha). These totemistic tribes demonstrated symbiotic survival strategies alongside indigenous peoples. Their descendants inherited distinctive cognitive frameworks.

Another notable Turkic group, the Khazars, occupied a vast territory in southern Russia, between modern-day Azerbaijan and Russia, and between the Caspian and Black Seas during the second century A.D. The Khazar Empire reached its zenith in the 7th century, following the collapse of the Hunnic state. A major city on the western bank of the Volga was Sarig-Sar (Yellow City), later known as Itil (modern Astrakhan), opposite Khamlikh or Hazaran. The city of Samandar, on the Caspian coast, was built between 833 and 835 under the direction of the Greek Petros during Emperor Theophilus’s reign. The Khazars also maintained a fortress, Sarkel, at the Don River's mouth and a temporary stronghold, Balangari, north of Derbent in the Caucasus.

The Khazars conducted significant trade with Bulgaria, Rus, Persia, and Byzantium. The Kagan served as the spiritual leader, while the Bek (vizier) oversaw military affairs. Under Kagan Bulan’s rule, around 860 A.D., the Khazars, after a brief encounter with Christianity, partially adopted Judaism. Al-Masudi documented the presence of seven judges: two Muslim judges presiding under Sharia; two Jewish judges applying Mosaic law; two Christian judges

following the Gospel; and one judge overseeing cases among Slavs, Russians, and other pagans.

The Khazars' power was eventually diminished by Arab incursions and attacks from the Pechenegs along the Volga's left bank. The Slavs ultimately defeated the Khazars in 969 A.D., although remnants persisted in Crimea and the Caucasus. The Khazars' legacy endures in regional names; for instance, the Caspian Sea is still referred to as the "Khazar Sea" in Azerbaijani.

Long before the spread of Islam in the region, foundational elements of many ethnic groups were already established in Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus, featuring historically stable territories, languages, and cultures. Azerbaijan maintained close cultural ties with neighboring regions such as the Caucasus, Iran, and other Eastern nations. After the Arab conquest of the Caucasus, Islamic religious values influenced a wide array of cultural developments—literature, philosophy, architecture, music, and more. During the Caliphate's dominance, Islamic values spread extensively. Following its decline, the region faced invasions by eastern nomadic tribes. The intermingling of Mongol-Turkic and indigenous populations ultimately formed the genealogical foundation of the Azerbaijani nation, a memory preserved across generations.

After the collapse of the USSR, some post-Soviet states experienced a temporary rise in nationalism and, in certain cases, religious fanaticism. This process remains complex and contradictory. The implementation of new economic systems was painful for much of the population. As a result, new missionary movements emerged—some of which disseminated anti-Slavic propaganda. Many of these missionaries attracted youth from economically disadvantaged backgrounds by offering free education and vocational training. Adolescents and young adults, particularly those aged 16 to 27, were most affected. High school graduates unable to enter universities became socially vulnerable, lacking the skills needed for employment and experiencing psychological and moral distress that led to a loss of self-worth.

Such conditions foster the rise of radical religious centers and nationalist cells. Under new socio-economic realities and the influence of ultra-radical propaganda, some groups developed xenophobic ideologies. Thus, fanaticism has become a central element in the ideology of radical religious sects. These groups self-identify as "defenders" of true faith. Vulnerable youth, struggling to find their place in society, are particularly susceptible to such influences due to psychological fragility. Faced with personal difficulties and social dislocation, individuals struggle to understand the root causes of their hardships. Without strong religious grounding, they are vulnerable to foreign missionary influence.

Such individuals often seek solace in whatever provides psychological relief and a sense of stability. In these circumstances, many are drawn to radical groups claiming to defend religious values. Once under the influence of fundamentalist organizations, individuals are subjected to psychological manipulation and emotional conditioning. These methods lead to the formation of a rigid, fanatical worldview and a distorted cognitive framework.

Unlike traditional religious practices, which are open and public, fundamentalist actions are typically conducted in secret. As with other domains of social consciousness, national issues must be analyzed on two levels:

1. Nationalist ideology—systematized presentations of national dogmas and myths by political leaders and public figures.
2. National psychology—national beliefs, sentiments, and mental traits characteristic of the average member of a nation.

Nationalist ideology often takes the form of myth, involving stories that attribute imagined supernatural qualities to one's nation. These myths are vivid and illustrative, allowing ultra-right politicians to effectively manipulate undecided electorates. As a result, the ambitions of political actors in some countries are wholly incompatible with scientific reasoning. These politicians “correct” national borders based on linguistic affiliations. Yet, societal laws—like any laws—must be shaped through rational thought.

Accordingly, when studying regional mentalities and national psychology and differentiating between religious movements, we simultaneously uncover the mental characteristics of individual leaders. The study of any leader necessitates examining their psychological identity, ethnosocial background, and individual psychological traits.

Psychosomatic human nature

Any ideological or economic theory developed without consideration of the mentality of people will inevitably lead to significant errors, unforeseen chaos, and a misunderstanding of democratic values. Mentality manifests itself in the speed of thought, the tempo of speech, facial expressions, mobility, and communication styles. Mentality is inherited, and although it undergoes slight changes as a person ages, these changes are relatively minor.


As is well-known, humans are biological beings, though they do not fully conform to the natural framework. The study of the laws governing mental processes is the most reliable starting point for acquiring knowledge. Just as a white beam of light disperses into different colors when passing through a prism, in thought, we observe various specific actions stemming from a single general cause.

The essence of true consciousness within mentalities is that which maintains its core nature despite undergoing change. The goal of human life is happiness, and besides knowledge, ethical virtue rooted in the will leads to this achievement. A person cannot pursue their goal in isolation; they require the participation of others, as individuals are members of society. A rational individual recognizes that individual rights can only be secured through social cooperation and collective effort.

Therefore, it is essential to study the mindset, emotions, mental qualities, interpersonal interactions, productivity, and desire for progress within each person. Collectively, these qualities represent the national mentality when aggregated at the societal level. While the conscious mind enables an individual to comprehend the external world, the subconscious transmits this information genetically to future generations. This “retroactive” information accumulates in the subconscious and is then transferred to the conscious sphere of individuals, shaping the collective mentality of a nation.

Psychological characteristics of mentalities emphasize features such as sensitivity, extraversion, introversion, and emotional intensity. The dominant emotions and motivations within a society are studied proportionally. Researchers examine temperament distribution among individuals representing a specific mentality. Furthermore, the character, cognitive processes, and intellectual insight of individuals are analyzed.

Psychologists have thoroughly studied general human characteristics. I. Pavlov classified people into three types: “artistic,” “intellectual,” and “average.” For the “artistic” type, perception is largely influenced by imagination and emotional resonance. The “intellectual” type, in contrast, prioritizes logical reasoning and theoretical inquiry. Being categorized as “artistic” does not necessitate being an artist or sculptor; rather, it indicates heightened sensitivity, emotional responsiveness, and the ability to grasp both concrete and abstract concepts. Artists, actors, sculptors, and musicians predominantly exhibit traits of this type. It is essential to note that artistic inclination does not imply weak intellectual development but instead highlights the predominance of artistic imagination over rational perception.



Ivan Pavlov

European psychoanalysts offer diverse perspectives on human typology. Ernst Kretschmer emphasizes the role of physical constitution in character formation. Vasily Gilyarovsky focuses on talent and its outcomes. Austrian scholar Sigmund Freud was captivated by the subconscious and its influence on a person’s worldview, relationships, speech, intellect, and creativity. Anton Shtanhel’s theory centers on the human body, with religion serving as a core component.

In the interest of understanding proportional human distribution in society, recent Western scholars engaged in mysticism have proposed thought-provoking ideas. The mystical worldview posits two realms and suggests that individuals interact with divine spirits. According to these scholars, success is attained by following paths revealed through divine guidance. Mystical philosophy has roots in traditions such as Chaldean wisdom, Astrology, Divination, Kabbalah, Scandinavian epics, Rune writing, Spiritualism, Theosophy, Anthroposophy, Bibliomancy, and Ornithomancy.

Fundamental conditions for leadership formation include Intuition, Sociability, Memory, and Intelligence. Among psychological traits, Temperament and Ability are essential, but interpersonal dynamics and the power of suggestion play a decisive role. Many prominent leaders have possessed this persuasive capacity.

Human temperaments vary significantly. History is replete with notable figures of differing temperaments. For example, A.V. Suvorov and A.I. Herzen were

sanguine; Emperor Peter I and I.P. Pavlov were choleric; N.V. Gogol and P.I. Tchaikovsky were melancholic; and M.I. Kutuzov and I.A. Krylov were phlegmatic. Psychological descriptions of these temperament types identify key characteristics such as:

1. Sensitivity – To evaluate this trait, one must account for the most subtle signals reaching an individual's consciousness.
2. Reactivity – Understanding this characteristic requires analyzing a person's response to internal and external stimuli, independent of volitional control.
3. Activity – This trait is necessary to achieve objectives and reflects an individual's ability to influence the external world and overcome obstacles.

The distinction between reactivity and activity relates to whether a person's actions are primarily driven by external stimuli or internal factors (such as mood, desires, and intentions).

Responses are further categorized based on mental reaction speed, physical movement, memory agility, and intellectual sharpness. Extraversion and introversion distinguish whether reactions arise predominantly from current external stimuli or from past experiences and future expectations. Emotional resilience reflects the duration of external stimuli's influence on emotional responses.

I. Pavlov's research on the nervous system's strength posits that its performance is regulated by peripheral inhibition. Pavlov's law of the correlation of forces indicates that an increase in stimulus intensity leads to a corresponding increase in response. However, this correlation is not constant; after reaching a certain threshold, further stimulus intensity leads to a decline in cortical activity due to peripheral inhibition. Based on this, Pavlov identified four types of nervous systems:

1. Strong and unbalanced – characterized by dominance of excitation over inhibition.
2. Strong and balanced.
3. Weak and balanced.
4. Weak – both excitation and inhibition are underdeveloped.

These temperament classifications help illuminate individual psychological profiles. Individuals can be empirically divided into four primary temperament types:

1. Sanguine (strong types) – characterized by strong, balanced excitation and inhibition.
2. Melancholic (weak types) – characterized by weak cortical performance, rapid peripheral inhibition, and dominant inhibition.
3. Choleric (impatient types) – characterized by strong but unbalanced excitation dominating inhibition.
4. Phlegmatic (calm types) – characterized by slow cortical processes and balanced nature.

Leaders, like ordinary individuals, can exhibit psychological strengths or weaknesses. Each leader possesses unique psychological characteristics, intelligence, cultural outlook, and behavioral tendencies. In certain instances, leaders perceived as weak eliminate the inner circle that elevated them. However, lacking inherent psychological traits typical of strong leaders, they often fall under the influence of a new environment, which ultimately governs their actions.

Sometimes, the leader's environment benefits the nation more than the leader themselves. As the adage goes, "A king is made by his court." This highlights that a leader's surrounding environment can be both beneficial and detrimental, and often self-serving. While this notion may initially seem applicable primarily to totalitarian states, historical experience reveals that, through manipulation of societal psychology and political technology, oligarchic forces in democratic nations can elevate tyrannical figures to power. A notable example is Adolf Hitler, who ascended to leadership via democratic means by exploiting post-World War I revanchist sentiments in Germany. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, in his memoirs, characterized Hitler as a mere corporal who "rose far."


Historical retrospection demonstrates that strong leaders play critical roles in resolving significant issues—this reflects their psychological acumen. For weak leaders, decisive actions often originate from influential figures within their environment. This underscores the necessity of studying the psychological profiles of leaders—whether idealistic, authoritarian, charismatic, or clan-based.

When a leader with a weak nervous system attempts to break free from the influence of their environment, the environment typically dictates their actions. Such leaders, despite attempts to appeal directly to the public, often find themselves misunderstood. Lacking societal support and constrained by the values imposed by their environment, they ultimately succumb to their circle's control. Occasionally, after failed attempts to assert independence, they revert to the status quo and delegate authority back to their inner circle.

In contrast, strong leaders maintain their positions despite external pressures. Their intuition and genius enable them to assess political realities accurately. Such leaders often surpass their environments, leading with exceptional foresight while their surroundings struggle to keep pace. Over time, the environment's initial skepticism may transform into admiration for the leader's visionary capabilities.

Ancient empires recognized the value of exceptional individuals and took measures to elevate them to leadership roles within society and the state.

The human brain contains distinct zones responsible for various abilities. Targeted development of specific zones can occur at the expense of others. For instance, Tibetan monks voluntarily undergo isolation in stone enclosures without windows or doors, relying solely on minimal sensory input



Paul Broca

delivered through a small opening. After years of such deprivation, monks develop abilities like clairvoyance and clairaudience, compensating for reduced stimulation of other sensory centers, as per Brock's theory. Consequently, certain brain areas expand while others atrophy, resulting in permanent cognitive changes.

Modern medicine employs techniques to selectively alter brain function. For example, liquid nitrogen is used to destroy specific cortical areas deemed non-essential, thereby promoting the development of remaining regions. Similarly, treatments for addiction, such as electric current therapy, disrupt established neural connections to foster the creation of new ones.

A neurosurgical method in the United States, referred to as "removal of painful memories," involves excising brain regions associated with traumatic memories, effectively erasing them.

Through conscious willpower, individuals can cultivate specific brain regions to foster self-education and discipline. Conversely, areas outside one's sphere of interest remain underdeveloped, making attempts to engage in uninteresting subjects largely futile.

Character Formation

One of the most distinctive features of a leader is their personal individuality or uniqueness. This encompasses character, temperament, peculiarities of psychological reactions, dominant emotions, and the motivations underlying their actions, all of which collectively shape their abilities. These psychological traits are never identical between two individuals, and each person's individuality remains unique.

Recently, geneticists have achieved a remarkable breakthrough by creating living beings with identical genetic codes. Undoubtedly, conducting such an experiment on humans would require extraordinary courage due to significant moral and ethical concerns. In theory, it is possible to create an individual with the same genetic code as someone like Einstein. Nevertheless, producing an absolute replica of such a genius—Einstein himself—is fundamentally impossible. This assertion can be made with full confidence. Regardless of genetic similarity, individuals cannot replicate the exact life trajectory of Einstein, as personal roles and functions are determined by the specific social groups in which they are embedded.

Occasionally, individuals who appear serious and strict in professional settings exhibit a joyful and humorous demeanor during recreational activities such as camping or fishing. In other words, the same individual may demonstrate completely contrasting behaviors across different environments. However, this is not universally the case. Frequently, individuals consistently exhibit the same traits across various contexts. At home, in the workplace, in public life, and during sports competitions, they often perform similar roles. A person's character is significantly shaped by their relationships and interactions within society. This explains why twins, despite sharing identical hereditary traits, often develop markedly different characters due to divergent social experiences.



Social structures and societal relationships play a critical role in character development. Material wealth or poverty, unemployment or optimism for the future, enslavement or social equality—all these conditions influence not only general personality tendencies but also the formation of individual characteristics. Consequently, character traits formed during early childhood tend to exhibit greater stability than those developed later and are more resistant to change. Character continues to evolve depending on an individual’s active engagement, social position, and methods of managing various situations. Conflict situations, in particular, are instrumental in shaping character.

Scientific research offers valuable insights in this regard. Seventy-three percent of respondents report that their characters remained unchanged after the age of twenty-five. Alterations in character during youth or old age are typically precipitated by significant external factors. During such periods, individuals may encounter complex challenges, and substantial exogenous influences often play a decisive role. Reactions to major injustices, for example, vary widely: some individuals withdraw from social interaction, experiencing emotional suffering and loss of morale, while others maintain composure, sensitivity, and the capacity for decisive action. These reactions largely depend on the nature of social treatment—whether individuals are ostracized or integrated into the community and whether this inclusion proves beneficial.

It is evident that behavior during conflict situations is deeply rooted in the character foundations established during early childhood and influenced by genetic predispositions. Even among highly educated and developed individuals,

the complex interplay of external and internal factors results in varied behavioral responses.

American scientists propose that personality traits are fundamentally shaped by an individual's early childhood understanding of the world. Lessons learned during this formative period persist throughout one's lifetime. Overall, the nature of a person's character—its depth, resilience, and consistency—is determined by the interplay among various personality traits. Culture and education play indispensable roles in this developmental process.

Human beings, much like birds, are born free, aspire to freedom, and instinctively seek to preserve it. This aspiration often manifests in the desire to ascend above others and exert authority, thereby safeguarding personal freedom through leadership.

How, then, can we explain the differences in character observed among twins? According to the theories of Kretschmer and Sheldon, such differences are attributable to innate, hereditary factors. These psychologists argue that character traits are genetically transmitted. Conversely, other scholars contend that personality traits are not biologically inherited but instead emerge through an individual's social experiences. Citing the observed differences between identical twins, they reject the notion of innate character traits.

In the prenatal stage, identical twins share the same hereditary traits. Researchers have examined several pairs of twins with respect to their social standing, moral standards, and material conditions. In terms of temperament, these twins demonstrated complete similarity. However, in terms of character traits, they exhibited marked differences, which became even more pronounced with age. This observation indicates that even with identical hereditary factors, distinct social circumstances lead to the development of divergent character traits. An individual is not inherently born intelligent or foolish, lazy or diligent, cruel or compassionate. Such qualities are cultivated throughout the course of life.

Thus, what is the principal mechanism governing the formation of character?

From the earliest stages of philosophical and psychological inquiry, there has been a persistent tendency to juxtapose the concepts of "brain" and "thought." Researchers emphasizing the significant distinction between psychological processes and cerebral activity often employed this opposition. This contrast was prevalent within both idealistic philosophy and psychology, supported by numerous morphologists, psychiatrists, and neurologists who argued that psychological processes fundamentally differ from the material mechanisms of the brain. For example, Monakov (1914), Goldstein (1927, 1948), and others contended that reason, or "categorical thinking," cannot be reduced to mere material brain functions.

It is indisputable that religion exerts a profound influence on an individual's abilities and the development of personality. Religion is readily embraced by human consciousness because it places humanity alongside divinity. It affirms the uniqueness of human nature, emphasizing that unlike animals, humans possess consciousness, manners, intellect, and the capacity for analysis, synthesis, and logical inference. Furthermore, religion posits that human personality persists beyond death and continues in an eternal form.



Konstantin Monakov

However, these concepts, while compelling, tend to reduce the unique qualities of human thought to more basic psychological mechanisms. Such perspectives found support both in the associationist psychology of the 19th century and in the structural theories of 20th-century Gestalt psychology, as well as among those who substituted the problem of “thinking” with concepts such as “the formation of conditioned reflexes” or “learning.” Nevertheless, it becomes evident that character represents a complex form of mental activity.

This view forms the foundation of modern neuropsychology; from this perspective, the question of the brain’s role in character

formation transcends philosophical debate and assumes a concrete scientific dimension.

Empirical research on the localization of specific mental functions within distinct regions of the cerebral cortex has demonstrated that pathological changes in these areas can lead to disturbances in mental function, subsequently reflected in alterations to an individual’s character. Psychologists and neurophysiologists have shown considerable interest in the localization of mental functions. Efforts have been made to map the brain and ascertain the functional roles of its specific regions. Early studies identified numerous “centers”—initially fifty-two, later increased to one hundred—with attempts to correlate each with particular psychological functions.

The right and left hemispheres of the brain exhibit functional asymmetry. The speech center, located within the left hemisphere, comprises three distinct regions. Damage to any of these regions results in significant speech impairments. In antiquity, complex psychological processes were attributed to the brain’s ventricles and their functions. Philosophers and naturalists of the Middle Ages explained all mental “capacities” through the localization of psychological

functions within the three brain ventricles. The eminent 19th-century anatomist Franz Gall elucidated the distinction between white and gray matter in the brain and spinal cord, emphasizing that specific regions of the brain are intricately linked to particular human “capacities.” As these regions develop, they expand within the skull, resulting in individual differences in cognitive and functional abilities.

Subsequently, the notion of “psychological capacities” was abandoned in favor of a new approach centered on the control of functional zones of the brain. Researchers began to investigate functional impairments in relation to organic pathological changes. For instance, it was observed that pathological changes in the motor function areas of the brain—or the central region located in the left frontal lobe—result in paralysis on the right side of the body. If pathological changes occur slightly posterior to this area, sensory deficits on the contralateral side of the body ensue.

A significant contribution to the study of mental disorders was made by the French anatomist Paul Broca in 1881. Broca demonstrated that individuals who had exhibited expressive speech difficulties (such as stuttering) often showed pathological changes in the left frontal lobe. He established that the speech center is located in the frontal part of the left hemisphere and that dysfunction in this area is associated with profound speech disorders.

In 1873, the German psychiatrist Carl Wernicke identified another critical speech-related region in the posterior section of the left temporal lobe.



Carl Wernicke




Kurt Goldstein

Pathological alterations in this region impair an individual's ability to comprehend speech. Patients suffering from damage to this area can articulate fluently but are unable to understand spoken language.

The majority of the centers responsible for regulating vital bodily functions are located within the brainstem. Twelve types of nerve centers have been identified, encompassing associative centers and elements of the autonomic nervous system. Numerous centers have been discovered across various regions of the brain, including the “comprehension” center (situated in the inferior portion of the left hemisphere), the “writing” center

(located in the posterior section of the frontal lobe), the “calculation” center, the “reading” center, the “spatial orientation” center, the “error detection” center, and the “mood regulation” center.

In 1934, a map of brain centers was created by the German psychiatrist Kurt Goldstein. Over time, however, Broca’s initial hypotheses and those of his successors, including John Hughlings Jackson, were refuted in favor of conceptualizing the brain as a system of interconnected complexities rather than discrete localized functions for complex psychological processes. Although initially met with difficulty due to the theory’s conceptual complexity, subsequent elaborations by Monakov (1914), Head (1928), and Goldstein (1927, 1937, 1948) further developed Jackson’s propositions, thereby establishing the foundation of a new school of thought. While not denying the localization of basic brain functions such as movement, vision, and hearing, these scholars argued that complex psychological processes could not be fully explained within the localization framework. Their studies demonstrated that brain cells are interconnected through axons and dendrites, with these neural pathways linking otherwise localized brain regions. Individuals with disrupted intracerebral connections frequently exhibit delusional ideation, adopt suspicious attitudes toward others, and draw erroneous conclusions from neutral statements.



John Hughlings Jackson

Accordingly, it was established that nerve endings within the cerebral cortex are coordinated by specific zones. In cases of mental and psychological dysfunction, both localized zones and broader cerebral regions are implicated.

As previously noted, any form of mental activity results from the operation of a complex functional system. The implication is that this function is executed by an intricate apparatus; damage to any one center within the system results in the disruption of associated psychological processes. Thus, each brain center, while performing discrete functions, is also integrally linked to other cortical regions, collectively sustaining a person’s mental and psychological equilibrium. Any dysfunction in localized cortical areas consequently disrupts the general psychological state.

Special attention must be accorded to the following observation: although the auditory and musical centers are considered structurally related, long-term empirical studies have shown that focal damage to the left temporal lobe may result in an inability to comprehend spoken language, while musical comprehension remains intact. Thus, a composer affected by such damage may continue to create significant musical works. This suggests that the auditory center must be further divided into discrete zones responsible for language and for musical perception, respectively. Moreover, it has been established that psychological processes related to spatial orientation, the construction of complex grammatical structures, and arithmetic abilities are organically interconnected. Pathology affecting the posterior region of the left temporal lobe invariably impairs the capacity to perform arithmetic calculations and understand intricate grammatical constructions.

Such findings confirm the existence of a complex functional system within the brain. Consequently, inquiry into the brain's functional systems and their role in mental activity has become critical. The cerebral cortex, based on its functional attributes, is conventionally divided into three principal blocks:

- I – A block responsible for emotional manifestations;
- II – A block responsible for reception, analysis, and defense against external stimuli;
- III – A block responsible for the regulation and control of mental activity.

Each block is hierarchically organized, comprising three cortical zones. The first, the projection zone, receives impulses from peripheral organs and transmits impulses outward. The second, the projection-associative zone, processes incoming information and prepares corresponding responses. The third, the complex (barrier) zone, is tasked with higher-order mental activities and exhibits delayed reactions relative to cerebral hemisphere activity.

The characteristics of personality—its depth, endurance, and coherence—are determined by the interrelations among these blocks. These interrelations form the physiological basis of character. Clinical observations have demonstrated that malfunctions in the third zone result in distorted worldviews and lead individuals toward unconventional life strategies. Notably, such dysfunctions have been associated with an increased predisposition toward necrophilia, characterized by a fascination with death.

Historical evidence suggests that Joseph Stalin exhibited such tendencies. He demonstrated a greater propensity to commemorate the anniversaries of individuals' deaths rather than their birthdays. For instance, during the peak of

the "Great Terror" in 1937, the 100th anniversary of A.S. Pushkin's death was celebrated with extraordinary grandeur in the Soviet Union. An apocryphal anecdote circulated at the time regarding a design competition for a monument to Pushkin: third prize was purportedly awarded to "Stalin reading Pushkin," second prize to "Pushkin reading Stalin," and first prize to "Stalin reading Stalin."

It is noteworthy that during Stalin's regime, Lenin's birthday was not celebrated with significant enthusiasm, whereas the anniversary of his death was treated as a national event. Lenin's death on January 21 was followed annually by the observance of "Lenin Memorial Day and the Victims of January 9, 1905," held on January 22. This day was marked by a public holiday framed in black mourning on calendars. Solemn-memorial meetings were organized nationwide, with Lenin's closest associates delivering keynote addresses in Moscow.

It is particularly striking that Adolf Hitler demonstrated similar necrophilic tendencies. Detailed studies of Stalin's political life and personal behavior increasingly corroborate the assessment made by N.I. Bukharin in the late 1920s: namely, that Stalin was "an unprincipled intriguer" who subordinated all considerations to the preservation of his own power, adapting his theoretical positions opportunistically to justify the elimination of political adversaries.

However, it must be emphasized that the role of an individual in social life cannot be determined in advance with certainty. One of the main reasons for malfunctions in the three blocks of the cerebral cortex is heredity. According to Mendel's theory, if there is a tendency towards mental disorders in a family, there is a high chance that someone in the next generation will suffer from the same condition. Another major factor causing dysfunction in the three blocks of the cerebral cortex is the influence of external (exogenous) factors. Individuals with such hereditary risks, when exposed to sudden bad news, placed in stressful or emotionally difficult situations, or experiencing major upheavals, may develop mental illnesses.

Psycholinguistic analysis

A person constantly reflects on their native language, which they themselves speak. Since ancient times, the structure of language—its arrangement of words, meanings, and combinations—has been a subject of study. However, a simplistic view of the role of language in society prevails today, wherein language is regarded solely as a means of communication, an instrument for transmitting information. It is often assumed that the language one speaks is of little importance, as long as it is sufficiently widespread and informative. This perspective on language is narrow and arises from a misunderstanding of its true nature. While it is undeniable that language evolved out of communication needs and serves to facilitate the exchange of information, it also reflects the unique characteristics of a society, its way of life, and its thought processes. Thus, language represents the foundation of all human experiences. When we embark on any activity, it is initially perceived through the lens of language.



A simple example illustrates this point. In the imagination of many, life in Europe is akin to a fairy tale. Europe is often envisioned as a paradise, with its inhabitants living in prosperity and luxury, resembling Hollywood stars. Russian women, in particular, are often inclined to marry European men. However, it is frequently overlooked that leading a life with a foreigner may not always be as ideal as imagined. Despite the fact

that the foreigner has learned the language and sought to master new communicative opportunities, they often fail to appreciate the connection between language, culture, and the character of the people. Language embodies the culture and lifestyle of individuals, shaping their behavior and worldview. Although the living conditions in Europe are indeed high, Europeans are typically not inclined toward extravagance, unnecessary spending, or ostentation. They live in prosperity, but with frugality. Consequently, marriages between individuals from different cultures often face disappointment. Over time, individuals in such unions begin to notice aspects they were unable to perceive during the initial stages of enthusiasm. In contrast, couples who share similar mentalities are more likely to reach mutual understanding. In international families, however, achieving mutual understanding is often complicated, as

cultural differences, behavioral stereotypes, and language barriers can act as significant obstacles.

Therefore, language plays a pivotal role in the formation of personality. An individual's spiritual and psychological world is largely shaped by the language they have spoken since childhood. The American scholar of indigenous languages, Benjamin Whorf, proposed a theory on the psychological significance of language, asserting that each mentality organizes and understands the world in a manner determined by its native language. For instance, in Azerbaijan, the types of ice are categorized as either solid or non-solid. In contrast, among the northern peoples of the Kol Peninsula, there are approximately 20 different words to describe various types of ice and 10 distinct terms for cold. Undoubtedly, language mirrors both the lifestyle and thinking of a people. It is not incorrect to say that Russians perceive the world differently from the French, as they think in Russian. The language we speak not only articulates our ideas but, to some extent, influences their development. Language affects the content of human thought. Two individuals from different nationalities who witness the same event may perceive it differently, as their consciousness organizes the experience according to the linguistic structure of their respective languages. This process of mental structuring is facilitated by language. Therefore, a Russian and a French person might observe the same event and interpret it in different ways, assigning different values and meanings. People who speak different languages inherently view the world through distinct perspectives. A French person cannot perceive and experience the world in the same manner as a Russian, as their linguistic tools differ. In an era of increased interethnic communication, the interaction between language, thought, and culture has become a pressing issue. The essence of language, its functional scope, historical purpose, and its intertwined relationship with national culture and psychology, remain central to the understanding of human experience.

Unfortunately, the study of linguistic manifestations is often conducted separately from the broader cultural and psychological factors that shape them. Research in this area is frequently limited to dialectology, and language is often treated merely as a tool for communication. The relationship between language and thought, as well as the connection between language and national culture, has not been thoroughly explored within linguistic studies. There remains a notable absence of interdisciplinary research that links linguistics with other fields of study.

The complexities surrounding the study of language arise from its broad nature. It encompasses not only specific linguistic aspects but also educational, moral, and political dimensions. Language issues extend beyond the confines of

linguistics, intertwining with philosophy, politics, and the broader cultural, psychological, and spiritual contexts. Language is an expression of how a society perceives the world; it embodies the mentality, system of values, traditions, and customs of its people. Each nation can be regarded as a unique personality, and language serves as the primary means of its self-expression and preservation. Language functions as an essential marker of an ethnic group's identity and a mechanism for distinguishing its members from others. It safeguards what might be called the "psychic genes" of a people, passed down from generation to generation. The Russian scientist V. S. Orlov vividly captures this notion, stating, "Just as the yellow butterfly remains a yellow butterfly even after thousands of years, and the oak tree remains an oak, protected by its hereditary code, so too does every nation preserve its identity through its language. For a nation to continuously experience renewal and self-creation, it must have a hereditary code, just like biological organisms. And this code exists only within the framework of the national language—people begin with language. The national language is, in essence, the genome of the people."

The concept of the "genome" of a people consists of various elements, as articulated by V. S. Orlov, who identifies several of these components. According to Orlov, the foundation of the people's cultural genome originates from the alphabet. A common question arises: "Is it truly significant which alphabet is used?" It is essential to recognize that this question, in itself, is misleading. The Cyrillic alphabet, for example, was specifically created for the Slavic peoples, and it embodies a distinctive code that reflects their culture and Christian spirituality. Recent studies by Belgian linguist F. Winke have revealed that within the Cyrillic alphabet's system of symbols, a profound religious and worldview significance is embedded. Concepts such as the divine triad and the embodiment of logos on earth are encoded within this alphabet. Each letter retains the essence of its creator and carries deep meanings, along with mystical and religious interpretations. Furthermore, each letter imparts a unique force to the words it constructs, and this must be considered when pronouncing words.

In examining the hereditary code of cultures, Russian philosopher M. K. Petrov concluded that national culture and mentality are greatly influenced by the structure of the language. Specifically, the way in which a people speaks—whether in a plastic and free-flowing manner, or in a rigid and fixed fashion—has a significant impact on their cultural identity. For example, the mentalities of the British and French, known for their propensity to measure and evaluate before taking action, are tied to the structure of their language. Their approach to initiative and practicality is shaped by this linguistic framework.

It is indisputable that "psychic genes" are transmitted through upbringing in a national language, just as biological genes are passed down through generations. Therefore, a Parisian with Russian roots cannot be regarded as a Russian person merely because they are the descendant of Russian emigrants. To be Azerbaijani is not simply a matter of ancestry, but also of engaging with the language of Sabir and experiencing the poetry of the original texts. Many Russians, for instance, are of Tatar descent. The saying "scrape any Russian, and you will find a Tatar" reflects this reality. If nationality is attributed solely based on origin, then it could be argued that many Russians are, in essence, Tatars. However, when a person loses their native language within the first generation, they forfeit their ethnic mentality in the second generation, and by the third, they have fully assimilated into the Russian identity. The soul of the people resides in their language; once the language is lost, the national spirit and identity are also diminished, leading to the individual becoming a representative of the culture whose language they adopt.

As the great linguist N. I. Tolstoy observed, "Language is the foremost, most vibrant, and steadfast indicator of an Ethnos." This concept is exemplified in the work of the Russian scientist V. I. Rassad, who dedicated his life to studying the Tofalar people, a Turkic group from Siberia. Rassad's research began with a deep engagement with their language. Living alongside native speakers in the taiga, Alachik communities, and mountain pastures, he gathered extensive folklore from this small ethnic group. His compilation of a unique card index of the Tofalar language contains 40,000 entries, and this formed the basis for a 13,000-word dictionary, meticulously illustrated with examples. Rassad's approach to studying the Tofalar language was guided by his desire to capture the culture and spiritual life of the people. Unlike many contemporary researchers, Rassad understood that to truly grasp the essence of a people, one must first learn to perceive the world through the prism of their native language.

Any people, above all, is its language, which unites contemporaries and links them to both their predecessors and successors. If there is no language, there is no people. Religion, though, can sometimes claim this role. Yet, religion alone cannot serve as the defining factor of an Ethnos. For instance, Islam does not recognize the concept of nationality. It is stated that there is no national identity in Islam; instead, Muslims are seen as brothers, forming a single community—the Muslim Ummah. The idea of the "Muslim Ummah" can be likened to the Soviet concept of the "Soviet people," a collective identity conceived during the socialist era. Even though the Soviet Union sought to create a new historical community of people, it did not establish a separate language for this community, despite proposals to do so. The "Soviet people" were, by necessity, Russian-

speaking. Even if the Soviet project had succeeded, the result would have been a version of the Russian people, uniting various ethnicities under a common linguistic umbrella.

In Islam, a similar phenomenon is observed. Arabic is the sole language required for worship, and every Muslim, regardless of their ethnic origin—be it Tatar, Afghan, or otherwise—must live according to the Arab cultural model. They are expected to adopt the traditions of the Arabs, even in matters such as marriage and food. Anything that deviates from these traditions is considered unacceptable under the guise of Islam. Under this principle, the Arabs, once isolated on the Arabian Peninsula, expanded their empire across Mesopotamia, North Africa, Central Asia, and even the Iberian Peninsula. In Islam, the notion of the absence of national distinctions and the unity of all Muslims formed the basis for the development of the Arab superethnos, a process that continues to this day. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate, large territories came under Arab control, yet the Arabs have not succeeded in fully assimilating the local populations. Even today, the process of Arabization in Egypt remains incomplete. Conflicts involving Islamic organizations such as Al-Qaeda are, in many respects, driven by efforts to consolidate the fragmented Arab world, opposing non-Muslim populations and striving for unity under the banner of Islam.

Today, there is often a belief that nationality and religion are the same thing. For example, many people identify Tatars as Muslims. However, this overlooks the fact that many Tatars are Christians. So, is being Muslim the same as being Tatar? This situation is common: in some families where the Tatar language is no longer spoken, parents make efforts to teach their children to say "Bismillah" before meals, thinking this is how they can preserve the national spirit. But the word "Bismillah" is not exclusive to Tatars—it is used by Arabs, African people, and Pakistanis before meals. It has nothing to do with Tatar culture.

If the Arab culture, under the guise of Islam, truly helped preserve the Tatar Ethnos, then a large portion of Poland's population would be of Tatar origin today. The ancestors of the modern Tatars have lived in Poland for centuries, but now all that remains of them is the name "Polish Tatars." These people have forgotten their language and culture and have become Polish Muslims, losing all traces of their Tatar roots. Those who are called "Polish Tatars" today are simply ordinary Poles with some elements of Arab culture, adopted through Islam.

When people use a foreign language or read prayers in a foreign language, they forget about their own identity. This is why European peoples fought hard to be able to pray in their own language. The Reformation in Europe, for example, allowed this change. It was through the church reforms that Europe could truly

become itself. During the Reformation, worship moved from Latin to the national languages of Europe. In the 16th century, a major event took place in European and world history, marked by the split of the Roman Catholic Church and the birth of new religious teachings. The Reformation was both a political and ideological movement in Europe, challenging Catholic beliefs and church practices. This is why the Reformation is often called a religious revolution.

The Reformation was a revolution in understanding. It was born out of the crisis the Catholic Church was going through. While the world and people's ways of life were changing, the Catholic Church, especially in Rome, stayed the same. Latin, which was no longer understood by most people, continued to be the language for public prayers. This situation caused people to question the church. The pope and his followers lived in wealth, while many of the clergy were more interested in luxuries like feasts and hunting. The selling of indulgences—payments to the church that promised to reduce the punishment for sins—became a scandal. People were shamelessly told that by giving money, they could save their loved ones from hell.

This growing dissatisfaction with the church led to new religious movements, which focused on the personal relationship between a person and God, rather than external rituals. The Reformation began on October 31, 1517, when Martin Luther published his 95 theses, criticizing the sale of indulgences. His theses introduced the main ideas of his new religion, rejecting the Catholic Church's teachings and structure. Luther argued that the church and its clergy were not necessary intermediaries between humans and God, and that faith alone could save the soul. The church that followed Luther's teachings became known as the Lutheran Church. Martin Luther was a key figure in the Reformation in Germany and the founder of Protestantism in Germany. He also translated the Bible and other religious texts into German, and the Lutheran Church began to conduct services in the native language of the people.

The Reformation spread quickly across Europe, reaching England, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, France, and Switzerland. The peasant wars of 1524-1526 in Germany, as well as the Dutch and English revolutions, were fought under the banner of Protestantism.

The Reformation left a lasting impact on European history. It changed European society and gave people the right to worship in their own language. National churches were established, and the people of Europe gained the freedom to express their spirituality in ways that were more personal and meaningful to them. The release of the European spirit from the control of the Roman Church gave a

powerful push to the development of Europe. The people of Europe advanced rapidly, outpacing other parts of the world in development.

Today, those who follow the Muslim religion often say that the Koran is only powerful when read in Arabic. If it is translated into any other language, it is just a piece of paper with print on it, not the Koran. But then, one might ask: is it not the Koran that is sacred, but the Arabic language itself? Why must a Muslim pray to Allah only in Arabic? Does Allah understand only Arabic? Many people today speak more than one language. Bilingualism and multilingualism have become common. The issue here is not faith, but the desire of the Arabs to spread their language and influence globally by using the word of God. Even the ancient Romans said, “whoever has the language - his is the power.”

The life of a language is closely connected to the life of a country. There are thousands of languages in the world, but only about two hundred countries. The world is made up of people, not just states. In fact, most countries in the world are made up of many different peoples. Having your own state is not always enough to preserve and develop your language. Take the example of the Jewish people. Even though they were expelled from their land, they managed to keep their language alive as they traveled around the world for centuries. It was only after two thousand years that Hebrew became the official language of Israel. Hebrew survived for two thousand years without a state!

There is also a different story about the Turkish Ottomans. In the Middle Ages, the Ottomans created a large empire. The areas previously conquered by the Arabs were taken over by the Ottomans. However, the Turks focused mainly on their military power and did not understand the power of language. The state ideology was based on the Arab-Muslim religion, and the Turks accepted the belief of the Mohammedan clergy that Arabic was the divine language, neglecting their own language. In the Ottoman Empire, the language of the Arabs was considered sacred, and the official language became Arabic. What was the result? The Ottoman Empire eventually collapsed, and most of its land was taken over by the Arabs. The Romans’ wisdom, "whoever has the language, has the power," proved true. The Turkish language, along with the Turkish people, survived only by a miracle in a small part of the empire. The Turks, who had considered Arabic as the sacred language, almost lost their own land.

The story of the Ottomans should be a lesson for all peoples. This is why language is such an important cultural component. Great nations are made by their masterpieces – Germans, Russians, French, Turks, Kalmyks. People often connect with their national traditions, the beauty of their national life, customs, language, and way of thinking without even realizing it.

Insight factor in psychological portraitology

Freudianism, along with its contradictions, provided an impetus for the pursuit of new knowledge and served as a driving force in the study of the human unconscious. Setting aside Freud's theory of sexopathology, we can focus on his clinical practices of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. The role of the



unconscious in human activities has been discussed above. One notable point to emphasize is that the words that come to a person's mind and are spoken during moments of enthusiasm become symbols of thought. Our way of thinking is shaped by how these images act and are revealed unintentionally. The images and scenes that emerge

during sleep are often explained by theologians as reflecting the connection of the human soul with divine beings. In the research conducted above, it was suggested that the sphere of the unconscious serves as a source of life from the creator. Further developing this idea could create conditions for individuals, including political figures, to examine the causes of historical events in relation to individuals, scientists, and leaders throughout their life paths, as well as the development of humanity in general, irrespective of their mental states. This approach will also allow us to explain the differences in human ways of thinking. The goal is to demonstrate the interconnection of the unconscious, which is a product of thought, as the primary object of study. The foundation for this proof can be derived from an explanation of dreams. Freud associates the explanation of dreaming with the idea that sleep is part of the structure of unconscious thought. However, opinions among scientists on this matter are divided. Most attribute sleepiness to both the unconscious and conscious realms. They believe that sleep and the unconscious, along with the right hemispheres of the brain, form the inner contours of the psyche. Meanwhile, the emergence of new ideas, images, and enthusiasm, along with the left cerebral hemisphere, make up the outer contours, resulting in these ideas being applied to human activity and lifestyle. Sleep, by itself, is not a passive process. Therefore, a person's mental activity is not interrupted during sleep. While sleeping, individuals retain several abilities, such as speaking and hearing. Consequently, with the use of hypnopedia during sleep, a person's capacity for learning can be significantly enhanced. Historical examples demonstrate that ideas of genius often arise during sleep. It


is not coincidental that creative processes are frequently resolved in dreams. The famous mathematician A. Poincaré writes, "In a dream, countless thoughts came into my head, and I felt how they clashed with each other. Until the two of them adhered to each other, forming a solid joint. As soon as I woke up in the morning, I realized that I had proven the class function of Fuchs." The renowned organic chemist A. Kekulé, after spending ten years conducting fruitless research to determine the structure of benzene, dreamed of a snake that turned and bit its own tail. This dream led him to the discovery of the cyclic structure of benzene. Academician K. R. Voblyy notes that historical and groundbreaking discoveries were made through the activity of the unconscious during sleep by individuals such as J. Mišle, V. M. Bekhterev, K. A. Gerchek, and D. I. Mendeleev. The historian J. Mišle, for example, would always review the papers he intended to work on the next day before sleep, and during sleep, he uncovered the secrets of the controversial aspects of historical documents. Surgeon P. L. Gerchek would sometimes wake up at night thinking about a new surgical technique, fall back asleep, and the next morning apply the new method in his clinic. When his assistants inquired, he explained that he had discovered the solution in a dream. D. I. Mendeleev, after several days without sleep while trying to create the periodic table of elements, found no success. Exhausted, he finally slept, and during this rest, he saw a vision in a dream that clearly revealed the arrangement of elements by atomic mass. Upon waking, he quickly drew up the table, leading to his groundbreaking discovery of the periodic table, a pillar of modern chemistry.

At times, prolonged, consistent work does not yield a solution to a research problem, and the scientist may abandon the study, turning to another task. During this time, an idea may suddenly occur to the scientist, offering the key to solving the previously studied problem. Thus, the transfer of unique ideas from the unconscious to the conscious realm is involuntary. In this process, the scientist's will and determination to work stimulate the force that propels these ideas into awareness. It is well known that sometimes, when unable to solve a problem, the scientist may abandon the study only to later find a solution—either the next morning or after several days—at a time when the issue is no longer at the forefront of their mind. This suggests that the unconscious sphere is connected to an "order" regarding specific issues. As a result of ideas flowing from the unconscious, a person may physiologically preserve the energy of the nervous system without overexerting their mind. Therefore, when solving certain problems, it is unnecessary to exhaust oneself; with the right motivation, the solution to the problem may emerge from the unconscious to the conscious mind. As N. V. Gogol wrote, "Not many people know how deeply an ordinary plot

makes a person think. The event motivates the mind to work deeply and stubbornly, leading to great labor.” Even if these problems remain unsolved, the event provides the necessary stimulation, causing the brain to continue thinking. Sometimes, no immediate breakthrough occurs, but if the stimulation sparks the unconscious, unique ideas on how to solve the problem will eventually flow into the conscious mind. This process, in which mature ideas from the unconscious enter the conscious sphere, is called insight. New discoveries, ideologies, philosophical perspectives, and other historical innovations made by humanity throughout its development can be linked to the phenomenon of insight. This process can be divided into four stages:

1. Preparation
2. Incubation (ripening)
3. Insight (the transition into the conscious sphere)
4. Conclusion

The first and fourth stages are products of the activity of consciousness, while the second and third stages are products of the activity of the sphere of unconsciousness. It should also be noted that sometimes, and even more often, not all unique ideas pass into the sphere of consciousness during the phenomenon of insight. Nevertheless, the idea is distinguished by its uniqueness, although it may not be progressive. For example, one can cite the unique theories of K. Marx, F. Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, based on atheism, as well as the ideas of individuals who laid the foundations of materialistic philosophy. It is also not rational to associate every innovation solely with the unconscious, because there are problems that individuals solve as a result of their experience and reading. Such examples can also be increased: B. L. Pasternak expressed, through the words of his character, that “in the sphere of unconsciousness, the processing of thoughts occurs during sleep. I have repeatedly witnessed that during the day, the things that do not attract attention, thoughts that have not been clarified, and words spoken without heartfelt intention pass through my body with my blood at night and become the subjects of dreams again.”



B. L. Pasternak

Thirty-six years ago in the United States, one frame per twenty-four seconds was shown by the rolling rollers of a cinematograph, placing an advertisement for Coca-Cola within these frames. The eye could not consciously see the Coca-Cola displayed in this way because the speed of the visual attention could not catch images rotating at twenty-four frames per second. However, although the eye could not consciously perceive it, the visual center in the human central nervous system received this advertising stimulus and transmitted it to the sphere of unconsciousness, as a result of which Coca-Cola sales increased. A second experiment was conducted by recording the word "stealing" on a tape at the same speed and playing it through radio recorders in large supermarkets in America. The word could not be consciously heard or distinguished at normal listening speeds. Nevertheless, as a result of the experiment, thefts in supermarkets were reduced by forty percent.

The unconscious possesses a vast reserve of information and serves as a treasure trove of memory, which individuals use sparingly. The challenge lies in the fact that a person does not have the ability to extract information freely from this reserve. While consciousness assists an individual in understanding the external environment, the sphere of unconsciousness acts as a keeper of accumulated information, protecting this valuable treasure and waiting for the right moment for its release, often remaining hidden for long periods. At some point, through the impulse of some force or divine influence, unique ideas stored within the unconscious sphere pass into the sphere of consciousness. Unconsciousness is a real element of the psyche, like emotions and will. Sometimes, ideas come to a person effortlessly and are historically unique. A. N. Luk wrote that while reading Darwin's book influenced by Malthus, "The Settlement of Peoples," the idea came to Darwin's mind that the struggle for survival ensures the preservation of strong forces while the weak perish.



V.I. Vernadsky

Humans have involuntarily used ideas accumulated in the sphere of unconsciousness since ancient times, and these ideas often appear in the form of optimal solutions, ripened through divine influence for solving specific problems. Academician V. I. Vernadsky wrote that "sometimes scientific creativity goes beyond the limits of logic, where the scientist relies on scientific findings even when they are not logically explainable." To understand the psychophysiological basis of insight, it is necessary to remember the words of V. I. Vernadsky, who stated, "Insight is an experience that we cannot understand." He

showed that insight is the foundation of unique scientific discoveries, which are later surrounded by illogical frameworks. However, the conditions for such discoveries can only be revealed through great hard work and mental suffering.

The basis for the groundbreaking discoveries in the development of humanity is built upon three facts:

I. Knowledge.


II. Experience.

III. An intuitive mindset with associative abilities.

From the perspective of dialectical materialism, insight is possible and legitimate, but it must be based on experience and acquired knowledge. From the idealistic point of view, intuition is regarded as a mystical and mysterious force, while from the perspective of scientific materialism, intuition is considered an element of the sphere of unconsciousness and is present in everyone, provided that the sphere of unconsciousness is stimulated so that its thinking products can pass into the sphere of consciousness. It should not be assumed that all problems can be solved with the help of intuition. Intuition can be productive only when the sphere of consciousness has already been heavily engaged in mental work. Intuition is one of the auxiliary mechanisms for revealing the truth. From this, we can conclude that the phenomenon of insight occurs under the influence of an unknown force. Science remains powerless to fully investigate this phenomenon, as it is impossible to uncover it as an independent element, a physiological process, or a pathophysiological process.

Body language or Ernest Kretschmer's theory

Although the body language training of the famous German psychologist and doctor Ernst Kretschmer was criticized by his contemporaries, it is quite interesting in terms of portraiture information. For example, the external appearance of the political leaders under study is familiar to readers, and the reader can also look at the photos of these individuals and independently determine whether they correspond to the ideas described below.



Ernest Kretschmer

Types according to body structure:

Type I – cyclometric

Type II – schizometric

Type III – athletic

Kretschmer compiled the characteristics of these types as follows:

Body structures:

Type I – cyclometric, picnic (lump)

Type II – schizometric, leptosome (stretched)

Type III – athletic (strong)

Body lines:

Type I – Broad, high, bulging forehead, often double chin, short neck prone to balding, high sensory qualities, weak muscle structure, prone to obesity, short wide hands.

Type II – Elongated face shaped like a shortened egg, sharp and strong profile, noticeable eyes and nose, chin receded, long thin face, thin narrow shoulders, thin neck, smooth long chest, narrow hands.

Type III – Coarse facial features, tall deep-lined face, thick brows, strong jaw, boxer-like appearance, broad blunt nose, rough appearance, broad shoulders, narrow calves, strongly developed back, rough hands, prone to some sloppiness.

The emotional sphere:

Type I – Kind, sincere, gentle, more intuitive, cheerful and balanced.

Type II – Sensitive, restrained, alert, apathetic, less intuitive, nervous and tense.

Type III – Unfeeling, indifferent, “thick-skinned,” calm and stable.

The sphere of desire:

Type I – Flexible, impulsive, less goal-oriented, impatient, easily influenced, poorly controlled.

Type II – Tense, restrained, alert, prone to apathy, extremely serious about achieving goals.

Type III – Not easily influenced, self-controlled, firm, restrained, independent, resistant, proud.

Sphere of thought:

Type I – Comprehensive, concrete, practical, verbose, subjective, personal stream of thoughts.

Type II – One-sided, abstract, theoretical, clear reasoning, objective.

Type III – Clear, understandable, laconic, dry, pedantic, few words, few actions.

Connection with the external environment:

Type I – Open, easy to relate to, talkative, lively, intelligent, sociable.

Type II – Reserved, closed, less sociable, correct, silent, official.

Type III – Quiet, tolerant, passive, sociable but inflexible, difficult.

The above comparisons, in my opinion, are still somewhat concise. Therefore, it is possible to form subtypes from these types. These subtypes include cyclo-schizometric, schizo-cyclometric, schizo-athletic, cyclo-athletic, athletic-schizometric, and athletic-cyclometric age types. Individuals with subtype I have a predominance of cyclometric characteristics but also include schizometric indicators. In individuals with subtype II, schizometric features predominate but cyclometric features are also present. Individuals with subtype III have a predominance of schizometric features and also incorporate athletic features. In subtype IV, cyclometric features prevail but also include athletic features. In subtype V and VI, athletic features are predominant, while subtype V combines schizometric traits and subtype VI combines cyclometric traits.

The most unique of these subtypes is the cyclo-schizometric subtype. All geniuses and luminaries belong to this subtype. However, one fact cannot be overlooked:

these anthropological indicators seem contradictory from the current psychological and physiological points of view. Thus, a person's position in society is measured by his activity, experience, knowledge, intellect, and material and moral values. However, although anthropological indicators seem mystical, the existence of such types in society is a fact.

On the other hand, even if we approach anthropological indicators from an idealistic point of view, we will still face contradictions. These contradictions come from religions themselves. Thus, religious scholars point out that the fate of a person, the writing on his forehead, is drawn by the Creator, while some religious scholars argue that the right of a person to choose between good and evil remains in his own hands. That is, a person participates in the formation of his own destiny. A person cannot avoid the mental and sociological influence of his environment. Based on this effect, certain changes occur in a person's mental state, rules of thinking, imagination, and behavior.

The influence of social factors on formation of characters



Alfred Adler

In a certain sense, the Austrian psychotherapist and psychologist Alfred Adler was right. In his concept of individual psychology, he demonstrates that a person's character is not shaped by biological influences, but by social ones. Adler's concept consists of the following:

1. Inferiority complex.
2. Compensation.
3. Overcompensation or striving for superiority.

For example, if a person has any physical impairments, especially in external organs, they inevitably develop a sense of inferiority. To distract themselves from their inferiority, they try to excel in something else.

People usually pay attention to a person's appearance during interactions. From an early age, starting at 12–13 years old, children mock the physical imperfections of their peers and start labeling them. The object of ridicule finds this very difficult to bear. Such children, even as adults, being aware of their physical impairments, often limit their communication with others. They develop mood disorders and pathological changes in character. Such individuals tend to be resentful, angry, nervous, and overly suspicious.

The smallpox scars that remained on Stalin's face for life, and the typhus that nearly killed him in childhood, were not the only misfortunes in his early years. As recalled by Semyon Goglichidze, "one day, on January 6, during the 'Epiphany' near the bridge over the Kura River, a large crowd had gathered." Among them was a group of church singers, including young Joseph. A carriage plowed into the children. The shaft of the carriage hit Stalin on the cheek, and the wheels ran over his legs. Stalin fell and lost consciousness. According to Goglichidze, "they picked up the unconscious child (Stalin was 10 or 11 at the time) and took him home. When his mother saw her injured son, she couldn't hold back a cry of grief. Soso (young Stalin) opened his eyes and said: 'Don't worry, Mama, I feel fine.'"

The doctor who arrived cleaned the wound, stopped the bleeding, bandaged him, and announced that his internal organs were not damaged. Two weeks later, Soso returned to his studies.

It is not entirely clear which injury caused permanent damage to his left arm. In the "Medical History of J.V. Stalin," it is stated: "atrophy of the shoulder and elbow joints of the left arm due to an injury at age six, followed by prolonged suppuration in the area of the elbow joint." Thus, unlike in official portraits, in real life Stalin was short, with a face scarred by smallpox. One arm was semi-paralyzed and shorter than the other. The toes on his left foot were fused together. This contributed to his famous "Stalin walk"—a slow, stealthy gait.

Young Soso was described as "frail and small" as well as "painfully proud" and provocatively rude, like many children with physical disabilities. Soso "was embarrassed to swim in the Kura River." All of this later reflected in his character.

His fellow revolutionaries in exile would say that he was a terrifying person with extraordinary qualities. According to Sverdlov's recollections, Stalin was "a great individualist" who viewed life from his own perspective. Maslennikov, who was also in exile with him, recalled, "Stalin always kept his distance from others, avoided everyone, considered himself above others, and would withdraw into himself to reflect."

Adolf Hitler had a condition known as monorchidism, a defect in the external genital organs. As a child, Hitler was ashamed of his peers who swam in the river and kept his distance from them. When Hitler came to power, people would ask him why he didn't marry. The Nazi leader responded, "My life belongs to the people." In reality, he liked to flirt with women but avoided physical intimacy, claiming that he preferred to devote his sexual energy to politics.

It is believed that Hitler's intimate life began at the age of 36. His first partner was 16-year-old Maria Reiter. In 1928, she attempted to take her own life. Hitler's second woman, Helene Hanfstaengl, claimed that Hitler was impotent. His cousin, Geli Raubal, played a special role in Hitler's intimate life. Hitler was extremely jealous of her and kept her under strict control. Hitler's peculiar love eventually led this woman to commit suicide. Those close to her knew well the secret of her death. "Hitler is very frightening. You can't even imagine what he made me do. By engaging in sexual perversions, he would achieve orgasm in a perverse way," she reportedly said.

After the tragic death of Geli Raubal, Adolf Hitler continued to engage with other women. One of them, the actress Renate Müller, revealed in her memoirs that Hitler harbored a profound fear of the bedroom. He would prostrate himself before a woman, compelling her to trample upon him, to insult him, to humiliate him, and to curse him with obscene language. This bizarre ritual would induce in Hitler a state of ecstatic arousal, culminating in his sexual gratification. Following

these episodes, he would depart, behaving as though nothing extraordinary had transpired.

In the trajectory of Hitler's personal life, the predominant figure was undeniably Eva Braun. Their acquaintance commenced in 1929, with Hitler casting voracious glances upon her; yet it was not until three years later that their relationship evolved into one of intimacy. A substantial age disparity of 23 years separated them. In 1932, Eva Braun narrowly survived an attempted suicide, having shot herself in the chest but escaping death by a miraculous turn of fate. Later, Eva confided to Hitler's trusted associate, the famed Otto Skorzeny, that Hitler would undress her completely and, aware of her prowess in horseback riding, would command her to mount and ride him like a horse. The most remarkable aspect, she noted, was the evident pleasure Hitler derived from this humiliation. He often proclaimed that the pathway to power necessitated undergoing humiliation, so that one could later inflict it upon others. This ordeal, he believed, fortified his authoritarian disposition and psychological endurance.

In reality, Hitler exhibited symptoms of profound mental illness, compounded by his pathological self-perception; indeed, the mere notion of sexual dysfunction often inflicts greater psychological harm than the dysfunction itself. The integrity of sexual centers is sustained through the continuous circulation of sex hormones within the bloodstream. Nevertheless, in the majority of cases, impotence does not stem from hormonal insufficiency but rather from disturbances of the nervous system, manifesting as instability, hypersensitivity, and acute mental exhaustion. It must be acknowledged that sexual potency, akin to other physiological processes, is highly individualized. It is influenced by the constitution of the nervous system, the structural build of the body, and overall health status. Generally, individuals of robust physical development possess greater sexual vitality than those burdened by obesity. However, an athletic physique does not invariably guarantee immunity from sexual dysfunction, while apparent physical frailty may coincide with diminished sexual capability. Psychological overload, trauma, and toxic influences act more swiftly upon those with unstable nervous systems, precipitating sexual dysfunction sooner than among calm and balanced individuals. Impotence, or sexual neurasthenia, constitutes a particular manifestation of broader neurasthenia. There exist intricate reciprocal relationships between these conditions. Heightened suspicion, hypervigilance, and excessive anxious responses diminish sexual tone, which in turn exacerbates negative emotional states, further undermining the sufferer's psychological resilience. These phenomena form a complex reflexive cycle. As with all neuro-reflexive activities, these mechanisms are orchestrated predominantly by the brain. The functional state of the nervous system governs the realization of sexual acts, the achievement of erection (penile rigidity), the emission of semen, and the

experience of orgasm (the culmination of sexual pleasure). Any factor impairing the nervous system concurrently undermines sexual potency. Depletion of physical, nervous, and hormonal reserves leads to profound psychological trauma. Initially, the impact of psychological trauma may paradoxically manifest as a temporary elevation of vitality in a young man. Yet this is a fleeting phenomenon, inevitably followed, either abruptly or insidiously, by the onset of sexual debility. It becomes apparent that individuals traumatized during childhood and adulthood encounter substantial difficulty in forging intimate relationships with partners. Empirical studies affirm that such emotional disturbances foster egocentric motivations, eventually blossoming into political jealousy and grandiose ambitions. The probability of developing psychiatric illnesses heightens significantly under the influence of sudden fear, intense stress, neurotic disturbances, and related factors.

Measured against the standards of normative consciousness, interpersonal relationships may, under certain conditions, transgress the bounds of acceptable conduct. Such transgressions furnish fertile ground for the development of selfish tendencies. Subsequently, these tendencies may give rise to political jealousy, culminating in conduct that exceeds socially sanctioned norms. Nonetheless, it would be erroneous to assert that every individual exhibiting traits reminiscent of Hitler or Stalin necessarily suffers from identical psychiatric disorders. In the domain of psychiatry, heredity is recognized as a principal etiological factor in the genesis of mental illnesses. According to the principles established by Mendel, the presence of a mentally ill individual within a familial lineage markedly increases the risk of analogous afflictions emerging among other family members. Consequently, individuals with a hereditary predisposition, when confronted with adverse events, acute stress, or neurotic episodes, are markedly more susceptible to the development of mental illness. In the ancient civilizations of the East, it was customary that a newly established dynasty of shahs would gain popular legitimacy only if no cases of mental illness were traceable within their ancestry. A notable historical instance involved the eminent physician Abu Ali Ibn Sina, who was summoned by the Khagan of Urgench regarding his mentally afflicted son. Ibn Sina attributed the prince's condition to hereditary factors, thereby laying the foundational principles of medical determinism.

Modern historical research has incontrovertibly established the existence of mental illness among Hitler's familial antecedents. One of the egregious atrocities committed by the fascist regime was the systematic castration of mentally ill men, suggesting that Hitler, in his manic state, projected his personal afflictions onto the collective body of the nation. His psychological profile unmistakably displayed the characteristics of a manic condition.

An insightful illustration of the psychic injuries sustained during childhood is

provided in Adolf Hitler's own treatise, *Mein Kampf*. In childhood, a person harbors innumerable dreams, of which the overwhelming majority—approximately 99%—fail to materialize. A mature individual, having shed naivety, may nevertheless achieve significant accomplishments, even in the absence of societal approbation. Upon reaching adulthood, as one assumes a place within the social order and accepts its regulatory frameworks, barriers are erected in the form of education, upbringing, and acquired skills. Throughout the maturation process, in navigating errors and failures, an individual confronts and struggles against their primal urges, yet occasionally succumbs to temptation. Such failures may precipitate the emergence of psychopathologies including paranoia, hysteria, psychosis, or neurosis. The rational mind endeavors to repress and distance itself from socially unacceptable desires, relegating them to the depths of the subconscious. Nevertheless, within the domain of latent consciousness, these repressed impulses inevitably resurface, particularly under conditions of stress and depression.

Humans, like other mammals, have preserved certain traits of their distant evolutionary ancestors in the form of vestigial structures, such as the appendix, body hair, and other atavistic manifestations, including the rare birth of a child covered in dense hair. Nevertheless, the human brain stands apart; it possesses no vestigial structures. The brain serves as the supreme center of higher nervous activity. However, animalistic instincts persist, concealed within the depths of the human subconscious. It is not surprising that colloquial expressions persist, likening human traits to animals: “as venomous as a snake,” “playful like a monkey,” or “cunning like a fox,” among others.

The eminent psychiatrist Sigmund Freud asserted that in casting aside folk wisdom, one uncovers profound concepts concerning the hidden meanings embedded within words and actions. This insight stems from the recognition that the immense energies of the subconscious exert a powerful and untamed influence upon the human psyche. When the conscious mind proves incapable of withstanding this internal pressure, pathological conditions emerge, including neuroses, psychoses, and paranoid disorders. Freud emphasized that the individual is ensnared between "three tyrants": natural instincts, internal desires, and the conscience, which arises from rational thought. The repression of forbidden desires intensifies psychological tension and inner conflict, often culminating in the manifestation of mental illness. Consequently, the afflicted individual may develop cruelty, perceive themselves as a universal arbiter, exhibit narcissistic tendencies, and become utterly convinced of their own superiority over others. A striking illustration of these psychological dynamics can be seen

in the influence of exogenous factors on the character formation and mental states of Stalin and Hitler.

It becomes evident that, through observing the distinct psychological characteristics of Stalin and Hitler, many individuals representing influential social forces within Russia and Germany came to believe that these figures were uniquely capable of resolving the profound societal crises of their times. Thus, by analyzing and decoding the personality traits characteristic of the communist leader Stalin, one may advance toward a more accurate comprehension of the social and historical processes that shaped his era.

Content analysis of political leaders

As is well established, the role of the first person in the state constitutes a specific and decisive factor, simultaneously dominating all other elements, a reality particularly evident in our region.

Content analysis, derived from the English term meaning "text," is a methodological approach for uncovering the latent meanings concealed within written communications between diplomats or political leaders. Naturally, not every document qualifies as an object of content analysis. In true content analysis, documents are examined to discern the emotional states of the counterparts, the mechanisms underpinning their thought processes, and the intentions hidden behind their stated ideas. This methodological precision is indispensable in conducting proper content analysis. In recent times, this method has been extended beyond the study of texts to the analysis of spoken words during negotiations, giving rise to the practice known as content analysis of the speaking leader. The method achieves its greatest effect when the leader speaks extemporaneously, without reliance on pre-prepared materials drafted by aides. This technique allows for the revelation of the speaker's genuine opinions, intentions, and even character during interstate negotiations. However, to prevent such transparency, many leaders prefer to anchor their speeches on pre-prepared texts, thereby introducing additional complexity for experts engaged in content analysis. Consequently, it has become increasingly important for specialists to monitor the autonomous actions of political leaders in international relations, even when these steps are taken independently of domestic political pressures. This emergent methodology is referred to as content analysis of political steps based on the personal characteristics of political leaders. Thus, content analysis has evolved beyond its initial framework and acquired a new methodological dimension.



It must be emphasized that the fundamental mechanism driving faith in leaders across societies is the "phylogenetic, psychophysiological reflex of following the leader," one of the most distinctive features of human nature. It is this reflex that seeks out strong-willed individuals within societies. To the collective, such charismatic figures appear

uniquely capable of calmly navigating the harsh realities of crises and identifying viable solutions under complex conditions. The leader's distinctive role lies in swiftly transcending the zone of doubt that paralyzes others, thereby resolving issues with operational decisiveness. In this process, the broader public often comes to recognize its own political insignificance, and initial doubts are supplanted by admiration for the leader. Leaders of this caliber possess the extraordinary capacity to dispel the internal sense of hopelessness, and as though constructing a "non-ordinary" pathway, they achieve concrete results. They alone identify the sole logical exit from emergent crises. These actions serve as psychological anchor points, deepening the people's emotional attachment to their leader.

It is an incontestable fact that, in recent times, the future trajectory of our region has been significantly influenced by the evolving relationship between Russia and Turkey. This reality has manifested in the growing importance of the personal rapport between the leaders of these two states, R. T. Erdogan and V. V. Putin. These nations, endowed with rich natural resources, are further bolstered by the extraordinary industriousness, adaptability, and vitality of their peoples, positioning them among the most powerful states globally. It is no coincidence that analytical circles frequently note that as Turkey and Russia continue to augment their national power, they increasingly orient their strategic focus toward the Eurasian continent. However, this strategic expansion remains tempered by a careful balancing of the interests of the United States, Europe, and Russia, particularly in the diplomatic maneuvers of Turkey. Nonetheless, in recent years, the durable growth of Russian-Turkish relations has become markedly visible, particularly in the realms of trade and energy cooperation. The volume of trade turnover between the two nations continues to rise, drawing them ever closer and thereby amplifying their collective influence within the region. In a broader context, Russia and Turkey represent the cohabitation of the Slavic and Turkic ethnic spheres.

The historical trajectory of Russia is inextricably intertwined with the history of the Turkic peoples. Numerous Russian princes and nobles bear surnames of Turkic origin, illustrating the deep interconnection between Slavic and Turkic ethnic lineages. The vast geographic expanse stretching from Lake Baikal to the Black Sea has historically served as the principal cradle for both the Slavic and Turkic peoples. Over millennia, this region has nurtured both the martial prowess and the peaceful industriousness that continue to characterize the way of life among these groups.

Considering that the majority populations of the Caucasus, Iran, Central Asia, and Asia Minor—as well as significant autonomous regions within the Russian Federation—consist of Turkic-speaking peoples, the importance of examining Slavic-Turkic relations becomes abundantly clear. Yet, the current political elite of Iran resists acknowledging this geopolitical reality and persistently employs various mechanisms of influence in an attempt to alter the status quo. Tehran remains skeptical toward the regional powers—Russia, Turkey, and Israel—and pursues a cautious diplomatic strategy often referred to as the "Parvaz policy." Nonetheless, the most cautious actor remains Russia. Any interference that fails to account for Russia's strategic interests risks calling Iran's own regional position into question.

The Iranian state has not forgotten the historical precedents of the Republic of Gilan, established by Moscow in the 1920s, nor the South Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, which emerged under the leadership of Mir Jafar Baghirov.

In the early years of Azerbaijan's independence, Iran activated one of its strongest traditional instruments of influence—religious sentiment—and pursued a sectarian policy in the region. Initially, this strategy even began to yield certain results. However, due to a combination of various factors, this influence was ultimately neutralized, with the political leadership of Azerbaijan playing a decisive role. Another critical element was Iran's series of strategic errors in foreign policy. In particular, in 1992, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati signed a strategic cooperation agreement with Armenia, a country that was then engaged in an armed conflict with Azerbaijan.

In fact, Iran's sectarian policy had the potential to spark religious confrontation within Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, the tolerant worldview cultivated among the Azerbaijani people during the Soviet era, along with the firm will of the Azerbaijani state, prevented this pressure mechanism from taking root.

Iran's potential influence was further weakened by the proliferation of new religious sects among the broader believing population. Displeased with this turn of events, Iranian strategists began working on the development of alternative mechanisms of influence, which included:

1. Institutionalizing official propaganda through the distribution of donations and humanitarian aid to low-income segments of the Azerbaijani population.
2. Actively supporting the entrance of Iranian businessmen into the Azerbaijani economy.

3. Facilitating the influx of Iranian students into Azerbaijan, many of whom were associated with Iran's intelligence services.
4. Engaging in targeted work with Persian-speaking ethnic groups within Azerbaijan.
5. Initiating serious lobbying efforts in Baku, Moscow, and among the Caspian littoral states to alter the existing legal status of the Caspian Sea.

At the same time, new actors began to assert influence over the region—first Turkey, followed by the United States and Israel—creating a new, complex geopolitical configuration. This evolving situation compelled Iran to adjust its policy toward Azerbaijan. Iran now faced not only Azerbaijan itself, but also the world's leading powers. Consider, for instance: regarding the status of the Caspian Sea, Iran found itself confronting Russia, the United States, and Israel; concerning ethnic dynamics, it faced the growing influence of Turkey and the Turkish identity.

Thus, new mechanisms of influence began to take shape. Importantly, these new mechanisms were not a complete abandonment of the earlier strategies; rather, while the form remained largely unchanged, the content evolved. From this moment onward, Iran launched extensive efforts to cultivate ties with the Russian political elite. In parallel, it promoted the idea of Slavic unity, particularly among Persian-speaking states, as a counterweight to the emerging idea of Turkic-Slavic solidarity—thereby introducing a new vision of Eurasianism.

Serious financial resources were allocated to this strategy, and many Russian figures were drawn into its orbit. As a result, today, it is not uncommon to hear pro-Iranian narratives emerging not from Tehran itself, but from Moscow.

On the other hand, it must be emphasized that the major political processes occurring today across the Caspian-Black Sea region are unfolding "outside of the formal game," a development that represents the most troubling aspect of the current situation. When these processes are evaluated through the lens of Western-Russian relations, it becomes evident that they are, in fact, being deliberately provoked by Western strategists, particularly those from the United States.

Russia, facing increasing pressure, found itself cornered without viable alternatives. It had either to initiate self-destruction or to pursue the assertive policies it now follows—because, in reality, there was no third option.

Under current circumstances, it would be far more strategic for Russia to emphasize Slavic-Turkic cooperation. In truth, a new geopolitical structure could be constructed based on the shared geography of Turkic-speaking and Slavic peoples. A glance at the Eurasian landmass reveals that the overwhelming

majority of its population belongs to either Slavic or Turkic-speaking ethnic groups.

Within Russia itself, numerous autonomous republics are home to Turkic-speaking peoples. Adding to this, there is a significant Azerbaijani presence and a large influx of migrants from Central Asia. Indeed, when walking the streets of Moscow today, one frequently hears the voices of Uzbeks and Azerbaijanis.

Thus, it is increasingly clear that a new societal structure is beginning to take shape within Russia.

Socio-Psychological Preconditions for Promotion of a Leader

It should be emphasized that the fundamental trigger for elevating an individual to leadership within society is most often the activation of deep-rooted phylogenetic psychophysiological reflexes—the instinct to "follow the leader." Society instinctively seeks out individuals who embody these traits, believing that charismatic leaders will, even under extreme conditions, maintain the composure and clarity needed to navigate crises. At first glance, such dynamics may seem applicable only to totalitarian regimes or the mass psychology of imperial systems. However, historical evidence demonstrates that through the use of political technologies—by accurately diagnosing the psychological mood of society and manipulating these primal reflexes—a tyrant of an even more extreme type than those of traditional totalitarian systems can ascend to power. In any case, it remains society itself that produces its leaders.

Such a leader, guided by genius and intuition, can rapidly and accurately assess the political realities surrounding them. Their capacity to solve critical problems often leaves their hesitant inner circle far behind. In these moments, feelings of distrust, rivalry, or resentment among those close to the leader are often displaced by admiration for the leader's extraordinary foresight and decisiveness. Leaders of this kind are capable of breaking through deadlocks with bold, seemingly reckless actions that, under the prevailing circumstances, emerge as the only logical course of action.

The dynamics described above are clearly illustrated by the fierce struggle for power that erupted after the Russian Civil War. With Lenin gravely ill, an intense and ruthless battle for control of the Kremlin unfolded among the top Bolshevik leaders. Main contenders such as Stalin-Orjonikidze, Rykov-Bukharin, and Trotsky-Kamenev-Zinoviev clashed bitterly for supremacy. Similar power struggles played out in regional centers, where conflicts centered around key individuals.

Leon Trotsky, who had been elected Chairman of the Petrograd Revolutionary Council on September 23, 1917, played an instrumental role in the October Revolution: in the seizure of the Winter Palace, the establishment of the new Soviet state, and the orchestration of the armed uprising. After the revolution, Trotsky served as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, later assuming positions as Commissar of Railways and Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs. However, serious disagreements between Lenin and Trotsky began to surface during Trotsky's tenure overseeing military affairs.

The situation was complex: Lenin, after agreeing to cede Western Ukraine to Germany in order to withdraw Russia from World War I and the Entente, tasked Trotsky with negotiating a peace settlement. Trotsky, however, took an erroneous

stance by trying to continue the war during negotiations with the German delegation. Upon learning of this, Lenin promptly removed him from the negotiations. Nevertheless, Trotsky continued to occupy high military posts, heading the Revolutionary Military Council (RVS) and serving as Defense Commissar from 1918 to 1925.

By 1923, it became evident that Lenin's health was irreversibly declining. The race for power among the party elite intensified. Stalin, as General Secretary of the Communist Party, had by then consolidated control over the party apparatus, laying the foundation for an internal dictatorship.

On the night of December 15-16, 1922, Lenin's health took a drastic turn for the worse. Violations of his prescribed medical regimen, carried out by those close to him (including his own family), led to an extraordinary decision: on December 18, 1922, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) convened a plenum that officially entrusted Stalin with personal responsibility for ensuring Lenin's strict adherence to the doctors' recommendations.

Despite this decision, violations continued—primarily by Lenin's wife, Nadezhda Krupskaya. Instead of shielding Lenin from political stress, she transcribed a letter to Trotsky at Lenin's dictation on December 21. Shortly thereafter, on the night of December 22-23, Lenin's condition deteriorated sharply: paralysis struck his right hand and leg.

Enraged by this breach, Stalin telephoned Krupskaya that night, delivering a sharp reprimand and threatening to escalate the matter to the Party's Control Commission. Krupskaya defended herself by claiming she had obtained permission from the doctors. Stalin, well aware that the doctors could not have given such authorization without his approval—as stipulated by the Central Committee's decision—responded with intense outrage.

Krupskaya countered, asserting that as Lenin's wife, she knew better than any physician what was beneficial for him. "Moreover... I ask you not to interfere in our personal life!" she insisted. Stalin, furious, reportedly shouted back, "You may know what is permissible in bed, but this concerns the interests of the Party, and the Party's interests are paramount to me!" According to some accounts, Stalin ended the conversation even more crudely, declaring, "Sleeping with the leader does not give you ownership over him. Lenin belongs not only to you but to the Party—and first and foremost to the Party!" Molotov's version of events reports an even cruder outburst: "Just because you share the same toilet with the leader doesn't mean..." and so forth.

According to Lenin's sister, Maria Ulyanova, "N.K. was deeply upset by the conversation; she was completely unlike herself, crying and rolling on the floor." It should be noted that at this time, Krupskaya was already 53 years old. The fallout was inevitable: the offended Krupskaya appealed to Politburo members

Zinoviev and Kamenev, seeking their protection against Stalin's "coarse interference in her personal life" and his "offensive insults and threats." However, not long after—or perhaps even during the same period—Stalin suggested that they "forget what was said," and Krupskaya agreed.

And what about Lenin? Lenin issued an ultimatum demanding to be allowed to work. After a meeting between Stalin, Kamenev, and Bukharin with the doctors, a decision was made: Lenin would be allowed to dictate for 5-10 minutes daily, but "neither friends nor relatives should inform Vladimir Ilyich about any political events, so as not to give him material to think about or worry over."

Thus, in response to her complaint, Krupskaya received from Kamenev a commission decision that supported Stalin.

Meanwhile, on December 23, Lenin began dictating the first part of his "Letter to the Congress" and sent it to Stalin the same day. At this point, it was purely a political document, with no mention of Stalin's personality. However, news of the conflict between Stalin and Krupskaya apparently reached Lenin rather quickly, likely through his wife. The more he learned, the worse his attitude toward Stalin became. On December 24-25, Lenin dictated the second part of the "Letter to the Congress," which, alongside farsighted political recommendations, also included personal motives.

On January 4, 1923, Lenin dictated the following "Addition to the letter from December 24, 1922": "Stalin is too rude, and this defect, though tolerable in our environment and in relationships between us, Communists, becomes intolerable in the position of General Secretary. Therefore, I propose that comrades consider removing Stalin from this position and appointing someone else."

A notable detail: in Lenin's assessment from December 24, 1922, Stalin was one of the "two outstanding leaders of the current Central Committee," but just 10 days later, Lenin suggested his... "removal."

Lenin learned the full truth about the "telephone war" (including the complaint against Stalin) in early March 1923. The fact that his wife's complaint had taken the form of a document evidently played a significant role in accelerating his death. Lenin had good reason to believe that Zinoviev and Kamenev, to whom the complaint was addressed, were not good at keeping secrets. Forced to defend himself in the eyes of others, Lenin wrote the following letter:

"To Comrade Stalin. Strictly confidential. A copy to Comrades Kamenev and Zinoviev. Dear Comrade Stalin, You were rude enough to call my wife to the telephone and scold her. Although she agreed to forget what was said, this fact became known through her to Zinoviev and Kamenev. I do not intend to forget so easily what was done against me, and needless to say, what was done against my wife I consider done against me. Therefore, I ask you to consider whether you

are willing to retract what was said and apologize, or if you prefer to break off relations between us. March 5, 1923. Respectfully, Lenin."

This letter was clearly written so that Lenin's uncompromising stance in defending his family's honor would be known, first and foremost, to Kamenev and Zinoviev. Since the apology to Krupskaya had already taken place, Lenin was now demanding an apology primarily for himself.

While dictating this truly dueling letter, Lenin, according to the recollections of his secretary on duty, Volodicheva, "asked to postpone it, saying that today it wasn't turning out well for him. He was feeling 'unwell.'" The next day, March 6, he read it again and "asked to personally deliver it by hand and receive a response." At the same time, "He was feeling worse."

What a situation! Going through all the details of the conflict between Krupskaya and Stalin, Lenin struggles to dictate his contradictory letter. Yet his brain, weakened by illness, still senses that something is not right, that something hasn't been fully disclosed to him.

Nevertheless, the next day, feeling even worse, Lenin sends the letter and starts waiting for a response. An hour passes, two hours, three, a whole day... and no reply. Lenin starts to noticeably get anxious, his condition deteriorates sharply, and still no response! So... everything must be true: Stalin is exactly how Krupskaya described him.

But in reality? In reality, it was Krupskaya who deliberately delayed delivering the letter to Stalin. According to Volodicheva's recollections, "Nadezhda Konstantinovna asked not to send the letter to Stalin, and that was done on the 6th. But on the 7th, I said that I had to follow Vladimir Ilyich's instructions. She spoke with Kamenev, and the letter was handed to Stalin and Kamenev, and then to Zinoviev as well..." Krupskaya understood that once Stalin received such a letter, he would once again realize that she had deceived him, as she had promised him to "forget what had been said" but didn't keep her word. On the contrary, she had told everything to Ilyich, further damaging his health.

It was only on March 7 that Stalin received Lenin's letter and immediately, as Volodicheva emphasizes, dictated a response with apologies. But it was too late: Lenin was already too ill to read it. During those days, new, irreversible attacks of illness occurred, including the loss of speech. Ten and a half months later, on January 21, 1924, without regaining his cognitive abilities, Lenin would pass away.

Lenin's death was explained by various causes—brain haemorrhage, stroke, atherosclerosis, and, finally, syphilis. Diagnosing syphilis "from a distance" is not simple, as its symptoms are typical of other diseases as well. No wonder syphilis is called the "great imitator." This disease is marked by high fever, rash, and general malaise. Following its initial stage, it is characterized by cycles of attacks,

followed by periods of apparent full recovery. These attacks include severe headaches, nervous disorders, and gastric pain. In the later stages, patients experience pronounced mood swings—periods of intense creative activity followed by episodes of depression, lethargy, and dementia. Damage to the circulatory system can lead to paralysis, stroke, or aneurysm. Prior to the invention of penicillin during World War II, syphilis was considered incurable. Lenin's illness seemed to “mimic” the progression of syphilis: months of unexpected convulsions and severe headaches, nausea, insomnia, and partial paralysis. Periods of heightened activity alternated with phases of decline and disability. At times, Lenin lost the ability to speak and required assistance to move. According to Robert Service, a professor of Russian history at Oxford University and author of *Lenin: A Biography*, Vladimir Ilyich twice requested to be given a fatal poison.

Deborah Hayden, the author of *Pox: Genius, Madness, and the Mysteries of Syphilis*, remarked, “Several of Lenin's biographers have noted that the doctors treating him suspected syphilis.” Hayden points out that she was “impressed” by the evidence presented by medical specialists who studied Lenin's condition. She specifically highlights the use of salvarsan—a drug used in the treatment of syphilis. Before the advent of penicillin, salvarsan was the primary treatment for syphilis. This drug was potent but carried severe side effects. Therefore, Hayden concludes that Lenin likely would not have been administered salvarsan unless he had been suffering from syphilis.

Hayden further explains that syphilitics do not invariably descend into complete dementia and often experience periods of intense creative output, even shortly before death. The mystery surrounding the condition of Lenin's brain remains locked within the walls of the Brain Institute in Moscow—A.M. After Lenin's death, the Institute sought to demonstrate that the brains of the leaders of communist society represented the “highest stage of human evolution,” and thus collected the brains of individuals such as Kirov, Kalinin, Gorky, Mayakovsky, Eisenstein, Michurin, and many others. Stalin's brain, too, was included in this collection and studied with the same rigor as his predecessor's. Room No. 19 of the Brain Institute, where this collection is housed, remained one of the most secretive locations in Russia for years.

In 1924, the 13th Party Conference passed a resolution condemning the “Bourgeois Principles of Certain Party Members and the Results of Discussions,” which targeted Trotsky and his supporters. Unable to accept such a defeat, Trotsky's failure became evident, and in response, Kamenev and Zinoviev aligned themselves with Stalin. Stalin, aware of the hidden motives of Zinoviev and Kamenev, nonetheless recognized his need for their support.

That same year, Trotsky's works *Lessons of October* and *On Lenin* were

published, both aimed directly at Stalin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev. In retaliation, Kamenev authored a book titled *Trotskyism and Leninism*, in which he harshly denounced Trotsky. A fierce and uncompromising struggle ensued between the factions, with both sides using any means necessary to discredit one another. Stalin's supporters took to publishing Trotsky's earlier insulting remarks about Lenin, made when Trotsky was young, long before the revolution. This caused Trotsky's standing among his fellow communists to rapidly deteriorate, placing his political career in jeopardy. At this point, Stalin still had to consider the positions of Kamenev and Zinoviev.

In response, Trotsky declared, "The political line of ignorant and shameless scribblers must be swept away like trash, precisely in the interests of the victory of the workers' state." He argued that those who sought to eliminate this "trash" were not defeatists but rather the true defenders of revolutionary values: "Ideological trash does not bring victory!" Stalin, in his speech on August 1st, interpreted Trotsky's statements as follows: "What is this 'trash'? It turns out it's the majority of the party, the majority of the Central Committee, the majority of the government. So, it turns out that when the enemy is 80 kilometers from the Kremlin, this operetta will be concerned not with defending the USSR, but with overthrowing the current party majority. And he calls that defense!"

On May 24th, at the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) Plenum session, Stalin remarked: "I must say, comrades, that Trotsky has chosen a very inappropriate moment for his attacks on the party and the Comintern. I just received news that the British Conservative government has decided to break off relations with the USSR. There's no need to explain that now there will be a widespread campaign against communists. This campaign has already begun. Some threaten the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) [CPSU(b)] with war and intervention, while others threaten with a split. Something like a united front is forming, from Chamberlain to Trotsky." Speaking at a joint meeting of the ECCI presidium on September 27, 1927, Stalin declared: "The opposition is now faced with a choice: either the Comintern and the CPSU(b), or... renegades from an illegal anti-party printing press. You can't waver between these two camps. It's time to make a choice. Either with the Comintern and the CPSU(b) and then—war... against all kinds of renegades. Or against the CPSU(b) and the Comintern, and then—off you go... to join all kinds of renegades and degenerates, to the likes of Shcherbakov and other scum." Stalin's arguments found resonance among other speakers, and after a brief discussion, Trotsky was expelled from the Comintern Executive Committee.

On October 21-23, 1927, a joint Plenum session of the Central Committee (CC) and the Central Control Commission (CCC) of the CPSU(b) once again addressed the issue of the opposition, with Stalin actively participating in the debate. He

remarked: “You’ve heard here how tirelessly the opposition members curse Stalin, sparing no effort. This doesn’t surprise me, comrades. The fact that the main attacks are directed against Stalin is because Stalin perhaps knows better than some of our comrades all the tricks of the opposition, and it’s not so easy to deceive him, so they focus their attacks on Stalin. Well, let them curse to their heart’s content.”

Stalin once again addressed Lenin’s “Letter to the Congress,” specifically Lenin’s remark that “Stalin is too rude...” etc., effectively rejecting Lenin’s criticism. Stalin responded: “Yes, I am rude, comrades, but I am so to those who crudely and treacherously destroy the party.” He reminded his audience of Trotsky’s opposition to Lenin prior to 1917 and Trotsky’s stance on the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty, rhetorically asking: “Perhaps Stalin’s rudeness is the cause of this? Or what does Stalin’s rudeness have to do with it?”

On October 23, 1927, Stalin declared: “We are not at war, despite the repeated predictions of Zinoviev and others. And how many times have we heard such prophecies of war! Zinoviev predicted war would come in the spring of this year. Then, he started predicting that war would most likely begin in the fall. Yet here we are, approaching winter, and there is still no war.”

Stalin asserted that the easing of international tensions was largely due to the efforts of the Soviet Union. Tensions with France had been mitigated following negotiations with the USSR regarding partial compensation for tsarist debts. In 1927, non-aggression pacts were signed with both Latvia and Iran, countries bordering the USSR.

The Soviet Union played an active role in drafting disarmament agreements, and by the end of 1927, the Soviet delegation to these talks presented a declaration on the basic principles of general and complete disarmament.

In 1927, Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Trotsky sought to introduce the issue of intra-party democracy. Having inadvertently played into Stalin’s hands by contributing to Trotsky’s expulsion from the party, they were unaware that they had just rendered Stalin an invaluable service.

On October 17, following the jubilee session of the Central Executive Committee (CEC), a celebratory demonstration was held to mark the 10th anniversary of the revolution. As the demonstrators passed the platform where the country’s leadership stood, they suddenly noticed an open truck carrying Trotsky, Zinoviev, and other opposition leaders. According to Isaac Deutscher, the demonstrators “recognized the two opposition leaders and stopped.” Some waved their hats and scarves, and Deutscher observed that “the behavior of the crowd standing before Trotsky and Zinoviev was ambiguous.” Curiosity appeared to be the dominant reaction, though Deutscher noted that “the opposition leaders misinterpreted the mood of the demonstrators,” believing that the masses were rallying to their cause.

Consequently, at the October Plenum of the Central Committee (CC) and Central

Control Commission (CCC), Trotsky declared that the working class of Leningrad was dissatisfied with the increasing bureaucracy and repression. The opposition began to prepare counter-demonstrations in Moscow and Leningrad, with slogans such as "Fulfill Lenin's legacy" and "Turn fire to the right—against the kulak, NEPman, bureaucrat." However, the opposition's attempts to sway the demonstrators were foiled by active interventions from the Moscow Party Committee and district party committees. It quickly became apparent that the "working masses" did not support the opposition. The counter-demonstrations degenerated into a series of scandals, marked by physical altercations, scuffles, and objects being hurled between the factions.

On November 14, 1927, during a joint meeting of the CC and CCC, following a discussion of the events of November 7, a decision was made to expel Trotsky and Zinoviev from the party, and to remove other key opposition figures from the CC and CCC. The 15th Party Congress, held in December 1927, ratified the CC and CCC's decision regarding Trotsky and Zinoviev, and also expelled 75 more prominent opposition members from the party, including Kamenev, Pyatakov, Radek, Rakovsky, Safarov, Smilga, Smirnov, Sapronov, and Laskhevich. Speaking at the congress, Stalin remarked that the leadership had shown leniency: "According to the rules, for such actions by the active members of the opposition, we should have arrested them on November 7th (voices: 'Correct!' Prolonged applause), but we refrained!"

In 1928, Trotsky was exiled from Moscow to Alma-Ata. By 1929, a decision was made to send him abroad. Under an agreement with Turkey, Trotsky was brought to Odessa, and from there, aboard the steamer *Ilyich*, to Prinkipo Island in the Sea of Marmara.

Throughout his time in the party, Stalin repeatedly raised the issue of his resignation from the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee. This matter was first discussed at the 13th Party Congress in May 1924, in connection with Lenin's well-known letter from December 25, 1922, which suggested that "consideration should be given to removing Stalin from the post of General Secretary." However, all delegations at the congress unanimously voted to retain Stalin as General Secretary.

Nonetheless, at the first Plenum of the CC following the 12th Congress, Stalin officially submitted his resignation. On this occasion as well, the Plenum unanimously rejected his request. The issue of Stalin's resignation was raised again during a joint Plenum of the CC and CCC on July 22, 1926, when Lenin's letter was revisited. Less than six months later, on December 27, 1926, Stalin once again submitted a resignation request to the CC Plenum.

The next similar request occurred at the first Plenum of the Central Committee (CC) after the 15th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on December 19, 1927. At that time, Stalin supported his request with a proposal to abolish the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee altogether. The stenographic report of the discussion that took place at the Plenum is as follows:

Kosior: (Secretary of the CC from 1926 to 1928); It is proposed to keep the Secretariat in its current composition: Stalin, Molotov, Uglanov, Kosior, and Kubiak.

Voice: What about the General Secretary?

Kosior: To keep Stalin as General Secretary.

Voices: Correct!

Rykov: Are there any other proposals? Comrade Stalin has the floor.

Stalin: Comrades! For three years now, I have been asking the CC to relieve me of the duties of General Secretary of the CC. Each time, the Plenum has refused. I admit that until recently, conditions required the party to have someone more or less tough in this post, someone to act as a counterbalance to the dangers posed by the opposition. I admit that despite Comrade Lenin's letter, there was a need to retain me as General Secretary. But now, those conditions no longer exist. The opposition has been crushed and expelled from the party. Therefore, the reasons that once justified the Plenum's refusal to relieve me are no longer valid. Meanwhile, we have Lenin's instruction, which we cannot ignore and must follow. I admit that the party was forced to bypass this instruction until now due to certain conditions in intra-party development. But I repeat, these special conditions no longer exist, and it is time to implement Comrade Lenin's instruction. Thus, I ask the Plenum to relieve me of the post of General Secretary of the CC. I assure you, comrades, that the party will only benefit from this.

Dogadov: (A member of the Presidium and secretary of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions from 1921 to 1929, representative of the Trade Union Council in the Council of Labor and Defense of the USSR). Let's vote without debate.

Voroshilov: I propose rejecting the statement we have just heard.

Rykov: Let's vote without debate. The proposal of Comrade Kosior is put forward. Who is in favor of this proposal? Who is against? Who abstains? One abstention. Comrade Stalin's proposal has been rejected by everyone except one abstention.

Stalin: Then I submit another proposal. Perhaps the CC will consider it advisable to abolish the position of General Secretary. There were times in the history of our party when we didn't have such a position.

Voroshilov: Back then, we had Lenin.

Stalin: Until the 11th Congress, we didn't have the position of General Secretary.

Voice: Until the 11th Congress.

Stalin: Yes, it seems, until the 11th Congress we didn't have this position. That was before Lenin stepped away from active work. If Lenin decided to raise the question of establishing the position of General Secretary, I believe he was guided by those special circumstances that arose after the 10th Congress when a strong and organized opposition emerged within the party. But now those conditions no longer exist, as the opposition has been thoroughly defeated. Therefore, we could consider abolishing this position. Many associate the position of General Secretary with special privileges. Based on my work experience, and the comrades will confirm this, I can say that the General Secretary has no special privileges that distinguish them from the other members of the Secretariat, nor should they.

Voice: What about the responsibilities?

Stalin: And there are no more responsibilities than those of the other members of the Secretariat. I believe this: we have the Politburo—the highest body of the CC; we have the Secretariat—a five-person executive body, and all five members of the Secretariat are equal. In practice, that's how the work was done, and no special privileges or responsibilities have ever been associated with the General Secretary. There has never been a case where the General Secretary gave any orders independently, without the sanction of the Secretariat. It turns out that the position of General Secretary, in the sense of special privileges, didn't exist in reality—it was just a title, called the Secretariat of the CC. I don't see any reason to keep this dead institution. Not to mention that this position, the title of General Secretary, has led to various distortions at the local level. While at the top, no special privileges or responsibilities have been tied to the position of General Secretary, at the local level there have been certain distortions, and now there's a power struggle over this position among comrades called secretaries, for example, in the national Central Committees. There are now quite a few General Secretaries, and at the local level, they are associated with special privileges. Why do we need this?

Schmidt: (People's Commissar of Labor of the USSR from 1923 to 1928): It can be abolished at the local level.

Stalin: I think the party would benefit from abolishing the position of General Secretary, and it would allow me to be relieved of this post. This is even easier because the party's charter does not include the position of General Secretary.

Rykov: I propose not allowing Comrade Stalin to resign from this post. As for General Secretaries in the regions and local bodies, this needs to be changed without changing the situation in the Central Committee. The position of General Secretary was created on the proposal of Vladimir Ilyich. Throughout all this

time, both during Vladimir Ilyich's life and after him, it has proven itself fully and completely, both organizationally and politically. The entire opposition, including those we've just expelled from the party, participated in the creation of this position and in appointing Comrade Stalin as General Secretary. Thus, the issue of the "testament" has been fully and completely resolved by the opposition at that time, just as we resolved it. The whole party knows this. What has changed after the 15th Congress, and why should we abolish the position of General Secretary?

Stalin: The opposition has been defeated.

Rykov: Yes, the opposition was defeated thanks to the good work of the party, thanks to the work of the Central Committee.

Voice: Correct!

Rykov: Is there any reason to undermine this work after all the successes we achieved by the 15th Congress? Is there any reason to spoil it in such a way that it would be seen as a concession to the completely defeated opposition—a concession that has no grounds whatsoever, on an issue where the whole party has demonstrated complete unity, and where the opposition showed the greatest hypocrisy, malice, and desire to deceive the party? Since the position of General Secretary and Comrade Stalin's work in this role have been fully justified throughout our organizational and political life, both during Lenin's time and after Lenin's death—justified 100%—there are no arguments for changing this now. Comrade Stalin is right in one thing: the work of the Secretariat, Politburo, and Orgburo has been completely collegial, and everything has been done under the collective responsibility of all. This is undoubtedly true, but still, Comrade Stalin's responsibility for the Secretariat is somewhat greater than that of the other members of the Secretariat—that is perfectly clear, and this responsibility should remain with him.

Voice: Correct.

Rykov: I propose rejecting Comrade Stalin's proposal.

Voices: Correct, let's vote!

Rykov: There's a proposal to vote.

Voices: Yes, yes!

Rykov: Voting is taking place. Who is in favor of Comrade Stalin's proposal to abolish the position of General Secretary? Who is against it? Who abstains? No one.

Stalin: Comrades, during the first vote regarding my release from the duties of General Secretary, I didn't vote, I forgot to vote. Please count my vote as against.

This excerpt is taken from the archival "Stenographic Report of the First Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the 15th Congress on December 19, 1927." It seems relevant to add to the quoted passage that, despite the decision made, Stalin was not formally confirmed in the position of General Secretary after the 17th (1934), 18th (1939), and 19th (1952) Party Congresses. Thus, after 1934, the institution of the General Secretary effectively ceased to exist. Although Stalin continued to be elected to the highest party positions throughout these years, and shortly before the outbreak of war, in May 1941, he also became Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, he made no further statements about resignation.

The position of General Secretary of the Central Committee was reinstated only in 1966, at the suggestion of the then First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, Mzhavanadze. The Plenary of the Central Committee, which took place on April 8, 1966, after the 23rd Party Congress, elected L.I. Brezhnev as General Secretary.

By the end of the 1920s, the second phase of Stalin's neutralization of his opponents began.

At the November Plenary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1928, A.I. Rykov, M.A. Tomsy, and N.I. Bukharin were labeled as "right-wing deviationists." The Plenary exposed this group. Bukharin did not admit his mistake, while Rykov understood his error and declared that no deviation could exist in the party line. Rykov, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee since 1922, was elected Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on February 2, 1924, after Lenin's death. Simultaneously, he held the position of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). After Lenin's death, he initially fought against Trotsky and then against Kamenev and Zinoviev, along with Stalin.

At the 15th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Rykov, in his speech, stated:

"I gave Comrade Stalin a 'broom' so he could sweep away our enemies with this 'broom.'" However, in 1928-1929, during the period of collectivization, Rykov and Stalin experienced significant disagreements, leading Rykov's position to align with that of Bukharin and Kamenev. N.I. Bukharin, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee at the time, opposed collectivization in 1928, advocating for the development of private peasant farms. On September 30, 1928, his article *Notes of an Economist* was published. In the agricultural sector, Bukharin criticized the new methods of farming, referring to them as an "adventurist approach." Even in a Politburo meeting, Bukharin described Stalin as an "Eastern despot."

On November 17, 1929, Bukharin was expelled from the Politburo. This forced him to acknowledge his mistakes, but his admission did not alter his fate. Similarly, Tomsy was removed from all positions. On December 9, 1930, Rykov was relieved of his duties as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, and on December 21, he was also removed from the Politburo. On January 30, 1931, Rykov was appointed People's Commissar of Posts and Telegraphs, and Bukharin was appointed to the board of the People's Commissariat for Heavy Industry. Stalin's two primary objectives in these appointments were as follows: Firstly, following the defeat of Trotsky, Stalin sought to eliminate the Kamenev-Zinoviev faction. He did not want the Bukharin-Rykov-Tomsy group and their supporters to align with Kamenev-Zinoviev's faction. Secondly, by splitting these factions, Stalin aimed to systematically neutralize them.

During this period, Rykov, Bukharin, Tomsy, and their supporters gradually shifted their stance to support Stalin. In fact, Stalin even appointed Bukharin as editor-in-chief of the *Izvestia* newspaper. Rykov believed that, due to his historical role in the revolution, he would eventually be re-elected to the Politburo, recalling a 1917 incident when he had requested to resign from both the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee, later withdrawing the resignation after an agreement with Lenin. Unfortunately, Rykov failed to recognize that Stalin was not Lenin.

In 1932, several prominent Soviet figures—A.P. Smirnov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and member of the board of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR, N.B. Eismont, People's Commissar of Supply of the USSR, and V.N. Tolmachev, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR—discussed the possibility of removing Stalin and his closest associates from leadership.

A memorandum criticizing Stalin's policies circulated among the higher echelons of power. The authors of this memorandum were candidates for Politburo membership: S.I. Syrtsov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, and V.V. Lominadze, First Secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the Party. Isaac Deutscher suggested that Syrtsov and Lominadze were pushing for Stalin's removal from power. Had they succeeded, it is likely that Syrtsov, Lominadze, Eismont, Tolmachev, and Smirnov would have sought to remove many others, particularly Stalin's most loyal supporters, such as Molotov, Kaganovich, and Voroshilov.

On the opening day of the 17th Party Congress, *Pravda* published the following statement: "In the fiercest battles against the Trotskyists and their allies—Kamenev, Zinoviev, and the right opposition led by Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsy, against the right-left bloc of Syrtsov-Lominadze, and the counter-

revolutionary remnants of the opposition—Uglanov, Maretsky, Slepko, Ryutin, Eismont, Smirnov—the Party forged Leninist unity of will and action."

In response to these sentiments, Trotsky addressed an open letter to Party workers in March 1933, asserting: "Stalin's strength has always resided in the apparatus, not in himself... Separated from the apparatus, Stalin is nothing... It is time to rid ourselves of the Stalin myth... Stalin has led you into a dead end... The time has come to reexamine the entire Soviet system and mercilessly cleanse it of all the filth that has accumulated. The time has come to implement Lenin's last and urgent command: 'Remove Stalin!'" He further emphasized, "There are no normal constitutional means left to remove the ruling clique. Only force can compel the bureaucracy to transfer power into the hands of the proletarian vanguard."

During the joint Plenary of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on January 7, 1933, Stalin stated that during the Five-Year Plan, completed in four years, the volume of industrial production had tripled compared to pre-war levels and had more than doubled compared to 1928 levels. By the end of 1932, the USSR's industrial production had reached 334% of pre-war levels, while in the same period, industrial production in the United States had decreased to 84% of pre-war levels, in England to 75%, in Germany to 62%. Meanwhile, industrial production in the USSR had increased to 219% of the 1928 level by the end of 1932, while in the United States it had decreased to 56%, in England to 80%, in Germany to 55%, and in Poland to 54%.

Speaking on Red Square, Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), S.M. Kirov, referred to Stalin as a "glorious, granite Leninist," the "best," and a "glorious, unyielding, great leader and strategist." Such excessive praise for Stalin was also evident in the repentant speeches of several former oppositionists who were given the floor, including A.I. Rykov, M.P. Tomsky, L.B. Kamenev, K.B. Radek, E.A. Preobrazhensky, V.V. Lominadze, and others. N.I. Bukharin referred to Stalin as the "field marshal of the world revolution."

Stalin exploited the assassination of Kirov as a pretext to eliminate many individuals. In 1934, Kamenev and Zinoviev were arrested, and in 1936, a public trial was held against them. During the trial, Zinoviev and his supporters began testifying against Rykov and Bukharin, accusing them of involvement in a military coup plot.

In Trotsky's Harvard archive, a letter written in Kamenev's hand discusses the necessity of changing the system by overthrowing Stalin. A transcript of a conversation between Kamenev and Bukharin is included: Kamenev: "What

forces do you have?" Bukharin: "Rykov plus Tomsy, plus Uglanov, plus me. All the Petrograders are with us. But they hesitate to remove Stalin from power."

After Kamenev and Zinoviev's arrest in 1934, Rykov was demoted to the position of a candidate member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), thereby being removed from the leadership of the country.

In 1934, following the rise of various opposition factions, the underground organization "Klyubok" (Tangle) was formed with the objective of seizing power from Stalin. They successfully swayed some military leaders to their side. According to their plan, Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, and Yezhov were to be arrested. Subsequently, a plenary session of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) would be convened, and leadership would be transferred to a member of the military.

After the arrest of members of this organization, including Yenukidze and Peterson, they revealed that the generals—heroes of the Civil War, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense M.I. Tukhachevsky and Military Attaché in London V.K. Putna—were supposed to take power.

Stalin became aware of rumors about the planned coup and, to disrupt the connections between the members of the organization, he appointed them to different administrative positions across various regions of the country. Stalin anticipated that the organization would disband on its own, but the members of "Klyubok" managed to maintain their connections. On June 2, 1937, a large meeting was held at the People's Commissariat of Defense with Stalin's participation. During his speech, K.E. Voroshilov named the military leaders involved in the coup plot—Tukhachevsky, Putna, Kork, Yakir, and Uborevich—and informed the meeting of their arrest. A few days prior to the plenary session, Stalin had already neutralized his opponents.

Having lost trust in the army, Stalin began to rely entirely on the NKVD. To gain full control of the NKVD, he had long been eyeing his fellow compatriot, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria. Stalin did not fully trust the NKVD chairman, Yezhov, and gradually expanded Beria's influence within the organization.

At the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on June 23, 1937, all participants unanimously agreed to identify and punish the traitors of the Soviet state and government. Despite Stalin's request to avoid excessive repression, he personally led the repressive actions. The participants of the plenum supported Stalin's leadership to protect the state. With this backing, Stalin simultaneously eliminated his personal enemies, replaced old

cadres with more loyal and capable individuals, accelerated military-industrial development, and ensured the country's economic growth.

In 1937, the majority of the participants at the plenum condemned Bukharin and Rykov for violating party discipline, engaging in sabotage, and deviating from the party line as dictated by Stalin.

During his speech at the plenum, Bukharin sharply criticized Stalin, Molotov, and Ordzhonikidze. Bukharin's supporters, along with the Rykovites, remained silent in the hall. Later, at a closed session of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), these groups admitted that they had received instructions from Rykov and Bukharin to overthrow Stalin by force.

Before this plenum, on February 24, Bukharin and Rykov had already been isolated at a Central Committee session. At the plenum, A.I. Mikoyan delivered an extensive speech condemning Bukharin and Rykov.

On February 27, 1937, a commission was established at the plenum. In the protocol, despite Stalin's proposal to expel them from the party and put them on trial, it was stated: "Of the 20 members of the commission, Yezhov, Budyonny, Manuilsky, and Shvernik proposed that Bukharin and Rykov be sentenced to the highest measure of punishment—execution." The other members of the commission voted for expulsion from the party and trial. In a politically astute move, Mikoyan recorded in the protocol: "Send Bukharin and Rykov to the NKVD." This implied not a trial, but immediate execution.

After Stalin intervened, an open trial was held for Rykov and Bukharin. During the trial, both Rykov and Bukharin confessed to their involvement in the right-wing deviation and to the existence of an anti-Soviet bloc. In his final statement, Rykov declared: "Whoever has not yet been exposed, help the state by changing your position. Those with weapons who are ready to fight against the state, surrender your weapons and turn yourselves in."

Bukharin, in his final statement, stated: "There is no limit to my terrible crimes."

It is noteworthy that investigators questioned Rykov about his connections. Rykov provided a list of his associates, including mention of Gazanfar Musabekov in the Caucasus. This led to the involvement of additional officials in the investigation. During the interrogation, Musabekov revealed his close ties with Ruhulla Akhundov, thus broadening the circle of suspects. It should be emphasized that Akhundov, according to his personal questionnaire, was listed as a "Social Revolutionary" (SR).

During the interrogations, the ousted People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, Yagoda, was forced to play the same role he once had when sitting on the other side of the interrogation table. Below are the testimonies he signed:

"In 1931, our counter-revolutionary organization adopted a course of terror and the organization of kulak uprisings. Naturally, as a member of this organization, I fully shared these positions and must be held accountable for this.

I also confirm my previous testimony about my participation in the assassination of S.M. Kirov. I knew in advance about the preparation of Kirov's murder, as it had been decided by the center of the conspiracy. I learned this from Yenukidze (Avel Safronovich Yenukidze – Secretary of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR – A.M.). Yenukidze suggested that I not interfere with the organization of this terrorist act, and I agreed. For this purpose, I summoned Zaporozhets from Leningrad, to whom I gave instructions not to obstruct the planned assassination of S.M. Kirov. After Kirov's murder, I attempted to 'hush up' the investigation of the case, but N.I. Yezhov, acting on behalf of the Central Committee, hindered my efforts by maintaining strict control over the investigation of Kirov's assassination.

I confirm that I was informed by Karakhan (Lev Mikhailovich Karakhan – Deputy People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs – A.M.) about the negotiations he was conducting on behalf of the bloc with German fascist circles. I am also aware that the Right-Trotskyist bloc gave its consent and promise to make territorial concessions to Germany after the bloc came to power.

I must add that the accelerated death of Gorky, i.e., his actual murder through deliberately improper medical treatment, was organized by me on the orders of the bloc's center, conveyed to me by Yenukidze. This decision was prompted by the fact that Gorky was known as an active supporter of the Central Committee's policies and a close friend of Stalin. I have no complaints or objections. The protocol has been read to me, and it is recorded correctly."

After the public execution of Bukharin and Rykov, a military tribunal was convened for the commanders of the Red Army, led by Marshal Tukhachevsky. They were all accused of treason. On June 11, they were sentenced to execution.

On the same day, newspapers reported that the organs of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs had exposed a military-fascist organization operating within the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. The organization included Marshal of the Soviet Union M. Tukhachevsky, Commanders of the First Rank I. Yakir, I. Uborevich, Commander of the Second Rank A. Kork, Corps Commanders V. Primakov, V. Putna, B. Feldman, and R. Eideman. The day after the sentencing, the condemned were executed in the basements of the building on

Nikolskaya Street, where the military collegium of the Supreme Court held its session.

The wives of Tukhachevsky and Uborevich—Nina Evgenyevna Tukhachevskaya and Nina Vladimirovna Uborevich—were arrested in 1937 and sentenced to eight years in labor camps as family members of traitors to the Motherland. On October 16, 1941, during the panic in Moscow when it seemed the capital could not be held, they were executed.

V.M. Molotov commented: "Tukhachevsky was a very dangerous military conspirator, whom we caught at the last moment. If we hadn't caught him, it would have been very dangerous... Until 1935, he was cautious and hesitated, but starting from the second half of 1936, he began to rush with the coup." In a 1970 conversation with F. Chuev, Molotov stated: "The year 1937 was necessary... We owe 1937 the fact that we did not have a fifth column during the war. Even among the Bolsheviks, there were and are those who are good and loyal when everything is going well, when the country and the party are not in danger. But if something were to start, they would waver and defect. I do not believe that the rehabilitation of many military personnel repressed in 1937 was correct. The documents are still hidden, but clarity will be brought in time." Justifying the brutal repressions, Molotov repeatedly stated: "Everything was stretched to the limit, and during this period, it was necessary to act mercilessly. I believe it was justified."

In his letter to the Party Control Commission, established in 1988 by the decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L.M. Kaganovich, in response to accusations of his involvement in the 1937-1938 repressions, wrote: "Similar mistakes were made, for example, by Khrushchev. After all, most of the leading workers, members of the Moscow Party Committee Bureau, district committees, and the Moscow Soviet, who worked and thrived under my leadership when I was the secretary of the Moscow Committee, were arrested under Khrushchev's leadership of the Moscow Committee. Or, for example, comrades Mikoyan and Shvernik. They too sent letters to the Ministry of State Security agreeing to the arrest not just of leading workers, but also of members of the Collegium and their deputies, and sometimes not just agreeing, but even requesting arrests, considering the materials from the MGB, accusing them."

The scale of the repressions expanded. After neutralizing his most ardent opponents, Stalin finally turned his attention to Orjonikidze and his supporters. During this time, under NKVD Order No. 00447, dated August 5, 1937, the scale of the repressions in the Soviet Union reached unprecedented levels. In 1937, Stalin's full and characteristic image emerged. Destroying all his political opponents, he did not stop, because during these years, he had developed reflexes that would continue to haunt him for the rest of his life.

It is rightly said: you are as you think yourself to be. Thoughts have great power. This is not about scattered, random, and fleeting thoughts, but about constant, purposeful, and well-formed ones. Depending on our thoughts, we feel healthy or sick, successful or unsuccessful, happy or unhappy, because we become what we consider ourselves to be. A person who is convinced that all their endeavors are futile always fails. They become a pessimist and even feel a bitter joy when their gloomy predictions come true. It is difficult to convince such a person that they are to blame for the collapse of their hopes, that their failures and illnesses originate in their own consciousness, that positive thinking is just as powerful as negative thinking, though it works in the opposite direction.

Mental energy itself is neither positive nor negative; it simply exists. It depends on the individual how they will manage their thoughts. Simple control over one's thinking, the development of concentration, does not yet imply spiritual development. An unscrupulous businessman, a charlatan, or a paranoid person may also possess such abilities.

Intellectual power knows no morality. It can be applied in any way. The key to concentration is desire. When a person passionately desires something, they focus on it and strive to achieve their goal. This goal may be constructive, destructive, or even pathological. But whatever the goal, this desire is the force driving the person toward its achievement, and concentration is truly a powerful weapon. Our dreams, wishes, and intentions become the means of this mighty weapon.

Desires can also be subconscious. The subconscious manifests itself in peculiar symbols, signs, and movements. To understand them, one must engage in uncovering the erased traces in memory, reviving forgotten moments. Understanding the significance of the subconscious desires of communist leaders helps explain the scale of the repressions of that time.

Psychological Portrait of Adolf Hitler



Adolf Hitler

Adolf Hitler was born on April 20, 1889, in the small Austrian town of Braunau. At the age of fourteen, he lost his father. In Hitler's memory, his mother, Klara, remained a woman who had not found happiness in life and who had been unloved by her husband. She sought to overcome her own life's disappointments by devoting herself with great affection to her child. However, in 1907, four years after her husband's death, Klara passed away from breast cancer, delivering a profound psychological blow to young Adolf.

Apart from occasional assistance and financial support from relatives, Hitler was left entirely alone. Consequently, his youth was characterized by isolation and introversion. At the age of eighteen, he moved to Vienna and once again attempted to gain admission to the

Academy of Fine Arts; however, success eluded him once more. During this period, Hitler developed a significant interest in politics. In general, one of the defining characteristics of human psychology is the desire of every ambitious individual to assert and prove themselves.

Thus, when family love, care, and positive emotional relationships are absent—particularly during childhood and adolescence—a desire for dominance often arises within the psyche. This desire then drives individuals to seek validation in politics or other fields, such as sports, science, craftsmanship, or the arts. The renowned Austrian psychotherapist and psychologist Alfred Adler referred to this psychological state as the "inferiority complex." Adler noted that individuals attempt to compensate for this complex by developing a strong desire for dominance. Furthermore, the political structure of society and the surrounding socio-psychological environment play a significant role. For instance, under totalitarian regimes, flattery becomes a highly valued trait for advancement within the political hierarchy. Another important psychological observation is that those in leadership positions often derive psychological comfort from the flattery of their subordinates. Through such dynamics, they seek to overcome the inferiority complexes that once rendered them submissive.

Accordingly, in the psychology of a future tyrant, traumatic changes take root during childhood and adolescence. From the perspective of standard consciousness, notable deviations begin to manifest in interpersonal relationships

and personality traits. This motivational background lays the foundation for future egotism, political jealousy, maniacal self-importance, and divergence from the conventional principles of consciousness. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that individuals with personality flaws do not necessarily possess the extreme psychological traits that characterized Hitler. In psychiatry, heredity is recognized as one of the principal causes of mental illness. If a mentally ill individual exists within a family lineage, then, according to Mendelian principles of dominant and recessive inheritance, the probability of mental illness appearing in future generations is markedly increased. Among such individuals, the likelihood of mental deterioration following a sudden traumatic event, stress, neurosis, or other influencing factors is substantially higher.

In ancient Eastern societies, when a new royal dynasty was founded, it was accepted only if no members of the dynasty exhibited signs of mental illness. Such a case was documented by the renowned physician and philosopher Abu Ali Ibn Sina (Avicenna). The Khan of Urgench, seeking to conceal his son's mental illness, turned to Ibn Sina for assistance. In addressing the hereditary nature of mental illness, Ibn Sina indirectly acknowledged this issue, thereby contributing to the foundation of determinism.

Historical research has confirmed the existence of mental illness within Hitler's family lineage. Nonetheless, one of the particularly brutal policies of the fascist regime was the mass sterilization of mentally ill individuals, a fact that remains strikingly paradoxical.

Undoubtedly, Hitler's perception of completeness differs from the inferiority complex experienced by a mentally healthy individual. In his case, a pronounced manic psychological state emerges. The best illustration of the profound psychological trauma that shaped the development of this political figure—who would ultimately alter the course of the twentieth century—can be found within his own work, *Mein Kampf*:

"...On April 1, 1924, by the judgment of the Munich court, I was sent to Landsberg Prison. After years of continuous labor, I was now granted freedom, as I finally had an abundance of spare time. I began writing a book... My friends had urged me to do so repeatedly...

The book was intended to serve the movement...

I am aware that the spoken word wins people's sympathy more effectively than the written word. Every great movement in history owes its success to great orators. However, to fully consolidate our doctrine, I decided to set forth its main principles in written form.

May my book become the foundation of the GREAT Cause..."

Landsberg Prison

On November 9, 1923, at 12:30 p.m., in front of the former Foreign Ministry building at the Schey House in Munich, our heroic comrades fell for our just cause. Alfarth Felix, Bauriedl Andreas, Casella Theodor, Ehrlich Wilhelm, Faust Martin, Hechenberger Anton, Körner Oskar, Kuhn Karl, Laforce Karl, Neubauer Kurt, Pape Klaus, Pfordten Theodor, Rickmers Johann, Scheubner-Richter Erwin, Strassner Lorenz, and Wolf Wilhelm—these are their names.

The so-called "national government" did not permit the burial of our martyrs in a common grave...

I dedicate the first chapters of my book to the memory of the martyrs. The names of those who perished painfully for the cause of justice will forever remain a shining beacon for the supporters of our movement...

Homeland

Being born in the town of Braunau on the banks of the Inn is, to me, a gracious gift of fate and God. After all, this town lies precisely where the two German states, still separated by borders yet united in the dreams of our people, converge. German Austria must, in every respect, become part of the greater German metropolis, and this necessity is justified not merely by economic considerations. No, even if such a union were economically beneficial, indifferent, or even harmful, the two states should still be unified. "One blood – one state!"

The German people should not aspire to acquire colonies and have no moral right to do so until they have united all their sons within a single state. Until the German state gathers within its borders the last of its people, the dream of sustaining a greater Germany will remain impossible. Only then will it possess the right to expand its land and conquer new territories. At that moment, the sword will be turned into a plow, and the blood-soaked tears of war will nourish the soil to feed future generations. That is why the small town I mentioned holds such a dear place in my heart as a symbol of a great and historic mission to be fulfilled.

Braunau holds significance for another reason as well. It was here, a hundred years ago, that the town became the stage for events irreplaceable and significant in German history. At a time when our homeland was insulted and humiliated, Johann Palm, a Nürnberg native who loved his homeland more than his own life, was martyred in this town. Palm, a bookseller, a nationalist, and a hero, earned the hatred of the French. Despite torture, he did not betray his comrades, and he continued to live in the hearts of the people as a hero. Just like Leh Schillinger, who was also betrayed to the French by informers. The police chief from Augsburg "made a name" for himself through this act of betrayal, laying the moral

foundation for today's German government, which submissively follows the words of Zevering.

In this town, warmed by the sun's rays and with Bavarian blood flowing through its veins, my parents lived during the 1880s. My father was a conscientious civil servant, and my mother was a housewife who divided her love equally between us children and our father.

From that period, I have only a few memories...

My father eventually had to leave the border town he cherished and move to Passau, into Germany itself, for the life of an Austrian customs officer in those days consisted of constant relocation and modest wages.

No sooner had we arrived in Germany than my father received orders to transfer to the town of Linz, where he would ultimately retire. However, retirement did not mean complete rest for the old man. As the son of a modest landowner, he had known nothing but hard work and hardship since his youth...

At barely thirteen years old, he had already left his homeland. Defying the "wisdom" of his fellow townsmen, my father set off for Vienna to learn a trade.

My Father

The events I am recounting took place in the 1850s. (The 1850s of the 19th century are meant here – A.M.) For someone with only three gulden's worth of provisions, setting off for an unfamiliar city without a clear goal was a formidable challenge. By the time he was seventeen, he passed the apprentice examination, but even this success did not satisfy him. Years of hardship, difficulty, and hunger had toughened his spirit.

As a village boy, he had once dreamed of becoming a priest. However, after enduring many struggles, he set his sights on attaining an even higher position—and he succeeded. After twenty-seven years of relentless effort, my father became a civil servant. Thus, the young man who had once declared, "I will not return to the village until I become a man," fulfilled his vow.

When he finally returned to his childhood village, no one recognized him.

At the age of fifty-six, my father decided to retire, yet he could not bear the idea of a life of idleness. He purchased a small house near Lambach, Austria, and after many years of separation, returned joyfully to his beloved farming.

First Ideals

It was during this period that my first ideals began to form. I spent much time outdoors, breathing fresh air. The road to school was long and arduous...

I grew up among boys who were physically strong, and my time spent in their company often worried my mother...

The circumstances were such that there was no chance of my becoming a sheltered child.

At that time, I often pondered what I would become when I grew up and what occupation I would pursue.

Whatever profession I chose, I knew that I did not wish to become a civil servant, working all day for a meager wage in service to the state. I despised the very idea of becoming a civil servant...

I believe it was during this period that I began to develop my oratorical skills, as I frequently won arguments with my peers. Soon after, I naturally assumed the role of a small leader among them.

I had no difficulty with my academic lessons, but managing my behavior proved challenging.

Outside of school, I received musical training at the choir school in Lambach, which gave me the opportunity to be inside the church and to become enchanted by its mesmerizing grandeur.

Most likely, had circumstances been different, the dream of becoming an abbot, as my father once wished, might have taken hold of me. However, my father did not approve of his mischievous son's talents for singing and speaking.

Soon enough, all my ideals were overturned, and I began to live with aspirations better suited to my temperament.

I repeatedly read the books available in my father's library.

One day, I stumbled upon a book about the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, and it immediately captured my attention. I read the book many times and cherished within my heart the heroism described in its pages.

The book had an irreplaceable impact on the course of my life. For the first time, I attempted to grasp the almost imperceptible difference between the Germans who fought in the war and those who remained behind.

"Why?" I would ask myself.

Why did Austria not take part in this war, and why did my father stand aside and not participate? Were we not Germans too, part of the same nation? These questions began to trouble my young mind. I listened, with a hidden sense of envy, to the answers given to these questions and to the remarks about how not

every German had the honor of belonging to Bismarck's empire. Sadly, I still did not fully understand...

Civil Servant or Artist?

Aware of my capabilities and understanding the nature of my temperament, my father intended to send me to a vocational school rather than a humanities-oriented gymnasium. My good drawing abilities, which were given little importance in Austrian gymnasiums, also played a role in his decision.

In short, my father was convinced that his son, like himself, should one day become a state official, and he did not consider any alternative. The notion of rejecting school and pursuing another path did not even occur to him. The strictness and resoluteness he had acquired through a lifetime of struggle were deeply ingrained in his character, and I doubted he would ever change them for my sake.

For the first time in my life, at the age of eleven, I became a dissenter. The more firmly my father insisted on his decision, the more stubborn I became. I refused to become a civil servant.

Neither his pleading nor his threats could move me. No, no, and no!

When my father recounted his life journey and the virtues of the civil servant's profession in an effort to persuade me, I would respond with yawns and shake my head in boredom. The idea of becoming a man confined to a desk, robbed of freedom, filled me with rage.

Naturally, for a child who was far from a "model boy" in the conventional sense, such notions only strengthened my feelings of aversion.

When I entered vocational school, little changed in my life. However, I now had to confront and resolve the tensions in my relationship with my father.

Faced with my steadfast opposition to his plans for me, my father tried to avoid a complete breakdown in our relationship.

One day, I finally gathered the courage to declare openly to my father that I intended to become an artist. It required tremendous bravery to face him.

My talent for art was undeniable. Nevertheless, my father could never have imagined that his son would wish to pursue such a path. On the contrary, when I disrupted his plans and rejected the prospect of becoming a civil servant, replying "an artist" to his question of "Then what do you want to be?", he was utterly shocked.

"What?! You want to be a painter, an artist?"

My father believed that I had either lost my senses or was being foolish. Yet a few moments later, when I calmly and firmly repeated my decision, he threw up his hands and exclaimed, "No, no, this is impossible!"

"As long as I live, you will not become an artist!" my father shouted, lunging toward me.

I had inherited my father's stubbornness. While he roared "No!", I answered with a determined "Of course, yes."

A rock had collided with a hard place.

In his book *Mein Kampf*, Hitler remarked: "In mass gatherings, people lose their ability to think. I use this phenomenon to influence them at the highest level with my speech, directing them to attend these gatherings. Whether they like it or not, they turn into a crowd here.

Intellectuals and members of the bourgeoisie, like workers, become part of this crowd, and I address them as if they were a single mass."



When Hitler expressed these thoughts, one realizes once again that he was deeply engaged with the psychological and psychoanalytic literature of his time. It appears to me (the author — A.M.) that Hitler was surrounded by influential psychoanalysts and psychotherapists. Considering that he himself suffered from psychological traumas, it is plausible that, alongside conservative psychotherapeutic treatment, he was also receiving advice from them.

For instance, in his book *Mein Kampf*, he writes: "Mass gatherings are essential because they make a person feel like a member and warrior of an all-encompassing corporation. He falls under the spell of a feeling that we call self-suggestion. Even if he has doubts, a person leaves these gatherings internally strengthened. Thus, whether he wants to or not, he becomes a member of our community."

He further develops this idea by writing: "The ability of the masses to comprehend is highly limited and weak. Therefore, for any propaganda to have an effective impact on the masses, it must consist of simplified stereotypes and formulas that are easy to understand. The less scientific ballast it contains, and

the more it appeals to the emotions of the broad masses, the more successful it will be.”

Upon reading these lines, it becomes evident that these are not simple ideas. Only a specialist well-versed in human psychology and the physiology of the integrative mechanisms of the central nervous system could express such thoughts. It is highly doubtful that these ideas were authored by Hitler himself, as he lacked both a formal medical education and practical experience in this field. Furthermore, an examination of the seized diaries of Joseph Goebbels, Nazi Germany’s Minister of Information and Propaganda, makes it even clearer that the ideological propaganda was crafted by a group of psychoanalysts, psychotherapists, psychologists, and sociologists.

For example, Goebbels wrote in his diary: “The people are primarily conservative. For them to fully accept the worldview we are shaping, the same propaganda must be repeated in various forms over and over.”

Goebbels also instructed his subordinates: “The more horrific the lie, the more convincing it becomes.” If a lie spreads through society faster than the truth, it becomes more believable. Whoever speaks first is always perceived as being in the right. Goebbels also wrote: “A fabrication is more effective when it is impossible to refute.”

At this point, the effects of perception on individuals come into play. When someone hears a piece of information for the first time, they fall under the influence of its novelty or intrigue and, by rapidly sharing it with others, unintentionally contribute to transforming the lie into accepted truth.

It appears that this psychoanalytic group, which shaped public consciousness within German society and guided Nazi ideology, went further and obtained Hitler’s approval for conducting selective human breeding. A top-secret program was developed and implemented by the Third Reich with the aim of producing a new Aryan race. This program involved arranging for tall Scandinavian women to have sexual relations with intellectually and physically fit young German men, with the goal of producing children who would embody the ideals of the new Aryan race. Each mother was expected to bear ten children.

The newborns were subjected to meticulous medical examinations. If, in the judgment of the program’s overseers, these infants did not meet the racial standards of the Aryan ideal, they were mercilessly eliminated. During fetal development, the “melatonin” hormone was administered to influence the growth of the lower limbs, ensuring that the child would eventually possess elongated legs and attain the desired “Gulliver-like” stature.

A specialized system of training and upbringing was also developed for these children. Hitler had a profound interest in Tibetan traditions, and numerous accounts describe expeditions he organized in search of Shambhala. It was envisioned that examples of the future Aryan race would be raised similarly to Tibetan monks.

To develop future far-sighted individuals, Tibetan monarchs would raise children from an early age in isolated temples built on steep cliffs, with no doors or windows, only a small opening through which food and water could be delivered, thus cutting them off completely from the outside world.

For years, these individuals received no external information. As a result, the centers in their cerebral cortex responsible for receiving and synthesizing external stimuli atrophied, meaning they lost their functionality. Conversely, they developed extraordinary abilities, such as hearing sounds inaudible to ordinary people and seeing in complete darkness. This phenomenon is explained by the fundamental principles governing the human central nervous system.

As is well known, similar metamorphoses are also commonly observed in nature. For example, children lost in African jungles often develop animalistic behaviors according to the laws of the forest. They may acquire extraordinary abilities, such as running rapidly on all fours like monkeys, leaping from tree to tree, or digging holes quickly like moles.

This phenomenon is related to the fact that specific areas of the human cerebral cortex are responsible for specific abilities. By developing a particular skill, an individual can suppress the zones responsible for other abilities. The area governing the dominant activities in a person's lifestyle exerts inhibitory control over other zones, diminishing their functionality. Consequently, in the cerebral cortex, areas that are no longer in demand may undergo organic denaturation or become assimilated into neighboring functional zones.

Therefore, forest-dwelling individuals who have absorbed animalistic behavioral patterns cannot integrate into society as regular members. Society, by developing the appropriate zones of the cerebral cortex that respond to interpersonal values, deactivates other zones. Conversely, in forest-dwelling individuals, the zones responsible for animalistic behavior dominate over others, suppressing them, and the inactive zones cannot be reactivated later. Even today, in modern medicine, experiments are conducted where certain unnecessary zones in the cerebral cortex are cauterized with liquid nitrogen vapor after opening the skull cap, thereby stimulating the development of other vital zones. Similarly, in neurosurgery, memory can be erased by scraping the zone in the cerebral cortex responsible for memory. In cases of alcoholism, a conditioned reflex to consume alcohol forms,

and by applying electrodes to the cortical zone managing this reflex, the connection is disrupted, helping the individual to break the habit.

After the outbreak of World War I, Hitler sought to join the Austrian army, but the medical commission deemed him unfit for military service. Nevertheless, the persistent Adolf went to Germany, where he joined the volunteer army. During his military service, he attained the rank of corporal and was awarded the Iron Cross, First Class.

In 1919, Hitler was discharged from the army. That autumn, he joined the National Socialist German Workers' Party, marking the beginning of his political career. This young politician developed the belief that he was the savior of the German people and the bearer of a sacred mission. One of Hitler's greatest strengths was his ability to persuade people and maintain mass influence through his words. His charismatic gestures and oratorical talent led millions to fall under his sway. Of course, the socio-political environment must also be considered. The German people had suffered defeat in World War I. In such a moment, Adolf—who was grappling with psychological trauma and expressing radical defiance—emerged, descending into manic depression and searching for enemies, which resonated with the discontented groups in German society. With his cold gaze and hysterical, fiery speeches, he captivated his listeners.

He blamed Jews, communists, and social democrats for the misfortunes that had befallen the German people. Hitler's unconventional thinking, phenomenal memory, and military discipline attracted the attention of prominent German businessmen and military figures from the early years of his political activity. Ernst Hanfstaengl, a German-American industrialist; General Ludendorff; Hermann Göring; and the famous composer Richard Wagner, along with his wife Winifred, were drawn to the Nazi Party under this pathological magnetism.

When Sir Henry Deterding, owner of the Shell Oil Company, met Hitler, he was so captivated that he began financially supporting the future Führer and his party.

Undoubtedly, Hitler devoted much of his time to reading. He immersed himself in German history and its glorious pages. By reading the works of Nietzsche and Spengler, he laid the foundation for a new ideology and introduced the Hitler philosophy to German society. Although he himself did not belong to the Aryan race, he established the foundations of an ethno-political Aryan doctrine. Clearly, a person with a healthy mind could not have authored a doctrine of racial supremacy. During that period, Hitler suffered from insomnia, abnormal sexual desires, narcissism, sadomasochism, frequent bouts of depression, and migraines.

Considering this, let us analyze further. History records certain anatomical and medical defects in Hitler. Born into a poor civil servant's family, young Hitler

was self-conscious about being naked when he went to the beach with his peers, often isolating himself from his friends.

Much later, after coming to power, when asked why he remained unmarried, he would reply, "My life belongs to my people." In truth, he enjoyed manipulating women but always hesitated to engage in physical contact, preferring to channel his sexual energy into politics.

It is believed that Hitler began his intimate life at the age of thirty-six. His first choice was sixteen-year-old Maria Reiter. However, in the summer of 1928, Maria attempted suicide. Hitler's second relationship was with Helene Hanfstaengl.

The most important woman in Hitler's intimate life was his niece, Geli Raubal. Hitler was very possessive of her and kept her under strict control. His intense and unusual affection drove this young woman to take her own life. This was evident from statements he made to his close friends.

After Geli Raubal, many women entered Hitler's life. One of them, actress Renate Müller, openly recounted several episodes involving Hitler in her memoirs.

The main woman in Hitler's life was undoubtedly Eva Braun. They met in 1929. Hitler adored her, but they did not begin a romantic relationship until three years later. There was a twenty-three-year age difference between them. Eva survived a serious incident on November 1, 1932.

Eva, in her candid conversations with the legendary commando Otto Skorzeny, confessed, "We are aware of some of Hitler's quirks." Later, she shared certain details of her intimate life with Hitler in further confessions to Skorzeny.

Hitler often remarked that to fully attain power, one must endure extreme humiliations, believing that such "executions" strengthened his authoritarian force and psychological resilience.

Another notable trait of Hitler was his detachment from reality. He believed he was carrying out a divine mission and, in a state of euphoric grandiosity, felt that he was capturing the hearts of people at lightning speed. Interestingly, a segment of the German population fell under the influence of his ideas.

The reasons for this phenomenon are rooted in the characteristics of the human psyche. Notably, the main supporters of Hitler's philosophy were German youth. The impact of the socio-political environment resonated strongly with this group. Hitler's efforts to inspire the German people aligned with their desire to escape the humiliating label of being the children of a defeated nation. This created a subconscious frustration with their repressed thoughts.

The integrative mechanisms of the central nervous system, which normally control such frustration, were unable to perform their physiological functions effectively. In this environment, moral and psychological traumas manifested in the behavior and thought patterns of adolescents, particularly those labeled as children of residents of occupied territories, making their integration into society's productive class a painful process.

Considering that adolescence is shaped dialectically and by environmental influences, this creates the possibility for anti-social traits to emerge in those who have experienced psychological trauma.

Each individual's character is shaped not only by the biological laws of heredity but also by the influences of social laws.

Identical twins who originate from a single egg share the same hereditary traits; however, if they live and are raised in different social environments, they develop different characters. In this context, the broader social relations characterizing the entire social structure play a significant role. Material need or prosperity, unemployment or confidence in the future, and social inequality—all of these factors profoundly impact not only the formation of socially typical traits in personality but also the development of individual qualities of character. From this perspective, during adolescence, sympathetic, friendly, supportive, and solidary relationships—or, conversely, antagonistic traits such as tyranny, harshness, malice, and pathological hatred—may develop within social interactions.

It is known that during adolescence, nervous processes are less flexible, meaning that traits developed during this period tend to be more enduring and are very difficult to change compared to those formed at later stages in life.

Research indicates that 73 percent of respondents noted certain changes in their character between the ages of 15 and 25.

During this period, adolescents may develop two types of reactions to negative external psychological influences. In the first type of reaction, they experience a sense of profound injustice, leading to anger, withdrawal from others, emotional distress, depression, and at times, aggression. These reactions naturally depend on each individual's psychological condition.

It is evident that a person's behavior in a crisis greatly depends on their prior development, any psychological trauma they may have experienced, and the environment surrounding them.

However, it is also a fact that with psychotherapeutic support, these adolescents can develop a second type of reaction. They become more gentle, sensitive,

increase their activity, broaden their interests, and integrate more smoothly into the productive segments of society.

Without timely psychotherapeutic intervention, these adolescents often feel insecure, psychologically and emotionally downtrodden, and perceive themselves as unnecessary members of society. In this vulnerable state, they become particularly susceptible to radical political ideologies promoted by missionary organizations, leading them to adopt a distorted worldview under the influence of pathological propaganda.

This factor creates a broad opportunity for radical religious and ultra-nationalist propagandists. The influence of such propaganda leaves a pathological mark on the majority of adolescents. Having been unable to fulfill 95 percent of their childhood desires, they reject the laws dictated by civilized society in their youthful naivety and construct their own barriers. Thus, during adolescence, they progress through making mistakes. On this path, they strive to realize their desires, and when these efforts fail, they fall into deep depressions, leading to certain psychological changes and the development of neuroses, psychoses, hysteria, and paranoid pathologies. Their bitter fate begins here, as they come to view anyone who disagrees with them as an enemy. Such individuals harbor deep suspicions toward others. They experience a reproduction of past injustices—a revival of remembered events. Their unreachable thoughts—memories, doubts, and fears—foster new tendencies and actions, forming a way of thinking that is excessively illogical and absurd. They are prepared to go to any lengths, even to tyranny, to prove they are right or to demonstrate a perceived "injustice" to those around them.

Therefore, every civilized society must, above all, prioritize the upbringing of its children to be principled, cultured, well-mannered, and healthy.

To be moral, cultured, well-mannered, and healthy means behaving according to the principles of reality and organizing one's actions in accordance with the laws and norms derived from reality. For this reason, providing full psychotherapeutic support to adolescents from the losing side of a war during their transitional period is of great importance in preparing them to become productive members of society. Research shows that it takes 13 months to return an individual who has adopted Wahhabism to a normal psychological state, and 11 months to treat those influenced by transcendental effects.

Psychological Profile of J. Stalin

J. Stalin was born on December 6, 1878, in the town of Gori, in Georgia, into the family of Vissarion Jughashvili.

"His father, Vissarion Ivanovich, a Georgian by nationality, came from the peasant class of Didi-Lilo in the Tiflis Governorate. By profession, he was a shoemaker and later worked at the Adelkhanov shoe factory in Tiflis. His mother, Ekaterina Georgievna, came from the family of a serf peasant, Geladze, from the village of Gambareuli.

In the autumn of 1888, Stalin enrolled in the Gori Church School. In 1894, he completed the school and entered the Tiflis Theological Seminary that same year. Some researchers believed that Stalin was Ossetian. They pointed to his surname—Jugayev—which was later given a Georgian ending.



Iosif Stalin

The Caucasus is one of the most ethnically complex regions in the world. The population of the Caucasus speaks languages belonging to several families:

- 1) Iberian-Caucasian languages,
- 2) Indo-European languages, and
- 3) Turkic languages.

The largest Iranian-speaking people of the Caucasus are the Ossetians (488,000), who mainly live in Caucasian Ossetia. Southern Ossetians have experienced significant Georgian influence. The formation of the Ossetian people was greatly influenced by the Alans, who assimilated the pre-Iranian population of the central regions of the North Caucasus. Ossetians generally do not differ much from other peoples of the North Caucasus, particularly from the Avars.

Georgians have developed from various tribal and territorial groups. These include the Kartvelians in Central Georgia, the Kakhetians in Eastern Georgia, and the Imeretians and Gurians in Western Georgia, among others. The Adjarians, who live in the Autonomous Region of Adjara in Georgia, are also considered Georgians. They were significantly influenced by Islam in the past, unlike other Georgians who maintained Christianity. In the northern mountainous regions of Eastern Georgia live the highland Georgians: the Khevsurs, Pshavs, and Tushs.

The highlanders of Western Georgia are the Svans, who live in the upper reaches of the Inguri River.

Most of the indigenous population of the Caucasus belongs to different types of the Balkano-Caucasian race. Georgians differ significantly from the Ossetians. Based on anthropological data, Stalin belongs to the Caucasian-Imeretian group, as shown by the following data:

| | Ossetians | Caucasian(Imeretians) |
|---------------------------|-----------|-----------------------|
| Height (sm) | 169 | 168 |
| Longitudinal diameter(mm) | 188.5 | 184.5 |
| Transverse diameter (mm) | 158 | 158 |
| Cranial index | 84 | 86 |
| Zygomatic width (mm) | 145 | 144 |
| Face height (mm) | 125 | 130.5 |
| Facial index | 86 | 89 |
| Depressed nasal bases (%) | 52 | 51 |
| Light-colored eyes (%) | 10 | 0 |

From an anthropological standpoint, the Caucasian Imeretians are more similar to the Turkic-speaking Azerbaijanis than to the Iranian-speaking Ossetians. These data further confirm Stalin's belonging to the Caucasian Imeretian group of Georgians. It should be noted that his cranial indices differ sharply from those of modern Ossetians.

In 1932, a book titled *Stalin and the Georgian Tragedy* was published in Berlin, written by Stalin's childhood friend, Ioseb Iramishvili. The author of the book claimed that the troubled situation in the family (the father's drunken rampages, accompanied by beating his wife and son) hardened the boy: "The undeserved and cruel beatings made the child as harsh and heartless as his father. Since all people who held positions of authority over others seemed to him like his father, he soon developed a vengeful feeling towards everyone who was above him. From childhood, he concentrated all his thoughts on revenge, and he subordinated everything to achieving this goal."

Stalin grew up in desperate poverty. As Simon Goglichidze recalled, soon "trouble arose between Vissarion and Keke (as Stalin's mother, Ekaterina, was called by her friends — Author's note) regarding the upbringing of their son. The father believed that the son should inherit his father's profession, while the mother held a completely different view. 'Do you want my son to become a metropolitan? You'll never live to see that! I'm a shoemaker, and my son must become a shoemaker too. Anyway, he will be a shoemaker!' Vissarion often told his wife.

Although Vissarion lived and worked in Tiflis, and Keke lived with her son in Gori, she was constantly worried: 'What if Vissarion comes and takes my son away and tears him away from his studies forever?' She went to Tiflis and took her son from the factory."

As Simon Goglichidze recalled, "some of the teachers knew about Soso's situation and advised her to leave him in Tiflis. Officials of the Exarch of Georgia (the highest-ranking clergyman of Georgian Orthodoxy at the time) offered her the same advice, promising that Soso would be admitted to the Exarch's choir, but Keke wouldn't hear of it. She hurried to take her son back to Gori."

In his book *STALIN*, Y.V. Emelyanov writes: "At this time, Vladimir Ulyanov, the future Lenin, was born into a noble family of a school inspector in Simbirsk. In the same city, one of the first premiers of the government after February Russia, Alexander Kerensky, was born into the family of a gymnasium director. One of Stalin's prominent colleagues, and later rivals, N.I. Bukharin, was born into a family of Moscow teachers. Stalin's main rival in the party, Lev Bronstein (Trotsky), grew up in the family of a prosperous landowner.

For many of Stalin's future partners and political opponents, the paths to education and intellectual pursuits were open from childhood. The parents of Bukharin, Ulyanov-Lenin, and Kerensky used their professional skills to engage with their children from their earliest years, introducing them to the values of the urban intelligentsia. To properly prepare their son for future life, Bronstein-Trotsky's parents sent him to the Odessa gymnasium at the age of 18 and raised him in a manner consistent with the values of their chosen circle. Governesses from Germany and Switzerland were hired to teach him, and from childhood, he was fluent in German and French. Churchill's parents, in keeping with British aristocratic tradition, did not concern themselves much with their children's education, but the best private school teachers in England took care of his upbringing and education."

Social inequality in Georgian cities had a pronounced ethnic character, as the bourgeoisie and a significant portion of the urban middle class did not represent the indigenous population of Georgia. In Gori, the wealthy majority of the population consisted of Armenians, while the poor minority were Georgians. Explaining the nature of interethnic conflicts in Georgia, Stalin wrote in his work *Marxism and the National Question*: "In Georgia, there is anti-Armenian nationalism, but this is because there is still an Armenian large bourgeoisie, which, by overpowering the small, still weak Georgian bourgeoisie, pushes the latter towards anti-Armenian nationalism."

In 1894, Stalin graduated from the parish school with honors and enrolled in the Orthodox seminary in Tiflis. One of his teachers, G.I. Elisabedashvili, recalled: "This very gifted boy had a pleasant high voice – a soprano. In two years, he

learned musical notation so well that he could easily sing by note. Soon, he started assisting the conductor and leading the choir... As a young conductor, I was interested in proving myself as a good leader. And indeed, my choir was well organized. We performed works by composers like Bortnyansky, Turchaninov, and Tchaikovsky... Soso sang well in the choir of the theological school's students. He usually performed duets and solos and often replaced the choir's conductor."

One of the most significant literary impressions of his childhood was the novel *Patricide* by A. Kazbegi. The novel particularly vividly depicted the fighter for the freedom of the peoples of the Caucasus, a supporter of Shamil – Koba. According to I. Iramishvili, "Soso's ideal and dream figure was Koba. He wanted to become the second Koba, a fighter and a hero. From that moment, Soso began calling himself Koba and insisted that we address him only by that name. Soso's face beamed with pride and joy when we called him Koba."

In 1898, the young Stalin became a member of the underground organization of Georgian Marxists, *Mesame Dasi*. That same year, he failed to appear for his next exam at the seminary and was subsequently expelled. During this period, Koba (his underground alias) became deeply involved in the revolutionary movement, with *Mesame Dasi* joining the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) following its founding in 1898. Y.V. Emelyanov writes: "Jughashvili's joining the circle of Georgian Marxists meant for him joining a large collective of people united in a single political party, but of various backgrounds. The leaders of Russian social democracy were revolutionaries with significant experience in underground work, authors of writings on Marxist theory, and long-time émigrés, such as Plekhanov, Zasluch, Axelrod, Deich, and others. In the 1890s, Vladimir Ulyanov-Lenin, a nobleman's son and brother of a Narodnik, who was executed for planning an assassination on the tsar, joined the ranks of social democracy. Around the same time, Lev Bronstein (Trotsky), the son of a prosperous Odessa grain merchant, joined a Marxist circle in Nikolaev. By 1917, other figures joined the same party, such as V.M. Scryabin (Molotov) from the village of Kukarka in Vyatka, A.I. Rykov, a Moscow teacher's son, N.P. Efremov (Tomsky), a student from a Moscow teaching family, F.E. Dzerzhinsky, the son of Polish nobles, K.E. Voroshilov, a locksmith from Lugansk, L.M. Kaganovich, a shoemaker from the Jewish shtetl of Kaban, Ukraine, and G.K. Ordzhonikidze, a student of Tiflis's medical school, among many others."

In 1901, on May 1st, Stalin was one of the organizers of a demonstration of Georgian workers in Tiflis. That same year, he became a member of the Tiflis committee of the RSDLP and was assigned to conduct political activities in Batumi. In 1902, he organized mass protests and demonstrations of workers in Batumi. Soon after, Koba was arrested, imprisoned for a long period, and exiled to Eastern Siberia. After escaping from exile, he decided to start a family and

married Ekaterina Svanidze, the sister of his friend. However, five years later, Ekaterina died of pneumonia.

Y.V. Emelyanov writes: "Life in captivity taught one to quickly judge people. A prisoner had to understand quickly whom they could rely on and whom they could not. At times, one had to entrust their fate entirely to another person. A prisoner's situation, and often their life, depended on whether those around them were willing to help, share necessities, or pass on vital information to the outside world. Constant vigilance, awaiting arrest while underground, and the impossibility of escape during exile was a source of oppressive mental states. The need to divide people into those who could help and those who could betray you, willingly or unwillingly, hardened the soul. It's no surprise that Stalin said of Ekaterina Svanidze, whom he married in 1904 after two years in prisons and exile, that she 'warmed my stone heart.' However, new arrests, new prisons, and exiles separated the couple. Ekaterina died while her husband was in prison. Their son Yakov, their firstborn, was left without parents. This was enough to harden Stalin's heart once again, making it 'turn to stone' once more."

The American scholar Adam Ulam emphasized that "the Russian Orthodox Church and the semi-Eastern nature of Georgia were steeped in male chauvinism, which led to a lack of refined manners in love for women's company and ease of communication with women" in Stalin.

In the secret archives of the KGB, evidence of Stalin's other affairs with women has been preserved. All of Stalin's relationships with women ended tragically, and his marriage to Nadezhda Alliluyeva was no exception. There are two versions of her death. One is suicide. Knowing much about the consequences of Stalin's industrialization policies, she could not bear what was happening to the country and its people. In her memoirs, Stalin's daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva, testifies that her mother left a suicide note for Stalin, full of accusations and reproaches. Stalin was so shaken by his wife's accusations that he did not attend her funeral. According to another version, his wife was shot. In the presence of Voroshilov and others, she publicly accused her husband of the deaths of starving people in Ukraine. A quarrel broke out. Stalin lost his temper and began beating his wife. She shouted that he was a murderer and a traitor. Then a shot rang out. Stalin subsequently eliminated everyone who knew what had happened, sparing only Voroshilov.

Researchers have tried to understand the origins of Stalin's cruelty. Some light is shed by the notes of the Kremlin doctor, Professor D. Pletnev, a cardiologist who was repressed in the 1930s and later executed. Here is his assessment: "Stalin possessed the fearlessness and courage of a lion, the cunning of a snake, the weakness and cowardice of a rabbit, and all of this simultaneously. He could not tolerate physical pain well, and joint pain sometimes drove him to frenzy. He did not tolerate dissent, was prone to boasting, and loved flattery. He had broad

knowledge, insight, resourcefulness, flexibility, and a strong tendency toward adventurism... Diabolical cunning and treachery, and an astonishing understanding of the human soul with all its weaknesses... He suffered from only two disorders: megalomania and paranoia.”

In 1904, after escaping exile from the village of Uda in the Irkutsk province, Stalin arrived in Baku. The leader of the Azerbaijani national democrats, Mammad Amin Rasulzade, noted in his memoirs: “During the revolutionary movement in Baku, I.V. Stalin led the uprising of oil workers. Following instructions from the oil owners, they planned to throw him alive into an oil well. Thanks to me, this did not happen. Later, when Stalin escaped from the Bailyov prison, he was helped by the Gummet organization.”

After the fall of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) in 1920, the chairman of the ADR parliament, M.A. Rasulzade, was arrested in the Lagich mountains of Azerbaijan by Russian Bolsheviks. At that time, Stalin arrived in Baku on his armored train, learned of the arrest of the ADR leader, and demanded his release. Rasulzade recalls being brought into Stalin’s armored carriage. Stalin welcomed him like an honored guest, embraced him, and offered him a responsible position in Moscow. At that time, Stalin headed the People’s Commissariat for Nationalities. Rasulzade agreed.

Later, Rasulzade secretly moved to Turkey and then emigrated to Poland. He noted: “Stalin saved me, as if to repay me man-to-man for saving his life then. However, I am sure that if I had stayed, he would have destroyed me too.”

Subsequently, Stalin arrested and repressed the wives of Molotov and Kalinin. After the Russian Revolution, Stalin isolated Lenin from the political arena, essentially placing him under house arrest in Gorki.

After the Great October Revolution, nearly all of its leaders were physically eliminated. Stalin was intolerant and ruthless toward his opponents, and at the first opportunity, he would arrest and execute them—this is a historical fact. His belief in being the smartest and strongest formed the foundation of Stalin’s dictatorial personality. His ego, self-praise, and ambition went far beyond the norm. This leader not only destroyed his opponents but even placed close comrades in a dependent position, arrested them, and executed their children. He approached everyone with suspicion. He destroyed millions of people to build socialism, to create an ideal state, promoting utopian ideas. All of this defies reason. Is it necessary to exterminate dissenters to build a new society?

The reader might think that Stalin placed the cult of his personality above the interests of the state—and this is true. The story of Stalin’s life points to a disturbance in his mental state. The best representatives of the Soviet

intelligentsia, including those from Azerbaijan, were brutally repressed in 1937. There are no longer any witnesses from that time capable of giving an accurate characterization of the era and the leader's personality, so Stalin's psychological structure and primary characteristics remain unexplored by researchers.

Consciousness includes mental processes, through which we enrich our knowledge. Among these processes are instinct, intuition, memory, and intellect. Stimuli that affect the brain create a picture for instinct and intuition. Memory recalls forgotten images, imagination, and illusion. Imagination draws an image or model of a non-existent object.

The main psychological characteristic of Stalin's personality looks like this: usually somewhat reserved, insincere, always very satisfied with himself, he lived for "high ideas" and sought to demonstrate his personal qualities, knowledge, and skills everywhere. Egoism and a tendency not to recognize others' thoughts and opinions were prominent. His personal life was closed off in a world invented by his imagination. He rejected the opinions of everyone around him and dismissed any criticism of himself. For him, there was only one truth—his own. He viewed anyone who disagreed with him as an outsider, an enemy. Being naturally suspicious, such people cannot get close to anyone and often remain lonely, relentlessly fighting against imaginary "enemies" and sometimes making very cruel and unjust decisions.

The high ideas occupying their minds arise from real events, are accompanied by intense emotions, and dominate their thoughts, even if they may be erroneous. Hurt by many injustices, they cannot forget grievances and constantly analyze the events that offended them. These feelings become dominant and create a thirst for revenge.

"High ideas" are a state between delusions and mistaken thoughts. While they do not cause mental illnesses, they are considered pathological. This description corresponds to a schizoid personality type.

The schizoid personality type is also called introverted. The term "schizoid" was proposed in 1936 by the German scientist Kretschmer, who believed that there was an etiological similarity between schizoid psychopaths and schizophrenic patients. However, it was later revealed that, despite the similarity in names, these disorders have neither etiological nor pathogenetic connections. A characteristic of this personality type is the presence of autistic thinking. The behavior, dress, and expressions of such individuals have specific distinctions. Suspicion is obsessive in nature. They carry out activities based on prior planning, strive to be precise in everything, and meticulously double-check their work multiple times, thus relieving their tension. They are always calm, simple, and try to be respectful toward those they approach and on whom they depend. They strive to please and

justify the trust shown in them. They put great effort into performing tasks with high quality. Despite all this, such people are never satisfied with the work they have done, and they are forever plagued by suspicion and insecurity. They usually enjoy being part of lively gatherings, demonstrating their qualities in front of guests, trying to stand out from others. But after a while, they want to be alone and show interest in unusual activities. They do not have close friends. In all of this, symptoms of a schizoid state can be seen in one form or another. From a physiological perspective, this is a reaction of the nervous system and the body as a whole.

Stalin often gathered members of the Politburo and held elaborate banquets at his dacha in Kuntsevo. V.M. Molotov recalled: "Stalin had an incredible capacity for work. I know this for sure. What he needed to know, he knew thoroughly and kept track of... And he didn't just look in one direction, but in all directions. Politically important was, say, aviation—so aviation it was... Cannons—so cannons, tanks—so tanks. The situation in Siberia—so the situation in Siberia, British politics so British politics, in short, what the leader should not lose sight of. Stalin would ask: 'Is it an important issue?' 'Important.' Then he would dive into it down to the last comma."

With the help of Mammad Amin Rasulzade (who would later become the chairman of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic's parliament), Stalin traveled to Finland to attend an RSDLP conference as a representative from the Caucasus. There, he met Lenin. In 1906, returning to Russia, Koba (Stalin's alias) began developing special operations, becoming one of the prominent leaders of Bolshevik combat units. This period was shrouded in secrecy; those who spoke about this chapter of Stalin's life often soon perished. In 1922, Stalin's close friend, Kamo, was mysteriously killed.

According to eyewitness accounts, on July 13, 1907, in the center of Tiflis, an attack was carried out on a treasury convoy, seizing 300,000 rubles. These funds were appropriated by Stalin, who also organized the attack. Stalin was accused of robbery and the murder of Governor-General Gryaznov. Naturally, the stolen money went into the RSDLP's funds.

Felix Chuev, the biographer of Stalin's comrades, who recorded every word of Molotov, noted: "Molotov spoke of Stalin in the following way: 'Stalin was a great tactician. He didn't dig too deeply, but he knew how to carry things out... And he had courage, determination.'" Molotov answered questions about Stalin:

-The Voice of America announced that the man who killed Trotsky had died. He served twenty years, was awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union, lived with us briefly, and then died in Cuba. Was that on our orders?

-Of course. Before his death, Trotsky said of Stalin: ‘He found me even here.’

-You mentioned that you were also being eavesdropped on?

-I believe they eavesdropped on me my whole life. The security agents told me, though I never verified it. Well, the agents treated me well. They would directly say, ‘Be careful what you say.’ Just out of caution—who knows? They might report something and add a bit of their own interpretation. So we tried not to chat carelessly. Stalin could be overly suspicious at times. But he had to be, he had to be... That was the difficulty, you know. Yes, the difficulty.

Stalin held a rather critical view of Voroshilov in some respects, especially after the war. Occasionally, Voroshilov would remind him, “We first met in Baku in 1907.” Stalin would reply, “I don’t remember that.”

Stalin was very cautious about this and was absolutely right. If he had been less cautious, would he have even survived? The atmosphere was extraordinarily tense. Voroshilov, however, was more liberal, drank, and loosened his tongue during these times. We lived in such complex conditions that one had to be very careful about one’s words. Well, Voroshilov liked to act a bit as a patron, a benefactor of artists, etc.,” Molotov recalled.

In 1908, Koba (Stalin’s alias) was once again arrested and exiled to the Vologda region. Escaping from there in 1909, he went to Baku. In 1910, he was arrested again and sent back to Vologda. Wherever the exiled Iosif Dzhughashvili rented a house, he would form close relationships: sometimes with the widow landlady in Vologda, who bore him a son, and other times with the young daughter of the landlord in Siberian exile, who also ended up pregnant. The girl was so young that the gendarmes had to intervene. Stalin promised to marry her once she came of age. These stories are no longer state secrets; documents regarding the “miraculous Georgian’s” affairs in Russia’s North and Eastern Siberia have been published.

As German intelligence prepared to attack the USSR, they considered information on the state leader’s intimate relations of the utmost importance. In pre-war Moscow, a persistent rumor circulated that Stalin, like his closest comrades in the Politburo—Molotov, Voroshilov, Kirov, Andreev—had married a Jewish woman. In this story, his wife was either a mythical sister of Kaganovich named Rosa or his real daughter Maya, who was still wearing a young pioneer’s neckerchief at the time. During interrogation, the Germans attempted to extract information on this from Yakov, Stalin’s eldest son, who was a prisoner. They asked, “Do you know that your father’s wife is also Jewish? Isn’t her last name Kaganovich?” Yakov, who himself was married to a Jewish woman (though he sometimes expressed anti-Semitic views), had to deny this false version.

A similar question was asked of Molotov half a century later in retirement, linking Stalin's name with Kaganovich's daughter. In reality, it was simpler, without involving a Jewish woman. Some members of Stalin's countryside security detail, who knew how to keep secrets, were aware of his chosen companion. The young woman was selected and introduced to the role of favorite at the "Near Dacha" by the head of Stalin's security service, who prided himself on his knowledge of women and was tireless in pursuing them. The young, slender, intelligent Russian woman with an impeccable background and a "clear-sounding" surname was meant, in his opinion, to serve both him and the Master. And so it happened, as envisioned and carried out by Nikolai Sergeyeovich Vlasik, a former Red Army soldier who, after many years of service to the leader, became a lieutenant general.

Kaganovich was one of Stalin's closest associates for a relatively brief period. Stalin grew close to him after Kaganovich departed Ukraine; it was around this time that Kaganovich was reinstated as a secretary of the Central Committee. He carried out Stalin's directives with considerable zeal, notably reorganizing the leadership of the trade unions (following the removal of M. Tomsky), "restoring order" within the Moscow Party organization (after the removal of N. Uglanov), and overseeing the collectivization efforts in the Moscow region, which at the time encompassed present-day Ryazan, Tula, and Kaluga regions, as well as the North Caucasus.

By 1935, Kaganovich transitioned to more administrative responsibilities, and from that point, he no longer played the pivotal role within Stalin's inner circle that he had previously held. Nonetheless, he continued to wield significant power and influence. Roy Medvedev writes: "Mikhail, the elder brother of Lazar Moiseyevich, had joined the Bolshevik party as early as 1905. Under his influence, Lazar also joined the Bolshevik party in 1911. Mikhail sought to expedite Lazar's political ascent, although Mikhail himself was already a prominent figure within the party. He played a critical role in the development of Soviet aviation, and when the Commissariat of Aviation Industry was established in the Soviet Union, Mikhail Moiseyevich Kaganovich became its first commissar, particularly since many leading designers, including A. Tupolev, had been unjustly repressed on fabricated charges."

However, Stalin attributed the failures within the Commissariat of Aviation to Mikhail Moiseyevich. As a result, M. Kaganovich was dismissed and reprimanded by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Nevertheless, he continued to occupy lesser, less critical roles within industry for an extended period. Shortly after the war, the NKVD fabricated accusations of sabotage against M. Kaganovich. False testimonies were presented, alleging that he had conspired with the Nazis, who allegedly

planned to install him, a person of Jewish origin, as the leader of a pro-Hitler puppet government.

The matter of Mikhail Kaganovich's fate was debated within the Politburo, with Beria advocating for his immediate arrest. Lazar Kaganovich did not defend his brother, just as he did not defend another brother who had been arrested in 1937 or 1938. Stalin proposed the formation of a commission to investigate Mikhail Kaganovich's alleged "guilt," with Mikoyan appointed to lead this commission. After hearing the charges against him, M. Kaganovich did not attempt to refute them. Instead, he inquired whether there was a restroom in Mikoyan's office, proceeded there, and took his own life. He harbored no illusions regarding the impartiality of the commission or the likelihood of his brother's defense.

In 1912, on Lenin's direct initiative, Stalin was elected as a member of the Central Committee in absentia. After once again escaping exile, Stalin traveled abroad and met with Lenin in Prague. From there, he journeyed to Austria, where he authored *Marxism and the National Question*. In 1913, after spending some time in Krakow, Koba returned to St. Petersburg. Betrayed by his comrade Malinovskaya, he was arrested once more and exiled to the northernmost point of Russia—the village of Kureika, located in the Turukhansk region. Stalin spent four arduous years there, enduring some of the most extreme and harsh conditions of his life.

The climate in the Turukhansk region was markedly more severe than in previous places of exile. Winter endured for up to nine months, with temperatures plunging to 45 degrees below zero. Summers were short and beset by swarms of mosquitoes and gnats. The region's soil produced little, and fish became a staple of his diet. During his time in the Arctic, Stalin faced a protracted struggle for survival. Being a native of the mountainous southern regions, he found the bleak, snow-covered plains and monotony of the landscape particularly challenging. He requested postcards depicting more scenic views to alleviate the psychological toll of the environment. Additionally, he was frequently deprived of solitude, as the local residents, particularly children, would often peer into his room, interrupting his reading and writing. Yakov Sverdlov, who was in a similar predicament, wrote: "They come in, sit down, remain silent for about half an hour, and then abruptly stand up and say, 'Well, I must go, goodbye!' As soon as one leaves, another arrives, and the cycle repeats. They appear to come deliberately in the evening, the best time for reading."

Stalin's time in Turukhansk left him with certain personal habits. In the polar region, he developed a particular taste for stroganina—raw, frozen fish sliced thinly and eaten with a bit of salt. Before his exile concluded, Stalin was summoned to the military recruitment center in Krasnoyarsk. In early February 1917, Stalin was deemed unfit for military service due to a childhood injury to

his arm. As his exile was set to end in June 1917, Stalin petitioned the governor of Yenisei to allow him to serve the remainder of his sentence in Achinsk, where he hoped to secure employment. He was granted permission and relocated to the city, where, shortly after his arrival, he received news of the overthrow of the autocracy.

Having profoundly embraced Marxist ideology, Iosif Dzhughashvili articulated concrete goals for revolutionary action, which were outlined in several of his works, including *The Russian Social-Democratic Party and Its Immediate Tasks* (1912), *We Demand* (1917), *What Do We Need?* (1917), *One of the Immediate Tasks* (1918), *Our Tasks in the East* (1919), *On the Immediate Tasks of Communism in Georgia and the Caucasus* (1921), *On the Party's Tasks* (1923), *On the Party's Tasks in the Countryside* (1923), *On the Komsomol's Tasks* (1925), and others. A political leader's capacity to overcome adversaries is contingent upon their intellectual abilities, emotional state, intelligence, and mental development. Intelligence is a multifaceted construct encompassing knowledge, experience, the ability to draw conclusions, and mastery of skills and knowledge. It involves memory, attention, and intuition, and their interrelation is crucial. Genealogical memory plays a significant role in this process.

The mechanism of memory is categorized into three primary functions:

1. Perception—the recording of sensory information.
2. Retention—the safeguarding of recorded memories.
3. Reproduction—the retrieval of stored memories.

High intelligence can be cultivated through diligent effort, study, and self-improvement. It would be erroneous to equate a lack of formal education with a deficiency in intelligence, as even individuals with minimal educational backgrounds can possess the capacity to accurately assess situations and demonstrate sufficient cognitive ability. Stalin himself did not possess higher education. Upon his return to Petrograd from exile, Stalin and Kamenev were not included in the Bureau. However, it was decided that Kamenev would assume the role of editor for the *Pravda* newspaper, while Stalin was assigned a consultative position. This arrangement was attributed to “certain personal traits characteristic of Stalin.”

With the support of Kamenev and Muranov (the former Duma deputy M.K. Muranov, who had also been exiled with Stalin), Stalin maneuvered to remove Molotov from his position at *Pravda* and took control of the editorial board. As Molotov recalled, “I was... pushed out of the editorial office... tactfully, without noise, but by a skillful hand, because they held more authority, undoubtedly.” Y.V. Yemelyanov remarked, “Stalin's position, as well as the party's policy and


Pravda's editorial stance, underwent a shift following Lenin's return from exile. On his journey to the capital, Lenin expressed his dissatisfaction with *Pravda's* position to the Bolsheviks who met him. He soon articulated his views in the April Theses and, on April 4, 1917, at the Tauride Palace, during a meeting of Bolshevik delegates to the All-Russian Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

In late April, Stalin participated in the first post-Prague VII conference of the RSDLP(b), where he delivered his first report on the national question. Following this, he regularly appeared at major party forums as an authoritative 'specialist' on national issues, a role solidified by the publication of his pamphlet *Marxism and the National Question*. He strongly criticized the views of Pyatakov and Dzerzhinsky, who asserted that all national movements were inherently reactionary.

At the April 1917 Conference, Stalin was elected as one of the nine members of the Central Committee of the RSDLP(b). During the Central Committee meeting on November 29, 1917, where he was introduced to the newly established Bureau of the Central Committee, Stalin was appointed as People's Commissar for Nationalities. Additionally, he assumed leadership of the editorial board of *Pravda*, headed the committee responsible for overseeing Bolshevik press activities, and managed the group in charge of relations with Ukraine. Starting on January 8 (21), 1918, Stalin worked on a commission responsible for food policy, and in March 1918, he joined a commission tasked with developing the party's program. On April 1, he participated in a commission preparing the draft for the first Soviet Constitution of Russia.

Y. V. Yemelyanov writes, "As early as October 31 (November 13), 1917, Stalin spoke at the session of the Military Revolutionary Committee, reporting on the situation at the front. In November 1917, he prepared the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, an appeal 'To All Working Muslims of Russia and the East,' drafted a report for the Council of People's Commissars on transferring historical treasures to the Ukrainian people, reported to the Council on Ukraine and the Ukrainian Rada, on trade with Finland, and also presented information on the government's financial-economic policy. During this period, he and Lenin outlined the program for the Brest-Litovsk negotiations and participated in preparing the Decree on the Court. On December 1 (14), Stalin negotiated with Muslim representatives on returning the Holy Quran of Osman, and on that same day, together with Lenin and Sverdlov, drafted the decree establishing the Supreme Council of the National Economy. On December 2 (15), he reported to the Council on Ukraine and on organizing the Congress of Belarusian Soviets. On December 5 (18), Stalin was elected to the editorial commission to draft regulations on volost (district) committees and to a commission authorized to negotiate with the Ukrainian Rada. On December 16 (29), Stalin reported to the Council on the situation in the Orenburg and Ural

districts, Turkestan, and the Caucasus. On December 18 (31), he provided another report on the Orenburg district, where Dutov's rebellion had begun. On December 19 (January 1, 1918), Stalin reported on Ukraine and proposed appointing Ordzhonikidze as the Extraordinary Commissioner of Ukraine. On December 20 (January 2), Stalin attended the All-Russian Board meeting on organizing and forming the Red Army."



According to the Deputy People's Commissar for Nationalities, Stanislav Pestkovsky, "Unlike other party leaders, who were usually talkative and told exciting stories about what was happening in the Central Committee, Stalin was gloomy and reserved." It is known that at times, Stalin could not endure the intense workload and, according to Pestkovsky, would leave the board meetings in the middle of prolonged, aimless discussions. If Lenin called Stalin on the phone, Pestkovsky would search for him in the offices and often found him alone. And yet, despite these signs of fatigue and emotional outbursts, Pestkovsky, reflecting on his work with Stalin, said: "True, he occasionally had conflicts with individual members of his board. In these cases, he would appeal to the Central Committee and, of course, would always win... I worked side by side with Stalin for about 20 months, participating in various 'oppositions' during this time. More than once, I openly opposed Stalin's national policies at board meetings... Nevertheless, Stalin treated me with the utmost patience and tried, as far as possible, to involve me in the work... I am almost certain that if, for example, Trotsky—who constantly accused Stalin of 'dictatorship'—were in Stalin's place, he would have dismissed such an oppositional board within three days and surrounded himself with 'his own' people."

When analyzing the personality of leaders, it is necessary to consider the presence of genealogical memory inherent to each nation's representative. The essence of this idea lies in the fact that each leader's personality is directly connected to their mental qualities. Of course, a political leader, even subconsciously, sees the solution to any issue while taking into account mental customs. The psychology of consciousness is powerless to understand and predict these phenomena. The subconscious cannot be studied by scientific methods; it can only be understood through symptoms and various expressions. Freud's psychoanalytic teachings reflected this idea. He wrote, "Psychoanalysis is 'Know Thyself.'" Similarly, Socrates stated, "Mistakes are the result of ignorance." At the core of Freud's theory is the assertion that every person's psyche is defined by their consciousness. Freud considered the psyche to be above consciousness, seeing consciousness as just a part of the psyche. The rest of the psyche exists unconsciously, within the subconscious. The genealogical foundation of the subconscious lies within each person's mental life. Freud wrote that the subconscious is rooted so deeply within one's mental life that it cannot be understood through traditional psychological and philosophical concepts. The subconscious acts as a regulator of communication. Every movement, interaction, and attempt draws energy from the subconscious. The subconscious cannot be directly understood; it manifests in subjective mistakes, interactions, conversations, judgments and comments, and attitudes towards oneself and others. Thus, if conditions arise in any ethnosocial environment to promote a leader from a different genealogical background or mental environment, this leader will view their surroundings through the lens of their mental worldview. This, ultimately, happened with Stalin.

Stalin, who was naturally suspicious, was never at ease with the emergence of a rival from a different mental environment. He especially disliked politicians of Semitic origin. I. Orlov recalls, "Throughout the years of the war, Stalin worked day and night. He would usually record his notes early in the morning. Often, I would find him around six in the morning, sleeping on a cot under the stairs leading to the second floor, or on the terrace. He would sleep without undressing — in his overcoat and boots. He would cover his face with his cap to shield himself from the sun. It's remarkable how he endured the war. He suffered from rheumatism, which affected his legs (which is why he liked pacing around his office), and he often suffered from angina, hypertension, and oxygen deficiency. The war aged him significantly; he went gray... Stalin was very ill. He often complained about his legs. From time to time, he suffered from severe dizziness. V. Tukov mentioned that they had to watch over him to prevent him from falling. Oxygen deficiency also caused him considerable discomfort. According to I. Orlov, pathways had to be cut through the trees at his dacha to allow air to circulate freely. To this, one must add hypertension, the constant companion of strokes and paralysis. In his final years, Stalin frequently lamented, 'Cursed old

age has arrived.’ Stalin treated his health carelessly. He dined at irregular times — sometimes at 3 PM, 5 PM, 7 PM, 8 PM, or even 10 PM. He distrusted doctors and avoided treatment, being pathologically suspicious of them.”

Shortly before Stalin’s death, TASS released a statement announcing the discovery of a terrorist group of doctor-saboteurs, whose “goal was, through harmful treatments, to shorten the lives of active figures in the Soviet Union.” Among the victims of these “despicable spies and murderers” were prominent party leaders A. A. Zhdanov, A. S. Shcherbakov, and several figures in the military leadership of the country. The names of well-known doctors, professors M.S. Vovsi, V.N. Vinogradov, M.B. Kogan, B.B. Kogan, P.I. Egorov, A.I. Feldman, Y.G. Etinger, A.M. Grishtein, and physician G.I. Mayorov, were included among the participants in this terrorist group. It was reported that most members of the group were associated with the “international Jewish bourgeois-nationalist organization ‘Joint,’” established by American intelligence, which carried out the dismissal of people of European descent from medical and other institutions.

At the end of August 1948, L.F. Tiamashuk, head of the electrocardiography department at the Kremlin Hospital, sent a letter to General N.S. Vlasik, head of the First Main Directorate of Security of the Ministry of State Security (MGB), claiming that the professors treating A.A. Zhdanov were allegedly misdiagnosing his illness. The following day, Vlasik forwarded this letter to Minister of State Security V.S. Abakumov, who then passed it on to Stalin. A major “case” was being prepared, and its architects were in no hurry. The trial was personally conceived by Stalin and pursued several goals. It could become the beginning of mass repressions in the country, reminiscent of the 1930s. There is reason to believe that through the “killer doctors,” they intended to implicate prominent party and state figures whom Stalin wanted to eliminate. The aging and increasingly suspicious Stalin now considered Molotov and Mikoyan among his opponents.

It is clear that mental life has a dynamic nature. Consciousness transitions to the subconscious and vice versa. No mental event can be purely assessed as conscious or subconscious. Between consciousness and the subconscious, there is an intermediate stage—an “amorphous consciousness.” Genealogical memory, intuition, movements, habits, inclinations, various gestures, facial expressions, and thoughts are drawn from the subconscious. Pathology helps to understand the significance of amorphous consciousness. During mental illness, disturbances in amorphous consciousness occur precisely due to emotions and feelings in interpersonal relationships. During such times, a patient may begin to hate a mother they once deeply loved or to regard close people with contempt. At the Central Committee plenary session on October 16, 1952, Stalin directed harsh words at Molotov and accused Mikoyan of “dishonesty before the party.”

Understanding Stalin's emotional outbursts during his amorphous state, one might have little doubt that their fate was sealed.

In 1948, the chairman of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (JAC), the prominent artist Solomon Mikhoels, was killed. Shortly afterward, the JAC was disbanded, and its members were arrested on charges of espionage and anti-Soviet nationalist activities. In 1949, a so-called anti-cosmopolitan campaign, overtly anti-Semitic in nature, was unleashed. In August 1952, a group of JAC members was executed following a court ruling. The provocation was intended to link the "JAC case" with the "crimes of the doctors." Professor M.S. Vovsi, a cousin of S.M. Mikhoels, who allegedly received directives from the U.S. through the JAC member-doctor, was expected to serve as the link between them.

Preparations were underway for a grand anti-Semitic trial, with expectations of mass repressions and the planned relocation of Jews to remote areas in the North and Far East. Freud observed that a psychopath does not completely lose consciousness, but instead retains fragments of awareness. If a person fully understood the disruption occurring within their psyche—if psyche and consciousness were entirely unified—they would be unable to act or speak. An individual manifests their consciousness through their interaction with the surrounding environment and through the information available to others. Thus, the structure of consciousness includes mental processes such as intuition, memory, and intellect, which serve to enrich one's knowledge. Stimuli affecting the brain create memories of incidents, drawing forgotten images into consciousness to become focal points of attention.

Consciousness is fundamentally linked to the perception of the "immediate and concrete," yet experience demonstrates that such perceptions are not sustained for long periods. A consciously imagined episode soon fades into the subconscious. Mental life is thus dynamic: information that particularly irritates or disturbs may shift from the subconscious to consciousness under the pressure of external stresses. This dynamic transition occurred in Stalin. These transitions are often reflected through symbolic gestures, signs, and movements.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was engaged in intense military preparations. On May 15, 1941, the General Staff, under the leadership of G. Zhukov, presented Stalin with a plan for a preemptive strike against German forces. The proposed attack was to be directed southwest, toward Krakow-Katowice, with the aim of cutting off German troops in the south and blocking their access to Romanian oil supplies. By mid-June, five Soviet armies were moved to the western borders of the USSR, with the offensive scheduled for early June. However, on June 22, 1941, at four o'clock in the morning, without any declaration of war, the German army launched a surprise invasion of the Soviet Union. The Soviet military forces were unprepared; German troops rapidly surrounded and disabled Soviet

positions. Aircraft were destroyed on airfields before they could even take off, and in the ensuing panic, Soviet forces abandoned tanks, artillery, and strategic positions, resulting in a catastrophic initial defeat.

This defeat dealt a profound psychological blow to Stalin. From June 28 to June 30, he isolated himself at his country residence, refusing to manage state affairs or answer telephone calls. Alarmed by Stalin's withdrawal, Molotov gathered members of the Politburo and visited Stalin at his Kuntsevo dacha. Visibly depressed and fatigued, Stalin received them and spoke of resignation, suggesting that perhaps a more suitable leader should be chosen. K. Voroshilov immediately objected, stating, "That cannot be considered," and the other Politburo members echoed their support. By July 1, Stalin returned to the Kremlin and resumed his leadership duties.

As the German forces advanced toward Moscow, Stalin took drastic security measures. Beginning in July, prisoners from Moscow's jails were evacuated. Stalin feared that if Moscow fell, his political enemies might be freed. On October 16, 1941, under an order from People's Commissar Beria, 138 prisoners from Butyrka prison were executed. On October 17, Mikhail Sergeevich Kedrov, a former member of the VChK Collegium, was also executed.

On October 28, 1941, further executions took place: Colonel-General Grigory Mikhailovich Shtern, twice Hero of the Soviet Union and Lieutenant-General of Aviation Yakov Vladimirovich Smushkevich, Lieutenant-General of Aviation Pavel Vasilyevich Rychagov, and Lieutenant-General Ivan Iosifovich Proskurov, former head of the Red Army's Fifth (intelligence) Directorate, were all executed. Stalin preferred to eliminate these military leaders rather than assign them to the front lines. These actions reflected the deep mistrust and hostility Stalin harbored toward those around him. His primary goal remained the physical removal of real or imagined rivals, driven by a persistent fear of losing power.

Marshal G.K. Zhukov later recounted to military historian Viktor Alexandrovich Anfilov that on October 7, 1941, he was urgently summoned to Moscow by the High Command due to Stalin's deteriorating condition. Zhukov was brought to the Kuntsevo dacha, where he overheard a conversation between Stalin and Beria. Stalin, unaware of Zhukov's arrival, instructed Beria to explore, through secret channels, the possibility of negotiating peace with Germany. Meanwhile, on October 15, the State Defense Committee issued a resolution concerning the evacuation of Moscow. Beria was personally tasked with ensuring the destruction of all critical infrastructure to prevent it from falling into enemy hands.

French President General Charles de Gaulle, who visited Moscow in December 1944 as the leader of the Provisional Government of France after its liberation from Nazi occupation, retained bitter memories of his meeting with Stalin.

"After the official negotiations," wrote de Gaulle in his memoirs, "Stalin began making toasts to each of those present. Turning to the commander of aviation, he said: 'You lead our air force. If you use the planes poorly, you know what awaits you.' Turning to the commander of the Red Army's rear support, Stalin said: 'The chief of logistics must supply the front with materials and personnel. Do it properly, or you'll be hanged, as we do here.' Finishing the toast, Stalin would call out the name of the one he was addressing: 'Come over here!' The marshal or general would hurry to Stalin to clink glasses with him. The French guest left the dinner at the earliest opportunity. As he was seeing de Gaulle off, Stalin cast a grim look at translator Boris Podtserob, an aide to Molotov, and suddenly said to him: 'You know too much. I feel like sending you to the camps.' 'Along with my companions,' de Gaulle wrote in his memoirs, 'I walked out. Turning back at the threshold, I saw Stalin, sitting alone at the table, eating something again.'"

This raises an important question: how is an image of the "father of the people" formed around a man with a deeply troubled psyche? Does it imply that charismatic leaders must inherently tend toward tyranny, dictatorship, and cruelty? There is only one answer: if society demands such personalities, they will inevitably emerge. Everything depends on society itself. This pattern applies equally to fascist Germany. Hitler, as a charismatic leader, became a cruel executioner. Under his regime, seven million Jews were annihilated, and fifty million people perished as a result of his policies. Within this context, Stalin's opinion of Hitler is particularly revealing. According to Zhukov's recollections: "On May 4, 1945, at 18:00, I reported Hitler's suicide to Stalin over the phone, to which Stalin replied, 'Only bandits and adventurers end their lives in suicide. Because, sooner or later, they must answer to the people they tortured.'"

What a paradox arises from this statement. Who then was responsible for the mass terror inflicted upon the Soviet people? Who bears the burden of responsibility for the millions of lives lost during the Stalinist repressions? Yet history, regrettably, tends to justify the victors and overlooks the defeated.

In 1943, the Tehran Conference was held among the leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition. This event remains a pivotal moment in diplomatic history. The participants included I. Stalin, F. Roosevelt, and W. Churchill. Each leader approached the matters of history, politics, and the future from distinct perspectives. The logic of wartime necessity brought them together against a common enemy. Central to their discussions was the deployment of Allied forces across the English Channel into Western Europe, thereby opening a Second Front. However, Churchill was reluctant to support Stalin's proposal. He advocated instead for opening the Second Front through the Balkans. His strategy aimed to capture Romania and other Balkan states, to deploy American and British forces across Southern and Central Europe, to support Yugoslav partisans with arms and supplies, to draw Turkey into the conflict, and to prevent the Soviet Army from

entering Central and Eastern Europe, Austria, Romania, and Hungary. In doing so, he intended to transform this region into a sphere of Anglo-American influence. Stalin, however, fully understood Churchill's ambitions.

During the conference, the sides were unable to reach an immediate agreement regarding the timing for the opening of the Second Front in Normandy, northern France. The British Commander-in-Chief, Allan Brooke, continued to insist on launching the offensive through the Balkans. The American delegation maintained a neutral stance, observing the dispute. A particularly complex situation thus unfolded. The nations and leaders, tasked with determining the fate of the world, engaged in subtle psychological maneuvering against one another. Each power sought to assert itself as the postwar global leader and superpower. Amidst this tense political atmosphere, Stalin demonstrated his characteristic firmness. Addressing the assembly, he stated: "We are leaving the conference, and we have no time for idle talk. We have much to do at the front."

Stalin's firmness, determination, and uncompromising stance forced Churchill to concede. As a result, the date for the opening of the Second Front was set for May 1944, with the landing scheduled for Normandy. Owing to Stalin's strong leadership and strategic insight, the Soviet Army ultimately secured dominance over Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia.

Stalin's appointees in extreme situations

One hour and ten minutes before Stalin's death, a meeting of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU took place, during which organizational issues were preliminarily discussed. It was deemed necessary "to have one body in the Central Committee of the CPSU – the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU – instead of two bodies, the Presidium and the Bureau of the Presidium, as defined by the party's charter." Before the meeting, Nikita Khrushchev suggested to Malenkov, "Let's talk about how we will live from now on." However, he received a cold refusal: "What's the point of talking now? Everyone will gather, and then we'll discuss. That's why we're gathering."

At the joint meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the evening of March 5, Beria nominated Malenkov for the position of Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Malenkov, in turn, proposed merging the two ministries – the Ministry of State Security (MGB) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) – into one Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, to be headed by Beria. Voroshilov became Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and Khrushchev was appointed chairman of the commission for organizing Stalin's funeral, being recommended to focus on his work in the Central Committee of the CPSU.

In his book *History is a Harsh Teacher*, A.N. Shelepin writes: "I first met and spoke with Khrushchev in 1946, when I was the secretary of the Central Committee of the Komsomol. The beginning of my closer relationship with Khrushchev was marked by Stalin's death. In early March 1953, a regular plenary session of the Central Committee of the Komsomol was scheduled. I was preparing my report in my office when suddenly the phone rang: I was summoned to the Central Committee of the CPSU, where members of the Central Committee were informed that Stalin had died. I was instructed to inform members of the Central Committee of the Komsomol and to await further orders. When I gathered the bureau members and shared this news, someone proposed renaming the Leninist Komsomol to the Lenin-Stalinist Komsomol. I went to Khrushchev and reported this to him. He agreed. However, around midnight, he called me at home and said that they had discussed it and decided not to do it."

After becoming Minister of the unified Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Beria concentrated enormous power in his hands. Various versions exist of how he intended to use it. It is known that in a conversation with Mikoyan, he expressed his beliefs as follows: "Lawfulness needs to be restored. We have many people under arrest who should be freed, and people should not be sent to camps without reason. The Ministry of Internal Affairs needs to be reduced; we are not here for surveillance but for oversight of them." Then, on March 9, speaking at

Stalin's funeral from the mausoleum podium, he declared that the rights of every citizen of the USSR, granted by the Constitution, would be guaranteed.

Following Beria's directive, in March 1953, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) Secretariat prepared and submitted a proposal to the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers, addressed to Malenkov and Khrushchev, suggesting an amnesty for all those convicted by extrajudicial bodies, particularly the "troikas." Another proposal recommended limiting the powers of the special tribunal under the minister (also an extrajudicial body) to a maximum sentence of ten years in the camps. However, during a meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium to discuss this issue, Khrushchev, supported by Molotov and Kaganovich, opposed the initiative, and Beria withdrew his proposal.

Based on a decree published in *Pravda* on March 28, more than a million people were released from detention facilities (this decree applied to those sentenced to terms of up to five years). The amnesty also affected those convicted under the decree "On the Protection of State and Personal Property" from June 4, 1947. However, all radical proposals from the MVD concerning the amnesty of those repressed in the 1930s and 1940s were rejected, with Beria being advised that he was carrying out such actions "with excessive haste."

At the same time, in the spring of 1953, under Beria's orders, local MVD bodies began collecting materials confirming the incompetence of party organs in economic matters. Party officials also became highly alarmed by an order to gather unrestricted data on the national and educational levels of the staff of regional, city, and district party committees.

Documents preserved in the archives indicate that in the first months following Stalin's death, the Beria-Malenkov pair shaped all CPSU Central Committee Presidium decisions in alignment with their own interests. For three and a half months after Stalin's death, Beria continued to put forward new initiatives.

On April 4, 1953, a "Statement from the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs" was published in newspapers. The public was informed that an investigative group, established by order of L.P. Beria, had determined that violence had been used during the investigation in the "Doctors' Case," that the confessions did not reflect the truth, and that the accusations were baseless. Through these actions, Beria aimed to gain Molotov's support, as Molotov's wife had been arrested in the "Doctors' Case." Additionally, he wanted to send a warning signal to Khrushchev and other factions aspiring to power. Since N.S. Khrushchev served as the secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the Party in 1936 and had been elected to the Central Committee Presidium since 1939, he was notorious for the "Moscow Trials," during which many innocent people were arrested and

executed. As the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Khrushchev also implemented mass terror against those who protested the widespread famine.

At that time, "troikas" referred to Stalinist extrajudicial bodies in which party officials carried out summary judgments against political opponents of the regime. These "troikas" operated in Moscow, as well as in the union republics, regions, territories, and cities. N. Khrushchev was a member of one of these "troikas" in Ukraine and Moscow.

In May 1937, delivering a report at the IV Moscow City Party Conference, N. Khrushchev spoke about sabotage and the fight against "enemies of the people," "Trotskyites and Bukharinites." On August 14, 1937, the plenum of the Moscow City Committee of the VKP(b), after hearing Khrushchev's report on measures to strengthen district party committees, instructed the bureau to urgently review all available materials concerning connections between certain senior officials and enemies of the people, and to ensure the strengthening of district party committees and party organizations with vetted party cadres. In his report, Khrushchev stated, "We must destroy these scoundrels. Our hands must not tremble; we must step over the corpses of enemies for the good of the people."

What happened as a result? By early 1938, almost all the secretaries of the Moscow and Moscow City Committees of the VKP(b), most district and city committee secretaries, many leading Soviet, trade union, and Komsomol officials, as well as hundreds of enterprise managers, specialists, and figures in science and culture, had been repressed.

Beria received letters from political prisoners proclaiming their innocence, the majority of which accused Khrushchev. It was N. S. Khrushchev who had given the orders for their arrests. Beria was preparing to remove N. S. Khrushchev from the political arena using these facts.

People were sent from Moscow to the national republics as second secretaries (in most cases Slavs) to oversee the activities of national leaders. Khrushchev understood from these sources that Beria was planning to expose him as one of the leaders of the "troika." Khrushchev then began devising a plan for Beria's physical elimination.

It was no coincidence that, following Beria's death, on Khrushchev's orders, all documents confirming his activities in Ukraine and in the Moscow City Committee of the Party, particularly regarding the "Moscow Purges," were retrieved from the archives and destroyed. Khrushchev had signed arrest warrants, was directly involved in mass repressions, condemned both "rightists" and "leftists" in his speeches in Moscow and Ukraine, and demanded that they be held to the most severe account.

After these purges, Khrushchev became a judge condemning Stalin. In 1957, the director of the Party Institute under the Moscow City Party Committee, Kastamarova, found documents in the archives signed by N. Khrushchev, ordering the execution of innocent people.

In 1988, the Politburo Commission of the CPSU Central Committee found an excerpt on the repressions conducted: "While leading the Moscow City Party Committee in 1936, Khrushchev repressed 55,741 people. While serving as the First Secretary of the Party in Ukraine, he repressed 167,585 people from 1936 to 1940" (*Anthology of Domestic History 1948–1995*, Moscow, 1996, p. 317).

On July 2, 1948, the well-known decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was drafted by Khrushchev himself. Based on this decree, people who failed to fulfill their duties were exiled to new locations.

In his memoirs (*From Stalin to Yeltsin*, N. K. Baibakov, p. 153), Mikhail Stepanovich Dokuchaev, a Hero of the Soviet Union and Deputy Head of the 9th Directorate of the KGB (which guarded senior state leaders), writes: "During the war, N. S. Khrushchev's son, Leonid, committed a serious crime. In a drunken frenzy, Leonid killed his comrade by attempting to shoot a bottle placed on the man's head, but instead hit the officer in the face. Nikita Khrushchev, wanting to save his son from punishment, appealed to Stalin. Entering his office, Khrushchev knelt and tearfully begged him to pardon his son. However, Stalin did not pardon him but sent him to a disciplinary battalion on the front lines. Young Khrushchev died in the Battle of Stalingrad. Khrushchev vowed to take revenge on Stalin."

This attitude of Khrushchev towards Stalin can be understood. In those years, the children of other high-ranking officials were also drinking, partying, and playing in "underground organizations" led by "fuhrrers," shooting at each other with trophy pistols. Vladimir Alliluyev writes in his book *Chronicle of a Family* that in 1943, he often pondered the origins of Vasily Stalin's alcoholism. "In 1943, at Zubalovo (a government dacha), things took a particularly bad turn." Vasily Stalin drove out his wife Galina, "and later my grandfather, mother, and all of us from Zubalovo, because our family was outraged by his behavior, openly confronting him about his immoral actions. It was as if Vasily had fallen under a dark spell, ignoring everything and continuing to party with his friends."

An analysis of archival documents suggests that Beria indeed had serious plans to seize power after Stalin's death. In the first few months following Stalin's death, the Beria-Malenkov duo directed all decisions of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee according to their own interests. For three and a half months after Stalin's death, Beria retained his positions and continuously introduced new initiatives.

Beria spent considerable time contemplating his moves, analyzing events, considering the balance of power, and developing plans. He searched for someone within the Kremlin who could support him. However, he sensed a gathering force around Khrushchev. Beria understood that the atmosphere in the Kremlin was turning against him. In his efforts to carry out his plans, he raised national issues, proposing to replace Moscow-appointed officials in the union republics with national cadres. He advocated creating conditions for the return of national émigrés, for the return of deported people to their lands, and for establishing common ground with local national leaders. These initiatives were particularly evident in Beria's special proposals for Lithuania, Latvia, Belarus, and Western Ukraine. He suggested a return to the Soviets established after the February Revolution of 1917, emphasizing democratic principles.

However, Beria felt the psychological pressure from the Russian political elite. He did not fully trust Malenkov. N. S. Khrushchev, in his memoirs, wrote: "I met with Politburo members one-on-one, trying to win them over. The person I was most wary of was Malenkov, as he was close to Beria. However, Malenkov, seeing no other way out, also supported me in this matter. After Malenkov, I came to an agreement with K. E. Voroshilov and L. Kaganovich. For the planned arrest, I invited Marshal G. K. Zhukov. At that time, Zhukov had been removed from his position as Minister of Defense and was commanding the Odessa Military District. Beria had tried to arrest Zhukov several times, but Stalin had prevented it. Knowing this, I felt confident that Zhukov would support me. When Zhukov entered my office, I said, 'We need to arrest that scoundrel Beria.' Zhukov replied, 'Nikita Sergeevich, I have never been a policeman, but I would gladly do this. How should we proceed?' I asked him to be ready with officers loyal to him for my call."

General K. S. Moskalenko, one of the main participants in Beria's arrest, recalls those days in June 1953: "At 9 a.m. on June 25, 1953, Khrushchev called me through the Kremlin's internal phone line. After greeting me, he asked, 'Are there people around you who are as loyal to the party as you are?' After thinking for a moment, I replied, 'There are such people, and they are unconditionally devoted to the party.'

After this, Khrushchev told me to bring these people with me to the Kremlin to meet the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Comrade Malenkov G. M., in the office where Stalin used to work. He added that I should also bring air defense plans, maps, and cigars. I replied that I would bring everything mentioned, but that I had quit smoking back in 1941 during the war. Khrushchev laughed and said that the cigars might be needed for a different reason than I was thinking. Only then did I realize that he meant I should bring weapons.

At the end of the conversation, he said he would call the Minister of Defense, Comrade Bulganin N. A. Khrushchev's hint about bringing weapons led me to believe that we had an important mission to carry out for the CPSU Central Committee Presidium.

I immediately pressed the button to summon Major Yuferev V. I., an officer for special assignments, Major General Bakov A. I., Chief of Staff, and Colonel Zub I. G., head of the political department, and informed them that we were going to the Kremlin and should be armed. Since none of us had weapons, I called the commandant of the headquarters, Major Khizhnyak M. G., and ordered him to bring and issue pistols and ammunition. Because our group was small, I then called the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (the former Chief of Staff of the Air Defense District), Major General Batytsky P. F., and asked him to come to me with a weapon.

Shortly after, the Minister of Defense, Marshal Bulganin N. A., called, saying that Khrushchev had called him and suggested that I come to see him first—that is, to Bulganin. With my group, now armed, I arrived at the Ministry of Defense. Comrade Bulganin received me alone. He said that Khrushchev had called him, which was why he had summoned me. He explained that we needed to arrest Beria, who had a strong and loyal guard in the Kremlin. 'How many people do you have with you?' he asked. I replied, 'Five, all of whom are battle-tested front-line soldiers, reliable people devoted to the Communist Party, the Soviet government, and the people.' To this, he replied, 'That's all well and good, but it's very few people.' He then asked, 'Who else do you think we could recruit quickly?'

I suggested his deputy, Marshal Vasilevsky. He immediately rejected this idea for some reason. Then I asked him who among the influential military people was currently at the ministry. He said, 'Zhukov G. K.' I then proposed involving him, and he agreed, but insisted that Zhukov be unarmed. However, since we were still few in number, he asked, 'Who else do you think we could invite?' I first named the Deputy Head of the Main Political Department, Brezhnev L. I., whom I knew from the war on the 1st and 4th Ukrainian Fronts as a brave and courageous general, a political officer loyal to the party and the people. I had met him many times under combat conditions.

The second person I named was Lieutenant General Shatilov, also a deputy head of the Main Political Directorate and former head of the political department of the 1st Ukrainian Front. The third was Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Getman, a former tank corps commander of our front. The fourth was Colonel General of Artillery Nedelin, whom I also knew from the war. Fifth, Bulganin suggested including Colonel General Pronin A.M., a member of the Military

Council of the Moscow Military District. Since there was little time, none of them had weapons, except for Brezhnev L.I., who was given a pistol by Bulganin.

Why Khrushchev chose to approach me specifically, I find hard to answer. After Beria's arrest, during a regular report to Malenkov, he mentioned to me and the Prosecutor General, Comrade Rudenko R.A., that before turning to Comrade Moskalenko K.S. to conduct this operation, they had first approached one of the marshals of the Soviet Union, who had refused to do it. Who this marshal was, Comrade Rudenko and I did not ask.

Khrushchev only knew me from the war, from the military actions at the front, and we occasionally met after the war. Stalin's attitude towards me at that time was also good, as it had been during the war. I had never personally met Beria before and only knew of him from the press. Therefore, I accepted Khrushchev's proposal, clarified by Bulganin, as an assignment from our party, our Central Committee, and its Presidium. I should note that all members of the Central Committee Presidium, such as Molotov V.M., Malenkov G.M., Voroshilov K.E., and others, treated me well.

Around 11:00 a.m. on June 26, at Bulganin's suggestion, we got into his car and went to the Kremlin. His car had government signals and was not subject to inspection at the Kremlin entrance. Upon reaching the building of the Council of Ministers, I went up in the elevator with Bulganin, while Bakov A.I., Batytsky P.F., Zub I.G., and Yuferev V.I. took the stairs. Zhukov G.K., Brezhnev L.I., Shatilov, Nedelin, Getman, and Pronin A.M. followed in another car. Bulganin escorted all of us to the waiting room next to Malenkov's office, then left us and entered Malenkov's office.

After a few minutes, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Malenkov, and Molotov came out to us. They began explaining that recently Beria had been behaving arrogantly towards the members of the Central Committee Presidium, spying on them, listening in on their phone conversations, tracking their movements, monitoring their meetings, and being rude to everyone. They informed us that a Presidium meeting was about to take place, and after a prearranged signal from Malenkov's assistant, Sukhanov, we would need to enter the office and arrest Beria. At that time, he had not yet arrived.

N.S. Khrushchev recalls: "At the meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium on June 26, 1953, all the members of the Presidium were gathered, but L. Beria had not arrived yet. It seemed to me that someone had betrayed me. However, after a while, L. Beria himself entered. He sat down on a chair and asked, 'Why was I summoned so unexpectedly, and what is on the agenda?' At that moment, without hesitating, I said, 'There is only one item on the agenda: the anti-party antics of the agent of international imperialism, L. Beria. I propose that

he be removed from his position, from the Politburo, and from the ranks of the CPSU, and that the matter be handed over to the tribunal. Who is in favor?' I said this and raised my left hand while pressing the alarm button with my right, signaling Zhukov. By the time Zhukov and the officers entered, others had also raised their hands. Zhukov, along with the officers, surrounded L. Beria and ordered, 'Hands up.' Completely stunned, L. Beria could not understand what was happening."

General K.S. Moskalenko recalled: "It all happened so suddenly for Beria that he was completely bewildered. When arrested, he had a piece of paper in his briefcase, scribbled all over with red pencil—'Alarm, alarm, alarm.' Apparently, as soon as they started talking about him and criticizing his actions at the meeting, he immediately sensed the danger and planned to give this note to the Kremlin security."

After it all happened, the meeting continued for another 15-20 minutes, and then all the Presidium members and Zhukov went home. Five of us—Batytsky, Baksov, Moskalenko, Zub, and Yuferev—were left with Beria. Outside, in the reception area, the doors were guarded by Brezhnev, Getman, Nedelin, Pronin, and Shatilov.

Beria was nervous, tried to approach the window, and several times asked the military to let him go to the restroom. All five of us, with our weapons drawn, escorted him there and back. It was clear that he wanted to somehow signal the MGB guards, who were everywhere, both in military uniform and civilian clothing, and all armed.

Time dragged on, and Malenkov's assistant, Sukhanov, who had been in the reception area the whole time, arranged for tea. But night still had not fallen to allow Beria to be taken out of the Kremlin unnoticed. Late in the evening, around 10 or 11 p.m., Army General Maslennikov, Beria's first deputy, suddenly appeared in the reception area. He raised a fuss, demanding to know what was going on.

I stepped out and calmly replied, "Please do not make noise or shout," and immediately called Bulganin. He ordered that Maslennikov leave the Kremlin immediately, and then asked for the phone to be handed to Maslennikov. I do not know what they discussed, but after putting down the phone, they both left at once. Later, when Beria's case was being reviewed, Maslennikov shot himself.

Beria's trial lasted an entire month. Together with two carpenters, I constructed a shield of boards, 3 by 2 meters, and attached it to the wall. Beria was brought into the room from the sleeping area of the bunker. They led him up to the shield and tied his hands behind his back. Beria acted very proud, but he had already turned

pale. In the bunker hall, the members of the court were Mikhailov, Shvernik, Batytsky, Moskalenko, his adjutant, and Prosecutor Rudenko. There was no doctor. They stood 5–6 meters from Beria. General Batytsky stepped forward, took out his 'Parabellum,' and shot Beria.

A.N. Shelepin writes: "Take I.A. Serov, the former Chairman of the USSR KGB. He was Beria's deputy, a very close associate, and directly involved in the mass deportation of entire peoples—Karachays, Chechens, Volga Germans, Crimean Tatars, Ingush, Balkars, and others. While working in the GDR as a representative of the NKVD during the evacuation of property, he sent Stalin an encrypted message about Lieutenant General K.F. Telegin, a member of the Military Council of the German group of forces, stating that he 'was embittered towards the NKVD.' As a result, Telegin was arrested and sentenced to 25 years. Serov had direct involvement in the execution of 15,000 Polish servicemen in Katyn Forest and was one of the participants in the failed attempt to create a special prison for political prisoners."

However, until the end of December 1958, Serov remained the Chairman of the USSR KGB, after which he was appointed by Khrushchev as the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR.

After physically eliminating L.P. Beria and the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Azerbaijan SSR, M.D. Baghirov, Khrushchev then turned his sights on the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, G. Malenkov, and his First Deputy, L.M. Kaganovich. Khrushchev informed his close circle about this. But the opposing side also began to regroup for a counterattack. By 1956, a rally against Khrushchev was held in Tbilisi, and the army dispersed it with force.

Malenkov and Kaganovich worked to win over V. Molotov, N.A. Bulganin, K.E. Voroshilov, M. Pervukhin, M. Saburov, and D. Shepilov. At the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, they launched a critique of Khrushchev. It is worth noting that A. Mikoyan secretly supported Khrushchev, although in this confrontation, neither Mikoyan nor Molotov openly attacked each other.

On June 18, 1957, the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee convened in the Kremlin. This session was unusual, lasting three days, with the Kremlin under heightened security. During the Presidium meeting, Molotov and Malenkov unexpectedly raised the issue of Khrushchev's removal. Khrushchev's opponents, who had previously opposed each other, united this time, carefully keeping their plan under wraps as they discussed his dismissal.

Khrushchev's opponents, anticipating success, had already discussed Khrushchev's fate. If he acknowledged his mistakes and agreed to resign, he would be demoted, for example, to the level of Minister of Agriculture of the

USSR. In other cases, they did not rule out the possibility of arresting him. He remained highly popular, not only among the public—though they could overlook this—but also among most members of the CPSU Central Committee. Therefore, letting him remain free seemed dangerous. They intended to appoint V.M. Molotov as First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Three members of the Presidium supported Khrushchev: Mikoyan, Suslov, and Kirichenko. Seven members—Molotov, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Pervukhin, and Saburov—stood against Khrushchev. Presidium candidate members Brezhnev, Zhukov, Mukhtidinov, Shvernik, and Furtseva also supported Khrushchev, but they only had an advisory vote at the session.

Ultimately, the Presidium of the Central Committee decided to remove Khrushchev from his position as First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. But Khrushchev declared that the Presidium did not elect him as First Secretary—the Plenum of the Central Committee did, and only the Plenum could remove him from this post. He demanded that a Central Committee Plenum be convened, but this was rejected by the Presidium. However, the Molotov-Malenkov group placed too much hope in the formal decision of the Presidium. Khrushchev was supported not only by the army but also by the KGB.

The vast majority of participants in the Plenum that was eventually convened unconditionally supported Khrushchev. The Plenum ran from June 22 to June 29, where they heard Khrushchev's report "On the State of the Party." It should be noted that Khrushchev urgently pulled from the archives all documents concerning his activities in the "troika" and other matters and destroyed them. He then began to accuse those whose documents remained in the archives as part of the "anti-party group."

Molotov was given the opportunity to express his views in detail, but all subsequent speakers supported Khrushchev, not Molotov. Seeing the defeat of the Molotov-Kaganovich-Malenkov group, Bulganin and Voroshilov quickly took the podium and switched to Khrushchev's side.

At the 1957 Plenum, members of the "anti-Party group" were removed from the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, as well as from Central Committee membership. Under these circumstances, Voroshilov, Bulganin, Saburov, and Pervukhin decided to give repentant speeches. However, Voroshilov and Bulganin did not realize that they would soon face the same fate as the members of the "anti-Party group."

Malenkov also acknowledged his mistakes. By the end of the Plenum, only Molotov remained defiant, abstaining as the only one from voting on the Plenum's resolution.

The Plenum's resolution and a brief report on its work were published only on July 4, 1957. The Plenum's decisions referred to the "anti-Party group of Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Molotov" but did not mention the involvement of Voroshilov, Bulganin, and others. Voroshilov and Bulganin retained their posts. Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and "the one who had joined them, Shepilov" were removed from the Presidium and from the CPSU Central Committee. Saburov lost his position as a Presidium member, while Pervukhin was reduced to a candidate member of the Presidium.

The June Plenum expanded the number of Presidium members to 15, adding recent candidates: L.I. Brezhnev, E.A. Furtseva, F.R. Kozlov, N.M. Shvernik, and G.K. Zhukov. A.B. Aristov, N.I. Belyayev, and O.V. Kuusinen also became Presidium members. Among the nine candidates for Presidium membership were A.N. Kosygin, A.P. Kirilenko, and K.T. Mazurov.

Molotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov lost their posts as First Deputy Chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers. A.A. Gromyko replaced D.T. Shepilov as Foreign Minister.

None of Khrushchev's opponents were expelled from the Party at that time, but all were assigned positions outside Moscow. Molotov was appointed Soviet Ambassador to Mongolia. Kaganovich became director of the Ural Mining and Processing Plant in the city of Asbest, and Malenkov became director of the Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydroelectric Station on the Irtysh River. Shepilov received a professorship in Central Asia.

In July 1957, Pervukhin and Saburov lost their posts as Deputy Chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers, with A.N. Kosygin and D.F. Ustinov becoming First Deputy Chairmen.

Psychological portrait of Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev

How could it happen that Beria underestimated Khrushchev—his abilities, his cunning, and his character—perceiving him as a "gray Cossack," a simpleton he could easily manipulate? Khrushchev, in his speech, spoke with a certain triumph about how Beria considered him a fool.



Khrushchev's rise to power was both a matter of chance and circumstance. Had Malenkov not clashed with Beria, and had the "Stalinist guard" united in 1953 rather than in June 1957, Khrushchev might never have become the leader. The entire course of Soviet history could have been different.

Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev appeared robust, lively, and cheerfully mischievous. His broad face, marked by two moles, large bald head, prominent snub nose, and protruding ears, could easily have belonged to a peasant from a central Russian village. This impression of "commonfolk" origin was reinforced by his stocky, full figure and long arms, which gestured almost continuously. Only his eyes—small, gray-blue, and sharp—betrayed a certain insincerity, capable of expressing kindness, authority, or anger. Certain psychological traits and temperament, indeed, manifest in facial features. By the structure and mobility of the face, one can often infer the type of nervous activity. Intelligence is often said to be reflected in the eyes, while emotions reveal themselves through the movements of the mouth and the patterns of wrinkles.

For example, the expression known as the "omega of the melancholic"—slightly raised and drawn-together eyebrows resembling the Greek letter omega (Ω)—indicates sorrow. The lower part of the orbicular muscle around the eye, often termed the "muscle of friendliness," contracts during genuine smiling. If it remains inactive, and the lower eyelids do not rise during a smile, it is considered a reliable sign of insincerity.

William James, the American psychologist, noted that "even in the slightest moment of distress, our emotional state is physiologically expressed, primarily through the contraction of the eye and brow muscles." He also observed that unexpected difficulties induce a physical sensation of awkwardness in the throat, prompting one to swallow, clear the throat, or cough slightly. Moreover, "in surprise or fright, we blink, even if there is no direct danger to the eyes," and the

momentary aversion of the gaze can be a reliable indicator that an offer has been poorly received and refusal is likely. Wrinkles radiating from the eyes are typically associated with a cheerful character and genuine humor.

While these observations confirm that mental states manifest in outward expressions, they do not validate the claims of physiognomy and phrenology that assert a direct link between appearance and personality or character. Khrushchev's anthropological features were characteristic of the Slavic peoples. Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians constitute the eastern group of Slavs. Khrushchev's small gray-blue eyes, height of 169 cm, and head circumference of 83 cm are typical traits of the population of central Russia and closely resemble the Ukrainian type found in neighboring regions.

Khrushchev was distinguished by his impulsiveness, hastiness, and emotional intensity. Born in 1894 in the village of Kalinovka in the Kursk province, he began working early. By the age of twelve, he was already employed in factories and mines in the Donbas region. He often recalled his youth as a factory worker and mechanic with a sense of pride. In 1918, he joined the Bolshevik Party and participated in the Civil War. Afterward, he held various administrative and party positions. He represented Ukraine at the 14th and 15th Congresses of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

In 1929, he enrolled at the Industrial Academy in Moscow, where he served as secretary of the party committee. During this period, he met Stalin for the first time through his classmate, Stalin's wife, thereby initiating his ascent within the party hierarchy. From January 1931, he served as secretary of the Bauman and later the Krasnopresnensky district party committees. From 1932 to 1934, he worked first as the second and then as the first secretary of the Moscow City Committee (MGK) and second secretary of the Moscow Regional Committee (MK) of the CPSU. At the 17th Congress of the CPSU in 1934, Khrushchev was elected to the Central Committee. By 1935, he was leading both the Moscow city and regional party organizations.

In 1938, he became First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and a candidate member of the Politburo, attaining full membership in the Politburo a year later. During the Great Patriotic War, Khrushchev served on the military councils of the Southwestern Direction, and the Southwestern, Stalingrad, Southern, Voronezh, and 1st Ukrainian Fronts, ultimately achieving the rank of Lieutenant General.

Between 1944 and 1947, he served as Chairman of the Council of Ministers (SNK) of the Ukrainian SSR, before resuming his role as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. In December 1949, he once again became First Secretary of the Moscow Regional Committee and

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. After Stalin's death in March 1953, Khrushchev focused entirely on Central Committee work, and in September 1953, he was elected First Secretary of the Central Committee. From 1958 onward, he concurrently served as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

A.N. Shelepin writes:

“In April 1958, during the XIII Congress of the Komsomol, Khrushchev invited me and said that the Central Committee of the Party was of the opinion that I should not be reappointed as First Secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, but instead approved as Head of the Department of Party Organs of the CPSU Central Committee for the Union Republics. I must admit, this came as a surprise to me. Thanking him, I said that I would try to justify the trust of the Central Committee. However, I did not work in that position for long.

By the end of December, just before the new year of 1959, Khrushchev shared news that profoundly shocked me: “The Central Committee has decided to assign you to work as the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR.” Offering his advice, he expressed his hope that I would restore the party style and methods of work within the KGB. In conclusion, he made a peculiar request: “Do everything you can to ensure that I'm not being eavesdropped on.” At that moment, I was stunned—could it be that even the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU was being subjected to eavesdropping?

I was further surprised that none of the Presidium members or CPSU Central Committee secretaries had introduced me to the members of the KGB. Nikita Sergeyevich had merely called me and said, “Go to the KGB and take over from Serov.”

It was often noted that Nikita Sergeyevich could be unpredictable in certain circumstances. He would occasionally come up with wildly imaginative ideas, make irrational statements, and harbor suspicions about those around him—even those closest to him. One incident left a particular impression on me, as Shelepin recalled: “On one occasion, Khrushchev invited me over and instructed me to immediately arrest one of his sons-in-law, naming him specifically. ‘He's a foreign spy,’ he stated. I replied that I could not take such action without first



conducting a thorough investigation. He insisted, ‘Just detain him first, then investigate. How much time do you need?’ I responded, ‘I’m not sure exactly, but I believe no less than a month would be necessary.’ A very thorough investigation was conducted, and it was conclusively proven that his son-in-law was innocent. When I relayed this outcome to Khrushchev, he thanked me sincerely.”

Throughout his life, Khrushchev consistently approached events with optimism. Individuals with hyperthymic personalities—active, cheerful people characterized by a good-natured and optimistic spirit, or those who are excitable and argumentative, engaging actively in the affairs of others—tend to maintain an elevated mood. They are cheerful, lively, energetic, carefree in their relationships, constantly satisfied with themselves, and consistently confident in their success. To those around them, they appear businesslike, energetic, and full of initiative, immersing themselves in every event and offering commentary on every matter. However, in reality, such individuals often lack deep knowledge and fail to engage in the full substance of issues. Their interest tends to be unstable and short-lived. Despite their outward cheerfulness, they are frequently prone to boredom and a loss of self-control, though these states pass quickly, often followed by moments of irritability and vengefulness.

A.N. Shelepin recalled, “In his later years, Khrushchev ceased meeting with the members of the Presidium and disregarded their opinions. He became increasingly arrogant and rude, encouraging sycophantic behavior. Many workers in the press, television, and radio actively promoted the myth of the ‘great decade’ and its ‘creator’ and ‘organizer,’ for which they received positions and titles, even though they knew that, during this period, the USSR’s economy had significantly lagged in many respects.”

In the final years of Khrushchev’s leadership, his views began to shift, and an explanation for this change may lie in the reflex functions of the body. When the number of outgoing impulses from the brain exceeds those entering it, the tension in mental activity decreases. Conversely, if the balance between incoming and outgoing brain impulses shifts towards delay, the level of wakefulness increases. This, in turn, reduces the influx of external information into the central nervous system, preventing overstimulation of the body. Such cyclical neural activity represents a fundamental condition for performing essential brain functions. It synchronizes brain activity across both space and time, providing a basis for time perception and facilitating the formation of short-term and operational memory. In essence, this circulating, or retained, brain activity is critical for the continuity of mental processes and overall bodily function.

The protective nature of motor “responses” is confirmed by the fact that, in most cases, when humans experience a strong, sudden stimulus, brain activity becomes so heightened that it cannot be internally balanced by the brain systems. Much of

it shifts to external motor and speech reactions, as there is insufficient time for the brain to form “inhibitions.” This is precisely how it was with Khrushchev: he became unwilling to listen to anyone, instead delivering long and inappropriate speeches. Consequently, A.N. Kosygin even accused Khrushchev of behaving inappropriately towards certain leaders of fraternal parties.

Seeing his “friend” in such a difficult position, A.I. Mikoyan supported the criticism of Khrushchev, but at the same time, he suggested that Khrushchev step down from one of the two positions he held. Mikoyan, however, had no choice but to support Khrushchev, as he feared him. Should Khrushchev have revealed his past to the Presidium members, it could have had unpredictable consequences. There was no certainty that the new team in the Kremlin would not use such information against Mikoyan. Incidentally, in February 1953, Stalin, along with Molotov, had intended to arrest Mikoyan due to questions surrounding his activities in 1918. At that time, when the British captured Baku, Mikoyan was arrested alongside the 26 Baku Commissars, though he was not among those executed in the Turkmen desert. Some rumors suggest that Mikoyan was released by the Dashnaks after negotiations with the Ashgabat Socialist Revolutionary government, while others claim he was not only a Dashnak but was recruited by the British, which may have spared him from execution.

Khrushchev was fully aware of this story, but after Stalin’s death, he halted the investigation. By 1955, Khrushchev’s political power had solidified, and he needed Mikoyan to assist in the removal of Malenkov and Kaganovich. Consequently, eliminating Mikoyan did not align with Khrushchev’s interests, especially considering that Anastas Ivanovich had been instrumental in the struggle against Beria. After his humiliating “retirement,” Khrushchev was assigned a residence in the small dacha settlement of Petrovo-Dalny, located near Moscow along the tranquil bank of the Istra River.

A few notes by Khrushchev’s wife, Nina Petrovna, from that period have been preserved. Nina Petrovna outlived her husband by 13 years. “I do not recall the exact month or year, but N.S. had calmed down somewhat and decided to begin writing memoirs about his work. He would dictate them into a tape recorder, and I transcribed the text from the tapes. As a considerable number of pages accumulated, N.S. gave the tapes to Sergey, so that a typist could retype them. This is how the tapes with N.S.’s recorded memories, as well as the already typed pages, ended up with Sergey. Later, I regretted this; perhaps, if they had stayed with us, what happened might not have transpired...”

Kirilinko summoned him to prevent him from continuing to write his memoirs and demanded that he hand over everything he had written to the Central Committee. In response, N.S. indicated that they could provide him with a stenographer so that all his memories would be available not only to him but also

to the Central Committee. The following day, N.S. was rushed to the hospital by ambulance after suffering a severe heart attack. He underwent a prolonged recovery and, upon his return, would spend hours lying on the veranda next to the bedroom, gradually regaining his strength. He received calls from Pelshe's office, who informed him that a book of N.S. Khrushchev's memoirs had been published abroad. "How did his memoirs end up there? Whom had N.S. entrusted them to?" Pelshe inquired. N.S. responded that he had not given his records to anyone—neither domestically nor abroad—and they were not in a form ready for publication in any case. He stated that he would never have sent them abroad. Pelshe pressed further, asking, "What does this mean? Is the book a forgery? How can we resolve this? We need to publish a rebuttal..." N.S. agreed. Pelshe wrote a draft of the rebuttal, which N.S. rejected, opting instead to write his own version, which was subsequently published in *Pravda*. The text affirmed that the memoirs had not been sent for publication either domestically or abroad. Pelshe insisted that N.S. add a statement declaring that he had not been writing memoirs and had never done so. N.S. refused, and the rebuttal was printed without this phrase. The visit to Pelshe also concluded with N.S. suffering another heart attack.

N.S. recovered but never fully regained his health, remaining weak for an extended period. He ceased dictating. In the first week of September 1971, on either the 5th or 6th, N.S. returned from a visit to his daughter, Rada. He went for a walk after lunch, carrying a small chair with him, but soon returned. That night, he experienced heart pain, and I administered the necessary medication. The pain subsided, and he fell asleep. In the morning, he awoke, washed, and his heart began to hurt again. Doctor Bezzubik arrived with a nurse, administered an injection, and took him to the hospital after his third heart attack. N.S. insisted on traveling while seated, which may have exacerbated his condition. Upon arrival at the hospital, he walked down the corridor unaided, conversed with the staff for a prolonged period in the ward, but that evening his condition deteriorated. On September 11, 1971, N.S. passed away.

Hidden struggle

L.I. Brezhnev was born in the settlement of Kamenskoye in the Yekaterinoslav Governorate (now the city of Dniprodzerzhynsk in the Dnipropetrovsk region) into a working-class family. He was of Russian descent. However, in his passport, issued on June 11, 1947, in Zaporizhia, his nationality was recorded as “Ukrainian.” Until the early 1950s, in all personnel records and party questionnaires that he personally completed, he identified as Ukrainian. It was only after moving to Moscow and ascending to higher ranks within the CPSU that he began identifying as Russian.

According to French President V.G. d'Estaing, Brezhnev's mother was Polish. d'Estaing noted that Brezhnev concealed this fact because of the widespread sarcasm and contempt that Russians harbored toward Poles. Nevertheless, Polish was Brezhnev's native language, and he often spoke it with Gierek, the leader of the Polish Communist Party. (d'Estaing V.G. *Power and Life*, Moscow, 1990, p. 134).

In July 1950, on the recommendation of N.S. Khrushchev, Brezhnev was appointed First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Moldavian Communist Party. In October 1952, at Stalin's initiative, Brezhnev was elected Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and was named a candidate member of the Presidium of the Central Committee. While attending the 19th Congress of the CPSU (Bolsheviks) in October 1952, the last Congress held during Stalin's lifetime, Brezhnev spoke during the debates on the Central Committee's Report. His speech impressed I.V. Stalin, who granted Brezhnev access to the Kremlin, a privilege typically reserved for high-ranking individuals. Brezhnev held the position of Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee for five months, during which he had no personal meetings with the leader.

In 1953, Brezhnev was promoted to Lieutenant General. Following Stalin's death, he served as Head of the Main Political Directorate of the Navy from March to May 1953. After the Directorate's dissolution on May 3, 1953, he wrote a letter to G.M. Malenkov, requesting a reassignment. “With the dissolution of the Main Political Directorate of the Navy, I appeal to you, Georgy Maksimilianovich, with a great request... Nearly 30 years of my working life have been tied to work in the national economy. Since 1936, I have been engaged in Soviet and party work. I love this work; it's like a second life for me... Now, as I approach the age of 50 and my health has been affected by two serious illnesses (myocardial infarction and endarteritis in the legs), it is hard for me to change the nature of my work or acquire a new specialty. I ask you, Georgy Maksimilianovich, to assign me to work in the party organization of Ukraine. If I have made any shortcomings or mistakes in my work, I ask for your forgiveness.” (APRF, File 80, Personal File No. 514 on L.I. Brezhnev, Op. 1, D. 23, pp. 1-2).

From February 1954, Brezhnev served as Deputy Head of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. In 1954, he was assigned to work as the Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. From August 5, 1954, he served as the Second Secretary, and from August 6, 1955, as the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, succeeding P.K. Ponomarenko, who left to serve as ambassador to Poland. From February to May 1956, he was Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, overseeing defense, heavy machinery, and capital construction. Simultaneously, from January to March 1958, he was Deputy Chairman of the Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee for the RSFSR.

On June 16, 1956, Brezhnev presented a draft letter to the Presidium of the Central Committee, prepared by a commission he chaired. The letter addressed the “Results of the Discussion of the Decisions of the 20th Congress” and was subsequently approved. The document aimed to curb ideological confusion and provide clear guidelines on the permissible and impermissible aspects of criticizing the personality cult of I.V. Stalin. In the lead-up to the June 1957 Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPSU, during which the “anti-party group” led by V.M. Molotov, G.M. Malenkov, and L.M. Kaganovich was defeated, Brezhnev suffered a minor heart attack. Nevertheless, he attended the Plenary Session to support N.S. Khrushchev. Although Health Minister M. Kovrigina announced that Brezhnev was seriously ill and should not speak, Brezhnev delivered a speech defending Khrushchev.

From May 1960 to July 1964, Brezhnev served as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Simultaneously, from June 1963 to October 1964, he was the Second Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, replacing the ailing F.R. Kozlov. Like other members of the Presidium, Brezhnev feared Khrushchev’s unpredictable temperament and sudden shifts in favor.

Brezhnev was of medium height, athletic, well-built, with dark eyebrows and a handsome appearance. He spoke in a rumbling baritone and was a constant smoker. His personality was marked by compliance, kindness, sociability, and a tendency to leave a positive impression on those he interacted with. He also possessed a sense of humor, carried himself simply and warmly, and demonstrated patience and tact. However, Brezhnev was not naïve or excessively kind. He was persistent, goal-oriented, and at times cunning, using subtle tactics to eliminate those he considered rivals. Over time, his public speaking style became increasingly theatrical.

Brezhnev played a significant role in organizing Khrushchev’s removal, personally discussing the matter with each member and candidate of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium. At the time, the wives of Brezhnev and Khrushchev were vacationing together in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia.

From October 14, 1964, Brezhnev served as First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and from April 1966, he became General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Between 1964 and 1966, he was Chairman of the Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee for the RSFSR, and from June 1977 to November 1982, he served as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

In neighboring Dneprodzerzhinsk, Brezhnev's future assistant, Georgy Tsukanov, graduated from the Metallurgical Institute alongside him. These were all loyal individuals, part of Brezhnev's trusted team. In Moscow, it became a subject of wry humor that Russian history could be divided into three distinct phases: the pre-Petrine, the Petrine, and the Dnepropetrovsk eras.

Brezhnev did not forget old acquaintances; he supported them. He possessed an exceptional talent for maintaining favorable relationships with influential individuals, who, in turn, remained loyal to him. Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko became head of the General Department of the CPSU Central Committee, Sergey Pavlovich Trapeznikov was appointed to head the Department of Science and Educational Institutions, and Semyon Kuzmich Tsvigun became the first deputy of Andropov. In 1966, Brezhnev first appointed Shchelokov as the second secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party and later decided to bring him to Moscow.

In 1965, Fyodor Davydovich Kulakov was appointed Central Committee Secretary for Agriculture, thanks solely to Brezhnev's influence.

Brezhnev's closest associates in the Politburo included Shcherbitsky, Andropov, Gromyko, Ustinov, and Kunaev. He harbored a certain resentment toward A.N. Kosygin and N.V. Podgorny. He took decisive action against those who gossiped about his leadership shortcomings or criticized him. For instance, in the latter half of the 1960s, Brezhnev was reportedly informed—likely by Andropov—that a group of former Komsomol officials had been meeting and discussing the potential replacement of the party leadership. This group included A.N. Shelepin, V.E. Semichastny, E.G. Egorychev, V.S. Tolstoy, A.P. Volkov, and others. At the instigation of V.V. Shcherbitsky, P.E. Shelest fell out of favor and was reassigned to the position of deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, losing his role as First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

In 1967, Brezhnev removed three powerful and independent figures who did not align with him. In May, he dismissed Semichastny from his position as KGB chairman; in June, he removed Nikolai Grigoryevich Egorychev from his role as First Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee; and in September, Alexander Nikolayevich Shelepin ceased to be Central Committee Secretary.

This occurred on May 19, 1967, during a Politburo meeting. Pyotr Shelest later described the events in his memoirs.

About an hour before the Politburo meeting, Brezhnev invited Shelest to his office and said, “Keep in mind that today we will address the removal of Semichastny from his position as KGB chairman.” This announcement took Shelest by surprise.

“And what is the reason?” Shelest asked.

Brezhnev attempted to deflect the question, responding, “There are many reasons; you’ll learn more later. I invited you here to discuss where best to position Semichastny next. We don’t plan to keep him in Moscow.”

“But why are we dismissing him? What’s the reason?” Shelest insisted.

Brezhnev, now nearly irritated, replied, “I told you—you’ll find out later.” He continued, “I don’t want to offend him too much. Perhaps you could suggest a position for him in Ukraine?”

Shelest proposed appointing Semichastny as First Secretary of a regional party committee, possibly in Kirovograd Oblast.

Brezhnev pondered the suggestion for a moment and then replied, “No, it’s undesirable to use him in party work. What other options are there?”

Shelest then suggested appointing Semichastny as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the republic.

Brezhnev nodded in agreement, “First Deputy.”

Shelest raised an objection, “There are already two First Deputies.”

Brezhnev dismissed the objection, saying, “That’s not an obstacle. Write a note to the Central Committee; we’ll create an additional position for a First Deputy.”

At the Politburo meeting, Brezhnev took a slip of paper from his breast pocket, looked at it, and said, “Call Semichastny.”

Semichastny, unaware of the reason for his invitation, appeared confused. Brezhnev then announced, “We now need to discuss the issue concerning Semichastny.”

“What’s there to discuss?” Semichastny replied.

Brezhnev answered, “There is a proposal to relieve you of your duties as KGB Chairman in connection with a transfer to another position.”

Semichastny protested,

“Why? No one has discussed this with me, and I am unaware of the reason for this transfer.”

Brezhnev responded sharply,

“There are many shortcomings in the KGB’s work. Intelligence and agent operations are poorly managed... And what about the incident with Alliluyeva? How was she able to leave for India and then fly to the USA?” Brezhnev stated firmly, “You will go to Ukraine.”

Semichastny asked,

“What am I supposed to do there?”

Pyotr Efimovich Shelest turned to him,

“We will find a position for you there.”

Semichastny persisted,

“What do you mean, find a position for me, Pyotr Efimovich? I am registered with the party organization in Moscow, not with you. Why should you be finding me a job? I am a member of the CPSU Central Committee, not the Ukrainian Communist Party’s Central Committee; these matters shouldn’t be confused.”

But no one was listening anymore. The decision was made. The new Chairman of the KGB was confirmed to be Central Committee Secretary Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov.

Vladimir Semichastny was sent to Ukraine. Around thirty or forty people from Shelepin’s circle were dispersed, mostly as ambassadors to minor countries. Nikolai Egorychev left to become Ambassador to Denmark. Nikolai Misyatsev returned from an assignment in Khabarovsk, only to be told at the airport that he had just been relieved of his post. Misyatsev was assigned as Ambassador to Australia.

Finally, Brezhnev removed Shelepin himself from the party apparatus. On September 26, 1967, a CPSU Central Committee Plenum relieved Alexander Nikolayevich Shelepin of his duties as a Central Committee Secretary, rendering him a general without an army. Although he remained a member of the Politburo, he was reassigned to the secondary post of Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (VTSPS).

Still, even in the role of trade union head, the energetic and popular Shelepin became inconvenient for Brezhnev. His fate was sealed. Shelepin's unsuccessful trip to England became the excuse Brezhnev needed to remove him from the Politburo. They had a very sharp exchange, and Shelepin was forced to submit his resignation. Brezhnev immediately called every member of the Politburo, and within a few hours, the decision was finalized.

According to his long-time assistant, A.M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, L.I. Brezhnev disliked both reading and writing. His staff member, G.A. Doroshina, would read official documents to him. In work notes, resolutions, and annotations, he made numerous spelling errors ("obeskourazhit" for "obeskurazhit," "Bon" instead of "Bonn," "hokey" for "hockey," "Novo Sibirsk" for "Novosibirsk," "Vengriya" for "Hungary," "Djuseldorf" instead of "Düsseldorf," "Chaushesku" for "Ceausescu," "Kisendzher" instead of "Kissinger"). He had a keen sense of spoken language, its nuances, and would respond sharply to any shift in tone. An experienced propagandist and political worker, L.I. Brezhnev preferred to familiarize himself with his speeches in an unusual way—not through reading, but through listening to them being read aloud. In doing so, he carefully considered each word, weighing its meaning and emotional impact.

During his leadership, the press stopped criticizing Stalin, and mentions of his past achievements became more frequent. Brezhnev was close to reconsidering the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU and fully rehabilitating Stalin, a view shared by N.A. Tikhonov and K.U. Chernenko, although he did not go that far. He introduced a rule that at Plenums, Politburo members and Central Committee Secretaries did not give speeches, as their collective opinion was expressed in the Politburo reports.

According to long-time aide A.M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, L.I. Brezhnev read infrequently and rarely, limiting himself to newspapers and popular magazines like *Ogonyok*, *Krokodil*, and *Knowledge is Power*. "Persuading Leonid Ilyich to read any interesting, relevant book or anything from fiction was almost impossible. In 21 years of working with him, I never saw him voluntarily pick up a volume of Lenin's works, let alone Marx or Engels, and read any of their works" (Aleksandrov-Agentov A.M. *From Kollontai to Gorbachev*. Moscow, 1994, p. 166).

He relied on a group of close associates, including Y.V. Andropov, K.U. Chernenko, A.A. Gromyko, and D.F. Ustinov, fully trusting them and relying on their suggestions and recommendations. He was Chairman of the USSR Defense Council, a Deputy of the Supreme Soviet from the 3rd to the 10th convocations, and was named Hero of the Soviet Union four times (1966, 1976, 1978, 1981) and Hero of Socialist Labor (1961). He was awarded the highest military order, the Order of Victory (1978), as well as eight Orders of Lenin, two Orders of the

October Revolution, two Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitsky 2nd class, the Order of the Patriotic War 1st class, the Order of the Red Star, and Honorary Arms. According to his chief security officer, General V.T. Medvedev, he initially refused the Order of Victory, saying that it was awarded only for military achievements. However, his party colleagues, led by Defense Minister Marshal D.F. Ustinov, easily convinced him: "You are the commander-in-chief of a mighty state! You're fighting for peace around the world!" So he agreed. He was appointed Marshal of the Soviet Union (1976), laureate of the International Lenin Prize "For Strengthening Peace Among Nations" (1973), and laureate of the Lenin Prize for Literature (1979). He was awarded the Karl Marx Gold Medal, the highest honor in social sciences (1977). On October 29, 1981, he received the CPSU Central Committee badge for "50 years of membership in the CPSU."

In his old age, he delighted in possessions like a child, had a weakness for fine clothes, admired his beaver coat, and proudly showed off custom-made electronic watches, which were just coming into fashion at the time. After his death, a safe in the Central Committee was found to contain a case full of various watches he had collected. He also had a passion for pigeons and was knowledgeable about them, keeping a dovecote at his dacha.

In March 1982, during a visit to Tashkent, he was seriously injured at an aircraft manufacturing plant when a scaffolding collapsed. Brought to his residence, bandaged and surrounded by doctors, he asked to be connected to Moscow and to KGB Chairman Y.V. Andropov: "Yura, an accident happened to me at the plant here. But please, I ask you, don't chop off anyone's head over it. Don't punish anyone; it's my fault. I went without warning, even though I was advised against it."

The long-serving head of the 4th Directorate in the Kremlin, academician E.I. Chazov, writes in his book: "Brezhnev, starting somewhere around 1975-1976, became a kind, increasingly senile 'grandfather,' who had lost the specific threads of control over the party and the country, entrusting the resolution of all issues to his inner circle. Perhaps I'm being subjective, but had Y.V. Andropov come to lead the state in the late 1970s, the history of our country would have been written differently. A.N. Yakovlev tries to convince everyone that Andropov would have created a 'barracks socialism.' I believe this statement is either due to a lack of understanding of Andropov and his views, or it is a tribute to the current trends that serve the immediate interests of certain circles in society today. Unfortunately, in those years, Andropov had no chance of becoming the country's leader.

The issue was not even that Brezhnev (to whom Andropov was loyal to the end) considered himself, like many elderly leaders, to be an active and irreplaceable

leader who was loved and respected by the people. The main reason was that the top of the party hierarchy, which defined the life of the country, was satisfied with the status quo that preserved each of their positions. I often feel ashamed and embarrassed when many from that hierarchy, having kept their ‘seats’ or gained new ones, now curse the years of stagnation. But where were you then? Why were you silent or giving panegyrics in honor of Brezhnev and the socialist system?

Apart from the fact that Brezhnev suited everyone, many feared Andropov’s rise to power, understanding that under him, the era of careerists and demagogues would end, professionalism and discipline would be required, concrete actions would be expected, and many would lose their comfortable, well-established positions. This especially concerned the party elite.

However, the most dramatic events unfolded after M.A. Suslov’s death in late January 1982. Formally, he was the second most powerful person in the Politburo, and his influence largely determined the life of the CPSU and, consequently, the life of the country.”

Suslov did not seek prominent government positions; he was never a minister or Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, he only served as Chairman of the Council of the Union’s Foreign Affairs Committee. He spent almost his entire life working within the party apparatus. As a member of the Central Committee Politburo responsible for ideology, Suslov stood at the top of a pyramid composed of numerous ideological institutions. If conservatism, bureaucracy, and dogmatism prevailed in the country, it was largely due to Suslov’s views and character. Incredibly, his opinion was often decisive for Brezhnev, and even a powerful figure like Andropov was cautious of him. In the party, Suslov embodied the old Stalinist wing, which had deep roots and certain support among party leaders of various ranks.

In 1947, he was transferred to Moscow and, at the Central Committee Plenum, was elected Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). At that time, the Secretariat included A. Zhdanov, A. Kuznetsov, G. Malenkov, G. Popov, and Stalin himself. Suslov enjoyed Stalin’s trust. In January 1948, it was Suslov who was entrusted with delivering the keynote speech at the ceremonial meeting marking the 24th anniversary of Lenin’s death. In 1949-1950, Suslov also became the chief editor of *Pravda* newspaper. He was elected a member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1949.

At the 19th Party Congress, Suslov was included by Stalin in the expanded Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. Suslov entered Stalin’s inner circle, and later, Khrushchev’s.

However, from the late 1950s to the early 1960s, Suslov began to cautiously oppose many aspects of Khrushchev's foreign and domestic policies. Suslov did not want further exposure of Stalin's actions. He insisted that the issue of the anti-party group not be raised at either the 21st or 22nd Party Congress. In this case, Khrushchev acted on his own initiative. Moreover, Khrushchev resolved many ideological issues with the help of either L. Ilyich or A. Mikoyan. Khrushchev did not have a "chief ideologist."

After N.S. Khrushchev's removal, the party leadership once again proclaimed the necessity of "collective leadership" and the inadmissibility of any new "cult of personality." Although L.I. Brezhnev became the "First" (and from 1966, the "General") Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, he did not yet wield the same power and influence as he would in the 1970s. Suslov and Shelepin also held significant influence within the party-state apparatus, engaging in a behind-the-scenes struggle for standing within the party. At the 23rd CPSU Congress in the spring of 1966, many observant delegates could see that it was Suslov who was the main director of the congress.

One of Suslov's opponents in the Central Committee was Brezhnev's protégé, S. Trapeznikov, appointed Head of the Department of Science, Schools, and Higher Education. Trapeznikov led not only this key department of the Central Committee but also a campaign for the rehabilitation of Stalin, which gained momentum in 1965-1966. At the time, Suslov did not consider such rehabilitation advisable or, in any case, timely. In 1967, Suslov insisted on the removal of KGB Chairman V. Semichastny, a close friend of Shelepin. Y. Andropov, who had previously worked under Suslov heading one of the international departments of the CPSU Central Committee, was appointed KGB Chairman.

At the end of 1969, Suslov did not support the almost fully prepared plan for Stalin's rehabilitation in connection with his 90th anniversary. However, after Suslov's death in 1982, he was buried in a spot precisely next to Stalin's grave.

Eighty-year-old Suslov suffered from severe atherosclerosis of the heart and brain vessels. A cerebral thrombosis leading to a stroke caused his death within two days. The "grey cardinal" seat was vacated.

Upon hearing of M. Suslov's death, Brezhnev reacted calmly, saying, "There's a replacement. There's no one better than Yuri" (he referred to those in his inner circle by their first names). Brezhnev promoted Y.V. Andropov, loyal to him and one of the most talented in the Politburo, to take Suslov's place. However, the political ambitions of a group supporting K.U. Chernenko, who was rapidly gaining influence within Brezhnev's circle, unexpectedly interfered. With difficulty, Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov was elected Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, as Leonid Ilyich was no longer what he once had been.

According to A.M. Alexandrov-Agentov, Brezhnev's longtime aide, in the last years of Brezhnev's life, there was no question about what he would say in his public speeches. The draft would be prepared on time, printed in large font, with the desired ideas and international initiatives already laid out. This responsibility rested entirely and irrevocably on his aides, although the speech texts were always circulated in advance to Politburo members and Central Committee secretaries. The main concern at this time was different: the strong leader had to periodically appear before the people, speak, pose for photographers, and be filmed. The task was to ensure that the General Secretary looked respectable and photogenic and, on the other hand, gave the speech as briefly and clearly as possible, pronouncing the main points without mixing up paragraphs or pages or struggling with certain words or geographical names.

Witnesses recount that at a ceremonial meeting in Baku on the 60th anniversary of Azerbaijan, Brezhnev's numerous entourage went overboard. He was handed a speech that he was supposed to deliver not at the republican celebration but at an industrial plant. For several minutes, Brezhnev diligently read the prepared text, ignoring signals from backstage, until his aide had to literally tug on his sleeve several times. Finally realizing the mistake, Brezhnev returned the text and took the correct one. Smiling, he told the audience, "It's not my fault, comrades!" Everyone laughed and applauded the joke.

Brezhnev's frailty became especially apparent after K.U. Chernenko was elected as Central Committee Secretary while still heading the General Department. According to Alexandrov-Agentov, by this time, the General Secretary's aides were increasingly under Chernenko's influence, as Brezhnev, as mentioned, no longer bothered himself (and physically could not) with handling concrete and complex state matters, often leaving the organizational work and coordination to Chernenko. As a result, the aides of the General Secretary often received instructions through Chernenko, who held them accountable, sometimes strictly, though major conflicts were avoided thanks to Chernenko's tolerant and loyal nature.

Brezhnev's entourage was interested in having him appear before the public from time to time. Brezhnev had to be constantly supported by the arms, and the guards carried multiple pairs of glasses for him (for reading and for distance) as he frequently lost them. People saw his weakness, and public frustration grew over the farce staged around him. Brezhnev twice raised the question of his resignation, but all influential Politburo members opposed it. In April 1979, he again expressed his wish to retire, but after discussing the matter, the Politburo advised him to continue working.

According to Roy Medvedev, on November 7, 1982, during the parade and demonstration, Brezhnev stood for several hours on the Mausoleum tribune,

despite poor weather. Three days later, in the morning, while having breakfast in Zavidovo, Brezhnev went into his office to retrieve something and did not return for a long time. His worried wife went to check on him and found him lying on the carpet near his desk. Four hours after Brezhnev's heart stopped, doctors announced his death.

The following day, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government officially informed the world of L. Brezhnev's death. According to another version, the General Secretary passed away during the night, but his death was only discovered in the morning during a shift change of the bodyguards. The Politburo passed a resolution titled "On the Commemoration of L.I. Brezhnev," under which the city of Naberezhnye Chelny in the Tatar ASSR was renamed Brezhnev, and the Cheryomushki district of Moscow was renamed Brezhnevsky. A memorial plaque was also installed on the building at No. 26 Kutuzovsky Prospekt in Moscow, where he had resided. However, by a Politburo resolution dated January 7, 1988, the city and district were restored to their original names, and the plaque was removed by the personal order of M.S. Gorbachev.

With Brezhnev's death, the unique institution of the General Secretary's aides also faded into oblivion, along with its inaccessibility, pomp, and aura of mystery. By this time, Brezhnev's aides had already left the scene. A.I. Blatov was transferred to the group of consultants in the Secretariat of the Central Committee, G.E. Tsukanov was sent to the department for foreign personnel, V.N. Golikov retired, and General Secretary's aide E.I. Samoteykin was appointed ambassador to New Zealand.

Psychogram of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev



Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev

In his youth, Leonid Brezhnev was a charming, handsome, and physically strong man who easily attracted people. Later, he realized that this trait was a powerful asset in politics and frequently made use of it. After World War II, Stalin took notice of the young party member—a general—who was working on the revitalization of the Dnieper region. In 1950, Brezhnev was

entrusted with an independent assignment: he was appointed First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldova. In 1952, he was elected to the Central Committee of the CPSU and became a candidate member of both the Presidium and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. According to rumors, Stalin once remarked about Brezhnev, “What a handsome Moldovan.”

According to the recollections of Nikolai Mesyatsev:

“The young Brezhnev was respectful to people, kind, intelligent, and a good-looking man. Women were infatuated with him. Although he appreciated beautiful women, he did not wish to engage in affairs behind his wife’s back.”

In contrast, Brezhnev's American counterpart, Richard Nixon, was reportedly devoted only to his wife. However, in 1962, their marriage nearly ended after Nixon, enraged by his defeat in the California gubernatorial race, physically assaulted his wife, giving her a black eye.

It is unsurprising that Nixon was unfaithful. He reportedly had an affair with Marianne Liu, a Chinese waitress from Hong Kong whom he met while still Vice President. In 1969, after Nixon assumed the presidency, Liu moved to his hometown of Whittier, California.

Journalist Anthony Summers has suggested that for five years the United States was led by a full-blown neurotic. This assessment was not based on media speculation but was allegedly made by Nixon’s own physician, Arnold Hutschnecker. Nixon reportedly managed his neurosis with the tranquilizer Dilantin, which was still in clinical trials at the time.

Richard Nixon remains one of the most controversial American presidents, known for his coarse language, frequent alcohol consumption, and racist views.

In October 1973, he was reportedly so intoxicated that he was unable to take a critical phone call from British Prime Minister Edward Heath. This episode, among other revealing details, is documented in recently published transcripts of phone conversations recorded by Henry Kissinger, the former U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Advisor.

On October 11, 1973, around 8:00 p.m., Prime Minister Heath called the White House to discuss an urgent matter: the Yom Kippur War had broken out five days earlier, raising the risk of a global conflict akin to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Consulting with his aide Brent Scowcroft, Kissinger decided not to reveal that Nixon was incapacitated due to intoxication. Instead, he informed the British that the President was not at the White House.

Brezhnev was passionate about driving. He often took the wheel himself, particularly enjoying driving the Ford gifted to him by the American president. He would frequently travel from Zavidovo to Moscow at speeds no less than 160–180 kilometers per hour. After his death, ten personal vehicles, gifted to him by various statesmen, remained. Of these, four were inherited by his grandchildren, three were given to the Central Committee of the CPSU, and three to the KGB.

Eyewitnesses recall that Brezhnev was a humane hunter; he never shot deer and, if he wounded an animal, would pursue it for kilometers to ensure it did not suffer unnecessarily.

Politically, Brezhnev was a skilled fighter and master of backroom maneuvering. He was often underestimated. However, he possessed a keen intuition for sensing who supported or opposed him—knowledge he held with certainty.

Brezhnev also had an excellent memory. Even in his later years, he could recite from memory long poems such as *Sakya Muni* by Dmitry Merezhkovsky, as well as many poems by Sergei Yesenin, learned during his youth. However, his fondness for flattery, his love of awards, and his appreciation for expensive gifts made him vulnerable to manipulation by courtiers within his circle.

Leonid Brezhnev was a heavy smoker. When doctors prohibited him from smoking directly, he developed a fondness for passive smoking. When Brezhnev's car would arrive at his residence and the door opened, smoke would pour out of the vehicle, as he would ask his bodyguards and drivers to smoke on his behalf. Sometimes, before going to sleep, he would ask someone to smoke in his bedroom.

In the later years of his leadership, Brezhnev reigned more than he governed. The country—and to a significant extent, Brezhnev himself—was controlled by his entourage, who exploited his human weaknesses. It is no coincidence that the

health records of Soviet General Secretaries were among the state's most closely guarded secrets.

Brezhnev's health began to deteriorate as early as 1968, with adverse reactions to sedatives among his early symptoms. During his visit to the United States (June 18–26, 1973), at a dinner with President Nixon, after consuming a considerable amount of whiskey, Brezhnev openly lamented the burdens of his office. Unlike the American president, he explained, he had to listen to "all sorts of nonsense" from other Politburo members and take their collective opinions into account. According to Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin's recollections, Brezhnev complained by name about colleagues such as A.N. Kosygin and N.V. Podgorny, alleging that they were undermining him and that he constantly needed to remain vigilant.

According to Politbugalinaro member Viktor Grishin's recollections, when A.N. Kosygin suffered a heart attack, Brezhnev decided to retire him. He telephoned Grishin (and likely other Politburo members) to persuade them to release Kosygin from his duties as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and to nominate N.A. Tikhonov, then Deputy Chairman, as his replacement. Grishin suggested that Kosygin might still be capable of serving the country, but Brezhnev, citing the opinion of Dr. E.I. Chazov, head of the Fourth Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Health, insisted otherwise. Brezhnev argued that Tikhonov would perform better, particularly in drafting the state plan. Nevertheless, the replacement was by no means equal. Kosygin soon passed away. It was decided to honor him with a burial at Red Square, with his ashes placed in the Kremlin Wall. Initially, Brezhnev indicated that he would not attend the funeral; however, after persuasion from his inner circle, he ultimately participated in the mourning ceremony.

According to Brezhnev's grandson's recollections:

"Did Leonid Ilyich fully realize what was happening in the country? I think not always. He was surrounded by a tight ring of numerous aides and staff, and sometimes took blatant flattery at face value. After all, each person reporting to him had a vested interest in presenting matters in the rosiest light possible, since that person was responsible for the situation in a given field. This kind of risk awaits every leader: as long as shortcomings can be blamed on predecessors, open criticism is possible. But when it comes to assessing the first results of one's own activity, disinformation begins."



"Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev never covered up for the misdeeds of his daughter and my aunt, Galina Leonidovna," recalled the General Secretary's grandson. "She broke free from his paternal control early, never took him into account, and caused him pain. Watching her over the years, I can say that she was an uncontrollable person. There were no laws for her or her husband, Yuri Churbanov. Churbanov was not a particularly bright man and was probably under her influence. He understood well that it was thanks to his wife that he received his general's epaulettes, widespread 'respect,' and material wealth. We, the grandchildren, spent weekends at Brezhnev's dacha, and every summer we vacationed together in Crimea. I remember him as a cheerful, responsive, and kind man. In his last years, however, he declined, became seriously ill, and was deeply affected by the fact that his children had gone astray and were bringing disgrace to his name. He limited his contact with the outside world, spending most of his time at the dacha in his study or in the gazebo, talking for long periods with his personal security chief, A.Y. Ryabenko, a wartime comrade and one of the few people he trusted completely. He slowly faded, and we felt sorry for him. When he died, I thought least of all that his death would mark a new chapter in my life, possibly less comfortable and secure. No, the grief was too immense. Judging by the newspapers, the entire country mourned along with us."

In *The Mystery of Kutuzovsky Avenue*, Julian Semenov wrote:

"I am still baffled by the fact that Brezhnev's heart just 'stopped' on its own. After all, he was living on an American pacemaker... And he died two days before the plenary meeting, when, they say, the new head of the KGB, Fedorchuk, who was not a member of the Central Committee, was expected to join the Politburo..."

According to cardiologist Yevgeny Chazov, who treated many Kremlin leaders, there was no conspiracy against Brezhnev. Nor were there any heart problems or a pacemaker. The only heart attack he had was when he was still in Moldova. Chazov insists that Brezhnev never had any strokes.

To put it mildly, Chazov was being evasive, because in 1974, Brezhnev's health sharply declined, and he suffered a nervous breakdown during a meeting with U.S. President Gerald Ford in Vladivostok. Due to this, Brezhnev had a stroke in 1976. His speech became slurred due to dental prosthetic issues (he had sustained a jaw injury in the war). Despite the efforts of Soviet and German doctors, he spoke indistinctly and with a lisp, which led to mockery. Signs of sclerosis, an unsteady gait, and quick fatigue also emerged. Without a prepared text, he could not address audiences, whether large ones or even at Politburo meetings. This fact alarmed the party officials of the time. Consequently, Yevgeny Chazov reached out to Professor A.I. Doinikov to correct Brezhnev's speech defect. From 1947 to 1956, A.I. Doinikov worked as the chief dentist for the USSR Ministry of Health, and from 1956 to 1984, he was the chief dentist of the 4th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Health (the Kremlin's Medical and Sanitary Directorate).

When Doinikov began to address Brezhnev's speech defect, he was first briefed on the patient's confidential medical record. Doinikov's recollections further confirm the truth about Brezhnev's illness:

"Brezhnev was a patient with a very complex combination of medical issues, extremely demanding and, at times, temperamental. He had suffered a heart attack back in the 1960s and later a stroke, which caused his speech to occasionally become slightly unclear. Some people later tried to attribute this to 'poor removable dentures.' However, Brezhnev did not use removable dentures until a certain point. Various dental crowns had been fitted and adjusted for him repeatedly, including by me. Leonid Ilyich naturally had a slightly misaligned bite, a mild overbite (his upper jaw was more developed than his lower jaw), and a slight open bite. As his 'authority' grew—and mainly as he aged—his demands increased greatly, while his physical condition did not improve, making treatment increasingly difficult. The six front crowns on his upper jaw were redone several times. Outwardly, everything was fine, but 'internally' he was not very satisfied because his speech barely improved. It was obvious that this had nothing to do with his teeth or these crowns. There was a very slight but noticeable incorrect tongue movement and misarticulation when pronouncing certain sound combinations.

Even N.V. Podgorny, then Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, got involved in the matter. (Nikolai Viktorovich held Brezhnev in high regard, admired his authority, and probably even held him in great affection. However, as it later turned out, this affection was one-sided. Podgorny was relieved of his post without any clear reason.)

N.V. Podgorny requested help for Leonid Ilyich. I was asked to go to West Germany to see what they were doing there and, if necessary, to invite consultants or even doctors to Moscow. Ambassador V.M. Falin was informed of this. I had a conversation with the ambassador, who advised me to get acquainted with Dr. Jakob, who provided services to the USSR Embassy staff. Jakob turned out to be a very tall, pleasant-looking man of around fifty. His well-equipped dental office was located between Bonn and Cologne."

Hidden control

Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov was born at the Nagutskaya station in the Stavropol Krai in the family of a railroad telegraphist. His father died when he was five years old. His mother, Elena Karlovna Fanshtein, a music teacher, remarried. She passed away when he was 13 years old. After her death, he was raised in his stepfather's family. In official documents, he often wrote: "orphan." He attended a factory school in Mozdok in the North Ossetian ASSR, where he was elected chairman of the student committee. From 1932 to 1936, Andropov studied at the Rybinsk Water Transport Technical School, while also working on Volga River vessels as a sailor, helmsman, and assistant captain. He later attended Petrozavodsk University but did not complete his studies. While serving as chairman of the KGB, he passed external exams at the Higher Party School under the Central Committee of the CPSU.

During the "Leningrad Affair," he came close to being arrested. Later, speaking at the 19th Party Congress in 1952, he spoke of some "purge" recently conducted in the party and government leadership as a great achievement. After the elimination of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov, "purges" began in the upper echelons of party organizations. Knowing Stalin's intolerance toward moral decay and extravagance in his inner circle, Andropov condemned such figures at party meetings. In 1951–1952, Andropov, as an inspector of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), oversaw party organizations in the lumber and pulp industries. From 1953, he served as the head of the department of party, trade union, and Komsomol organs of the Central Committee of the CPSU. From 1953, he began working in diplomacy as the head of the 4th European Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which managed relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia. However, he was soon demoted and appointed advisor to the Soviet embassy in Hungary, where he remained until 1954. From 1954 to 1957, he was the extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador of the USSR to the Hungarian People's Republic. He was considered for an ambassadorial position in Denmark and interned in the Scandinavian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

He became ambassador to Hungary on the recommendation of V.M. Molotov. In 1956, he witnessed the well-known events in Budapest sparked by N.S. Khrushchev's anti-Stalin report at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. During the anti-Soviet unrest in Budapest, he insisted on bringing Soviet tanks into the city. Thirty combat vehicles guarded the Soviet embassy building. At that time, Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov was under especially tight security. There were serious reasons for this. He recounted what he saw in Hungary. Bloody stars on the bodies of the dead marked the fury of those who dreamed of overthrowing the power of the working class. A heavy burden fell upon his shoulders, perhaps heavier than

he had imagined. The counter-revolution in Hungary threatened the socialist achievements in that country. In the spring of 1957, Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov returned to Moscow as his friend Otto Ville Kuusinen became secretary and a member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee.

The Finnish SSR. During these years, Y.V. Andropov headed the Karelian-Finnish SSR Komsomol. In 1944, Y.V. Andropov transitioned to party work: from 1944 to 1947, he served as the second secretary of the Petrozavodsk City Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Karelian-Finnish SSR.

Many biographers believe that it was Kuusinen who suggested that Andropov head the newly created Central Committee CPSU department for relations with communist and socialist countries. He held this position for ten years, serving simultaneously as a CPSU Central Committee secretary from 1962 onward.

In 1962 (according to other sources, in 1963), Andropov held a secret meeting with Mao Zedong together with Kuusinen, attempting to resolve tensions between China and the Soviet Union.

Andropov's appointment as KGB chairman in 1967 was largely the result of a power struggle between the Soviet Union's General Secretary Brezhnev and Premier Kosygin. The former advocated for gradual change without revolutionary upheaval, while the latter supported radical reforms. By replacing the politically inexperienced Semichastny with Andropov, Brezhnev significantly strengthened his position, gaining a reliable ally in the KGB chief. (In any case, Leonid Ilyich placed three of his "own" people—Tsvigun, Tsinev, and Chebrikov—as Andropov's deputies in the KGB).

They noted that Kosygin opposed this appointment until the last moment, and subsequently, his relationship with Andropov remained, to put it mildly, cold. Suslov also viewed Andropov with considerable distrust.

E. Rybov, in his book *Russian Leaders in Struggle, Love, and Death*, writes: Unlike many Soviet leaders, Yuri Vladimirovich was a broadly educated and well-informed person, not a dogmatist; he could be argued with and persuaded if he was wrong, although he adhered to conservatism both at work and at home. He was an authoritative Politburo member but avoided close friendships with members of the leadership. Andropov always maintained loyalty to Brezhnev, who placed him in the key position of KGB chairman in May 1971, although he "tied" his "hands" with his appointees—KGB deputy chairmen S. Tsvigun and K. Tsinev, who were close to him from Moldova and Dnepropetrovsk, respectively.

In his reports to the Politburo, Andropov repeatedly suggested adopting less harsh measures against dissidents than those demanded by the Central Committee's

ideological department, overseen by Suslov. Thus, during Andropov's time at the KGB, about 2,000 people were convicted under "anti-Soviet" charges. According to veterans of Lubyanka, one of those who actively supported Suslov in these disputes was his then-subordinate, the first deputy head of the ideological department, A.N. Yakovlev. Through complex maneuvering, Andropov eventually persuaded Suslov to send Yakovlev to Canada as an ambassador.

After the death of M.A. Suslov, Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov was appointed Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee upon the recommendation of L.I. Brezhnev. Following Brezhnev's passing, Andropov ascended to the position of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. In his capacities as Secretary and later as General Secretary, he was also elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. It is widely noted that Andropov maintained a particularly close relationship with L.I. Brezhnev, personally reporting to him on all significant future plans, with only a select few matters being presented for discussion before the CPSU Central Committee Politburo.

Andropov harbored a distinctly negative view toward A. Kosygin, G.I. Voronov, P.E. Shelest, D.S. Polyansky, among others. He exhibited particular animosity toward his predecessors in the leadership of state security, A.N. Shelepin and V.E. Semichastny. On the basis of Andropov's reports to Brezhnev, several prominent figures—including A.N. Shelepin, G.I. Voronov, P.E. Shelest, former Secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU N.E. Egorychev, Chairman of the Committee on Labor and Wages A.P. Volkov, and Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU V.S. Tolstikov—were removed from their positions and expelled from the Central Committee.

Upon his appointment to the Committee for State Security (KGB), Andropov reinstated numerous measures reminiscent of Stalin-era practices, though notably without initiating mass repressions. He reintroduced the management of state security across all cities and districts and appointed security personnel to research institutes, industrial enterprises, and institutions of defense and other strategic importance. Security departments were restored within the railway, maritime, and aviation sectors, as well as within the armed forces. Surveillance of mail from various organizations resumed. Furthermore, the system of "activists" and "informants" embedded within workplaces, institutions, and residential areas was reestablished. Telephone communications, both local and long-distance, were once again monitored. Not only were the conversations of ordinary citizens intercepted, but, utilizing advanced KGB technology, conversations held within the apartments and dachas of senior government and party officials were also subject to surveillance.

Through the influence of Brezhnev, Andropov succeeded in transforming the KGB from a committee subordinate to the USSR Council of Ministers into the

State Security Committee of the USSR—an autonomous body effectively accountable only to the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Consequently, the security apparatus became virtually independent of governmental control and functioned as a "state within a state." The heads of KGB committees and departments increasingly became permanent members of both central and regional party leaderships. Thus, the role and standing of the KGB within the broader state system were significantly elevated. Institutional reforms within the KGB structure commenced shortly after Andropov's appointment.

Within KGB operations, the concept of "active measures" refers to foreign activities unrelated to traditional intelligence or counterintelligence work. These measures include disinformation campaigns, the infiltration of agents into political, governmental, and business circles abroad, support for particular political organizations and movements, and, in some cases, the orchestration of military operations intended for the physical elimination of selected individuals.

The coordination of such activities was entrusted to a newly established unit named "Service A" (derived from the term "active measures") within the KGB's First Main Directorate. This new service replaced Department "D" (short for "disinformation"), which had been operational since 1959.

Strategic disinformation served to advance the broader objectives of the Soviet state: to mislead adversaries concerning the Soviet Union's primary achievements and to sow discord among capitalist countries regarding their policies toward each other and third countries.

Western scholarly literature on the KGB is replete with accounts of its disinformation operations. These activities often involved the production and dissemination of forged documents and fabricated reports, which were introduced to state officials and the press through indirect and covert channels. Such materials were typically presented as documents "found after a fire at an embassy," "discovered by accident near a military base," or "provided anonymously by concerned individuals." A special editorial office within the Soviet Press Agency (APN) played a key role in channeling these forgeries into domestic and international media outlets. Notable examples of KGB disinformation operations include:

- 1976: The fabrication of a supposed "will" by Zhou Enlai, wherein he allegedly admitted that the "Cultural Revolution" was a grave error and urged Chinese leaders to ally with the Soviet Union in the pursuit of global peace.

- 1980: The creation of a “telegram from the U.S. Department of State” directed to the American embassy in Islamabad, concerning the alleged disappearance of a “CIA courier” reportedly dispatched to President Amin in 1979.
- 1981: The dissemination of counterfeit “staff plans” purportedly from the U.S. Army, dating to the 1960s, which implied that the United States had planned to employ nuclear weapons on the territories of NATO allies in Western Europe.
- 1981: The production of “maps of Austria” annotated with targets for sabotage and U.S. nuclear strikes in the event of war, along with fabricated “CIA maps” allegedly found on Afghan opposition fighters, identifying military facilities in Afghanistan and adjacent regions of the Soviet Union.
- 1982: The fabrication of a “study” from an unnamed research institute alleging that the United States was preparing a military coup in Greece to install a government more favorable to the continued presence of American military bases.

Interestingly, after these "documents" were published in the Western press, they were reproduced by TASS worldwide, as well as through newspapers and television within the Soviet Union, in an effort to influence domestic public opinion. However, there were also major failures. In this context, the term does not refer to agent-based intelligence but rather to individuals in positions enabling them to influence political events and public opinion.

- 1971: Anwar Sadat arrested Sami Sharaf, a long-time adviser to President Nasser, who had allegedly been recruited by the KGB in 1958.
- 1974: Willy Brandt’s advisor, a KGB agent, was arrested; in 1981, he was exchanged for a group of detainees in East Germany.
- 1980: well-known French journalist Pierre-Charles Pathé, a KGB agent since 1959, was arrested.
- 1981: the political secretary of the Malaysian Prime Minister was arrested on charges of collaborating with the KGB, along with other cases.

After Yuri Andropov assumed leadership at Lubyanka, military and paramilitary operations were managed by the 8th Department within the KGB’s First Main Directorate. This department oversaw training camps for the preparation of fighters from foreign paramilitary organizations. It was KGB personnel, together with special forces, who stormed the palace of Afghan President Hafizullah Amin in December 1979, resulting in Amin’s death.

The murder of Bulgarian defector Georgi Markov in 1978 and the attempted assassinations of defectors from Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Poland—namely Josef Frolik (1976), Vladimir Kostov (1982), and Boris Korshak (1981)—are attributed to the 8th Department. These operations may have been carried out by the intelligence agencies of the respective countries; however, in Eastern Europe, these agencies were practically functioning as divisions of the KGB.

If we examine Andropov's speech on the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the security organs, we can observe how he valued the Stalin years. In his speech at the ceremonial gathering in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses on December 20, 1967, he delivered a positive assessment of the Chekists who had been repressed during the Great Purge:

“Comrades!

The Soviet people have traveled a heroic path. Together with them, the state security organs have traveled this path. On December 20, 1917, at the initiative of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage was established.

Our socialist revolution at that time required such an organ of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which would uncover the schemes of conspirators and could, in Lenin's words, 'with ruthless, swift, immediate repression, relying on the support of the workers and peasants,' thwart all counterrevolutionary plots. The VChK became precisely such an organ.” (Applause.)

“At various times, such distinguished figures of our party as V.R. Menzhinsky, M.S. Uritsky, Ya.Kh. Peters, M.S. Kedrov, I.K. Xenofontov, V.A. Avanesov, M.Ya. Latsis, I.S. Unshlikht, S.G. Uralov, Ya.Ya. Buikis, and many others who made up the Bolshevik core of the Chekist organs, worked within the VChK.

During the Great Patriotic War, the state security service was devoted to the fight for victory over the fascist invaders.

We must not forget the time when political adventurers, who found themselves in leadership positions within the NKVD, attempted to remove the state security organs from party control, isolate them from the people, and allowed lawlessness, causing significant harm to the interests of our state, the Soviet people, and the security organs themselves.

Life shows that as long as imperialism exists, still retaining economic and military power, there remains a real danger to the people of our country and other socialist nations, to all progressive forces, and to universal peace. This is once again evidenced by the dirty war of American imperialism against the heroic Vietnamese people, the imperialists' active support of Israeli aggression against

Arab countries, and the constant interference of the United States in the affairs of Latin American, Asian, and African countries.

As a result of the actions of state security organs in recent times, several agents of imperialist intelligence and emissaries of foreign anti-Soviet organizations have been identified and neutralized, and many criminal channels of enemy agents' communication with foreign intelligence centers have been disrupted, preventing numerous enemy sabotage attempts. The materials published in our press provide some insight into this aspect of the state security organs' work. Behind each of these operations stands the Chekists' skill and devoted service to their duty." (Applause.)

"As for certain individuals who occasionally fall into the nets of the CIA and other subversive centers, such renegades in no way reflect the sentiments of the Soviet people. Certainly, even during the formation of new, communist relations, a few individual cases may be found—people who, for various personal reasons or under the influence of hostile propaganda from abroad, become favorable targets for enemy intelligence."

"But we know something else: not a single one of such individuals was able, or will be able, to gain any serious support. In the end, all these 'soul hunters'—victims of the CIA and other imperialist intelligence agencies—end up being exposed with the help of Soviet citizens, who consider it their sacred duty to protect and safeguard the security of their Soviet state." (Applause.)

"It could not be otherwise. Our state is a socialist, people's state. The protection and safeguarding of its security is a matter of interest to the entire nation. In the context of an all-people's socialist state, the ties between the KGB and the working people are especially strong. Only our enemies, who have every reason to fear and hate the Chekists, portray the Soviet security service as some kind of 'secret police,'" Andropov said.

The long-serving head of the 4th Directorate in the Kremlin, Academician E.I. Chazov, wrote in his book:

"Having known many KGB employees of those years, I can assert that Y. Andropov was not only respected and acknowledged in that organization but was also, in a certain sense, a source of pride. Our meetings with Andropov were quite candid. I trusted him completely, and knowing his honesty, I believed that everything he did was for the good of the country, for the good of the people. At the same time, as an intelligent, well-educated person, he sought to preserve himself and not to turn into an ordinary 'secret police' leader like J. Fouché, or worse, L. Beria. He did not want to be accused of terror or violence; he sympathized with progressive views internally, as long as they did not contradict his worldview. He often came to me with requests to help prominent figures in

science, literature, and the arts, for instance, the creator of the children's musical theater, Natalia Sats.

However, if he believed someone's activities harmed the existing regime or could contribute to its collapse, that person became his enemy. Such, of course, was A. Sakharov for him. I had the impression that Andropov, at the same time, valued him as an intelligent and talented scientist, believing that Sakharov had turned into a puppet in the hands of his second wife, Yelena Bonner, and had become 'a mouthpiece for her views' (Y. Bonner was Armenian by origin—A.M.). Y.V. Andropov told his friends that when Solzhenitsyn was summoned to the KGB, he came in an old sheepskin coat, rough boots, and a hat, as if ready for transport to a colony. The KGB informed him that such a disguise was unnecessary. He was dressed in a normal suit, taken to the airport, and flown to West Berlin, from where he later moved to live permanently in the United States."

In his book *Russian Leaders in Struggle, Love, and Death*, Y. Rybov writes: "Following yet another stroke in 1976, L.I. Brezhnev effectively withdrew from actively governing the country. Many within the Kremlin saw Vladimir Shcherbytsky, leader of the Ukrainian Communist Party, as Brezhnev's successor, given Brezhnev's long-standing warmth toward him. Shcherbytsky certainly had the potential of an exceptional leader, but in Moscow, he was considered an outsider. Brezhnev once offered him the position of Chairman of the Council of Ministers when Kosygin fell ill, to which Shcherbytsky replied that he 'didn't play Moscow games.' Andropov also supported Shcherbytsky and wanted him to work in Moscow, but Shcherbytsky remained in Ukraine, where he worked until 1989. He retired, only to die by suicide less than a year later.

At one time, Fyodor Kulakov was another strong candidate to succeed Brezhnev. Kulakov had played a role in the plot against Khrushchev. In the fall of 1964, Fyodor Davydovich hosted the conspirators at the Teberda Reserve to discuss their plan. Indeed, a month after Khrushchev's removal, Kulakov was transferred to Moscow, where he headed the Central Committee's Agriculture Department.

Kulakov seemed likely to become General Secretary, but a tragic incident disrupted these plans. According to one version, the leadership had decided to retire the aging Brezhnev with honors and appoint Kulakov in his place. In another version circulating in Moscow, Brezhnev was to retain his newly acquired nominal post as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, while Kulakov would assume the position of General Secretary of the Party.

TASS reported that on the night of June 16–17, 1978, Fyodor Kulakov 'died of acute heart failure resulting in sudden cardiac arrest.' At the same time, the KGB spread rumors that Kulakov had slit his wrists following a failed power grab. Overall, his death was mysterious. The medical report only deepened suspicions,

as Yevgeny Chazov did not clarify the cause of death for this otherwise healthy and robust man. Further suspicions arose as Brezhnev, Kosygin, Suslov, and Chernenko did not attend the funeral."

Academician E.I. Chazov writes:

"In conversations with me, Y.V. Andropov did not conceal his ambition to transfer as soon as possible from Dzerzhinsky Square, the location of the KGB headquarters, to Staraya Square, where the Central Committee of the CPSU was situated. Despite his energy and political acumen, he occasionally displayed unwarranted caution and hesitancy. This was particularly evident after the death of M.A. Suslov. In my assessment, L.I. Brezhnev's indecision regarding Andropov stemmed from a fundamental dilemma: while he recognized Andropov as the most suitable candidate for the post of Second Secretary of the Central Committee, he also understood the crucial role of the KGB Chairmanship—not only for preserving the sociopolitical order but also for securing his own authority as General Secretary. Although Brezhnev personally trusted Andropov, he remained uncertain whether Andropov's successor at the KGB would demonstrate the same loyalty."

At this juncture, a political struggle for influence emerged between Y.V. Andropov and K.U. Chernenko. Andropov sought to appoint his deputy, V.M. Chebrikov, as the next KGB Chairman, following the suicide of S.K. Tsigun and the serious illness of G.K. Tsinev. Conversely, Chernenko, concerned about Andropov's continued influence over the KGB, advocated for the appointment of V.V. Fedorchuk, a close associate and head of the Ukrainian KGB. This internal Kremlin intrigue persisted for several months with significant intensity. M.S. Gorbachev, although fully cognizant of the underlying dynamics, prudently refrained from direct involvement.

The struggle for power continued even during Brezhnev's lifetime, exacerbated by his deteriorating health. E.I. Chazov recalls, "I became fully aware of the situation in October 1982 when the issue of Andropov's health was suddenly brought into political calculations. Brezhnev unexpectedly inquired about the nature and prognosis of Andropov's illness, a development that surprised me. Previously, despite being informed multiple times of Andropov's health issues, Brezhnev had responded indifferently, even remarking that 'Yury works more than all the healthy members of the Politburo combined.' Now, at Chernenko's urging, Brezhnev expressed new concerns, requesting a comprehensive medical evaluation of Andropov's condition and capabilities."

Subsequently, Andropov, visibly anxious, contacted Chazov, expressing concern that Brezhnev's inquiries were intended to uncover the full extent of his illness to politically undermine him.

"Try to dispel Leonid Ilyich's doubts,' Andropov requested. 'I am convinced that behind these expressions of concern lies an attempt to portray me as gravely ill, an invalid unfit for leadership.'"

Andropov's apprehensions were understandable, as he had previously encountered a similar situation in the summer of 1966 during the turbulent period following N.S. Khrushchev's removal. At that time, amidst political tension with A.N. Shelepin's faction, Andropov was hospitalized with a diagnosis of "hypertensive disease; myocardial infarction." However, his clinical condition did not align with such diagnoses. Changes observed on his electrocardiogram allowed physicians to claim he had suffered a heart attack, with suggestions of moving him to disability status.

Although E.I. Chazov was not yet part of the 4th Directorate at that time, he was invited to consult on Andropov's case at the behest of Academician E.M. Tareev, a distinguished clinician. Upon review of Andropov's medical records and examination, they concluded that the diagnosis was inaccurate. Instead, the condition was identified as secondary aldosteronism associated with kidney dysfunction and adrenal response. Laboratory data supported the presence of ischemia, but after appropriate treatment, Andropov's electrocardiogram normalized within three to four days. Thanks to the combined efforts of Chazov and Tareev, Andropov remained politically active, ultimately progressing from department head in the Central Committee to General Secretary over the subsequent 18 years.

Chazov notes that perhaps due to Brezhnev's failing memory or other unknown factors, the matter of Andropov's health was never raised again by Brezhnev after that conversation.

K.U. Chernenko maintained substantial influence among party officials and was regarded as Brezhnev's closest and most loyal supporter. Particularly in Brezhnev's declining years, Chernenko often managed state affairs by reviewing and approving documents which Brezhnev would routinely sign without thorough examination.

Brezhnev's death was officially announced on November 10, 1982. Two days later, on November 12, the CPSU Central Committee convened in plenary session and elected Y.V. Andropov as General Secretary. Upon his election, Andropov nominated N.I. Ryzhkov and Y.M. Ligachev as secretaries of the Central Committee and appointed A.A. Gromyko as First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Despite assuming the role of General Secretary while seriously ill, Andropov concealed the severity of his condition for an extended period. Upon taking office,

he initiated a sweeping purge of senior officials, removing more than one-third of Central Committee and Council of Ministers members, as well as numerous regional party leaders. His objective was to consolidate authority with a cadre of reliable personnel, although genuinely loyal allies remained scarce.

Heydar Aliyev was urgently summoned to Moscow from Baku to join Andropov's inner circle. Together with Aliyev and others, Andropov's administration functioned effectively.

Fully understanding the critical role of personnel management, Andropov sought to assemble a leadership team characterized not only by ideological loyalty but also by professional competence. He was acutely aware that political stability hinged on the population's access to basic necessities such as food and clothing. Consequently, he prioritized addressing the country's mounting economic challenges, aiming to extricate the Soviet Union from stagnation and avert impending crisis. To this end, he established an economic department within the Central Committee and appointed Heydar Aliyev as First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

After Brezhnev's funeral, Heydar Aliyev recalled, he met privately with Andropov. "I need you; I want you to start working in Moscow," Andropov told him. Just as he had done earlier with Brezhnev, Aliyev refused Yury Vladimirovich, explaining that he could not imagine leaving Azerbaijan, his beloved homeland. However, Andropov replied, "Azerbaijan has become too small for you," and smiled gently. Upon Aliyev's repeated refusal, Andropov spoke more sternly, "You are needed by the entire Union. Azerbaijan is already too small for you, Heydar. You voted for me to become General Secretary, and now you do not want to help me."

According to Mikhail Smirnyukov, head of the Administrative Department of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Brezhnev had already made the decision to transfer Aliyev to Moscow before Andropov. During Brezhnev's last trip to Baku, he called the office of Premier Nikolai Tikhonov. At that moment, Tikhonov was present. "I want to send you the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers," Brezhnev stated. Tikhonov attempted to change the subject by asking, "How are things going there for you, Leonid Ilyich?" Nonetheless, Brezhnev repeated, "I want to send you reinforcement." Tikhonov feigned ignorance and asked, "And who would that be, Leonid Ilyich?" to which Brezhnev responded, "Heydar Aliyevich."

Tikhonov likely feared that Andropov's influence in the Council of Ministers would increase with this appointment, particularly because Brezhnev's choice of Heydar Aliyev had not originated from the Dnepropetrovsk clan. Consequently,

Aliyev's arrival at the Kremlin was delayed, and the appointment only occurred after Andropov assumed power.

Recalling those days, Mikhail Smirnyukov wrote that all the veterans who had known Heydar Aliyevich during his government service noted his astonishing work ethic. He would arrive earlier and leave later than all other deputies. Adapting to his new position posed challenges for Aliyev, particularly because he was responsible for complex sectors such as transportation and social welfare. He frequently sought assistance and advice from ordinary government officials, which earned him a reputation as a straightforward and approachable figure. Aliyev endeavored to uphold this reputation during his travels across the country. A well-known story recounts how a petitioner at the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) broke through security to hand a request directly to Aliyev. Although the petitioner was detained afterward, Aliyev, during dinner, instructed, "Let that man go." Stories of his intelligence, insight, and understanding of life spread widely throughout the nation.

In addition to his duties as First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Heydar Aliyev was entrusted with managing Soviet relations with the Islamic world, where he commanded considerable respect. He undertook important diplomatic missions to Egypt, Libya, Pakistan, Jordan, and Iraq. Aliyev recalled, "In 1984, I was urgently sent to Damascus. The KGB had reported a conflict between Hafez Assad and his brother Rifaat, who headed Syria's intelligence services. The Kremlin could not allow a regime change or leadership shift in Syria. I rushed to Damascus and met with the recovering Hafez Assad. Despite his illness, our meeting lasted eight hours. Not long after, he sent his brother Rifaat to Spain. Thus, the problem was resolved, and the Politburo breathed a sigh of relief."

According to the recollections of V. Kryuchkov, as early as 1974, Andropov and Ustinov had discussed a "soft and painless" plan for the gradual removal of Brezhnev from power due to his declining health. However, for various reasons, the process dragged on for eight years. Alongside Ustinov and Gromyko, Andropov had supported the decision to deploy Soviet troops into Afghanistan. One of the motivations for this intervention was the belief that the southern borders of the USSR were vulnerable to threats from reactionary Islamic circles. Today, Andropov is often credited with the phrase, "It is better to fight in Afghanistan than in Central Asia or the Caucasus."

In the memoirs of Andropov's son, I. Yu. Andropov, he notes: "He never spoke to me about Chernenko. Their relationship was strictly professional, though it felt like it was not the type of relationship my father wished to discuss. He spoke more about Gorbachev. Yury Vladimirovich was intrigued, so to speak, by Gorbachev's youth and energy. He knew how to stay silent and did not seek to

impress his superiors. When I met Gorbachev in December 1983, he had already become a courtier. He would say things like, 'Raisa Maximovna and I went for a walk in Stavropol, and people criticized us, saying we didn't care enough about Andropov's health.' At that time, I thought, 'Learn, Igor—this is high-level diplomacy!' Oh, it was such Byzantine-style politics!"

Nevertheless, Andropov was most unfortunate with regard to the American president of the time, Ronald Reagan, as his son openly acknowledged. Soviet-American relations had reached a point of extreme tension, and the world stood precariously on the brink of nuclear war. The Americans engaged in open blackmail against the USSR, notably through threats to develop the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Furthermore, the CIA had specific directives aimed at conducting operations against the USSR, supporting covert activities in Eastern Europe, and undermining the Soviet economy.

In response, the KGB initiated the "RYAN" (Nuclear Missile Attack) program, through which Soviet intelligence agencies worldwide gathered information on the possibility of an unprovoked nuclear strike. Inevitably, the heightened intensity of this confrontation influenced Andropov's leadership style. As his son noted, "Yes, at times, his style was tough, but it was justified."

These sentiments are confirmed in an interview Yury Andropov gave to the West German magazine *Der Spiegel*. The interview took place on April 19, 1983.

R. Augstein: I am very pleased to have the opportunity to meet and talk with the highest leader of the Soviet Union. We have already formulated some questions, for which we received written answers. I must say that before our meeting, I had already reviewed the text of your responses. I am not sure if you will officially hand it over to me now, or if we can consider it already delivered to us.

Y.V. Andropov: I am ready to give you this text. I think this is the most reasonable and convenient way. Does this suit you?

R. Augstein: Yes, of course. Thank you. However, since no text can be exhaustive, I would ask for permission to ask you a few additional questions here.

Y.V. Andropov: Please.

R. Augstein: In the West, it is often claimed that, for a certain period, while the United States was not arming at the pace they are now and planning to do, the Soviet Union was actively increasing its armaments, while American forces even decreased.

Y.V. Andropov: These claims are not new; the Americans are especially active in spreading them, though they are also supported by their NATO allies. I didn't

specifically prepare to answer this question, but proving that your statements do not reflect reality is easy. To start from the beginning, allow me to remind you that it was not the Soviet Union that invented and first deployed atomic weapons. There was a rather lengthy period when we didn't have these weapons at all, while the Americans had them and tried to blackmail us, as well as the rest of the world. We had to catch up with them. Several years passed, and nuclear weapons appeared in the Soviet Union as well. We were forced to do this. That's how it was.

R. Augstein: But wasn't it the case that in 1977, the Soviet Union's top leadership itself acknowledged that there was approximate equality in armaments between both sides?

Y.V. Andropov: Exactly. But I haven't finished answering your question. If we then follow the development of events in several stages, here's how it went. The United States began to intensively improve its nuclear weapons. From single warheads, they moved to multiple warhead missiles. Then we were forced to do the same. Then the Americans adopted independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). In response, we had to do the same. Next, the U.S. began installing MIRV missiles on their submarines, which we didn't have at the time. Here, too, we had to respond in kind.

There is an approximate balance of power; we believe there is an approximate parity even now. Thus, the matter has always been that in the arms buildup, we were simply following the Americans, not the other way around. While catching up with the U.S., we constantly offered to stop this race, to freeze the level of arms on both sides, and to move toward reductions. Unfortunately, we did not receive consent from the American side.

If we now talk about the current state of affairs, of course, there are different ways to evaluate it, using various methods and approaches. The United States, for example, considered that their nuclear weapons would be invulnerable if placed on submarines. And they did this. It makes sense, as the U.S. is a maritime power. We are a continental power, and most of our nuclear weapons are deployed on land. Now the Americans propose that we reduce land-based nuclear weapons while leaving sea-based missiles aside. Naturally, this approach does not suit us. From our side, we take into account all types of nuclear weapons that both sides possess and propose their equal reduction from both sides—reduction up to their complete elimination ultimately.

As for detailed data on the balance of forces of both sides, our Defense Minister, D.F. Ustinov, recently spoke publicly on this topic and provided detailed data and figures. You will see the fairness in what I am telling you here.

R. Augstein: The Soviet Union has stated that if the Geneva talks do not yield positive results and American missiles are indeed deployed in Europe, the USSR will place its missiles at approximately the same distance from U.S. territory. I would like to ask you, Mr. General Secretary, do you truly intend to do this, and if so, in which regions of the world might your missiles be placed?

Y.V. Andropov: Even in confidence, I won't tell you this—for obvious reasons. But speaking to the essence of the matter, I want to confirm that we will find a way to respond to American actions both in relation to the U.S. territory and in relation to Europe. Nuclear negotiations are not a poker game where, if you lose, you can somehow hope to recover later. These negotiations literally involve life and death issues for the peoples of the Soviet Union, the U.S., the Warsaw Pact countries, and NATO countries. We cannot take lightly the prospect of more than 500 nuclear missiles being stationed near our borders, in addition to the French and British missiles already aimed at us. Our countermeasures will be fully justified from any perspective, including the highest moral standards.

R. Augstein: President Reagan, speaking to a religious audience, declared the Soviet Union the "focus of evil." You responded to this statement with your own assessment of him. But I would like to ask: is it possible, in such an atmosphere, to have reasonable and successful negotiations at all?

Y.V. Andropov: We are realistic enough not to pay attention to rhetoric. If Reagan, besides his accusations, had accepted even one of our concrete proposals on arms reduction issues or made even one reasonable, suitable proposal himself, we would forgive him his, shall I say, unfounded statement. The French are probably right when they say that everyone speaks in the language they know best.

R. Augstein: It is rare for all evil and all guilt to lie solely on one side, even if it is about the East in relation to the West and the West in relation to the East. In this regard, I must ask the following: is there an awareness in the Soviet Union of how much the Afghanistan issue damages the international atmosphere, and are there any plans to resolve this situation?

Y.V. Andropov: Answering the first part of your question, I will say: of course, there is awareness. Our plans for a political solution to the Afghan issue are no secret. We have publicly explained them more than once. Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev spoke about this. We believe that as soon as external interference in Afghanistan's affairs stops and guarantees are provided that it will not resume, we will withdraw our troops. Our troops are in this country at the request of the legitimate Afghan government—the one that was in power then—and they continue to be there at the request of the legitimate government led by B. Karmal. We are not seeking anything for ourselves there. We responded to a request for help from a friendly neighboring country. But of course, we are far from indifferent to what happens

right on our southern border. Washington, after all, considers itself entitled to judge what kind of government should be in Nicaragua, claiming it affects the vital interests of the United States. But Nicaragua is more than a thousand kilometers away from the U.S., while we share a long border with Afghanistan. So, while helping our friends, we are also thinking about ensuring our own security interests.

Currently, political negotiations are underway to resolve issues related to Afghanistan. They are proceeding with difficulty; Pakistan, one might say, is being held back by its overseas friends. However, we believe that these negotiations, taking place with the assistance of the UN Secretary-General's representative, have some potential.

R. Augstein: I would like to return once more to the issue of intermediate-range missiles. If the Americans go ahead and deploy them in the FRG, will you continue negotiations with the U.S. on nuclear weapons in Europe?

Y.V. Andropov: The Soviet side has repeatedly emphasized that such a development would signify a sharp deterioration not only in Europe but also globally. We would have to make the necessary decisions accordingly.

R. Augstein: There is another issue that greatly concerns many in the FRG. It's well known that the external debt of some socialist countries has now reached extremely dangerous levels. What solution might there be to avoid deepening the crisis? After all, we are all dependent on each other in Europe.

Y.V. Andropov: Since we are talking about sovereign states, I can only say that finding solutions to emerging problems is a sovereign matter for each country. If the question is what the FRG might do, then I can suggest only one thing: engage in trade, develop economic relations, and refrain from "sanctions."

From Yegor Ligachev's memoirs: "After Andropov was elected General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, he received tens of thousands of telegrams and letters with requests and demands to strengthen discipline and order in the country and increase the accountability of leaders. And Yuri Vladimirovich responded to this call from the people. The 'Year of Andropov' remains in the public memory as a time of restoring order in the interest of ordinary people. Primarily, it was about effectively utilizing our country's enormous potential. I should mention that Yuri Vladimirovich possessed a rare, truly leadership ability to translate general goals into specific actions. He focused on key issues such as the balance between labor productivity growth and wages and maintaining balance between goods and population income. For him, these were matters of great policy."

Unfortunately, he could not fully realize his plans because Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov had been suffering from a progressive kidney disease for more than 16

years, which led to chronic kidney failure. Twice a week, he would go to the Central Clinical Hospital for hemodialysis—cleansing the blood of toxins that were almost no longer being removed from his body. Andropov was encouraged by the example of the Austrian Chancellor, who also worked while on an artificial kidney. He always knew he was doomed, but he never complained. The illness made him even more reserved, stern. On February 9, 1984, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, passed away. On February 14, he was buried in Red Square. The funeral speech was delivered by the new General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko.

Psychological Portrait of Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov

A lot has been written about Andropov. At the same time, he is known more as the Chairman of the KGB and General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, yet his personality still remains a mystery to most. His modesty bordered on asceticism. Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov's conservatism manifested itself in his personal life and behavior. He was distinguished by his reserve, reticence, and cautious, distrustful attitude toward people. His private life was closed off, and he showed no desire to socialize with his colleagues at work. Andropov dressed plainly: a long coat in winter and fall, and a dark hat even in warm weather in summer.

For years, he had to be persuaded to get a new suit or coat when the karakul collar had worn down to the leather. He would refuse, saying, "They're perfectly decent clothes; I can still wear them." It took three years to convince him to put a carpet in his rest room. "What am I, a Persian prince?" he said. He was offered to replace the old walnut panels in his office.

He became very annoyed when traffic officers blocked traffic for him. "Why make me a feudal prince?" he'd ask. He didn't celebrate his birthdays—no feasts, no banquets. People would come one by one to congratulate him. Even after

becoming General Secretary, he didn't want to leave his dacha, which, even by those times, was extremely modest and wooden.

Andropov had a close friendship with Dmitry Fyodorovich Ustinov, the Minister of Defense. In many ways, they were quite similar. He received many gifts: fruits, drinks like cognac and wine, which he immediately sent to the special pantry. The dishes went there as well. Valuable gifts were sent to the Gokhran (State Treasury of Precious Metals and Gems). It's said that the Afghan leader Taraki once sent him a carpet. Someone suggested, "Let's give it to Irina; she just got a new apartment." And he replied, "What! A gift from a statesman, and give it to my daughter? To the Gokhran!"



Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov

Andropov carried himself modestly and was attentive to his colleagues, though somewhat reserved. He was known for his strong work ethic and high sense of responsibility for his duties. He was demanding of himself and his colleagues. At times, he showed excessive caution; for example, he would travel to and from work using different routes each time, switching cars, etc.

Y.V. Andropov avoided any kind of friendly relations with members of the leadership bodies. He was distrustful and suspicious of everyone and everything. It's said that when Andropov left for the Central Committee in 1982, two rooms were filled with gifts—5,500 items by inventory. He ordered that the paintings and sculptures be given to two orphanages under the KGB's patronage. He sent items made of precious metals to intelligence services and symbols to the Museum of Chekist Glory.

Those who knew him say that Y.V. absolutely could not stand any form of cult of personality. Every time he was presented with a new portrait, he would grimace and say, "Disgusting! Hide it somewhere." He also disliked being photographed. He took only two things with him to the Central Committee: the Brockhaus and Efron Encyclopedic Dictionary and a clock in the shape of a ship's wheel, a gift from the residents of his hometown Rybinsk.

It became known that Andropov wrote poetry only after his death. However, few people know that he published some of it during his lifetime under pseudonyms. One poem was published on behalf of a sailor, addressed to Mao Zedong during the heightened tensions with China. He was also known to write journalistic pieces that were published in the USSR's major newspapers. For example, he published an article in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* on June 13, 1943.

"WOODEN SHIPS ARE SHIPPED BY IRON MEN"

Folk traditions and customs have long been acknowledged for their significant role in fostering resilience and strength in youth. These traditions, deeply rooted in antiquity, have been sustained over centuries, carrying rich cultural sources of vitality and endurance.

The Cossack horsemen, along with traditional festivals like the Tatar Sabantuy, exemplify longstanding cultural practices that emphasize bravery, agility, and courage—values that have become deeply embedded within the collective psyche of the community. By incorporating traditional folk competitions and strength-based contests into educational frameworks, these traditions can play a crucial role in enhancing both the physical and moral endurance of young people.

In Karelia, traditional folk skiing festivals serve as a noteworthy example of cultural persistence. These festivals are not simply competitions; they are

significant community events in which individuals of all ages—men, women, and children—actively participate. The festivals hold particular value as each family brings its unique preparation methods, including the creation of custom ski waxes and adherence to family-specific training regimens. The event has become so ingrained in local tradition that, in some regions, no formal announcements are necessary, as the occurrence of the festival is well established within the community.

Unfortunately, participation in such folk festivals, like the skiing competitions, represents one of the few instances where Komsomol organizations have successfully utilized the nation's traditions in youth education. This presents an opportunity to further expand and enhance the potential of these practices for the benefit of future generations.

For example, among the Pomors, a historical tradition existed wherein sons accompanied their fathers to sea, learning the demanding professions of fishing or hunting from a young age. The harsh conditions of northern work, particularly along the White Sea, required individuals to be deeply attuned to the whims of the sea and to endure the challenges of working in cold, wet, and hazardous environments. This tradition of father-son collaboration, where young boys (referred to as 'zuiks') learned the trade alongside their fathers, was fundamental to professional development. The people of the White Sea famously stated, "Iron men sail on wooden ships," emphasizing the toughness required for this profession.

However, the continuation of this tradition now faces a threat, as fewer young people are entering these professions. Recent events, such as the large number of sayka fish being driven to the shores by seals, have highlighted the contrast between the natural bounty available and the decreasing number of workers able to capitalize on it. The diminishing number of young fishermen and hunters in the region underscores the urgent need for reinvestment in these traditions.

Furthermore, the coastal areas of Karelia, long renowned for their small shipyards, continue to face a similar challenge. Traditional boat-building methods, passed down through generations, are beginning to fade. The construction of boats such as 'shneks,' 'als,' and 'karbasses'—once used by the Pomors to navigate treacherous waters as far as Norway and even America—is now primarily maintained by the elderly, with few young individuals learning the craft. Revitalizing this tradition, where skills are passed from one generation to the next, is of great importance for preserving this cultural heritage.

Yuri Andropov, throughout his career, frequently engaged with creative and intellectual individuals, fostering relationships with prominent figures such as

Alexander Bovin, Yulian Semyonov, Fyodor Burlatsky, and Yevgeny Yevtushenko.

Andropov's background and personal life, although not widely known, provide valuable insight into his formative years. Born in the Stavropol region in the foothills of the North Caucasus, Andropov's father was of Cossack descent, while his adoptive father, a Pontic Greek named Andropulo, adopted him and changed his surname upon his arrival into the family. His mother, Yevgenia Karlovna Feinstein, had a complex background that Andropov himself chose not to discuss.

In 1982, shortly after his appointment as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Andropov's first official biography, published by *Pravda*, notably omitted any reference to his ethnicity. This omission was partly due to the ambiguity surrounding his mother's background. Andrei Andropov's mother was abandoned as an infant and later adopted by Karl Feinstein, a wealthy merchant. The mystery surrounding her origins was a sensitive issue, and the absence of a 'Nationality' section in his biography reflected this.

Andropov's early years were marked by tragedy, as his father died from typhus when Andropov was just four years old. His mother, seeking to protect her young son from emotional trauma, claimed that his father had gone on a work trip. It was only after several days, when Andropov perceptively noticed the unusual silence in the household, that he asked, "Our dad died, didn't he?" His mother, caught off guard, confirmed the reality. Later, Yevgenia remarried a Pontic Greek named Andropulo. This, combined with the complex ethnic landscape of the Caucasus region, left Andropov's exact ethnic background unclear. The North Caucasus region is ethnically diverse, with various groups—including Adygo-Abkhaz, Nakh, and Dagestani peoples—making it difficult to definitively categorize Andropov's heritage.

The Adyghe (204,000 people), for instance, are indigenous to the Adygea and Cherkess Autonomous Regions and have a rich history. In the past, many Adyghe groups, such as the Shapsugs, Abadzekhs, and Beslencevtsy, resided along the left bank of the Kuban River, with many later resettling in Turkey after the Balkan War. The Kabardians, also from the Northwestern Caucasus, share linguistic ties with the Adyghe. These groups, along with others from the Caucasus region, contribute to the ethnically complex environment in which Andropov was raised.

| | Pontic | Caspian | Pontic-Zagros | Caucasian (Imertians) |
|----------------------------|--------|---------|---------------|-----------------------|
| Height (cm) | 167 | 164 | 165 | 168 |
| Longitudinal diameter (mm) | 191 | 190 | 181 | 184.5 |
| Transverse diameter (mm) | 152 | 150 | 156 | 158 |
| Cephalic index | 80 | 79 | 86 | 86 |
| Zygomatic width (mm) | 142 | 140 | 142 | 144 |
| Drooping nasal base (%) | 46 | 41 | 58 | 51 |
| Light eyes (%) | 8 | 2.5 | 4 | 0 |

The Abkhaz are the indigenous population of the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic and share close ties with the Adyghe peoples. According to anthropological characteristics, Yuri Andropov's features resemble those of the native Caucasian population, particularly the Pontic group, more than any Semitic elements. As for Andropov's mother, who was found on the doorstep of the wealthy merchant Karl Feinstein, this story is shaped by the political context in Russia at the time.

Following the Balkan War at the close of the 19th century, a significant number of Caucasians began relocating to Ottoman Turkey. Many Caucasians were resettled along the left bank of the Kuban River and primarily in the Stavropol region. This migration was influenced by the geopolitical situation of the era. The British sought to extend the war in Turkey, with British diplomacy not opposed to seizing all of Crimea up to the Isthmus of Perekop and "returning" it to the Ottoman Empire. They planned to land in the Caucasus, capture all of southeastern Caucasia, and create a vassal state called "Circassia" under Turkey and British protection. This was intended to block Russian advancement into Persia and India, with the British willing to shed blood in the Caucasus to defend India from a potential Russian invasion. For decades, Tsarist Russia pursued a policy of expelling Muslims from the Caucasus, who had aligned themselves with the Ottoman Empire.

Among anthropologists, there is a famous saying: "Show me a face, and I will tell you who you are." Traits such as a protruding chin, a notably large orbital index, a sharp zygomatic-maxillary angle, a high alveolar process relative to the height of the nose, an average cranial base length, and a wide frontal diameter all indicate Andropov's connection to the native Caucasian populations, particularly the Pontic people.

Andropov became a full orphan at the age of 14. Yevgeniya Karlovna outlived Yuri's father only briefly, passing away from an unknown illness. His stepfather remarried soon after, leaving the boy entirely alone. In search of a better life, Andropov left his family home and settled in Rybinsk, where he enrolled in the River Faculty of the Water Transport Technical School.

Yuri Andropov was married twice and had four children. The mother of his first son, Volodya, and his daughter, Yevgeniya, was Nina Yengalycheva, who worked for the NKVD. She met Yuri in Rybinsk, where they studied together. At a student party, young Andropov saw a short, slender girl with dark eyes and black curls, and he fell in love with her at first sight. Nina Yengalycheva studied in the Electrical Engineering Faculty of the same technical school. They married in 1935, and a year later, their daughter Zhenya was born, whom Yuri named after his mother. Their son Volodya was born in 1940.

When Yuri was sent to Karelia to lead the Komsomol organization in Petrozavodsk, Nina did not accompany him. He never returned to her, nor did he bring her to him. The family eventually fell apart. Andropov never forgave Nina for leaving him during difficult times in his life. After the war, Nina Ivanovna worked to provide a decent life for her daughter and son. The children were raised by the same nanny, Anastasia Vasilyevna, who had once cared for Yuri Andropov.

Yuri inherited a love of music from his mother. He would attempt to play children's songs on the piano. With particular dedication, he would piece together the melody of the lullaby his beloved nanny used to sing to him: "A gray kitten sat on the hearth, and little Yura sang softly."

Although her ward, Yurik—whom she always called him—had left the family, Anastasia Vasilyevna never judged him. When the children made mistakes in their school notebooks, she would quietly approach the desk and say, "Do you know how well Yurik studied? He would never have made that mistake."

"She sang lullabies about little Yura not only to my mother but also to me," recalls Andropov's grandson Andrey with a smile. "To her, we were all Yurochkas..."

The first wife never spoke ill of her former husband. The rare letters Andropov sent only to the children were carefully preserved in a folder.

When Yuri Vladimirovich appeared on television, the whole family would gather to watch. The nanny would approach the TV screen closely and ask, "Where is my Yurik?" Finding his familiar face among the presidium members, she would sit down on the sofa and watch him for a long time, unable to take her eyes off him. She passed away at the age of 92. After her death, Yuri Vladimirovich sent a letter to his daughter with these lines: "The only person who loved me simply because I am who I am has died. I don't think she ever forgave me."

From his second wife, Tatyana Filippovna, Andropov had two children: Irina and Igor. According to those close to him, Andropov was very particular about his children's acquaintances. He insisted on being informed of all their interactions, saying, "If I find out that someone gave Igor a car or arranged for him to be met during a business trip, I'll fire them. Let him be like everyone else." Despite having tickets to any theater performance on his desk, Andropov never gave them to his daughter, Irina, who had a great passion for theater. Irina worked as the deputy editor-in-chief of the magazine *Musical Life*, and her colleagues spoke highly of her professionalism.

Tatyana Filippovna struggled with neuroses and became dependent on sedatives, unable to manage without tranquilizers. She was often admitted to the neurology department of the Central Clinical Hospital. Andropov was deeply concerned about his wife's health, which, in turn, also affected his own well-being.

For over 16 years, Yuri Andropov battled a progressive kidney disease, which eventually led to chronic kidney failure. Twice a week, he underwent hemodialysis to purify his blood of toxins that his body could no longer remove naturally. He was inspired by the example of the Austrian chancellor, who managed to continue his work while using an artificial kidney.

In August 1983, Andropov received his last foreign visitor at a dacha in Crimea—the leader of South Yemen, Ali Nasir Muhammad. After their conversation, there was lunch, and when it ended, Deputy Head of the International Department Karen Brutents recalls, "Yuri Vladimirovich got up and went to the door to say goodbye to the guests. But as he extended his hand to Muhammad, he suddenly turned pale—his face turned chalky—and he swayed. Andropov probably would have fallen if one of the guards hadn't supported him and seated him in a chair. Another guard gently stroked his head. It all lasted no more than a minute, then Yuri Vladimirovich got up and, as if nothing had happened, said goodbye to the guests."

During his time in Crimea, Andropov felt slightly better and decided to visit the mountains, where he caught a cold. His severely compromised immune system made even a mild illness potentially deadly. He developed an abscess, which required surgery, but the infection could not be contained. Andropov was aware of his imminent demise but never complained, and his illness made him even more reserved and strict.

Yegor Ligachev recalled the days when their relationship had reached a point where they could communicate with just a few words. "Our conversations were always direct and frank," he said. "So, I wasn't surprised when a few days later, Andropov's assistant, Pavel Laptev, called me and said, 'Yegor Kuzmich, you need to visit Yuri Vladimirovich. He's inviting you today at six in the evening.'

Andropov was already seriously ill and no longer holding Politburo meetings. He was in the hospital, and I could hardly imagine how and where our meeting might take place, which I directly expressed to his assistant. 'A car will come for you and take you there,' they told me."

As department head, Ligachev often had to brief Andropov on critical national affairs. Andropov would usually begin such meetings by asking, "So, tell me, Yegor Kuzmich, where are we right now?" He would then add, "Let's run this problem through the wringer." During these discussions, they would thoroughly "wring out" a particular issue, all while sipping tea with biscuits. If it was just the two of them, Andropov would often conclude the conversation with, "Well, I've had a look at you..."

Andropov seemed to imbue this phrase with a personal meaning, and it became a signature ending to his conversations with Ligachev.

Many political leaders who left a significant mark on world history are believed to have had the gift of hypnosis. Using a particular tone of voice and manner of speaking, they could draw people into a hypnotic state from a distance. Public speaking, the ability to speak at length without interruption, often resembles hypnosis. At large gatherings, during prolonged speeches, some members of the audience may fall asleep or doze off, perhaps unknowingly subjected to a form of hypnosis. One feature of hypnosis is that it distracts people from their daily concerns, creating psychological comfort, which prevents them from focusing while the hypnotist plants ideas in their minds.

Adolf Hitler, for example, was known to possess strong hypnotic abilities. On July 20, 1944, an assassination attempt against him was orchestrated by Army Commander General Olgrich, National Security Commander General Frank Stein, and Colonel Count Schabinger Berger. The count participated in a meeting at Hitler's residence in Krossdostland, East Prussia, on that fateful day.

In the count's briefcase was an explosive device. He placed the briefcase near Hitler and, under the pretense of leaving to make a call, stepped away from the bunker. After some time, a powerful explosion was heard. However, Hitler miraculously survived unharmed. Count Schabinger, hearing the loud explosion from afar, was certain Hitler had died. He reported Hitler's death to General Olgrich. The general, taking command, ordered the regiment's major, Reimer, to arrest all leaders of the Third Reich. Major Reimer, surrounding the Reichstag building, began to disarm the leaders of the Third Reich. When he entered Goebbels' office, he informed him that he must surrender his weapon. Goebbels, not losing his composure, told him that his information was incorrect: Hitler was alive. Goebbels suggested that the major contact Hitler by phone. Major Reimer agreed. Known for his hysterical speeches, Hitler, with a calm, gentle voice,

managed to sway Reimer to his side and, with his help, had all the conspirators executed.

The essence of hypnosis lies in tone and a distinctive manner of speaking. The role of suggestibility, fixed through evolution, is significant here. Suggestibility often takes on a protective role when a person's nervous system is weakened by extraordinary influences: illness, deep sorrow, fear of danger, difficulty in making a choice in a complex situation, extreme physical exhaustion, etc. These states frequently lead to the development of what is called the paradoxical phase (the "suggestion phase," according to I.P. Pavlov), in which strong stimuli from the real world are perceived less intensely than weak verbal influences.

It is notable that, in most cases, the "hypnotizer" is another person whom one turns to for sympathy, advice, or assistance, and who likely does not realize the role they are playing at that moment. In all these states, the suggestive power of words is extremely strong. For this reason alone, a person overwhelmed with grief would always seek another person, who, in turn, would feel a duty to offer comfort, advice, or sympathy.

Since we have touched on the role of words in shaping a person's mental state, it is worth recalling the psychophysiological nature of speech as a specific stimulus for humans. A truly scientific understanding of the psychophysiological mechanisms by which verbal suggestion affects bodily processes emerged only with I.P. Pavlov's research on higher nervous activity. Thanks to him, we can now understand how one person's words can influence another's higher nervous processes, the mechanisms of suggestion, self-suggestion, and suggestibility, and the role of these phenomena in human life, the origin of certain diseases, and their treatment.

I.P. Pavlov demonstrated that the second signaling system (words and speech in all its forms), which is unique to humans, reflects their social and labor nature and serves as a comprehensive conditioned stimulus, forming the basis of a complex signaling system among people. Verbal conditioned responses in humans are formed on the material basis of the first signaling system, which perceives direct physical influences (such as light, sound, smell, etc.).

Acknowledging leadership in the field of hypnosis and a positive attitude toward the hypnotization process (which may be motivated by various factors) leads to a temporary, situationally conditioned reduction in the conscious willpower processes of the person being hypnotized. More precisely, willpower processes are temporarily not engaged "to participate in this play." The word "temporary" here is very important. In experiments, we often induced deep hypnosis in people with known strong willpower qualities. For this, it was only necessary to cultivate a clearly positive attitude toward the hypnosis process, along with a full

understanding of the importance and necessity of the procedure for accomplishing a specific task. Naturally, no negative impact on their professional performance or willpower was noted afterward. On the contrary, the adjustment of their state and well-being during hypnosis improved their productivity in the post-hypnotic period, provided physical rejuvenation, and increased endurance. We focus on these questions because, even today, one can still hear—sometimes not only from uneducated people but even from the work of certain scientists—that a person “susceptible” to hypnosis has a weak will.

To summarize, it should be emphasized that the primary psychophysiological mechanism of hypnosis is most often the phylogenetically conditioned reflex of “following a leader.” Activation of this reflex causes an involuntary reduction in both conscious control of the situation and general psychological tension.

Conditions that facilitate the development of hypnosis include the deactivating effect of monotonous stimuli or a general reduction in the flow of external stimuli, as well as muscular relaxation, which sharply reduces the tone of the central nervous system. In some cases, these conditions may serve as primary hypnotic factors.

Finally, the ability to manage a person’s state in all stages of hypnosis is based on the central nervous system’s property of creating and extensively utilizing “watchpoints” in various states and situations, which are capable of perceiving only certain types of information. The selectivity of perception is undoubtedly determined by the mental attitude shaped by a given situation.

We have reviewed the main mechanisms involved in the formation of the hypnotic state as partial inhibition of the cerebral cortex. Here, other psychophysiological mechanisms come into play, determined by the overall specificity of inhibitory states within the human central nervous system.

Thus, hypnosis, as a partial inhibition of the cerebral cortex, is a state in which the effectiveness and vividness of images and ideas activated through targeted suggestion may surpass real external influences. Limiting the influx of external stimuli and the partial inhibition of the cerebral cortex represent exactly the combination of conditions in which the reproductive properties of the central nervous system are maximally revealed.

Mikhail Gorbachev claims that when Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov addressed the members of the Politburo from his hospital bed for the last time, he named Gorbachev as his successor. According to Gorbachev, Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko concealed this part of the address and did not disclose it to the Politburo members. Gorbachev presented himself as a convinced follower of

Andropov's vision. However, Gorbachev's character was not suited to this role, as he later became one of the causes of the disintegration of a powerful state.

In reality, the facts tell a different story. In response to journalists' questions about whether Andropov might have named Gorbachev as his successor, Andropov's son, Igor Y. Andropov, noted: "My father, as far as I know, thought it inappropriate to write something akin to a political will. Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, moreover, understood that he would not be able to do so. Because he held the highest posts in the party and the state for a very short time, and such a will could simply have remained unfulfilled. And my father would never have named Gorbachev as his successor. Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov believed that Gorbachev had very limited experience. My father had a different idea: to bring young regional secretaries into the center, from among whom a future leader might be chosen."

The collapse of the Soviet Union

Laws of society

In September 1984, General Secretary of the Central Committee K.U. Chernenko turned 73. It was not a milestone age, and no awards were expected on this occasion. However, as General Secretary, he received his third Gold Star of the “Hammer and Sickle” from D.F. Ustinov. The public response to this “award” was one of great bewilderment. This star, which is now openly acknowledged, weakened Chernenko’s authority within the party and among the people.

According to A.M. Alexandrov-Agentov’s recollections, “In the last months of K.U. Chernenko’s life, it seemed as though he was working in a sort of vacuum. I can say without exaggeration that each day he lived in those last three months was painful for him. At the same time, it appeared as though his closest colleagues in the highest leadership were pretending that nothing was happening, diligently helping with work that had become unbearable for him. In reality, they were gradually distancing themselves, watching as their leader, stoically holding on to life, took part in new activities that didn’t align with his health condition.”

K.U. Chernenko clung to life with all his might, striving to show those around him that he was still in charge. Sometimes, it even seemed — though it’s hard to believe that such an impression could be shared even by top medical experts led by E.I. Chazov — that the General Secretary might still pull through and fully return to duty.

By the end of 1984, the General Secretary’s health was visibly deteriorating. Those around him clearly saw it, yet they avoided talking about it. Reports about the health of the USSR’s top Communist began to leak into the Western press. The always quick-to-report German magazine *Stern* even published a photo report showing how the General Secretary and “President” Chernenko, with great difficulty and only with the help of his guards, managed to reach his residence in the Kremlin. Several photos were published. In one, a guard fastens the buttons on his coat; in another, he is helped up the steps of the porch; in a third, he is supported by his arms as he is led through the door. The sight was disheartening.

Fedorchuk is considered indirectly responsible for the sudden worsening of Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko’s health. This story was described by Chernenko’s aide, Viktor Pribytkov.

In the summer of 1983, Chernenko went to Crimea to rest. Nearby, at a resort, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Vitaly Vasilyevich Fedorchuk, was also on vacation. The minister entertained himself by catching mackerel and smoking it himself. He decided to treat Konstantin Ustinovich to some of his homemade smoked fish.

“There was nothing unusual about this visit,” writes Pribytkov. “Fedorchuk and Chernenko had known each other for a long time. The mackerel was surprisingly good—fresh, fatty, slightly salty. It was a true delicacy with boiled potatoes. The whole family enjoyed the Black Sea treat. But that night, Konstantin Ustinovich became ill—abdominal pain, vomiting, severe poisoning. In extremely serious condition, he was urgently flown back to Moscow. While the rest of the family remained healthy, Konstantin Ustinovich ended up in the Kremlin’s intensive care unit.”

“Unfortunately, the fish turned out to be bad,” writes Academician Chazov in his book *Health and Power*. “Chernenko developed a severe toxic infection with complications in the form of heart and lung failure. Our top specialists had to urgently transport him to Moscow due to the severity of his condition. His state was so critical that both I and his attending pulmonologist, Professor A.G. Chuchalin, as well as other specialists, feared for his life...”

The story is strange—according to the strictly observed protocol, all food for Politburo members underwent rigorous inspection. Special laboratories under the Ninth Directorate of the KGB managed this process. So what happened? Did someone ignore the protocol, assuming that former KGB head Fedorchuk wouldn’t bring poison? Or was it simply bad luck—an unlucky piece of fish for a man already in poor health?

Konstantin Ustinovich’s aide, Viktor Pribytkov, suspects something worse—deliberate attempt to remove Chernenko: “Immediately after Gorbachev achieved his long-desired position, Fedorchuk was removed from his duties and sent into political oblivion, as if they were trying to hide the main witness...”

In reality, Fedorchuk wasn’t hidden away. The whole story is reminiscent of another myth—about the death of Tsvigun.

A.M. Alexandrov-Agentov recalls this episode with sadness: “On December 27, 1984, the General Secretary, who hadn’t appeared at his office on Stara Square for several days due to a worsening of his illness, suddenly called around 11 a.m. in a quiet but demanding and dissatisfied voice, expressing his displeasure: why didn’t he have the list of award recipients, whom he was supposed to present with state honors that day.”

It was unexpected. A week earlier, when his illness had flared up again, the doctors had insisted that the General Secretary refrain from any ceremonies or public appearances for the foreseeable future. This particular ceremony was supposed to honor a group of writers who had been awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor and had been waiting a long time for their turn. At that time, V.F. Shaura, who was the head of the Culture Department of the Central Committee, had been informed to cancel the event. Naturally, none of this was mentioned to

the General Secretary during the conversation. Only the time of the ceremony was confirmed. He set it for 4 p.m., and at 3 p.m., they were to bring him the materials.

By the appointed time, everything was ready. From the waiting room, they passed along the message that the General Secretary asked them to come in. He was not in the office. The door to the rest room opened slightly, and the doctor gestured for them to enter. Konstantin Ustinovich was half-reclining in a chair, without his jacket, with his shirt collar open, his tie loosened, and oxygen tubes intertwining around him. He looked so helpless that it made one's heart ache. Lifting his eyes, Konstantin Ustinovich asked with a mixture of sadness and frustration, "So, how do I look? Looking good?"

In such a situation, the only response was silence, pretending nothing unusual was happening. However, half an hour later, he was at his desk, sitting up as always, neat, with his silver hair meticulously combed. The ceremony was to be held not in a special room but right there in his office. Moving freely was difficult for Konstantin Ustinovich. Five minutes before the ceremony, the office began filling up with a noisy group of photographers, filmmakers, TV crews, and the honorees themselves. This agitated the General Secretary. More than anyone, he was aware of his frailty and knew others could see and sense it too, which made him anxious and nervous. For those present, the ceremony passed with a painful tension. But K.U. Chernenko endured it through sheer willpower. Only during the presentation of the final award did he, it seems to Anatoly Ananyev, lose his balance for a moment, and only the quick reaction of a security guard, who caught him, kept him on his feet.

Take, for instance, the excessive fuss and over-organization surrounding the preparation for K.U. Chernenko's pre-election speech in February 1985. Of course, a meeting between a candidate of such high rank and the voters was traditionally significant and required extensive preparation. But in this case, it should have been absolutely clear to both the medical experts and everyone around that a meeting between the General Secretary and the voters was impossible. He physically couldn't participate; he was dying. No foreign stimulants could help him anymore. They should have simply published a short statement from the candidate in the press explaining why he couldn't meet with them at the moment. That would have sufficed. People would have understood the situation.

The most likely candidate to succeed Chernenko believed himself to be Gorbachev, but he knew that only a few members of the Politburo wanted him as General Secretary. Someone with influence had to come to his aid, or else the position would go to someone else. It was said that Viktor Vasilyevich Grishin, the First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee, was also aiming for the post.

Possibly. But it was certain that the Foreign Minister, Andrei Andreyevich Gromyko, also hoped to lead the country after Chernenko. When Suslov died, Gromyko wanted to assume his position as the second person in the party, but Andropov was given that role.

After the deaths of Andropov, Chernenko, and Ustinov, Gromyko considered himself the most worthy candidate to lead the party. However, his colleagues did not favor Andrei Andreyevich; he was not known for his ability to endear himself to others. Rumors circulated that he tried to form an alliance with Prime Minister Nikolai Tikhonov, who strongly disliked Gorbachev and sought to hinder his rise. But a Gromyko-Tikhonov alliance never materialized. Tikhonov attempted to convince the KGB chairman of the inadmissibility of electing Gorbachev as General Secretary. Chebrikov got the impression that Tikhonov himself aspired to the position. However, the KGB chairman firmly took Gorbachev's side and even relayed his conversation with Tikhonov to Mikhail Sergeevich.

By January 1985, the General Secretary's health had progressively worsened. He could barely move, was unable to stand for long periods, and struggled with constant wheezing and coughing. What kind of public speech could even be considered? But the preparation for the election meeting continued intensively, by inertia. There was even consideration of having the candidate speak while sitting. A task was even given to create a specially designed podium for this purpose. Finally, the decision was made to pre-record K. U. Chernenko's campaign speech at the Central Clinical Hospital and then broadcast it on Central Television. Several attempts were made to record it, none of which were successful. Despite Konstantin Ustinovich's courageous attempts, he could not manage to speak even for 3-5 minutes.

By the end of the 1970s, the average age of the Politburo members was approaching 80 years. Most Politburo members suffered from severe age-related illnesses. Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Chairman of the Council of Ministers Nikolai Tikhonov regularly lost coordination and would fall during official gatherings. Central Committee Secretary Andrei Kirilenko, suffering from brain atrophy, constantly got confused in his thoughts, forgetting what he wanted to say. Brezhnev's personal security chief, General Vladimir Medvedev, recalls: "I witnessed phone conversations between Kirilenko and Brezhnev. Kirilenko would call: Leonid, hello. -Hello. -It's me, Andrei. -I'm listening, Andrei. -You know, ... and suddenly he would fall silent. There would be a long pause. Leonid Ilyich would sit, smiling, waiting: -Andrei, sorry, it slipped my mind... - Well, no worries. Remember, call me back."

Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov, the Minister of Defense, who had a good chance of succeeding Chernenko, unexpectedly passed away two months earlier, in December 1984. Gorbachev asked Academician Chazov about Chernenko's

health: "How much longer can he hold on – a month, two, six months? You understand that I need to know the situation to decide how to proceed." Chazov could not provide a precise answer. Gorbachev was nervous; he needed to form an alliance with someone influential within the Politburo. But for that, he had to pick the right moment.

A few days before his death, Chernenko developed a twilight state. It became clear that his days were numbered. Chazov called Gorbachev and warned him that the tragic end could come at any moment. For Gorbachev and his circle, the time to act had arrived. Particularly active was Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev, the Central Committee Secretary for Personnel Affairs. He had to ensure a unanimous opinion among the influential body of regional and district first secretaries in favor of Gorbachev. At that moment, the deal between Gorbachev and Gromyko was finalized: Andrei Andreyevich promised to take the initiative and nominate Mikhail Sergeyevich's candidacy in exchange for the position of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

The KGB chairman had already made his choice. Immediately after Chernenko's death, at a Politburo meeting, KGB Chairman Chebrikov firmly stated:

"I, of course, consulted with my colleagues. Our agency must be well aware not only of foreign policy issues but also of internal and social ones. Taking these circumstances into account, the KGB entrusted me with naming the candidacy of Comrade Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev for the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. You understand that the voice of the KGB, the voice of our workforce – this is also the voice of the people."

During Gorbachev's election to the position of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the most active figure was Ligachev, the CPSU Central Committee Secretary for Personnel. Over 1983-1984, he managed to place approximately 70% of his people into key positions as regional and district first secretaries of the CPSU, who were ready to follow any of his orders and secure an arithmetic majority in votes at Central Committee plenums on any issue. This cohort, lacking sufficient experience in political and organizational work, understood that the Politburo members with substantial experience were an obstacle to their ambitions. Thus, immediately after Gorbachev's election as General Secretary of the Central Committee, a campaign was launched to discredit a number of high-ranking officials through the media. This included G. Aliyev, the First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and a Politburo member.

Gorbachev initiated tragic events, destruction, chaos, and immense hardships. With his own hands, Gorbachev dismantled one of the most powerful states in history.

In 1987, M. S. Gorbachev, presumably with the help of foreign "friends" like R. Maxwell, published his book *Perestroika and New Thinking for Our Country and the Whole World* in an enormous print run. This book brought him huge foreign royalties and served as an unambiguous signal of his readiness to initiate radical changes in the USSR. Gorbachev's speech at the UN at the end of 1988 further strengthened the Western decision-makers' belief that he was prepared for contact with the West. And so, on January 19, 1989, the leaders and representatives of the "world government" – a delegation of the Trilateral Commission – arrived in Moscow. The delegation included the founding father of this globalist body, D. Rockefeller, as well as J. Bertouin, I. Okawara, V. Giscard d'Estaing, and Y. Nakasone. This mysterious commission, along with the equally secretive Bilderberg Club and the Council on Foreign Relations (in all of which, incidentally, D. Rockefeller was essentially one of the primary figures), forms that very globalist center that regulates all world politics.

The Trilateral Commission representatives had a thorough conversation with M. S. Gorbachev, in which A. N. Yakovlev, V. A. Medvedev, G. A. Arbatov, and other prominent "perestroika" advocates were also present. Summing up this meeting, D. Rockefeller stated that "the conversation was exceptionally interesting, useful, and promising in terms of its potential outcomes."

There is nothing secret that does not eventually become revealed. Articles suddenly appeared in the foreign press criticizing the Communist Party, surprising many.

The Washington Post, USA:

"For most Soviet people, the Communist Party has become a symbol of repression, rights violations, and economic collapse. It bears responsibility for the crimes and mistakes of the past... All attempts to reform the party, made by Gorbachev after coming to power, have led nowhere... Having been shaped by the party, he fails to grasp the extent of its discredit."

From the recollections of E. Ligachev:

"Even at the beginning of 1990, *The New York Times* published an article raising the question: should Gorbachev be helped? Before answering this question, the newspaper noted, it should be rephrased: in what endeavor should he be helped?"

Mechanism for financing friendly parties, creating a real threat to their continued existence. In a memo to Comrade M. S. Gorbachev dated June 22, 1990, it was emphasized that if we now fail to meet our financial obligations to the 'friends' firms,' the CPSU will be faced with the necessity of finding resources to support friendly parties at the expense of the party budget."

"If the successes of perestroika are understood as the creation of a communist system that would be economically efficient and politically democratic, then the

answer must be negative." In the newspaper's opinion, assistance should be aimed at dismantling the existing system and creating a strong private sector.

Soon, Gorbachev made a trip to the United States (late May – early June 1990). Before departure, there was an exchange of opinions about the participation of foreign parties in the work of the 28th Congress of the CPSU. During this, Mikhail Sergeevich mentioned that Yegor Kuzmich was in favor of inviting foreign guests to the congress, and he supported this opinion. It seemed the issue was settled. But that was not the case. A few days later, at a working meeting of the Central Committee secretaries, I reminded them of this decision. Turning to Medvedev, I asked, "Where is Vadim Andreyevich, the invitation text for foreign guests to the congress?" Yakovlev interjected, "We need to consider the high costs of inviting foreign delegations." N. N. Slyunkov responded to Yakovlev's remark: "What are you talking about, Alexander Nikolayevich, this is not a commercial issue, but a political one." I added, "Referring to costs is merely political cunning."

The explanation for this event became clear a year later, with information about the financing of foreign communist parties from the CPSU budget. Apparently, Gorbachev did not need these parties abroad. They seemed to interfere with his efforts to establish relations with Western countries.

This is made clear in a fragment of a confidential memo sent in February 1991 to the Deputy General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, V. Ivashko. We draw readers' attention to the language of the document:

"The urgent need to resolve issues related to the 'friends' firms' is dictated by the fact that their deteriorating financial situation and threat of bankruptcy disrupt the mechanism for financing friendly parties, creating a real threat to their continued existence."

In a memo to Comrade M. S. Gorbachev dated June 22, 1990, it was emphasized that if we now fail to meet our financial obligations to the 'friends' firms,' the CPSU will be faced with the necessity of finding resources to support friendly parties at the expense of the party budget."

Attempts to resolve this issue at the departmental level have yielded no significant results. In our opinion, a political decision from the Central Committee of the CPSU on this issue is needed, with a direct appeal to Comrade V. Pavlov. We request consideration.

Head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee (V. Falin).
Head of the Socio-Economic Policy Department of the CPSU Central Committee (V. Vlasov).
February 19, 1991.

Memo on payments to the "friends' firms."

In accordance with the instruction from the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated July 11, 1990, PP-28612, Vnesheconombank of the USSR paid off overdue debts to the friends' firms. In August – September 1990, Vnesheconombank of the USSR made the following payments to the following firms (in million rubles):

| | |
|---|-----|
| IT-Comércio (Portugal) - V/O "Raznoexport" | 4.4 |
| Metalkim (Portugal) - V/O "Legpromexport" | 0.3 |
| Numerica (Portugal) - V/O "Exportles" | 0.6 |
| Globus (Austria) - V/O "Vneshtorgizdat" | 0.8 |
| Land og Folk (Denmark) - V/O "Vneshtorgizdat" | 0.3 |
| OPF (France) - V/O "Vneshtorgizdat" | 0.3 |
| Plambeck (FRG) - V/O "Vneshtorgizdat" | 0.1 |
| Total: 6.8 | |

Current overdue debt, according to Soviet foreign trade organizations:

| | | |
|---|--|-------------------------------|
| V/O "Vneshtorgizdat" | | V/O "Raznoexport": |
| International Trading (Japan) 0.5 | | Kraus (Austria) 24.6 |
| OPF (France) 0.4 | | Papadopoulos (Greece) 3.7 |
| Teti Editori, Editori Riuniti, Amilcare | | Philiass (Greece) 0.2 |
| Pizzi, Xylon (Italy) 1.9 | | Agapiou (Greece) 2.0 |
| Globus (Austria) 2.2 | | Fidas (Greece) 1.5 |
| Pergamon Press (UK) 0.5 | | Omega (Greece) 0.3 |
| Druckhaus Norden, Dastim, Locher, | | Recor (Greece) 0.5 |
| Barch International (FRG) 0.4 | | VEK (Greece) 0.3 |
| Coop (Switzerland) 0.1 | | Delta (Cyprus) 2.7 |
| Avante (Portugal) 0.2 | | Cosmos (Cyprus) 0.2 |
| Land og Folk (Denmark) 0.3 | | Frey (Malta) 0.9 |
| Ving-Tryck (Sweden) 0.1 | | Farrugia (Malta) 0.7 |
| Total: 6.6 | | Jarmal (Malta) 0.4 |
| | | Bortex (Malta) 1.9 |
| V/O "International Book": | | Sport Trend (Malta) 0.4 |
| People's Daily World (USA) 0.1 | | Imperial Products (Malta) 2.9 |
| Unita (Italy) 0.05 | | Anderwea (Malta) 0.3 |
| Morning Star (UK) 0.1 | | Visca (Malta) 0.5 |
| Rizospastis (Greece) 0.1 | | Intex Hosiery (Malta) 0.5 |
| Total: 0.35 | | IT-Comércio (Portugal) 1.3 |
| | | Cecea (Portugal) 2.2 |
| | | Amorim (Portugal) 0.5 |
| | | Planco (Portugal) 0.5 |
| | | Faeda (San Marino) 0.2 |

| | |
|--|--|
| | Tess (Sweden) 0.4 Japan Sea (Japan) 3.8 Total: 53.4 Total for friends' firms: 60.35 |
|--|--|

This appeal, like others, yielded no significant results. Senior officials determined that it was time to sever relations with these firms. By declassifying their names, they effectively imposed a barrier on the funding of communist parties abroad.

When M.S. Gorbachev was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, President Bush remarked that "thanks to M.S. Gorbachev, significant political and economic changes occurred in Eastern Europe." There is nothing surprising in this acknowledgment. However, the statement became more contentious when M.S. Gorbachev himself reiterated this sentiment during his speech in the Spanish Parliament on October 27, 1990. "I think I have grounds to say that the unification of Germany," he emphasized, "would hardly have happened, especially in such a short time and with international consensus, if not for Soviet perestroika." In an interview with the Japanese newspaper *Asahi Shimbun*, he further stated that the changes "in Eastern Europe... became possible to a large extent due to the deep transformations in Soviet policy as a result of our perestroika."

Mikhail Sergeyeovich, by promoting the myth of "new thinking," led a once-powerful nation to ruin. Day by day, life grew more difficult for ordinary citizens. One might question the rationale behind his actions: why did the "author of perestroika" systematically weaken the country's strength when he could have halted this destructive process at the outset?

Encouraged by "foreign friends," the unique Oka missile complex, also known as the SS-23, which was not included in Soviet-American negotiations, was dismantled. This action alone resulted in a loss to the country amounting to \$7 billion. On June 15, 1990, Gorbachev transferred 51,000 square kilometers of the Soviet portion of the Bering Sea to the United States.

He also created "hot spots" that escalated into national conflicts and, in some instances, wars. It was Gorbachev who ordered the deployment of Soviet troops to Baku in January 1990. In an interview, Gorbachev responded to Heydar Aliyev's direct accusation that Soviet army troops massacred unarmed civilians in Baku on Gorbachev's orders that January night: "Well, these things happen; we called Baku to inform them that the situation was under control and that 'extraordinary measures' needed to be taken, and that we had to act immediately. And everything was done consciously!" He expressed no regret, stating these words with casual indifference, as though nothing significant had occurred.

To better understand Gorbachev's true character, consider his reflections after the dissolution of the USSR:

"I think fate was still kind to me. And, of course, my main task was perestroika,

which affected the lives of both my own country and the whole world. I believe that I acted from a highly moral and humane position, with a credo of freedom, democracy, and a new society that I wanted to build without bloodshed. You could say that this was, to some extent, utopian. But I still adhere to this philosophy."

In 1994, when Russia faced the potential of another Caucasian war, Gorbachev offered his mediation. Upon hearing this, Dudayev reached out to Gorbachev, and they had an insightful conversation, culminating with Dudayev affirming, "We have always been and will be with Russia." However, President Yeltsin completely disregarded Gorbachev's offer.

When the first Chechen conflict ended, Maskhadov traveled to Kazan to meet with Shaimiev, with Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers present. Lubbers later recounted how he managed to arrange a meeting with Maskhadov, during which the Chechen leader openly expressed their desire for the same status that Tatarstan had received from Moscow.

Former CPSU Central Committee Secretary Grishin, in his memoirs, wrote: "Unable to create anything, these individuals managed to destroy everything, achieving significant results in doing so. After the tragic events of August 1991, it became clear that Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, and their supporters were carrying out a specific political agenda to dismantle the Communist Party, the great socialist state, socialism, and socialist ideology. Gorbachev's 'talent' was fully revealed when it came to making difficult, unpopular decisions. Recall the events in Vilnius, Baku, and Tbilisi. Blood was spilled, lives were lost, and the head of state, like a cowardly hare, hid behind the backs of his comrades. The people were never given an explanation as to who was responsible for this bloodshed. And this blood remains on Gorbachev's conscience, as his reckless actions, or criminal inaction, led the situation to a critical point. When the time came to answer, he blamed others. His six years of leadership were six years of betrayal—betrayal of his comrades, of all communists, and of the destruction of a great state that had been built not only over the past 70 years but over centuries, through the efforts of many generations of people."

Regrettably, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev never demonstrated any inclination to learn from either the mistakes of others or his own. By the time the situation reached a critical point, it was already too late to reverse course.

On April 17, 1991, a referendum on the future structure of the Union was held in the USSR. Three-quarters of the Russian population, along with citizens from other Soviet republics, expressed their support for a unified, federal state. By the end of July 1991, a draft of the new Union Treaty was ready. This draft effectively annulled the 1922 Union Treaty, signaling the beginning of a "new era" in the relations between the peoples and republics within the Soviet Union.

The draft of the Union Treaty was prepared and discussed behind closed doors, in secrecy, with no public involvement. On July 29-30, 1991, a meeting was held in Novo-Ogaryovo between Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Nazarbayev. As was later revealed, this meeting addressed a wide range of issues concerning the future of the Soviet state, the upcoming signing of the Union Treaty, the cessation of the union's legislative and executive bodies, and the creation of new bodies to replace them. Personnel matters were also part of the discussions.

On August 20, 1991, the day the Union Treaty was to be signed, Soviet citizens would have faced the fait accompli of the Soviet Union's dissolution and the emergence of a new entity—the Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics. While the abbreviation remained the same—USSR—the content was to be entirely different.

The events of August 1991 are indelibly etched in history under the ominous name of the "coup." The signing of the Union Treaty, an immensely significant and crucial document directly affecting the country's future, was scheduled for August 20. Under such circumstances, Gorbachev could not afford to leave the Kremlin unattended, even for a single day. Only his personal presence could have safeguarded the fate of the Union Treaty. However, contrary to expectations, the President of the USSR abruptly left for a two-week vacation, allegedly for urgent medical treatment, despite being in good health aside from some sciatica. The day before his departure, on August 3, Gorbachev convened a select group of cabinet members and issued cryptic instructions: "Keep in mind," he told them, "we must act firmly. If necessary, we will do whatever it takes, even up to declaring a state of emergency."

On August 4, as he was boarding the plane, Gorbachev once again reiterated these strange instructions. "If necessary, act decisively but without bloodshed," he advised Vice President Yanayev, who had been left in charge during his absence.

On August 18, Boldin, Baklanov, Varennikov, and Shenin traveled to Foros, to the presidential residence (known as "Zarya"), and spent over an hour attempting to persuade Gorbachev to sign a decree declaring a state of emergency. Gorbachev claims that he resolutely rejected their proposals, cursed at them, and referred to them as adventurers.

However, the so-called "adventurers," including Boldin, insist that by the end of the conversation, Gorbachev had actually agreed with their arguments. He was particularly concerned about whether the emergency measures would apply to Yeltsin's leadership. Upon receiving an affirmative answer, Gorbachev is said to have waved them off, saying, "Do as you please!" According to the head of the presidential administration, Gorbachev even offered a few suggestions on how he believed the state of emergency should be implemented.

It is difficult to ascertain the full truth, but certain key details, agreed upon by both sides, raise significant questions.

It is known that all communication at the residence was cut off from 3:00 p.m. on August 18. However, this disruption only affected the main residence; communication remained available in the guardhouse. Moreover, after the emissaries departed, Gorbachev made a few calls from the guardhouse.

For example, he contacted Arkady Volsky, merely to reassure him: “They’ll say on the radio that Gorbachev is sick, but you should know, I’m fine!” Volsky could not comprehend the significance of this statement. It seemed absurd, even theatrical. “If Mikhail Sergeyevich had wanted to change his situation,” writes his personal security chief, Vladimir Medvedev, “my men were ready at hand. I had at my disposal a reserve Tu-134 plane and a helicopter. It would have been a simple task, technically, to apprehend the coup plotters and fly them to Moscow. We could have arrived in the capital, and it would still have been possible to arrest anyone we wanted. It was only the 18th...”

“The security staff had contacts with border guards and naval personnel responsible for ensuring the president’s safety,” confirms Vice President Yanayev. “They repeatedly offered to take Gorbachev wherever he wished and connect him with anyone he needed.”

General Rasshchepov, head of the KGB's 7th Directorate, which was responsible for surveillance, testified that on August 17, during a meeting at the office of USSR Deputy Minister of Defense Achalov, the neutralization of Yeltsin was discussed in detail. According to the operation plan, Yeltsin was to be subdued and sent to the KGB base at “Zavidovo.” However, the system failed once again. At 5 a.m., Kryuchkov ordered everyone to return to the group’s headquarters. This was one of the most significant mistakes made by the State Emergency Committee (GKChP). According to the protocols of a coup, Yeltsin should never have been allowed to remain free.

It remains unclear whether Kryuchkov lacked the resolve or underestimated Yeltsin's determination, but he hoped that an agreement could be reached with the Russian leader. It turned out that Yeltsin shared as little affection for Gorbachev as the GKChP did.

Yeltsin began reaching out to the outside world. He called other republic leaders, seeking their support. Interestingly, the communication at his residence was not severed—an odd development. “Kryuchkov didn’t foresee this either,” Yeltsin wrote in his *Notes of a President*. “Due to the rapid development of business in the country, countless new means of communication had emerged.”

On the morning of August 19, at an emergency meeting of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Minister Yazov did not elaborate on details. “He came out, announced

that Gorbachev was ill, the signing of the Union Treaty was scheduled for tomorrow, but under these circumstances, it could not be signed. And to reassure the public, a state of emergency was being introduced,” recalled Air Force Commander-in-Chief Shaposhnikov. Meanwhile, General Varennikov, the Commander of the Ground Forces, who was in Ukraine at the time, sent urgent coded messages: “We request immediate measures to neutralize the group led by the adventurer Yeltsin B.N.,” Varennikov wrote on the evening of August 19. “The building of the RSFSR government must be immediately blocked off, cut off from water sources, electricity, telephone, and radio communications...”

None of these measures were implemented. Central television and radio stations were filled exclusively with classical music, occasionally interrupted by emergency decrees.

As the indecisiveness of the putschists continued, Yeltsin gained increasing momentum. He ordered barricades to be built around the White House. His first decree outlawed the decrees issued by the GKChP within Russia. By approximately 5 p.m., Yeltsin issued a new decree transferring all executive bodies of the USSR, including security agencies, under Russian jurisdiction. In effect, if anyone had carried out a coup, it was Boris Nikolaevich. No one had granted him such authority, and this was a blatant violation of the Constitution.

Former head of presidential administration, Sergei Filatov, explained: “Yeltsin is not a politician for calm, stable situations. He is active, effective, and at his best in times of crisis, during ‘storms and stresses.’ It seems he needs someone to fight against constantly.”

Boris Nikolaevich spent the decisive night in his office, where a plan was developed to evacuate him urgently to the nearby American embassy in the event of an assault. The Americans even kept their back gates open specifically for this purpose.

At 10 a.m. on August 20, Defense Minister Yazov informed his colleagues that the Ministry of Defense had decided to withdraw troops from Moscow. From that moment onward, any further attempts to change the situation became futile. The putschists refused to act, instead engaging in endless discussions rather than taking decisive action, despite repeated calls for firmness and resolve. President Gorbachev, for his part, vehemently rejected accusations of his involvement in the GKChP. “There is an opinion circulating that I supposedly knew about the impending coup,” he writes in his book *The August Coup*. “The investigation will reveal everything. Just as it will dispel the rumor that I had an uninterrupted line of communication but chose to step aside, waiting out the situation so that I could later arrive ‘when things were set up for me.’ In other words, a win-win scenario. If the coup succeeded, the president, who had given the GKChP a chance, would come out victorious. If the coup failed, I would still be in the right.”

Valery Boldin, a member of the GKChP and one of the closest figures to the General Secretary, states: “At the beginning of 1990, Gorbachev invited a group of Politburo and Security Council members to join him—all of those who would later become members of the GKChP (including Kryuchkov, Yazov, Baklanov)—and raised the issue of introducing a state of emergency. Everyone Gorbachev invited at that time supported the idea, especially given the growing nationalist and separatist tendencies in the Baltics and the Caucasus. And in Gorbachev’s office, we began developing a concept for a state of emergency.”

In his book *The Politics of Diplomacy*, then-U.S. Secretary of State James Baker writes directly: “As it turns out, Yeltsin was also warned about the conspirators’ plans. No less than the U.S. president himself informed Boris Nikolayevich about this when Yeltsin was on a visit to the United States. And when, the day after his return, Gorbachev began to assume the role of a leader—appointing ministers, making statements—Yeltsin immediately put him in his place.”

Under pressure from Yeltsin, the USSR president was compelled to appoint all the candidates Yeltsin had specified. Among these appointments, Commander of the Air Force Shaposhnikov, who had previously promised to bomb the Kremlin, became the Minister of Defense. Bakatin, who had opposed the coup, was appointed head of the KGB.

“From now on, you will make all personnel appointments only after consulting with me,” Yeltsin set an ultimatum for Gorbachev.

“Gorbachev looked at me closely,” Yeltsin writes in *Notes of a President*. “It was the look of a man cornered.”

At this time, the Western press reported:

Neues Deutschland, Germany:

- The current political situation in the USSR is marked by Gorbachev’s unprecedented weakness and Yeltsin’s strength. Taking advantage of his once powerful rival’s weakness, Yeltsin is moving forward. He realizes his own strength.

NBC, USA:

- The Gorbachev-Yeltsin alliance will not last long... Cooperation between these leaders resembles the situation in several Eastern European countries after 1989. In Poland, for instance, General Jaruzelski remained president for more than a year after he agreed to let Solidarity representatives form a government.

The New York Times, USA:

- B. Yeltsin emerged as the main victor. However, his reward was a crumbling Third World economy, a demoralized population, widespread alcoholism, social problems, polluted water and air, and ultimately, a society that has guns but no butter. Yet, the Soviet people had dreamed of reforms for so long that they were now ready to achieve some real progress.

Le Monde, France:

- The President of the USSR saw with his own eyes how his “savior” declared the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) illegal in Russia with the stroke of a pen... In Europe, until now, only one country—Turkey—had banned the Communist Party.

The vast country was collapsing before Gorbachev’s eyes. Decree after decree, Yeltsin dismantled the powerful state. The activities of the Communist Party within the territory of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) were banned. All party property was transferred to the councils of people’s deputies.

Gorbachev voluntarily stepped down as General Secretary and urged the members of the Central Committee to dissolve. Formally, he still remained President of the USSR, but real power was now in Yeltsin’s hands. In the ten days following the coup in August, Latvia, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan achieved full sovereignty. By October, Turkmenistan was the last to break away. The Soviet Union de facto (and soon de jure) ceased to exist.

All power shifted into Yeltsin’s hands. “The 20th century ended on August 19–21, 1991,” Yeltsin would later write, and he would be absolutely correct.

The decision to dissolve the USSR had already been formed by those around Russian President Yeltsin shortly after the August coup.

The Soviet Union had been founded in 1922 by four republics: the RSFSR, Ukraine, Belarus, and the Transcaucasian Federation. The three Slavic republics had the right to dissolve this Union, and the leaders of these republics recklessly signed an act called the “Belavezha Accords,” disbanding the Union.

In the Russian Supreme Soviet, nearly everyone voted in favor of the Belavezha Accords, including the Communists.


Gorbachev’s last hope lay with the military; after all, he was still the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. According to Shakhrai, “From December 8 until the 25th, when Gorbachev announced his resignation, he was calling the commanders of

military districts, calling Shaposhnikov, and asking for their support. But they all refused him.”

On December 25, exactly five days before the anniversary of the USSR’s founding, Gorbachev was forced to resign voluntarily. Of course, he could have continued to resist, to demand an extraordinary convocation of the Union parliament. But what would that have accomplished? With Gorbachev’s resignation—the first and last Soviet president—a mighty, multi-million-strong empire collapsed.

Psychological portrait of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev

Gorbachev was born in the village of Privolnoye, Krasnogvardeisky District, Stavropol Territory, to a peasant family. He was Russian. He studied in school and, during summer vacations, helped his father in the fields, working as a



Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev

combine operator's assistant. He led the school's Komsomol (Communist Youth League) organization and joined the Party while in the army. From 1950 to 1955, he studied at the Faculty of Law at Moscow State University named after M.V. Lomonosov. Beginning in 1955, he worked for the Komsomol: as Deputy Head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Stavropol Regional Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League (VLKSM), then as the First Secretary of the Stavropol City Komsomol Committee. In 1958, he became the second, and later, the first secretary of the Stavropol Regional Komsomol Committee.

In January 1962, at the regional Komsomol reporting and election conference, his work was sharply criticized by the First Secretary of the Regional Committee of the CPSU, F.D. Kulakov: "The report stated that over two years, 18,000 young men and women were sent to the most important sector of agriculture. It seems like a big achievement, but in reality, this work is invisible, as during the same period, 16,000 young people left the farms. The main reason for this turnover, Comrade Gorbachev, is the thoughtless approach of the regional Komsomol committee to creating basic cultural and living conditions for the working youth, and the neglect of mass political work on farms. Not enough attention is given to organizing socialist competition. There is much formalism. As a result, the movement for awarding the title of collective and communist labor shock worker did not gain wide momentum in the region. The regional committee of the VLKSM only pays attention to competitions when it's time to sum up the results. It might be better, Comrade Gorbachev, to act more honestly and discuss one issue in a Party manner: 'On the unsatisfactory work of the bureau of the regional committee of the VLKSM in leading socialist competition.'"

From March 1962, Gorbachev became the Party Organizer of the Stavropol Territorial-Industrial Collective Farm and State Farm Administration. In the summer of 1962, the bureau of the CPSU Regional Committee, in its resolution, drew his attention to the irresponsibility shown in working with the Appeal of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR to agricultural workers. M.S. Gorbachev objected to this assessment, prompting F.D. Kulakov to propose creating a commission to review his work, and on August 7, 1962, at a meeting of the regional Party leadership, he was “reprimanded in full.”

The former chairman of the Stavropol KGB, E.B. Nordman, recalled that before the regional CPSU committee plenary session, where the matter of the first secretary was to be decided, he was summoned by the First Deputy Chairman of the KGB, S. Tsvigun. During that period, all personnel appointments, including party positions, were coordinated with the KGB leadership. Considering that Andropov was at the head of this organization, it’s clear why the KGB’s opinion held such weight in these decisions. Tsvigun was interested in how closely Gorbachev, as a former Komsomol leader, was connected with the A. Shelepin – V. Semichastny group, who were considered the main opposition to L. Brezhnev. E. Nordman assured S. Tsvigun that Gorbachev was distant from Shelepin and Semichastny and had nothing to do with their group.

E. Nordman’s life was not without its challenges. Y.V. Andropov met Nordman, while vacationing in Kislovodsk, appreciated his honesty and, seeing him as a loyal person, offered him the position of heading the republican KGB administration in Uzbekistan. Through Nordman, Gorbachev was introduced to Andropov. In 1971, Gorbachev became a member of the CPSU Central Committee. He served as Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee from November 27, 1978, to March 11, 1985, was a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo from November 27, 1979, to August 21, 1980, and became a full member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo on October 21, 1980. His further fate is well known to all—General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee from March 11, 1985, to August 24, 1991.

Theoretical studies of Gorbachev’s personality and his characteristics in overcoming critical situations revealed two traits: an infantile level of irresponsibility in an intellectually developed person and a careless attitude towards his surroundings. Although the format of our book does not include diagnosing Kremlin figures, an explanation for Gorbachev’s irresponsibility can only be found in the classification by the scholar F.E. Vasilyuk.

Observing significant differences in overcoming critical situations and the feelings they evoke—on one hand towards an accomplished critical event, and on the other towards the life necessity affected by this event—F.E. Vasilyuk

identified a hedonistic reaction. Such a reaction ignores the accomplished fact, internally distorts and denies it (“nothing serious happened”), and forms and maintains an illusion of well-being and the integrity of the disrupted aspects of life. This, if one may say so, is a defensive reaction of Gorbachev’s infantile consciousness.

Gorbachev’s aide, Georgy Shakhnazarov, adds: “Here one of Gorbachev’s vulnerable traits—carelessness—became apparent. An optimist by nature, who had always been lucky in life, he was invariably confident in a favorable outcome for himself in every matter and, accordingly, did not prepare for the worst. I almost never saw him in a state of fear for the future or experiencing concerns that would prompt him to take additional precautions.”

Gorbachev’s ‘infantilism’ led to student riots on Tiananmen Square during his official visit to China on May 18, 1989. Recalling those days, academician E.I. Chazov writes:

"In my mind's eye, I remember the unforgettable meeting between two communist reformers: the Soviet one – M.S. Gorbachev, and the Chinese one – Deng Xiaoping. The comparison was not in favor of the father of Soviet 'perestroika.' Deng Xiaoping was a wise politician, a subtle diplomat, and, at that time, a man of great willpower. When Gorbachev tried to speak in support of students and democracy, he was sharply cut off with a folk proverb: 'Sometimes trash appears on the street, but the wind comes and sweeps everything clean. So it will be with us.' Yes, Sophocles was right: 'To talk a lot and to say a lot are not the same.' I had no doubt that the next day after our departure, that wind would sweep over Tiananmen Square, ending China's attempt to follow the new, Soviet path."

"A normal person with realistic experiences adheres to the principle of reality, which is based on patience and a sober attitude toward what is happening. Ultimately, a person accepts the reality of what has happened, adjusting their needs and interests to a new sense of life. Realistic experience fully acknowledges the presence of a critical situation but builds a new content of life. Aimed at self-reflection and self-knowledge, realistic experience can lead to a higher understanding of the meaning of life. This capacity allows a person to 'comprehend life on a grand scale and recognize what is truly significant in it... there is something infinitely surpassing any scholarship... this precious and rare quality is wisdom.' It is wisdom, through realistic experiences, that allows a person to maintain will and perseverance. An analogy to realistic experience can be found in moral behavior, which is governed by moral principles rather than external circumstances, no matter how harsh they may be."

"But with Gorbachev, everything was the opposite."

The word goes to Doctor Academician E.I. Chazov:

"The next day, when we were flying back home from China, about twenty minutes after the plane took off, Gorbachev invited me to his salon for lunch. Besides him and Raisa Maksimovna, A. Yakovlev and E. Shevardnadze were also at the table. Whether from fatigue or due to the difficult negotiations, the lunch ended quickly. I was about to take my leave when Gorbachev addressed his two closest associates at that time: 'Excuse me, but I would like to discuss some medical issues with Yevgeny Ivanovich.' The three of us remained."

"Gorbachev started from afar, recalling the past and asking how things were going at the Cardiology Center I had established, where his daughter had begun working. Raisa Maksimovna enthusiastically shared her impressions of the visit to China, highlighting, as always, her husband's achievements. Gradually, the conversation shifted to political issues. Knowing that in the Gorbachev family many state and personnel matters were decided at Raisa Maksimovna's suggestion, I was extremely surprised that, when she joined the conversation, she supported me, especially when it came to Mikhail Sergeyevich's inner circle. I had never seen Gorbachev so irritated. He blushed, jumped up, and started pacing around the cabin, interrupting us. His words completely shattered the image of a progressive, wise, and strong General Secretary of the ruling party that I had built for myself many years ago. Before me was an ordinary party secretary, struggling to hold onto his slipping power and trying by all means to assert his political uniqueness."

"'You don't understand anything about politics or running a country,' he said. 'I need to be elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. And to do that, I must gain the support of both conservatives and democrats. As for the people around me – the main thing is that they are loyal to our cause, loyal to me.' You see, the thought of reconsidering his beliefs never once occurred to Gorbachev."

Since such a person lacks experience in willful behavior, he also does not retain the ability to consciously and composedly search for a way out in critical situations. The outcome of experiencing a crisis can be twofold. In any case, such a person neither controls the situation nor can they stand against the current state of affairs. They lack the psychological foundation for a heroic act.

Remember Gorbachev, when he became a puppet in Yeltsin's hands, lacking the psychological attributes to withstand critical situations.

Leader without makeup

Gorbachev and Yeltsin had known each other for a long time, since the time when Gorbachev served in Stavropol. Their relationship, though not close, was quite warm. They even embraced and kissed when they met.

Yeltsin claims in *Confession* that he did not aspire to move to the capital. When, in April 1985, Central Committee Secretary Dolgikh called him directly to his car and, on behalf of the Politburo, offered him the position of head of the Construction Department at the Central Committee, Boris Nikolayevich, "after thinking for literally a second or two," declined.

"This is where I was born," he explained, "this is where I lived, studied, and worked. I like my work; although the progress is small, it is there. Most importantly, I have strong, deep connections with people, built over many years." Yeltsin had already served as the first secretary for nine years, a decent term.

According to eyewitnesses (Yeltsin's security chief Korzhakov and Politburo member Medvedev), Central Committee Secretary Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev played a decisive role in Yeltsin's fate. He proposed Yeltsin's candidacy to Gorbachev, something he would later deeply regret.

Ligachev first heard about the Sverdlovsk secretary in December 1983 from Andropov himself. Andropov called him directly from his hospital bed and "asked him, if possible, to visit Sverdlovsk and 'take a look' at Yeltsin." A month later, an opportunity arose as the regional party conference came to the Urals. It was at this meeting that Ligachev got close to Yeltsin. "What attracted me to Yeltsin was his liveliness in dealing with people, his energy, his decisiveness," he wrote many years later.

However, Boris Nikolayevich does not mention this in his memoirs. As usual, he does not want to share his success with outsiders, especially not with such a controversial figure as Yegor Kuzmich.

It is hard to say what feelings Yeltsin had when he left his native Sverdlovsk in the spring of 1985. Central Committee Secretary and future Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov, for example, had a rather skeptical attitude toward Yeltsin. When Gorbachev and Ligachev asked for the opinion of the former director of *Uralmash* (who had known Yeltsin back in Sverdlovsk), he gave his compatriot a downright humiliating assessment.

"Yeltsin... by nature, is a destroyer. He'll make a mess, you'll see! Great power is contraindicated for him. You've made another fatal mistake."

But the General Secretary did not heed Ryzhkov's advice. Although his right-hand man, the notorious Yegor Ligachev, volunteered to visit Sverdlovsk to check the facts, so to speak, for peace of mind. Gorbachev later recalled:

"I've spoken with people here, exchanged views. It's my opinion that Yeltsin is

the man we need. He has everything – knowledge, character, he’s a large-scale worker, he’ll be able to get things done.”

It should be noted that the then First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee, Viktor Grishin, who had ruled the capital for nearly two decades, had long drawn Gorbachev’s discontent. The head of the Main Trade Department, Tregubov, the director of the Eliseevsky store, Sokolov, the director of “Okean,” and dozens of lower-ranking trade workers had been arrested.

“Today is a day of celebration for all of Moscow,” wrote Gorbachev’s assistant Anatoly Chernyaev in his diary on December 24. “Finally, Grishin was removed and replaced by Yeltsin.”

The first conflicts arose in the winter on January 19, 1987, at a Politburo meeting. Yeltsin dared to criticize the draft of Gorbachev’s report to the plenum on “Perestroika and Personnel Policy.”

Gorbachev was actually to blame for what happened. All the time while the report was being discussed, Yeltsin remained silent, and the General Secretary directly asked him: “What’s your opinion, Comrade Yeltsin?”

“We are still on the path to perestroika. Negative phenomena are still alive,” replied Moscow City Committee Secretary B.N. Yeltsin. He proposed publicly evaluating each former Politburo member, as they were guilty of stagnation and crisis. But Gorbachev quickly interrupted him, saying that the slow pace of perestroika was due to personnel errors.

“We need to bring in new forces, but it’s unacceptable to... persecute cadres, to break people’s lives over our knee.”

“Yeltsin was embarrassed and subdued,” Gorbachev later wrote. “At that time, many complaints were already coming from the capital about his rudeness, bias, and harsh treatment of people... Yeltsin spoke again: ‘This is a lesson for me. I think it’s not too late.’”

When the Politburo meeting ended, Yeltsin felt unwell, experiencing heart trouble. Everyone had already left, but he couldn’t get up from his chair, and a doctor had to be called. The next day, he began calling Politburo members, seeking their sympathy and support. “I overdid it again. I think I went too far somewhere, don’t you think?” he confided to the Russian Premier Vorotnikov.

Vorotnikov reassured the Moscow Committee Secretary: “Others often enter into disputes too.” But even that wasn’t enough for Yeltsin. Although he expressed remorse at the meeting, he still pushed to see Gorbachev, confiding his struggles and asking him to “take into account the peculiarities of his character.”

Their heartfelt conversation lasted 2.5 hours.

But barely a month had passed before Yeltsin began acting out again. Some people attribute these strange behaviors to Yeltsin's neurasthenic state. Thus, these days in his life should be viewed strictly from a medical perspective. This is evidenced by his letter to Gorbachev. He felt hurt by the whole world.

"I am inconvenient," Boris Nikolayevich wrote, "and the veil of pity clouds my eyes. The number of issues associated with me will only increase and hinder your work. I sincerely wouldn't want that... because, despite your incredible efforts, the struggle for stability will lead to stagnation." And therefore: "I ask to be relieved of my duties as First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU and of my responsibilities as a candidate member of the Central Committee Politburo... This is neither weakness nor cowardice."

During these days, Yeltsin was constantly under KGB surveillance. They monitored him covertly, his phones were tapped. The last time, on November 7, Boris Nikolayevich ascended the platform of the mausoleum. From the outside, it was hardly noticeable; he waved his hat in greeting to the columns of workers just like the other Politburo members. However, in that circle, he was already an alien, a living dead man. The other leaders tried not to even look at their former comrade, as if he didn't exist.

On November 9, 1987, under mysterious circumstances, Yeltsin was urgently hospitalized at the Central Clinical Hospital.

"Apparently, my body couldn't handle the nervous tension," Yeltsin laments in his memoirs, "I had a breakdown. They immediately pumped me full of medications, mostly tranquilizers and drugs to relax the nervous system. Doctors forbade me from getting out of bed, they constantly gave me IV drips, new injections. The nights were especially hard; around three or five in the morning, I could barely endure the crazy headaches. My wife wanted to visit me, but they wouldn't let her in, saying I was too unwell to be disturbed."

At that time, the 4th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Health was headed by Yevgeny Chazov. According to Chazov, "It was a nervous breakdown, understandable given Yeltsin's personality structure and nervous system type. For such a type, power is paramount. Everything that stands in the way must be overcome or swept aside. In ordinary circumstances, a person restrains and controls this trait. But alcohol, especially when abused, will inevitably bring it out and drive it to a pathological state."

Is everything clear now? But Yeltsin insists that, supposedly, while he lay in the hospital room, "killer doctors" deliberately injected him with psychotropic drugs, which drove him to madness and in this delusional state dragged him to the Moscow City Committee plenum. According to Yeltsin, the main culprit was academician Chazov.

In the Presidential Marathon, he writes: "Chazov came to the hospital: 'Mikhail Sergeyevich asked you to attend the plenum of the Moscow City Committee; it's necessary.' Whether I lived or died afterward didn't matter. They pumped me full of drugs and put me in a car. At the plenum, I felt so bad it seemed I would die right there in the meeting hall.

Naina remarked, "But how could he! He's a doctor!" To which the response was, "And what of a doctor? Doctors were also under orders. There were no simple doctors or teachers back then; everyone was a soldier of the party. Soldiers of the state." It is worth noting that, according to Korzhakov, it was not Chazov who administered a massive dose of baralgin to Yeltsin, but another doctor, Dmitry Nechayev.

In April 1996, Dmitry Nechayev was mysteriously shot by hired killers outside his home. The perpetrators were never found.

Possibly due to the influence of the drugs or in a state of deep depression, Yeltsin took the floor at the Moscow City Committee plenum of the CPSU on November 11, 1987, expressing views that contradicted his recent statements. He said, "I think there is no need to assess myself here, as my actions are simply unpredictable. Today, at the plenum of the Central Committee, the Politburo, the City Committee Bureau, and at today's plenum, I have heard more criticism than I have in my entire life. Perhaps this was, to some extent, the reason for what happened. I just want to firmly assure you here, Mikhail Sergeyevich, and the members of the Politburo, the secretaries of the Central Committee who are present, and the members of the City Committee of the party, all those present at today's plenum of the City Committee: First, I give my honest party word that, of course, I had no ulterior motives, and there was no political intention in my speech.

Second, I agree with the criticism that was voiced today. Probably, Comrade Yeliseev (the rector of Bauman Moscow State Technical University) was right when he said that if this had happened earlier, it would have been beneficial. I must say that I firmly believe, as a party member, in the party's general line and the decisions of the 20th Congress. I am absolutely convinced of perestroika, and no matter how difficult it may be, it will ultimately succeed. It's just that perestroika, and here we indeed had differing views, progresses differently in various regions and even within different organizations. But I do believe in perestroika, and there can be no doubt about that. I declare this absolutely honestly to you, the communists who have worked together with me for two years in the party organization. Any future action of mine that contradicts this statement should, of course, lead to my expulsion from the party.

At the beginning of last year, I was recommended by the Politburo and elected here at the plenum as the First Secretary of the City Committee of the party. The

bureau was formed, and I must say that the bureau worked very productively. The Executive Committee of the Moscow Soviet was also formed; I mainly mean the chairman and his deputies, who, as many noted, began to engage in concrete work. But starting around the beginning of this year, I began to notice that things were not going well for me.

You remember, at the plenum of the City Committee of the party, we spoke about the need for each leader, if they are not succeeding, to honestly come forward and tell their higher party organ that things are not working out. But here, of course, there was also a tactical mistake. This was probably due to being overloaded and other factors. But indeed, something began to go wrong in my work; I can't say this was true of the entire bureau, but things became less effective. Today, it's clearer than ever that it was easier to make promises and develop comprehensive programs than to implement them. This is the first point. And secondly, during this period, in recent times, one of my main personal qualities—my ambition—came into play, as was mentioned today. I tried to fight it, but unfortunately, I was unsuccessful.

The main thing for me now, as a communist in the Moscow organization, is, of course, what decision to make to cause the least damage to the Moscow organization. Of course, there is damage, and it has been done, and it will be hard for the new First Secretary of the City Committee, the bureau, and the City Committee of the party to heal this wound, this damage done not only to the Moscow organization but to restore it through work as quickly as possible.

"I cannot agree that I do not love Moscow. Other circumstances played a role, but no, I managed to come to love Moscow, and I tried to do everything I could to address the shortcomings that were there before. Today, it was particularly hard for me to hear such specific criticism from party comrades with whom I have worked for two years, and I would say that I cannot refute any of it. And it's not because one must beat one's chest, but because you understand that I, as a communist, have lost the political face of a leader. I am very guilty before the Moscow party organization, very guilty before the City Committee, before you, of course, and before the bureau. I am, of course, also very guilty personally before Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, whose authority is so high in our organization, our country, and worldwide. And I, as a communist, am confident that the Moscow organization is united with the Central Committee of the party, and it has gone and will continue to go forward confidently with the Central Committee of the party."

However, Gorbachev recounts the events differently: "When we began discussing the possibility of his working at Gosstroy as a minister, the conversation took a business-like tone. 'Is this a departure from the political arena?' 'Right now, it's not possible to bring you back into big politics,' I replied. 'But a minister is a

member of the government. You will remain part of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). And then we'll see how things go. Life goes on."

Korzhakov provides a similar account: "At that time, I personally brought the telephone to my boss's bedside and left. From behind the door, I heard Yeltsin's despondent voice continuing the conversation. Gorbachev offered him the position of Deputy Chairman of Gosstroy at the ministerial level in the USSR. Boris Nikolaevich accepted without much hesitation."

On January 14, Yeltsin was appointed First Deputy Chairman of Gosstroy of the USSR with the rank of Union Minister—a position that had not existed before and was specifically created for him. At the same time, Yeltsin remained a candidate member of the Politburo, unlike the Chairman of Gosstroy. Thus, he officially became a subordinate; however, despite this, he was in fact of a higher rank and did not report directly to anyone.

Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin took a long time to recover. The humiliation and disgrace were difficult for him to endure. At this moment, Gorbachev made a significant mistake by ignoring Yeltsin's election as a delegate to the All-Union Party Conference.

On June 28, the Kremlin Palace of Congresses was filled to capacity. Since the plenum of the Moscow City Committee nearly half a year earlier, Yeltsin had not appeared in public. According to the agenda, Yeltsin's speech was not scheduled. However, Yeltsin managed to break through to the podium, as this was his last opportunity to return to big politics.

He kept sending note after note to the presidium: "Give me the floor." The response was zero. Then, on the final day of the conference, July 1, Boris Nikolaevich decided to openly challenge the system and headed directly to the podium. Yeltsin approached Gorbachev. The hall fell silent, and in that quiet, Yeltsin's voice rang out: "I demand to be given the floor to speak. Or put it to a vote of the entire conference."

Gorbachev nodded in agreement, fully aware that Yeltsin would persist in taking the podium. After the August coup, it would be revealed that Yeltsin's office at Gosstroy had been packed with "bugs." "Much of what we discussed in his office," wrote his aide Sukhanov, "immediately became public knowledge. We had no doubt that we were within reach of the 'big ear.'" According to the Secretary of the Moscow City Committee, Yuri Prokofiev, on the evening before the last session, the second secretary of the Moscow City Committee, Yuri Belyakov, called him at home and informed him that a speech by Yeltsin was expected. Belyakov even asked him to speak out against Yeltsin. There were no surprises. In fact, Politburo members had been informed in advance. Yeltsin was

being set up for a public, demonstrative confrontation. Behind the scenes, the Kremlin had already developed Plan B.

Yeltsin and his circle's strategy was to attract attention by speaking at the conference. Boris Nikolayevich, acting as a "battering ram" politician, made a bold move.

Yeltsin stated: "Comrade delegates! A delicate issue. I wanted to speak only about the issue of my political rehabilitation after the October plenum of the Central Committee. If you think there's no time for it, then that's all," he said, spreading his hands, as if about to step down from the podium. But Gorbachev intervened: "Boris Nikolayevich, speak; they're asking you to." (Applause.)

"I think let's remove the secrecy from Yeltsin's case. Let Boris Nikolayevich say whatever he feels he needs to say. And if we have something to add, we can say it too. Please, Boris Nikolayevich."

After this remark, the signal was given to proceed with Plan B. One by one, speakers came forward, once again demanding accountability from the presumptuous maverick. The most striking speech came from Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev, whose words that day would remain forever etched in history: "Boris, you are wrong!"

At this conference, a decision was made to create two highest bodies of power—the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. In other words, citizens would first elect deputies, and from among themselves, they would form the standing, bicameral Supreme Soviet.

Elections were scheduled for March 26, 1989. In these elections, Yeltsin received 5,117,745 votes. No one, including Yeltsin himself, expected such a decisive victory.

Yeltsin was not the only one to rise to power against the Kremlin's will. In numerous regions, provincial and district secretaries, senior officials, and generals suffered humiliating defeats. All 14 commanders of military districts failed, as did 30 provincial and city committee secretaries. In Leningrad, none of the seven party leaders passed. The Baltic states unanimously voted against Moscow's candidates.

A day after the elections, the Politburo convened an emergency session.

"In Moscow, it wasn't because of a meat shortage that Yeltsin received 90 percent of the votes," his longtime adversary Ryzhkov admitted at the Politburo. "There's meat in the capital. We ourselves made mistakes."

After Yeltsin's victory, Gorbachev took measures to avoid direct conflict with his former comrade. In doing so, he sought to reconcile with Yeltsin. For instance,

Gorbachev demonstrated courtesy by not blocking Yeltsin from entering the Supreme Soviet, the permanently functioning governing body, despite having the ability to do so and prevent him from becoming anything more than a regular deputy. This was a fatal error, as the Supreme Soviet provided Yeltsin with a platform to continuously criticize Gorbachev and his team. By this time, Yeltsin had already established his own circle, working closely with the U.S. embassy, which helped craft his image as a champion of democracy.

With the assistance of the U.S. embassy, Yeltsin's circle organized his first trip to America, supposedly at the invitation of several institutes and foundations. This was effectively a form of vetting by the intelligence services and a psychological evaluation of Yeltsin. He was even received by President George Bush, who had spent many years as CIA director. The meeting was unofficial, lasting only 12 minutes, but that was sufficient for the Americans to assess Yeltsin. For Gorbachev, who considered himself the sole irreplaceable politician, the West's preference for Yeltsin felt like a devastating blow. Gorbachev's jealousy knew no bounds. The very next day after Yeltsin's return to Moscow, an article appeared in *Pravda*. It was a reprint of a piece by journalist Vittorio Zucconi from the Italian newspaper *La Repubblica* about Yeltsin's recent visit to the United States. Later, it would become clear that the article was part of a series of "active measures" orchestrated by the USSR's KGB. The Italian Zucconi wrote:

“Over five days and five nights spent in the United States, Yeltsin averaged two hours of sleep per day and downed two bottles of vodka, four bottles of whiskey, and countless cocktails at official receptions. Yeltsin fell asleep right in the middle of an official dinner, spent all his free time shopping for consumer goods with money earned from lectures, and generally behaved like a drunken, uncivilized Russian bear encountering the civilized world for the first time... He drank half-liter bottles alone at night in his hotel room in Baltimore,” the reporter wrote bluntly. Yeltsin even greeted the astonished "honorary professor" who had arrived early to escort him to the university conference hall with a slobbery, drunken kiss and a half-empty bottle of whiskey. “Let's drink to freedom,” Yeltsin suggested at 6:30 in the morning, waving a full glass—the kind usually reserved for toothbrushes and toothpaste in hotel bathrooms. But he drank alone.”

After the article's publication, Gorbachev and his circle expected a public outcry against Yeltsin, but the opposite happened. The accusations of drunkenness were met with unprecedented enthusiasm from the people. “One of us, flesh of our flesh!” they thought. Not some pompous talker with his detested Raisa. A true Russian man, a giant two meters tall. In work and play, he knows no half-measures. Work to exhaustion, drink to the point of blacking out. People despised Gorbachev for his anti-alcohol campaign.

“The phones in the editorial office kept ringing nonstop,” recalled then-editor of *Pravda*, Viktor Afanasyev. “Then came telegrams, letters... Pickets were set up outside the editorial office. Copies of the newspaper issue were publicly burned...” Both *Pravda’s* editor and Gorbachev, as well as members of the Politburo, would later insist that the article had simply appeared on its own, without any ill intent or order from above. It supposedly came through regular TASS channels and was published due to its sharpness and sensational nature.

But that was not the end. Gorbachev would still attempt to disgrace Yeltsin at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet on October 16, 1989, through the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs. As a result, Yeltsin addressed the USSR Supreme Soviet in writing:

“On October 16, 1989, during a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR chaired by M.S. Gorbachev, an incident was made public that affects my honor and dignity. Against my will, USSR Minister of Internal Affairs Comrade Bakatin was involved in the review of this matter. Mixing lies with truth, he had no moral right to contribute to spreading rumors that tarnish my reputation in the eyes of the public. Moreover, Comrade Bakatin had previously assured me that no investigation or disclosure of information concerning me personally would take place.

The new political farce staged by M.S. Gorbachev at the session of the Supreme Soviet and inflated by the official press as an event of the highest order in the country is, of course, not about concerns for my health and safety, nor about calming the electorate, but rather a new attempt to undermine my health and remove me from the political arena.

The creation of the Interregional Deputy Group, uniting nearly 400 USSR people’s deputies on its platform, my election as one of the leaders of its coordinating council, our independent stance, our alternative proposals that contradict the conservative views of the administrative-command system’s supporters, and even my private trip to the USA—all of this incites the apparatus’s furious hostility. On their orders, an entire series of provocative, false, and tendentiously biased publications were concocted in the Soviet press, on central television broadcasts, and among the public, spreading the most incredible rumors about my behavior and personal life.”

“In light of the above, I find it necessary to state the following:

1. All of this is part of a single chain in a campaign of harassment against me, directed by Comrade M.S. Gorbachev.
2. Matters of my safety and private life concern only myself and should be constitutionally protected from any intrusions, including those from the party leadership.

3. If the political harassment continues, I reserve the right to take appropriate actions against those encroaching upon my honor and dignity as a citizen and deputy.
4. I consider it unacceptable and dangerous to shift the focus of political struggle to immoral, unprincipled methods of moral and psychological destruction of an opponent. This leads to the complete collapse of moral and ethical standards, dismantling the democratic foundations of perestroika, and ultimately to a rigid totalitarian dictatorship.

October 17, 1989

People's Deputy of the USSR B.N. Yeltsin.”

By early 1990, Yeltsin had already become one of the leading politicians in the USSR. His circle at the time announced Yeltsin's participation in the upcoming elections to the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. They believed he should first gain a seat in the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR and then aim for the speaker's position. Afterward, with the help of the legislative authority, they intended to establish the presidential institution in Russia and, eventually, with the guidance of political consultants receiving directives from the West, elect Yeltsin to this position.

Gorbachev's aide, Shakhnazarov, recalls how at one Politburo meeting, the General Secretary suddenly began to think out loud: “Strange things are happening among the people! What Yeltsin is doing is beyond comprehension. Abroad, and even here at home, he doesn't sober up, speaks inarticulately, sometimes spouts nonsense like a broken record. But the people keep saying: ‘He's one of us!’”

In the spring of 1990, Yeltsin, along with his aides Lev Sukhanov and Viktor Yaroshenko, traveled around Europe to promote his newly released book *Confession on a Given Topic*. He visited Stockholm, Amsterdam, Oslo, Milan, Paris, and Hamburg. The book presentations were largely symbolic. We learn about this from the memoirs of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. During this visit, Yeltsin met with Thatcher, known worldwide as the “Iron Lady.” In her memoirs, she described the meeting in detail, which was arranged with the support of the British Foreign Office (naturally with the approval of MI-5 intelligence officers). Yeltsin proposed establishing direct trade and economic ties with Russia. Thatcher, diplomatically reassuring Yeltsin, said, “Mr. Yeltsin, let's wait. Let Russia gain independence, become new and free. And then... anything is possible.” Thus, they gave Yeltsin a new directive for the future.

Yeltsin preferred to disclose his intentions in confidential discussions, as he was always wary of the KGB. In November 1989, while meeting with intellectuals at the House of Cinema, Boris Nikolayevich said, “They can't catch spies. But they

gather rumors within the team and then report them to the authorities. That's what their role comes down to. In Sverdlovsk, we had KGB agents in the party committee for 10 years. Not a single spy was caught."

At his first opportunity, within the first four years of his presidency, Yeltsin restructured the KGB six times: from KGB, it became AFB, then MBVD, followed by MB, FSK, and finally FSB.

In his well-known book *The Russia Hand*, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott vividly describes how, during closed meetings, Yeltsin was receptive to the coaxing and persuasion of U.S. President Bill Clinton. Then, during concluding press conferences, Yeltsin would go to great lengths to hide how accommodating he had been behind closed doors.

The elections for the Russian parliament were held on May 16, 1990. The West actively supported Yeltsin's election. Despite Yeltsin's impressive victory, he still had battles to face. His supporters did not have the decisive majority needed. To pass any decision, 531 votes were required. "DemRussia," led by Yeltsin, held about 465 seats, while the Communists had 417, and there were 176 independent deputies. Yet somehow, on May 29, on the third attempt, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin was elected as the new Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. He gained seven votes beyond the required threshold, while his opponent Vlasov failed to reach the numbers previously held by Polozkov: 535 votes to 467.

There is probably no need to recount everything that happened afterward. In August 1991, the State Emergency Committee lacked the resolve to use force against the Supreme Soviet, headed by Yeltsin. And in September 1993, that same Yeltsin in sovereign Russia definitively dissolved the congress and, under his orders, deputies were fired upon by tanks. Such was the "democrat and liberal" Yeltsin. These characteristics of his were well-known not only to his inner circle but also to foreign leaders.

After the Soviet Union dissolved, the power structure changed drastically. In the book *The Yeltsin Era*, nine former aides and speechwriters of the president quite openly note, "After 1996, the structure of the new bureaucratic staff changed. Previously, there was speculation about the political orientation of this or that high-ranking official. Now, the question was different: who was 'supporting' them, and to which oligarchic group did they belong?"

When he fell ill, Yeltsin ended up in complete isolation, trusting no one but his family. Yeltsin's younger daughter, Tatyana Dyachenko, became his most trusted confidante.

Informally, all power ultimately shifted to Dyachenko, or more precisely, to her friends — Berezovsky, Yumashev, Abramovich, and Chubais.

Yeltsin even seriously considered transferring all power de facto to his daughter Tatyana, and for this, he even thought about staging a presidential election. But he soon realized that this option likely wouldn't work.

At that time, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin unexpectedly appeared on the political scene. He was completely different from the typical Yeltsin appointees; moreover, he showed no ambition for power and always remained in the background.

Russia's first president stepped down before the end of his term, on the evening of December 31, 1999. Reflecting on his farewell day in the Kremlin, Yeltsin wrote, "There was a feeling of loneliness and even melancholy."

Psychological portrait of Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin

Yeltsin was born on February 1, 1931, in the poor Ural village of Butka. His parents, Nikolai Ignatievich and Klavdia Vasilyevna (née Starygina), were, like all their ancestors, peasants.

Later, when Yeltsin became the leader of the state, historians would try to trace his genealogy, hoping to find some royal or at least noble roots, but without success. The earliest ancestor of Russia's first president that they managed to identify was named Sergei Yeltsin. In the first half of the 18th century, he was a state peasant in the village of Basmanovskoye, Butka volost, Shadrinsk uyezd, Perm region.

According to historian Dmitry Panov, the Yeltsin family came to the Urals during the settlement of the region by people from Veliky Novgorod. However, this claim is based on rather shaky evidence. In the land registry books of the Sytninsky parish from 1495, Panov supposedly found someone named Elizarko Yelts, although by the same logic, Yeltsin's roots could be traced back to the ancient town of Yelets.



Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin

Historians established one thing for certain: the original surname of Yeltsin was actually "Yeltsyn." It was only in 1921 that the soft sign first appeared in the surname, and the difficult-to-pronounce letter "y" was later changed to an "i" to form "Yeltsin." Most Russian historians link the Yeltsin family to the village of Butka in Basmanovo (also known, as Basmanovskoye).

If we closely examine the facial features of the Yeltsin family, we can see that they exhibit more Asian characteristics than Slavic ones.

Before the revolution, the Yeltsin (or Yeltsyn) family was considered strong and well-off. Ignat Yeltsyn, the future president's grandfather, owned a large farm: a wind and water mill, a thresher, a reaper, five horses, and four cows. When Ignat Yeltsin was labeled a "kulak" in 1930, all his property was meticulously counted and inventoried.

The new authorities took everything the Yeltsins had earned through hard work, imposed an individual agricultural tax on them, and expelled them from their native village. They were relocated to the village of Butka in Talitsky district,

about fifteen kilometers from Basmanovo. There's nothing surprising about this: Siberian and Ural kulaks were not sent far from their native lands; there was no place with worse living conditions anyway. From that time came the saying, "They won't exile you farther than the Urals..."

It was there, in Butka, that the future president was born. But he didn't live long in the Urals. After struggling in the collective farm, his father, Nikolai Ignatievich, along with his wife and brother Adrian, set out in search of work. In 1932, the Yeltsin brothers moved to Kazan and found work as carpenters on the construction of an aircraft factory.

On the night of April 27–28, 1934, the Yeltsin brothers were arrested. Brigade leader Nikolai Yeltsin was taken right in front of three-year-old Boris, in the small room of Barracks No. 8 in the settlement on the Sukhaya River, where they were then living. "I still remember that horror and fear," Yeltsin writes. "Night, people entering the barracks room, my mother's cry, she's crying. I wake up and cry too. I'm not crying because my father is leaving—I'm too young to understand what's happening. I see my mother crying and terrified. Her fear and her tears affect me. They take my father away, my mother rushes to hold me, I calm down and fall asleep."

The trial was brief. The Yeltsins each received three years for "systematically conducting anti-Soviet agitation among workers, aiming to undermine the working class and foster dissatisfaction with the existing order... attempting to create unhealthy sentiments by spreading provocative rumors about war and the imminent downfall of Soviet power." They were also charged with "agitation against loans, actively opposing aid to Austrian workers." On May 28, the brothers, along with their accomplices—the father and son Gavrilov and the "kulak" Ivan Sokolov—were sent to the Dmitlag labor camp near Dmitrov.

Nikolai Yeltsin had to serve his sentence working on construction once again, this time on the Moscow Canal near Taldom, outside Moscow. The family followed him there, living in the barracks with other prisoners. Perhaps it was these difficult days that shaped young Boris's future, along with his resilience in the face of hardship?

In the camp, Yeltsin's father became friends with another inmate, a former paramedic named Vasily Petrov, whose wife, Nina Petrova, sheltered Klavdia and Boris. Later, Boris's younger brother, Mikhail, was born in the Petrov home.

Nina Petrova recalled that Boris Nikolayevich was a very active child and, due to the lack of toys, liked to play with firewood, building various structures, houses, and towers.

For some reason, Yeltsin never mentioned his savior, Nina Petrova, in his many memoirs. Perhaps he had unpleasant memories of those days. Possibly, the

memories of his childhood troubled him more than the hardships he faced later in life.

Yeltsin's memories of his childhood always evoke a somber atmosphere: "We lived in poverty. The house was small, we had a cow. We had a horse, but it soon died, so there was nothing to plow with. Like everyone else, we joined the collective farm... My father then decided to try his luck somewhere else, at a construction site, to save the family. This was during the so-called industrialization period. He knew that in the nearby Perm region, they needed workers for the construction of the Berezniki Potash Plant. So that's where we went. We hitched ourselves to a cart, loaded our last belongings, and headed for the station, a 32-kilometer walk away."

Connecting Yeltsin's personality traits as a politician to the hardships of his childhood isn't unfounded. He felt deeply affected by his family's poverty and low status. It turns out that he suffered from an inferiority complex in his youth. As is often noted, people with such backgrounds can grow into egocentric political leaders.

Ruling leaders are generally divided into two subtypes: egocentric and sociocentric. The egocentric leader directs power toward himself. Power can be seen as a tool for compensating for their feelings of inadequacy, with any physical or psychological shortcomings motivating them toward significant accomplishments. Power often serves as a way to obtain both material and immaterial benefits (wealth, fame, prestige, recognition, access to elite circles, etc.), as well as a means of dominating others and deriving pleasure from others' dependence on them (a form of "power sadism"). Such people may show a distorted sense of familial feelings, often displaying indifference toward family and close friends. They can surprise others with their lack of gratitude, insensitivity, and emotional numbness. Up until recently, B. N. Yeltsin did not keep in touch with either his brother or his sister. No matter how often he traveled to Yekaterinburg, he never visited Mikhail.

General Korzhakov, Yeltsin's chief of personal security, expressed confusion about this: "He (Yeltsin) never met with his brother in my presence. I never saw Mikhail at all, and only saw his sister, Valentina, twice, when she moved to Moscow. Borodin gave Valentina an apartment on Protochny Lane, and Yeltsin sent me to check on the house. He himself, of course, never visited her then or afterward."

The sister's reaction to this treatment is unknown, but the younger brother, Mikhail Nikolayevich, assured journalists that he held no grudge against Boris, saying his brother was simply too busy. He even tried to help him, after hearing on television that the Yeltsins were forced to dig up potatoes for the winter themselves, by deciding to send them two sacks. But they declined the potatoes.

“They said they had a good harvest of their own,” explained the former mechanic good-naturedly.

Yeltsin brought his mother, Klavdia Vasilyevna—toward whom he showed little affection even as president—to live with him only in 1992, when her health seriously declined, and she needed constant medical care. However, there was another reason. Rumors began circulating in Yekaterinburg about the ungrateful president who had abandoned his mother. To prevent these rumors from spreading across the country, the Yeltsin family brought her to Moscow. He settled her in a dacha in Barvikha, where she ate separately from the rest of the family.

According to a semi-official Kremlin version, Klavdia Yeltsina passed away due to worries over her son in the midst of Yeltsin’s standoff with the Supreme Soviet. However, the staff working at the dacha on the day of her death told a different story. They claimed that his wife, Naina Iosifovna, had harshly scolded her mother-in-law, who, feeling upset, locked herself in her room. Boris Nikolayevich was the last to learn of his mother’s passing, finding out six hours after she had died. It seems that family ties were never close to him.

With functional nervous system disorders, a person can become indifferent, unresponsive to what’s happening, and completely apathetic to social and moral issues.

When Yeltsin was sober and alert, he was a strong, resilient, and determined person. But after the first glass of alcohol, he would seem like a different man. His typical intake ranged from a glass to a liter, and he often started drinking early in the morning.

All of Yeltsin’s favorites—Barannikov, Grachev, Korzhakov, Barsukov, Tarpischev, Borodin, and Shumeiko—shared one common trait: they could drink heavily. Those who didn’t drink were not admitted to his inner circle, regardless of their high positions.

This was the criterion by which Viktor Barannikov became Minister of Security, and Vladimir Shumeiko became First Deputy Prime Minister. No one else could handle gatherings like he could.

Gennady Burbulis, before losing his influence, even developed a method—figuring out the best times and with which documents to approach Yeltsin. Other experienced associates would precisely time the hours after the first drink to get the president to sign important documents.

Here are a few excerpts from *The Russia Hand* by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, published after Yeltsin’s resignation:

“At the first meeting with Clinton in Vancouver, at dinner, Yeltsin downed three shots of whiskey and four glasses of wine and hardly ate anything. Warren Christopher passed a note: ‘Not eating anything. Bad sign.’ Counting how much Yeltsin drank would become our habitat summits...”

That night at Blair House, Yeltsin was stumbling around the rooms in his underwear, roaring drunkenly. Stumbling, he made his way down to the first floor and started talking to an agent of the U.S. Secret Service. The agent managed to convince Yeltsin to go back upstairs under the watch of his bodyguard, but soon Yeltsin returned, muttering, “Pizza! Pizza!” Finally, the Russian security team took him firmly by the arms, trying to calm him as they quickly led him upstairs.

In a confidential report, President James Harrison’s advisor wrote: “When the plane landed, Yeltsin disembarked, but instead of greeting the delegation waiting for him, he walked across the tarmac to the back of the plane and, turning his back to us, urinated on the rear wheels. Stunned, we stood in awkward silence, not knowing what to make of it. Yeltsin returned, said nothing, shook hands with the officials, received a bouquet from a young woman, and got into his waiting limousine. Everyone pretended, as if nothing had happened.”

In September 1994, in Washington, according to Talbott, Clinton managed in one sitting to convince Yeltsin that he shouldn’t fear NATO—that America and Russia were forever brothers and that the “great friendship” would bind the two presidents for the rest of their lives. “I understand,” Yeltsin nodded in agreement as he sat at the table. “Thank you for what you said.”

“Yeltsin noticed Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Madeleine Albright just as the waiter brought them champagne. He grabbed one of the glasses on the tray. ‘Mr. President,’ Christopher said, ‘it already has fingerprints on it!’ Yeltsin barked, demanded his own glass, drained it in one gulp, and then turned back to Chris. ‘Long time no see,’ he said with such an exaggerated look of menace on his face that it was almost comical. ‘You and Kozyrev—both losers! Absolute losers!’”

In *The Yeltsin Era*, a book authored by a group of former presidential advisors, it is noted that during Yeltsin’s visit to the United States in September 1994, his entourage observed that the president exhibited an unusually high-spirited mood on the first morning of his stay. During a joint breakfast, Yeltsin focused primarily on the wine, almost entirely disregarding the food. President Clinton appeared somewhat taken aback by this liveliness but refrained from showing any overt surprise. As time passed, Yeltsin’s mood became increasingly jovial, and he made continuous jokes, laughing loudly at his own humor.

Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott recalls that he was supposed to ride to the airport in a limousine with Yeltsin, but Russian Ambassador Vorontsov

announced that the president, feeling quite fatigued, would prefer to travel with his wife. Talbott's initial suspicions regarding the true cause of this decision were soon confirmed. Upon arriving at the plane, Yeltsin grasped the handrail tightly, focusing on each step. At the final step, he stumbled and clutched his wife Naina's hand for support.

The next stop was Shannon Airport in Ireland, where Yeltsin was scheduled to meet Prime Minister Reynolds. However, during the flight, Yeltsin started another drinking session and became so intoxicated that he collapsed unconscious in the cabin in the middle of the night. As a result, the Irish government delegation, waiting at Shannon Airport, never saw him disembark after the plane landed.

It is important to recognize that this behavior was not unique to Yeltsin alone. Individuals suffering from alcoholism often exhibit behavior akin to his. Other biochemical factors, however, also play a significant role:

- The level of endogenous (internal, natural) alcohol in the body: the lower it is, the more likely an individual is to consume alcohol.
- The activity of liver enzymes responsible for metabolizing alcohol: the lower the enzyme activity, the slower alcohol is processed, thereby prolonging its intoxicating effect on the brain.

Recent genetic studies have provided further support for these observations. Australian researchers have found that alcohol abuse and pathological dependence are governed by distinct genes. Identification of these genes remains an ongoing objective for researchers. Alcoholism and habitual drinking, although similar in their manifestations, are regarded as different disorders. A heavy drinker "drinks too much" according to social standards, whereas an alcoholic cannot function without alcohol. These findings also substantiate the longstanding belief in the hereditary nature of these conditions.

A study conducted by Johns Hopkins University revealed that individuals who endured severe psychological trauma or physical punishment during childhood are more likely to develop alcoholism later in life. Yeltsin himself, in an interview, recounted how his father had subjected him to reckless physical punishment. Moreover, individuals with pronounced anxious or suspicious traits are more predisposed to alcohol dependency than those who exhibit a more balanced temperament.

Adopting the advanced views of contemporary medical experts, it can be concluded that when examining psychosomatic relationships, the focus should not be solely on the illness but rather on the entirety of the affected organism, with all its unique characteristics. This perspective gave rise to a specific theory of somatic personality types. The findings from new research, based not on

experimental data but on clinical observations, remain largely descriptive in nature.

When considering the expressive properties of a person, it is clear that social life—necessitating constant and unavoidable interaction—compels individuals to account for the typical traits of others, whether consciously or unconsciously. Modern science enables us to recognize many characteristic psychological and physiological features of a personality based on an individual's behavior.

Behavior is one of the most constructive functions of the psyche. Therefore, particular attention should be given to the development of strong skills in consciously managing this function. Behavior can be either passive or active. In passive behavior, an individual is involuntarily drawn to strong external stimuli or internal psychological phenomena, such as sensory images, thoughts, or experiences. Conversely, in active behavior, the selection of an external or internal object occurs as a result of a conscious effort.

In active behavior, well-being and efficiency are integral components of the focus on more complex sensory images. These images should ideally be derived from real-life experiences, rather than abstract constructs, as the latter often lacks the necessary degree of effectiveness. It has long been observed that in certain states of the central nervous system, the degree of effectiveness and its impact on physiological processes in the body are significantly increased. This pattern manifests under specific levels of cortical inhibition when brain cells enter what is known as “phased states.”

A wakeful nerve cell typically responds to stimuli according to the principle of force relations: the stronger the stimulus, the more intense the response. However, in a partially inhibited state—such as immediately after waking or when fatigued—this pattern is disrupted, with nerve cells showing minimal response to strong stimuli but heightened responsiveness to weaker ones. This state continuously affects the flow of mental processes.

According to Pavlov's teachings, the second signaling system is the highest regulator of human behavior. Everyone is familiar with cases of self-commands or self-persuasion in difficult situations, where a person must exert significant internal effort to regulate their state and behavior.

Thus, in Yeltsin, we observe obsessive states characterized by the involuntary and overpowering emergence of thoughts. With obsessive doubts, intrusive thoughts about the correctness of already-made decisions or actions predominate.

The last months of 1999 were a time of despair and anxiety among the residents of the Kremlin. It became evident that President Yeltsin was so gravely ill that it was unclear how long he could hold on. Academician Chazov, at the Cardiology Center where Yeltsin underwent surgery, wrote that Boris Nikolayevich had five

heart attacks, and a sixth could have been fatal. This ultimately happened in 2007, when Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin died from another heart attack. Doctors were unable to save him.

Relaxopedia of Society

Typology of Leaders

The typology developed by the German historian, economist, and jurist Max Weber had a profound impact on researchers. He identified three types of leadership:



Max Weber

1. **Traditional Leadership:** Based on the belief in the sanctity and unchanging nature of traditions. A leader emerges through tradition, such as when the son of a monarch inherits the throne after his father's death.

2. **Charismatic Leadership:** Relies on the belief in the exceptional abilities of a leader, who is thought to possess charisma granted by divine will.

3. **Rational-legal Leadership:** Based on the belief in the legitimacy of the existing order, election, and the individual's professional competence.

Weber found the phenomenon of charisma to be particularly interesting. Charisma is solely based on the leader's personality, with the leader being attributed divine abilities. The relationship between the leader and the masses is emotional and mystical, with the masses expected to show complete personal loyalty to the leader, who is seen as fulfilling a "historical mission." The transfer of power from such a leader is associated with significant challenges, as it cannot follow established traditions or legal norms. This often leads to intense struggles for power, causing political instability. The charismatic type of leader has historically appeared across a variety of political systems.

Ruling leaders can be conditionally divided into two subtypes: egocentric and sociocentric.

All organized mental activity in humans is characterized by selectivity. From the vast number of stimuli reaching us, an individual selects only those that are the strongest or most relevant to their interests. This explains why people desire freedom in choosing stimuli. Out of the many traces stored in memory, only a few are selected to meet the memory task, allowing necessary intellectual operations to be performed.

Thus, a person seeks elements in society that align with their interests, rather than having an artificial political, economic, or even military structure imposed upon them—one that is disconnected from the concept of humanity.

As previously mentioned, each nation has its own customs and religious interpretations, all of which are stored in the form of memories passed down genetically to new generations. Imposing incompatible governing structures on such societies goes against the moral and psychological principles that define that nation. Therefore, a person's interests should not be dismissed or undervalued in the life of the state. If an individual feels unnecessary in society, or if the state does not meet their needs, it can lead to social psychosis within society itself.

Yeltsin's "ideologues" seemed to do everything possible to torment, impoverish, harden, desecrate, and defame the Russian soul, depicting this remarkable people in a dark light for the world to see. Justice is the essence of the Russian soul and character. Who in the world does not recognize Pushkin, Lermontov, Chaadayev, Tyutchev, Blok, Pasternak, Nekrasov, Akhmatova, Tsvetaeva, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Chekhov, Sholokhov, Shishkin, Repin, Bryullov, Mussorgsky, Scriabin, Tchaikovsky, and many other brilliant, divinely gifted geniuses, who are celebrated not only by Russians but by the entire world?

The great, mighty, loving, and loved, kind-hearted, hospitable, hard-working, wise, patient, resilient, courageous, and brave Russian people!

Vladimir Putin became Prime Minister as an unknown figure to the "ideologues." His strength lay in the fact that no one knew anything about him, as he always remained in the shadows. He was a man without a past, which turned out to be an undeniable advantage. Even those who had worked with Putin for years admitted that they did not truly know him—he never revealed himself, remaining a "thing-in-itself." A politician is judged not only by their words but by their actions in various situations, and Putin's political career essentially began in the summer of 1999. Rumors spread among the people: he was a military man with a strong sense of hierarchy, obedience, and a habit of both following and giving orders.

While working in the KGB is not entirely military service, the KGB is a militarized organization, even though discussions with superiors are possible. This is why political analysts note that Putin is more accustomed to dealing with people in uniform, who not only listen but obey. He acts like a paternal commander.

In traditional societies, the perception of a leader as a father-protector is most vividly embodied in the institution of monarchy. However, in modern societies, the concept of a founding father holds special significance. A new regime that breaks continuity with the past still requires legitimacy. The role of a founding father plays a fundamental role in structuring society. Even when monarchy is

abolished, as seen in Russia and Germany, the masses' need for paternal care remains strong. Certain characteristics of this attitude toward power are reflected in the Russian national character and political culture. An autocratic style of governance is something every child learns within the family. Another feature of Russian political culture is the need for a leader to fulfill the role of a father. Perhaps this is why these traits of Putin played a significant role in his career, which was shaped by his immense efforts.

After the fall of communism in East Germany, in January 1990, KGB Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Putin returned to Leningrad. In 1975, he graduated from the Law Faculty of Leningrad State University and began working at his alma mater, becoming an assistant to the pro-rector of Leningrad University for international affairs. He found this position suitable as Anatoly Sobchak, who had taught Putin during his university years, was elected Chairman of the Leningrad City Council. Sobchak appointed Putin as his assistant. Sobchak faced criticism for hiring a former KGB officer, but he responded succinctly:

"He is my student."

During the August coup, Putin, who had urgently returned from vacation, stood by Sobchak. On August 20, he wrote a report requesting his resignation from the KGB. Under Putin's supervision, the red flag was taken down from the House of Political Education—this event was symbolic for Leningrad.

Sobchak always trusted him. In March 1994, Putin became the first deputy mayor of St. Petersburg, while retaining his position as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

The year 1996 was a challenging one for Putin. He was one of the leaders of Anatoly Sobchak's election campaign headquarters, but Sobchak was defeated. During this time, the head of the Presidential Property Management Department, Pavel Pavlovich Borodin, invited him to Moscow. In a newspaper interview, Borodin mentioned that Putin had once helped him with a favor. Putin's colleague from the mayor's office, Alexei Kudrin, was head of the Presidential Control Directorate. In August 1996, Putin took the position of deputy head of the Presidential Property Management Department.

When the position of head of the Presidential Control Directorate became vacant—after Alexei Kudrin left to join the government as First Deputy Minister of Finance—Putin assumed the role. A year later, in May 1998, he became the First Deputy Chief of the Presidential Administration.

On July 25, 1998, Putin was appointed head of the Federal Security Service (FSB). Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko introduced him to the FSB board. Upon becoming head of the FSB, Putin transferred his old friend Sergey Ivanov, with

whom he had started his service in the KGB, from intelligence to the FSB as his deputy.

Ivanov shared in an interview with *Izvestia*: “We met after university when we began working in a very small division of a large organization... The division was involved in intelligence. We worked together for about two years, shared the same age and roughly the same views, sometimes ironic, about the activities of party organizations in the security services... We did sports, though different kinds—he did judo, I did basketball. It was just a normal relationship between two young men. After that, I left Leningrad practically for good, while he stayed... We didn’t try to stay in constant contact, but we’d call each other now and then, though there were long periods of silence when we were abroad... When he was appointed as the director of the FSB, he offered me a job there...”

Just two months after Putin became the director of the FSB, he brought in Nikolai Patrushev, appointing him as deputy director and head of the key department of economic security, which oversees the activities of Russian business.

By early 1999, Nikolai Platonovich was already the first deputy director of the FSB and effectively ran the entire service, as Putin became increasingly focused on his duties with the Security Council. When President Yeltsin tasked Putin with leading the government, Putin agreed with Boris Nikolayevich that Patrushev would remain in charge at Lubyanka.

A few other of Putin’s close associates took prominent positions in the state security apparatus. Vladimir Shultz was appointed State Secretary and Deputy Director of the FSB. He had served in state security since 1992 as deputy head of the St. Petersburg division before heading the FSB Academy.

The Federal Protective Service (FSO) was headed by Yevgeny Alekseyevich Murov. Initially serving in intelligence, Murov switched to counterintelligence in 1992. He worked in St. Petersburg, headed various district departments, and eventually rose to become deputy head of the regional division. After his appointment as chief security officer, journalists began speculating that Putin was placing people he personally knew in key positions.

"Yes, Vladimir Vladimirovich has a lot of acquaintances and friends," Murov responded.

Experts agree that work in intelligence itself leaves psychological scars on agents. Intelligence officers are required to live double lives, constantly concealing their true activities, emotions, feelings, and views. When engaging with others, they focus on learning about their conversation partner while revealing little about themselves. They continuously assess the trustworthiness and connections of others, all while maintaining a suspicious outlook.

Putin holds his own views, which he compares to his observations of a person who may be vainly attempting to convince him of something.

The Chairman of the USSR KGB, Kryuchkov, wrote about Putin:

"Calm, not loud, not argumentative, he approached any issue seriously. He avoided public polemics, even with those who violated federal laws, and refrained from making grand denunciations for external effect. He assessed situations objectively and generally chose the right path to resolve issues. In the autumn of 1998, when there was a risk of mass protests against the Russian authorities, President B.N. Yeltsin made the optimal decision to place a reliable and fairly decisive person at the head of the FSB. That's how V.V. Putin returned to his familiar surroundings at Lubyanka."

"Perhaps in Putin, emotion and reason were harmoniously balanced. His colleagues noted that he never seemed to plan his life with a long-term goal in mind. He never imagined himself in an unusual role years later. At that time, everyone felt that he was satisfied with his work and how his life had unfolded, without seeking anything radically new. In the end, it seems that chance elevated him to higher positions. But once he reached the top, occupying high roles, those who had known him before suspected that he could eventually attain the highest post. And they weren't wrong."

On Putin's initiative, a memorial plaque dedicated to Yuri Andropov was restored on the old KGB building at Lubyanka Square. When the 85th anniversary of Andropov's birth was celebrated, Putin laid a wreath at Andropov's plaque.

When dismissing Primakov, Yeltsin struggled to decide whom to appoint in his place: Stepashin or Aksenenko. Ultimately, he chose Stepashin and made Aksenenko his deputy with potential. In early 1990, Aksenenko, a colonel in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, won elections in Leningrad and became a People's Deputy of the RSFSR.

In the Supreme Soviet, Putin headed the crucial parliamentary committee on defense and security, became a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and thus interacted with Yeltsin almost daily. He firmly supported Yeltsin, which caught the president's attention. Meanwhile, Stepashin's impressive ability to engage with people of differing political views also stood out as a valuable skill.

After the August coup of 1991, Stepashin headed the commission to study the activities of the KGB. At the time, there were various opinions about the future of state security. Many suggested completely abolishing the KGB and creating a new service with new people and principles. Stepashin advocated for a different approach: to divide and modernize the KGB, rather than dismantling it entirely.

Vladimir Putin later recalled, "Stepashin acted completely unexpectedly. In fact, he used his democratic authority to protect the intelligence services."

On August 9, 1999, Boris Yeltsin issued a decree to create the position of a third first deputy prime minister within the cabinet and appointed Vladimir Putin to this role. He instructed Putin to temporarily fulfill the duties of the head of government and sent a letter to the Duma requesting approval of Putin as head of government.

Speaking on television about Putin's appointment as prime minister, Yeltsin stated:

"A year from now there will be presidential elections. Today, I have decided to name the person who, in my opinion, can consolidate society, relying on the broadest political forces, and ensure the continuation of reforms in Russia. He will be able to unite those who, in the new 21st century, will renew a great Russia. This person is Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin..."

Initially, no one took Yeltsin's words or Putin's appointment seriously. However, Putin's inner circle thought differently. As head of government, in December 1999, Putin spoke at an FSB assembly on Security Service Day:

"Allow me to report that the FSB employees seconded to the government are handling their tasks well."

At the end of August 1999, Naina Iosifovna remarked to reporters, "Right now, it's hard to explain this appointment, but with time, everyone will understand that this decision was the right one."

When Vladimir Putin assumed control of the government, marking the end of the oligarchs' mercantile era, a critical question lingered in the minds of the oligarchs: "How will he act?"

Soon, the public was informed that Putin was a man of faith. Unlike his predecessor Boris Yeltsin, Putin knew how to conduct himself in church. Following his appointment as prime minister, Putin began visiting the patriarch frequently. On December 31, 1999, Alexy II called for the congregation at the Cathedral of Christ the Savior to "prayerfully support Vladimir Vladimirovich."

During the presidential election campaign, while serving as acting president, Putin further solidified his position and won the March 2000 elections in the first round. Over the next four years, he maintained his popularity and repeated his success in the March 2004 presidential election, securing a second term.

One of Putin's first acts as head of state (then still acting) was a decree granting immunity from any judicial or administrative prosecution to the first president of the Russian Federation and his family members.

During Putin's eight years as president, Russia underwent significant changes, driven both by improvements in economic conditions and various reforms implemented throughout the country. In the early 2000s, Russia, which had endured a severe economic crisis in 1998, was in a precarious position. The

situation was further compounded by the weakness of the central government, tensions between the executive and legislative branches, the powerful influence of big business on government decisions, and ongoing military actions in the North Caucasus. To address these challenges on multiple fronts, Putin took several measures that sparked mixed reactions within society. Among these, actions to reduce the influence of the so-called Russian “oligarchs” on politics began almost immediately after Putin came to power.

In terms of foreign policy, Putin steered Russia toward a course of reviving its independence. Over time, Russia’s rhetoric evolved from an initial focus on cooperation with the West to a multi-vector approach. In February 2007, in Munich, Putin delivered a landmark speech in which he sharply opposed a unipolar world and asserted Russia’s claim to be one of the centers of power in a new, multipolar world.

Before this, Chechnya had remained a “sticking point” in relations between the West and Russia. The international campaign against terrorism, which was launched after the September 11, 2001, attacks in the U.S., worked in Putin’s favor in addressing the issue of separatism. Putin made the decision to cancel direct gubernatorial elections in the country, a measure that was implemented by the end of 2004. From the outset of his rule, Putin focused on strengthening the vertical of power and controlling the autonomy of regional governors, but it took four years to gain full control over the regional heads. One of his first steps as president, in May 2000, was to reform the Federation Council, replacing temporary gatherings of governors with a permanent body of senators.

In late 2001, through the merger of the “Unity” and “Fatherland - All Russia” parties, the pro-government party “United Russia” was created. This development led to a change in the composition of factions in the State Duma, and by spring 2002, the Communists had lost their influence in the lower house. In the 2003 elections, the “United Russia” party won a constitutional majority, thereby enabling the country’s leadership, under Putin, to push through all its initiatives in the State Duma.

Throughout Putin’s presidency, reforms were enacted in several key sectors, including pension provision, healthcare, housing, agriculture, and education. Four national projects were launched to address issues within the social sphere.

Both of Putin’s presidential terms marked dramatic changes in Russia’s political and economic landscape, encapsulated by the terms “Russia-2000” and “Russia-2008”—two distinct versions of the country.

Ultimately, in May 2008, after the inauguration of the new president, Dmitry Medvedev, Putin became the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, while also remaining the independent leader of “United Russia.” Prior to this, he had

served as the President of the Russian Federation for eight years, leading the country from 2000 following the early resignation of Boris Yeltsin, who had named Putin as his successor. On both occasions, Putin won the presidential elections in the first round, receiving more than 50% of the vote.

Psychological portrait of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin

Vladimir Putin was born in Leningrad in 1952. His father, Vladimir Spiridonovich, worked as a locksmith at a factory and was a disabled veteran of the Great Patriotic War. He had sustained grenade fragments in his legs, which caused him pain during bad weather. His mother, Maria Ivanovna, survived the siege of Leningrad. Before the war, the Putins had two sons, both of whom died at a young age. Volodya, their later child, became a source of great joy for his parents. Life was difficult, and the future president grew up in a communal apartment.



Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin

He was not open with others, kept his personal matters private, and did not form close friendships. As his former classmates recalled, “Gestures, a smirk, a chuckle into his fist—he still has that.”

What surprised his parents the most was that Volodya was a troublemaker from a very young age. This behavior was partly attributed to the fact that Volodya was the only surviving child after the deaths of his brothers, and his parents indulged him. They hoped he would settle down once he started school, but their expectations were unmet—his behavior only worsened.

“I started school when I was almost eight,” Vladimir Vladimirovich recalls. “I remember standing in an old-style gray school uniform, which resembled a

military one, holding a flower pot in my hands. For some reason, not a bouquet, but a pot. I wondered, why do I have a pot? So, I just threw it into the trash...”

“My parents hardly told me anything about their lives. It just wasn’t done,” Putin admits in his book *In the First Person*. “Only fragments here and there... My father, Vladimir Spiridonovich Putin, was born in Petersburg in 1911. When the First World War began, his family moved to the Tver region. There, he met Maria Ivanovna Shelomova. They married when they were 17. In 1932, the Putins moved to a suburb of Leningrad—Petergof.”

“They buried their sons...”

“My mother went to work at a factory, and my father was immediately drafted into the army,” Vladimir Vladimirovich recalls. “He served in the submarine fleet. He returned, and a year apart, they had two sons. One of them died a few months later. Then the Great Patriotic War began. Volodya’s father immediately volunteered for the front, and his mother and young son were evacuated from Petergof under shelling and bombing by her brother. To protect him from starvation, Maria Ivanovna placed her son in an orphanage.”

“They tried to save his life,” Putin remembers. “But in the orphanage, the boy contracted diphtheria and died as well.”

Maria Ivanovna did not learn of her son’s death until a year later. She herself was struggling to survive the famine.

“Her brother helped her. When he was temporarily transferred somewhere, my mother was on the brink,” Putin states. “One day, she lost consciousness from hunger, and they thought she had died. They even placed her among the deceased. Thankfully, she regained consciousness just in time and groaned. She survived by a miracle...”

She later encountered her husband by chance in the hospital, where Vladimir Spiridonovich had been recovering from a severe injury.

“My father saw my mother barely alive and secretly started giving her his food. But the doctors noticed that he was fainting from hunger and stopped allowing her to visit him. Ultimately, both survived...”

After the war, Vladimir Spiridonovich was demobilized and worked as a master craftsman at the Yegorov Carriage-Building Plant.

“Everyone at the plant loved and valued my father. He would give it his all. They took a long time to grant him disability status, even though one of his legs was practically useless,” Putin recalled. After the war, Maria Ivanovna held a variety of jobs, including as a janitor and bread unloaders at a bakery. Soon, Vladimir

Spiridonovich was assigned an apartment in a communal building. Before the war, they had shared half of a house in Peterhof.

The Putins had long hesitated to have more children after losing two sons, but seven years after the war, they decided to have Volodya, whom they adored. When Putin's mother passed away, his father's health deteriorated. Despite his busy schedule as Prime Minister, Putin traveled to St. Petersburg every weekend to see him. As his father's condition worsened, Putin feared that he might not make it in time to say goodbye. In the end, he was able to spend his father's last hours with him.

As a young boy, Putin aspired to be a leader and took up sports. Initially, he tried boxing, but after breaking his nose, he switched to sambo and later to judo. A close friend, whom he had persuaded to compete, suffered a spinal injury and passed away, deeply affecting Putin. However, he did not quit sports. For the previously unimposing young man, who spoke quickly and indistinctly, success in sports helped him gain self-confidence. He eventually became a master of sports in sambo and judo, winning the city championship in 1976.

As an adult, Vladimir Putin occasionally encountered street thugs and engaged in fights with them. On one occasion, he even broke his arm.

“Even before I finished school, I had the desire to work in intelligence,” Putin later shared with journalists writing the book *First Person*. “Although it seemed as unattainable as a flight to Mars... Books and movies like *The Shield and the Sword* had an impact. I was most struck by how, with minimal resources—literally the effort of one person—you could achieve what entire armies could not. One intelligence officer could determine the fate of thousands of people.”

As a ninth-grader, Putin visited the reception office of the KGB Directorate for Leningrad and the Leningrad Region. The KGB was the only institution in the country where anyone who showed up would be listened to attentively. Young Volodya Putin expressed his desire to work for the KGB.

“First, we don't take volunteers. Second, you can only join us after the army or after graduating from a civilian university.”

“And after which university?”

“Any university!”

“And which is preferred?”

“Law school!”

Vladimir Putin enrolled in the Law Faculty at Leningrad University, where he attended lectures by Professor Anatoly Alexandrovich Sobchak, who would later

play a key role in his life. His classmates remembered him as calm, composed, and self-controlled. He did not stand out in any particular way. Near the end of his studies, he acquired his own Zaporozhets car, which his mother had won in a lottery. Although the Putins were in need of money, they decided to gift the car to their beloved son.

In his fourth year, Putin's dream came true. KGB recruiters approached him, and he was thrilled. Later, journalists would ask him if he ever thought about the reputation of the state security agency or the KGB's involvement in repressions.

"Honestly," Putin replied, "I didn't think about it at all. I didn't really know anything. Only those who didn't want to know, for whom it didn't matter, didn't know..."

The KGB personnel department was selective and did not typically recruit those who openly expressed a desire to join. In the KGB, there was a concept of a "volunteer"—someone who persistently requested to join. The Committee always treated such "volunteers" with caution, seeking to understand the true motivations behind their desire to work in state security and to thoroughly evaluate the individual.

KGB recruiters would invite promising students, ask about their families and plans, and explain that they possessed the qualities needed for a responsible job involving language skills and interaction with people. However, further specialized education was required. By the end of their fifth year, the student would be invited for another interview, during which they would discover that their life, family, and friends had been carefully investigated.

When Putin agreed to work for the KGB, he had to undergo a year of study. He successfully graduated from the special school, though it proved to be very challenging both physically and mentally. The attrition rate was significant; not everyone could handle the intense tests and psychological conditioning. As is typical in such environments, there were always "informers"—those who reported on their colleagues. Any form of misconduct, such as speaking out of turn or drinking during leave, resulted in expulsion.

"I was initially assigned to the management secretariat, then to a counterintelligence unit, where I worked for about five months," Putin told journalists. He handled various cases. After six months, he was sent for further training, which lasted another six months for operational retraining. It was an unremarkable school in Leningrad. The instructors considered that he already had a basic foundation but required specific operational training. After completing his studies, he returned to Leningrad and worked in the counterintelligence unit for another six months.

When asked about his duties, Putin only recalled that the department dealt with dissidents. On Easter, during the religious procession, the future president supervised public order.

KGB recruiters from the First Chief Directorate (foreign intelligence) took notice of the university graduate. The primary focus in the FCD was on studying foreign languages, with proficiency in languages significantly influencing assignments. After a year of additional training, Putin returned to the Leningrad office and was assigned to the 1st (intelligence) department.

What did the Leningrad office's intelligence department do? They focused on foreign nationals visiting the city, aiming to recruit them. They paid special attention to foreign sailors, whom they considered morally unstable. These individuals were met at the so-called Interclub, which was filled with KGB agents. The department also worked on developing Soviet citizens who traveled abroad.

Vladimir Putin worked in the Leningrad office for four and a half years. He was then invited to Moscow, to the central headquarters, and soon after, he was sent abroad under journalistic cover.

Putin served excellently, achieving the rank of major. He was sent to Moscow for retraining at the Andropov Red Banner Institute (now the Foreign Intelligence Academy). Following this, he was sent on his first and only foreign assignment to the KGB representation in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1985.

“Before going to the GDR, Lyudmila was thoroughly vetted,” Vladimir Vladimirovich recalled. The requirements for family members were extremely strict. For example, the wife had to be healthy enough to work in hot and humid climates. “Imagine, you’ve been trained and prepared for five years, and finally, you’re ready to go abroad for work in a critical area, but your wife’s health doesn’t allow it. That would be terrible! So, my wife was tested thoroughly. Of course, she wasn’t told anything about it. Only after everything was completed, she was called to the university personnel department and informed that she had passed the special inspection.”

Right before leaving, they threw a farewell party, and Masha was born. There was dancing, and Putin danced enough that night to last him a lifetime! Both modern and ballroom dancing...

Lyudmila Shkrebneva, Putin’s wife, grew up in Kaliningrad. She participated in the drama club at the local Pioneer House and recited poems at all the school gatherings. She enrolled in the Kaliningrad Technological Institute but left after her second year to become a flight attendant. Lyudmila met Volodya at an Arkady Raikin concert in Leningrad in 1980, during a three-day business trip from Kaliningrad. At first, Putin didn’t impress her much: he was modest, poorly

dressed, and very quiet. But still, they spent three days together. Putin told his future wife that he worked in the criminal investigation department, which was actually his cover. When Volodya escorted Lyudmila to the plane, he gave her his home phone number.

“After three or four months,” Lyudmila recalls, “I had already decided he was the person I needed. And I started courting him for... three whole years!” However, their romance lasted three and a half years before he finally decided to propose.

Putin married relatively late, and the personnel department probably viewed him with suspicion—bachelors were not favored by the KGB. “Listen, old man, it’s time to settle down,” Volodya’s friends urged him. “Just get married!”

“I realized myself,” Putin admits in his book *First Person*, “that if I didn’t get married in another two or three years, I’d probably never marry at all.” He was already 29, had grown accustomed to bachelor life, to working 24 hours a day, to his career, and to his friends. He had big, ambitious plans for the future, but they didn’t seem to include a wife. However, there was this smart blonde, Luda, whom Volodya had been seeing for three years. During that time, Lyudmila had moved to Leningrad and entered university to study philology. She met with Volodya each week by the metro, but he would always arrive an hour or an hour and a half late!

“From one date to the next, day by day, it was always the same,” says Lyudmila. “But each time, I hoped that this time would be the last time he was late.” Putin eventually wore her down, and when her patience finally ran out, he suddenly told her...

“Sweetheart, now you know what I’m like. I’m not exactly an easy person. I’m quiet, sometimes pretty abrupt, and I can occasionally hurt someone’s feelings. In short, I’m a risky life partner. After three years, you’ve probably figured that out for yourself?”

“Well, yes, I have,” Lyudmila said with some hesitation.

“Really? Well, if that’s the case, then I love you and propose we get married on July 28.”

Lyudmila was shocked but agreed. The wedding took place three months later.

“Mom, I’ve met a good man, and I want to be his wife,” Lyudmila told her mother the day before their wedding. Her mother didn’t respond, only raised her hands and asked when the celebration was planned.

The wedding was held on a boat docked at the shore, and only their closest friends and family—just 12 people—were invited. “We took this event very seriously,” Lyudmila said.

Immediately after the wedding, the newlyweds moved in with Volodya's parents.

"We didn't have a choice. We lived with his parents. Volodya's father had received that apartment as a disabled war veteran. The parents lived in a 15-square-meter room with a balcony. Ours, without a balcony, was 12 square meters."

They lived with his parents for two years. "The parents treated me as the woman their son had chosen. For the first year, we lived in harmony. It felt like a continuous celebration and joy. And then, later, when I was pregnant with our eldest, Masha, she was born while I was in my fourth year of university."

Their second daughter, Katya, was born a year later, already in the GDR.

Lyudmila Putin made her first public appearance when she attended Raisa Gorbacheva's funeral with Naina Yeltsin. She was used to keeping a low profile, as was expected of a KGB officer's wife. But people say Lyudmila is just as energetic and strong-willed as her husband.

In 1994, she was involved in a serious car accident and was taken to the hospital. She underwent spinal surgery, and it turned out she also had a fractured skull base. The surgeons saved her life.

In Dresden, Vladimir Putin and his family lived in a spacious apartment in a five-story building. They were also given a country house with a small garden and a company car, a Zhiguli.

-We came from Russia, where there were queues and shortages, to the GDR, where there was plenty of everything," Vladimir Putin recalls in his book *First Person*. "I immediately gained about 12 kilos and weighed 85.

Another reason for this was the regular beer drinking, which Putin didn't mind traveling to another town for.

-We regularly went to a little town called Radeberg, the president recalls. There was one of the best breweries in East Germany. I'd get this 3-liter-plus container, fill it with beer, and drink it like from a keg. So, every week, that added up to 3.8 liters of beer. And when friends visited, we really went all out.

Putin's favorite dish in Germany was stewed cabbage with pork knuckles. Generally, Vladimir Vladimirovich isn't considered a gourmet. He prefers Russian cuisine and mainly eats porridge, cottage cheese, and honey in the mornings. "I try not to eat sugar or flour products," Putin says. "Either meat or fish." But he still prefers fish over meat. And if he does eat meat, it's lamb. His small weakness is ice cream, but he doesn't overindulge and keeps an eye on his figure.

Since childhood, Putin had dreamed of owning a Volga car, like Yuri Detochkin's in *Beware of the Car*. When he returned from the GDR in 1990, he fulfilled that dream and bought a GAZ-21. Putin's Volga, a 1956 model in ivory, with chrome steel rims, a leather interior, and an automatic transmission, was restored at the GAZ factory. The car has a mileage of only 120 km. It's notable not only for its beauty but also because Putin used it to open the Sochi-Krasnaya Polyana tunnel. He even personally drove George Bush in this Volga at Novo-Ogaryovo. The American president took the wheel for a bit and joked, "Be careful, he's giving me a driving lesson."

As Prime Minister, Putin doesn't need a personal car since he's driven by vehicles from the special-purpose garage. Currently, it has three Mercedes cars and one GAZ-21. For watches, he prefers the Swiss brand Patek Philippe, costing around 17,000 euros. Wearing his watch on his right wrist has become a signature look for Putin.

-It's a habit. No, I'm not left-handed," Vladimir Putin says. "I like having it dangle on my wrist. If I wear it on the left wrist, the crown faces toward my hand, constantly rubbing against it..."

Politician-organizer

Categorical thinking

The intellectual reserves of the human body are exceptionally vast. Their development, enhancement, and practical use in appropriate cases are key to personal self-improvement. Among the mental qualities of a person, one stands out as having exceptional significance: the drive for leadership. This quality is especially prominent in politicians. The development of future leaders depends, to some extent, on how early they acquire the ability to navigate the world around them. Space and time are essential conditions for the formation of consciousness and self-awareness. A person perceives themselves and the surrounding world only within a specific space and time.

Born with a certain genetic program, a person begins life oriented toward the future, without yet having a past or the experience of perceiving themselves and the world. Thus, much of a person's psyche consists of inherited traits (passed down through genes) that exist in the form of latent psychophysiological abilities, which can only be revealed and realized under the influence of the external environment and appropriate activities.

Based on innate psychological qualities that manifest in people's behavior and speech, especially in politicians, two types are distinguished: the ideological politician and the organizational politician. Powerful ideologists included Lenin, Trotsky, Bukharin, Lincoln, Roosevelt, and de Gaulle, who made huge leaps in understanding politics and proposing new ideas.

I believe that Dmitry Medvedev, based on his innate psychological qualities, is an organizational politician.

As an example, here are some excerpts from his biography: In the spring of 1989, Medvedev participated in Anatoly Sobchak's election campaign for the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. Medvedev's career as an organizer officially began in November 1999 after V. Putin was appointed Prime Minister of Russia. The first position Medvedev held in the capital was Deputy Head of the Government Office of the Russian Federation. However, Medvedev didn't remain in this position for long. After President Boris Yeltsin announced his resignation on December 31, 1999, and declared V. Putin his successor, Medvedev also moved to the Kremlin. On the same day, he was appointed Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, which was then headed by Alexander Voloshin, by decree signed by Acting President V. Putin.

After D. Medvedev was invited to lead V. Putin's election campaign headquarters, many expected him to announce further ambitions. This expectation was reinforced by the fact that the president himself mentioned that he saw D.

Medvedev as a potential future head of the Kremlin administration (Gazeta.Ru, November 4, 2003). However, Medvedev did not demand or ask for anything. A little-known fact from this campaign is that all unspent funds from the election fund were returned to the state treasury down to the last penny.

For almost four years, Medvedev "absorbed" administrative experience. Even A. Voloshin once respectfully noted that "Dima is an absolutely reasonable and decent person" ("Argumenty i Fakty" No. 46, November 12, 2003).

On June 30, 2000, at the annual shareholders' meeting of Gazprom, he was elected chairman of the company's board of directors, replacing Viktor Chernomyrdin. In April 2001, he became head of a working group on the liberalization of Gazprom's stock market, created by order of President V. Putin. Prior to this, Medvedev gained business experience working at the Ilim Pulp Enterprise. In 1993, he took the position of director of legal affairs, and later, in 1998, he was elected to the board of directors of the Bratsk Woodworking Complex (LPC) representing Ilim Pulp. According to unofficial reports, D. Medvedev indirectly held a stake in Ilim Pulp's business. However, in 1999, before moving to Moscow, he left the company, giving up all positions there.

D. Medvedev is considered the author of an idea on how a government body, without violating the law, can become a co-founder and co-owner of a joint-stock company by contributing not land, but the lease payments for the land ("Saint Petersburg Courier," November 6, 2003).

Medvedev chaired the board of directors of the gas monopoly until he was elected president of the country in 2008, with a one-year break. From June 2001 to June 2002, this post was held by Rem Vyakhirev, who was removed from his position as head of the holding (Alexey Miller was appointed as the new chairman of the management board). However, even during this period, D. Medvedev oversaw Gazprom's affairs, heading the working group on the liberalization of the gas holding's stock market from April 2001. This process took four years, as the lifting of restrictions on trading Gazprom's shares on the stock market was preceded by work to return assets and consolidate a controlling stake in the hands of the state. In his role as chairman of the board of the gas holding, Medvedev did not act as a public figure, but all strategic development issues of the company were resolved with his direct involvement.

On October 30, 2003, Medvedev was appointed head of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, replacing A. Voloshin, who had resigned. In April 2004, he was appointed a member of the Russian Security Council.

Medvedev took a step toward greater visibility and openness in November 2005, when he transitioned from the presidential administration to the government. He

was appointed First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, responsible for implementing four priority national projects in healthcare, education, housing, and agriculture. Following this appointment, political analysts and the media began to consider Medvedev, along with Sergey Ivanov, who was appointed Deputy Prime Minister at the same time, as potential successors to V. Putin for the presidency.

In addition to national projects, Medvedev was responsible in the government for developing mass communications, ensuring unity of the economic space and freedom of economic activity, developing competition and antitrust policy, implementing state policy in the field of natural resource use and environmental protection, interacting with judicial authorities and the prosecutor's office, and executing state policy in the field of justice.

While on the post of the First Deputy Prime Minister, Medvedev outlined four main areas he believed needed focus in the coming years. He emphasized concentrating on the "four I's" — institutions, infrastructure, innovations, and investments.

Medvedev was officially nominated as a candidate for the Russian presidency in December 2007 by the United Russia party, which had gained a constitutional majority in the State Duma in the parliamentary elections. Prior to this, his candidacy was endorsed by V. Putin. Medvedev himself linked his nomination to the need for continuity in Putin's policies. Shortly after his nomination, he promised that if elected, he would offer Putin the post of Prime Minister. Ultimately, in March 2008, with the support of over 70% of voters, Medvedev was elected as Russia's third president. His inauguration took place in May, after which the State Duma, at the proposal of the new head of state, confirmed Putin as the Prime Minister.

Medvedev pledged to make human capital development a priority in his policies as head of state. Among his primary goals, he cited the dynamic development of the economy, expanding opportunities for small and medium-sized businesses, increasing citizens' welfare, strengthening the social sphere, and implementing a clear demographic policy. "Further steps are needed to develop education, healthcare, Russian culture — all the factors that influence human capital," Medvedev said.

Additionally, during his presidency, Medvedev believed the country needed to "overcome legal nihilism," drastically reduce administrative barriers, and minimize corruption levels. In the economic sphere, Medvedev advocated reducing the tax burden for an innovative economy, modernizing infrastructure, creating an independent financial system in Russia, and strengthening the ruble as a stable regional currency.

Three months into his presidential term, Medvedev faced a serious foreign policy crisis when, on the night of August 8, Georgia launched military actions against South Ossetia. Around 2,000 people lost their lives in the fighting. Russian peacekeepers had been stationed in the unrecognized republic since the early 1990s to maintain security. Medvedev decided to intervene in the conflict to protect the residents of South Ossetia. The President of France participated in mediating the situation. After the end of the military actions, Russia encountered an extremely negative response from the West and reluctance from the U.S. and Europe to acknowledge the Georgian leadership as the initiator of the military operation. As a result, on August 26, 2008, Medvedev signed decrees recognizing the sovereignty of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

In his address to the Federal Assembly on November 5, 2008, Medvedev proposed increasing the presidential term in Russia to six years and the term for the State Duma to five years. His proposal to lawmakers was approved by the upper and lower houses of the Russian Duma. Following these new constitutional amendments, the presidential term was extended to six years. After V. Putin was elected president in 2012, Medvedev was appointed as Prime Minister of Russia.

Psychological portrait of Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev

All those, who know D. Medvedev, confirm that he does not impose his opinion on any issue nor does he leverage his official position. He relies on persuasion based on clear, logical statements aimed at justifying the necessity and fairness of a decision or stance. He conveys that his assessment is objective and only changes his mind if presented with a more well-reasoned position. He is uncompromising only on fundamental production issues, scientific truths, and social truths, but he is accommodating on minor matters. Negligent subordinates may take advantage of this, but if boundaries are crossed, he is capable of imposing strict administrative penalties, including dismissal. In such cases, he prefers either to simply point out the possible consequences or take decisive action.



Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev

He knows how to connect with people, spark interest, or encourage understanding of his ideas. He is a good teacher, encouraging even small initiatives, listening to all viewpoints, allowing people's abilities to emerge, and keenly sensing people in his sphere of interaction, such as when addressing an audience. He can gauge listeners' reactions to his words well and adapt quickly if needed, steering the discussion

in an unexpected direction. The larger the audience, the more confident he feels. However, he struggles when dealing with individuals who lack vision and are too grounded in routine. He avoids conversations that don't interest him and doesn't engage in pointless small talk.

Medvedev strives for a comprehensive examination of any matter—only by doing so, he believes, can one gain an objective view of what is happening. The outcome of these reflections is answers to questions like “why,” “what for,” and “for what purpose.” He breaks down the subject into parts to explain the mechanisms of complex structures, and with this approach, he can tackle the most challenging problems. He speaks concisely and to the point, asking immediately if anything needs clarification.

In September 2011, at the United Russia party congress, it was decided to nominate V. V. Putin for the presidency. If Putin won, Dmitry Anatolyevich

Medvedev would take the position of Prime Minister. The Russian Constitution did not prevent Putin from running for re-election.

Following Putin's victory in the March 2012 elections, he transferred his powers to Medvedev to allow him to form the government.

During the four years of D. Medvedev's presidency, a new form of ruling tandem emerged in Russian politics. It should be noted that Medvedev took charge of Russia during a global economic crisis, but it was Prime Minister V. Putin who primarily tackled its effects. The decision was made to return to the election of governors, and a deep reform of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) began.

However, Medvedev's position on Libya caused great discontent among Russian patriotic circles. Russia abstained in the Security Council vote on the anti-Libyan resolution, after which even V. Putin, who is usually reserved in such cases, openly disagreed with this decision—not so much due to the lost military and other contracts, but because Moscow had yielded to America and Europe on a matter of principle.

When his presidential term ended on May 7, 2012, an hour after Vladimir Putin's inauguration ceremony, Medvedev wrote on Twitter to his supporters: “Thanks to everyone, who supported me over these four years as President of Russia. Our communication will continue. There is a lot of work ahead!”

Psychological Portrait of Muammar al-Gaddafi

The desert and the concept of humanity occupy a special place in the lives of every Arab. Many scholars claim that as one moves toward the equator, the sky appears closer to the earth. In many Arab countries, the sunrise and sunset are not observed; as soon as the sun sets, the desert is enveloped in pitch darkness. In this darkness, the stars shine brighter than in other places. In the dark desert, the shining stars are the first thing that captures every person's attention. The stars appear so close that it seems as though they could be picked from the sky, one by one. Looking at the star-studded sky, a person suddenly feels like a mere speck. As you focus on the scenery above, you begin to daydream and become a



Muammar al-Gaddafi

captive of this magnetic attraction. In this trance-like state, you undergo a psychological transformation, splitting or doubling in consciousness. On one hand, it feels as if you are dreaming as usual, while on the other hand, you sense that you are under the pressure of the sky above, falling into a new psychological state. Many pilgrims on the Hajj also describe experiencing this kind of psychological state when visiting the Kaaba. A person feels one foot in the sinful world, while the other steps into a pure world they aspire to reach with holy feelings. In this trance state, a person becomes acutely aware of their dependence on the Creator, witnessing their own vulnerability once again.

Therefore, Arabs living in the desert often avoid wandering alone at night, fearing the magnetic effect of the starry sky that could lead them into a trance. Bedouins, overwhelmed by this state, prefer to travel in groups at night in the desert. When Muammar Gaddafi was born under such desert darkness, his parents had no idea that 27 years later, they would be celebrating the birth of a man who would hold the reins of power in their country for many years.

In the Arab world, there are very few leaders like Muammar Gaddafi who inspire such contradictory views. Many researchers portray him as a brilliant leader, while others describe him as a dictator who could not control himself. So, who is Muammar Gaddafi, in the truest sense?

Muammar, whose full name is Muhammad Abdul Salam bin Khalid bin Muhammad Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi, was born in 1942 in a Bedouin tent in the

desert, south of the town of Sirte, 30 km from the Mediterranean Sea. The future leader's childhood was spent in the harsh desert environment, marked by crystal-clear air, fierce sandstorms, mirages, and, at times, lifeless silence. His childhood was strongly influenced by his grandfather, Muhammad, who would frequently recount stories of the resistance led by Omar Mukhtar against the Italian colonizers and his heroism. Undoubtedly, these stories left a lasting impact on young Muammar.

As his family led a nomadic lifestyle, they were often on the move. During these journeys, young Muammar would play war games with his peers, portraying himself as a member of Omar Mukhtar's "band." Sometimes these games among the children would disturb the neatness of the Bedouin tents. At night, Muammar would lie on the desert ground, staring up at the stars, lost in daydreams. Later, reminiscing about his childhood, Muammar Gaddafi would say:

"I grew up in a pure environment, untouched by the harms of modern life. We always respected our elders and could distinguish between good and bad."

When young Muammar turned six, he insisted, "I want to learn to read," surprising his parents. This was because, in their six-person family, no one knew how to read or write, nor did they feel the need to. As a family of nomadic shepherds, they lacked the financial means to fulfill Muammar's desire for an education.

By the time he was nine, Muammar's grandfather, Muhammad, noticed his attempt to read the Quran and decided, at any cost, that the child should be educated. Grandfather Muhammad sold his share of livestock to cover Muammar's school fees. Muammar then set off for the town of Sirte to attend a seven-year primary school. He stayed at the town mosque at night and attended school during the day. Every Friday, he would walk 33 kilometers back to his family, returning to Sirte with a week's supply of food.

Muammar's classmate, Miftah Ali, recalls:

"There were three of us in the class who were the children of Bedouin Arabs leading a nomadic lifestyle. We were in such a miserable state that we didn't know where we would find food or where we would sleep. Our other classmates looked down on us and often mocked and ridiculed us. Because of this attitude and our miserable lives, we often wanted to return to the desert, to our tents. But Muammar was always against it and would say, 'Let them think of us as poor savages; yes, their families are better off than ours, but they cannot understand life as we do.'"

For this reason, Muammar Gaddafi, who experienced severe hardships during his childhood and adolescence, always sought to assert his superiority over others to psychologically affirm himself. The quality of self-assertion and standing out

from others followed him throughout his life. Later, with the creation of his “Third World Theory,” he would again attempt to set himself apart.

During his rule, Libya became involved in several military conflicts. These included the 1977 border war with Egypt, the military conflict in Chad during the 1980s, the 1986 bombing by the United States, and the sanctions imposed in the 1990s due to Libya’s nuclear program. Immediately after coming to power, inspired by pan-Arabism, Muammar Gaddafi proposed the idea of uniting Libya with neighboring Arab countries, presenting unrealistic proposals as he once again sought to distinguish himself from other Arab leaders.

On December 27, 1969, a meeting took place in Tripoli with Gaddafi, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Sudanese Prime Minister Jaafar Nimeiry, resulting in the signing of the “Tripoli Charter,” which included the idea of uniting these three states. Later, Syria also expressed interest in joining these united states, while Sudan announced it would join at a later stage. On April 17, 1971, in Benghazi, an agreement to establish the Federation of Arab Republics was signed by the leaders of Egypt, Syria, and Libya, although the declaration of its creation was only announced on August 2, 1971. The following year, the agreement was approved by referendum in all three countries, and the unified state’s flag and emblem were confirmed.

At the August 2 meeting in Benghazi with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, a phased unification plan between the two countries was agreed upon, with September 1, 1973, set as the final date. Following these agreements, Gaddafi called on Muslims to struggle against the United States and Great Britain and expressed his support for Black revolutionaries in the United States, Irish revolutionaries, and those fighting for the freedom of Palestine. Both Anwar Sadat and Hafez al-Assad soon realized they had fallen into Gaddafi’s game, and this plan too failed to materialize. As a result, on November 11, 1977, the Federation of Arab Republics was officially dissolved. Gaddafi proposed unification to Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba, but Bourguiba declined.

Later, during secret talks between Libya and Syria, which were under Soviet influence, on September 1, 1980, Gaddafi proposed to Syrian President Hafez al-Assad that the two countries unite to more effectively fight against Israel. On September 10, an agreement to unify the two countries was signed, but once again, the unification did not come to fruition.

During his visit to Morocco on August 13, 1983, Muammar Gaddafi signed the Arab-African Federation Treaty in the city of Oujda with Moroccan King Hassan II. This treaty, seen as the first step towards creating a Greater Arab Maghreb, envisioned the unification of Libya and Morocco. In a referendum held in Morocco on August 31, 99.97% of voters supported the treaty, and Libya’s General People’s Congress unanimously ratified it. Additionally, Libya halted its

support for the Polisario Front, which was fighting against the Moroccan army. However, in 1985, Libya's signing of an alliance treaty with Iran and King Hassan II's meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres, which Gaddafi strongly criticized, led to Morocco canceling the unification treaty in August 1986.

Gaddafi's life, shaped by the social environment he was in, molded him into a contradictory and highly combative individual. The psychological traumas of his childhood and adolescence created several complexes in Muammar Gaddafi. One of the most significant of these was his phobia of being overthrown. Following the military coup conducted under the name "Operation Jerusalem" on September 1, 1969 (which would later be called the "revolution"), he would have many of the military officers who participated alongside him arrested. He would show intolerance toward many people he invited into politics, later pushing them off the political stage. Key figures in Muammar Gaddafi's rise to power and the consolidation of his political authority, such as Abdul Salam Jalloud, Rifi al-Sharif, Hussein Sharif, Muhammad Zulm, Muhammad Khalil, and Hadi Fede, would also not be allowed to remain in the political arena. Like the monarchy he and his revolutionary companions had opposed, he would attempt to transfer power to his son, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, and distribute the main resources of the state among his children.

When the blood of thousands of protesters was spilled onto the desert sands in Libya during February and March of 2011, Gaddafi would once again distinguish himself from other Arab dictators. He would call these people, whom he had drenched in blood, "rats." In his address to the nation, he would claim that he was not an ordinary person but one of the "chosen" by God.

Here, Muammar Gaddafi's true psychological state becomes evident. By expressing high-value ideas about himself, he would reveal once again the nature of his mindset. High-value ideas are erroneous judgments associated with reality, accompanied by intense emotional tension, and dominant in thought. A person who feels wronged over a particular injustice may dwell on the event for a long time; a minor grievance can turn into a great offense or crime in their mind, leading to erroneous judgments that dominate their thoughts and are incongruous with reality. In another case, a person with no special talent may advance the fantastical and erroneous belief that they are a genius. Such judgments take precedence over all other thoughts. Due to the intense emotional strain accompanying high-value ideas, they disrupt behavior. A person like this devotes all their time and energy to proving these judgments. They are prepared to go to any length to convince others that they are a "genius" or to prove a perceived "injustice."

Such ideas are found in psychopathic individuals (in their paranoid form) who have unstable and disharmonious emotions. What differentiates them from delusional ideas is their connection to real events. Additionally, unlike delusions, high-value ideas do not exhibit extreme illogicality or absurdity.

Psychological Portrait of Mikheil Saakashvili

Mikheil Saakashvili was born on December 21, 1967, in Tbilisi, into a noble Georgian family. His father, Nikolas, was a medical professional, but shortly before his son's birth, he left his wife and joined another family. Saakashvili's mother, Giuli Alasania, was a historian, professor, expert in medieval Georgian



Mikheil Saakashvili

culture, a Turkologist, and the head of the "Georgia-Azerbaijan Friendship Center." She later married Zurab Kometiani. Giuli took charge of raising Mikheil, while his stepfather maintained a distant relationship with him. As a result, Misha grew up without the affection of a father.

These childhood experiences significantly influenced his character, perception, and future behavior. However, it was not his stepfather who caused him the most resentment, but rather his biological father. Saakashvili harbored deep animosity toward his father for abandoning the family before his birth and could not forgive him for the pain it caused. In a symbolic act of revenge, Saakashvili changed his patronymic from Nikolozovich to Nikolayevich, a gesture that also revealed his Mingrelian ethnic origin.

Raised in this emotional environment, Misha developed feelings of envy toward his peers, which led to social isolation. In an attempt to compensate for his family's dysfunction, he focused intensely on his studies. However, the scars of his early childhood trauma left a lasting impact on him. As a result, power became a critical tool for Saakashvili in his pursuit of success. He sought power not only as a means of acquiring material and immaterial benefits—such as wealth, fame, influence, recognition, and access to higher social circles—but also as a way to assert dominance over others, deriving satisfaction from their dependence on him, a distinctive form of ruling sadism.

The Charisma and Magnetic Appeal of Saakashvili

Mikheil Saakashvili, a modern demagogue of history, used the opposition electorate for his own purposes. He is the ideal of the masses, relying on their unconditional admiration and support. He speaks precisely what the majority of the people want to hear.

Andrey Kolesnikov, a special correspondent for the Kommersant newspaper, characterized the events in Tbilisi on November 22, 2003, as follows:

“As I walked through the rally, suddenly, behind the statue of Joseph Stalin, a dark blue ‘UAZ’ vehicle stopped, and out stepped Mikheil Saakashvili, accompanied by several bodyguards with earpieces and microphones. They moved with absolute professionalism, swiftly mingling into the crowd. Saakashvili took to the podium. I saw a charismatic leader. Every word he spoke caused great admiration. People didn’t even understand what he was saying. It didn’t matter to them. For them, simply having him there and seeing him in person was enough.”

That day, the opposition surrounded the parliament building, holding roses in their hands. On November 23, 2003, the leadership of the “National Movement” party, including Mikheil Saakashvili, along with Zurab Zhvania and Speaker Nino Burjanadze, held a protest rally. There was a change in government in Georgia. The organized uprising was based on the motivation of alleged electoral fraud in the November 2, 2003, parliamentary elections. Eduard Shevardnadze was forced to resign.

Saakashvili is unpredictable and principled. He is an adventurer, often clinging so tightly to imagined means that the actual goal is forgotten. To remain in the spotlight, he channels all his energy into provocations. However, many are drawn in by these actions, falling under the spell of “self-hypnosis” over what is happening. At such times, Saakashvili manages to appear right in everyone’s eyes, using this to neutralize his political opponents.

Mikheil Saakashvili’s personal life is as he imagines it. He does not accept the opinions of those around him and rejects any criticism directed at him. For him, there is only one truth: his own opinion. Anyone who disagrees with him is seen as a stranger or even an enemy. Because of this suspicion toward everything and everyone, people like him often do not get along with others and end up alone. They are constantly searching for imagined “enemies” and live with “grand aspirations.”

“Grand aspirations” actually arise from real events, accompanied by intense emotions, and take a dominant position in their thoughts, leading to erroneous conclusions. Those who cannot come to terms with many wrongs never forget

insults directed at them and spend their lives analyzing these situations, with feelings of revenge arising in their minds.

Grand aspirations are an intermediate state between error and delusion. Although not considered a mental illness, grand aspirations are seen as pathological. These symptoms in Saakashvili's character can lead to conflict-causing traits like aggression and quick temper.

Many of these traits are characteristic of a schizoid personality type. Let's discuss the schizoid personality type (also referred to as introverted). The term "schizoid" was introduced by German scientist Kretschmer in 1936. He believed that there were similarities between schizoid psycho-types and individuals with schizophrenia. However, later it became clear that, despite some resemblance, there is no etiological or pathological connection between them. This personality trait stems from their autistic thinking, which sets them apart from others. Their facial expressions, behavior, attire, etc. have a distinctive uniqueness. Being caught up in a vortex of suspicions becomes a habit for them.

All of these are symptoms of a schizoid personality type. From a physiological perspective, this is a reaction involving the entire organism and nervous system.

Such people often enjoy being cheerful, attending noisy events, and demonstrating their qualities in front of others at concerts to show how different they are. However, after a while, they want to be alone.

They constantly strive to climb higher and suffer from the "unjust" obstacles they encounter, as well as from suspicions of persecution.

Those who experience persecution or paranoia are perpetually suspicious of everything. Such personalities prefer to keep their inner impressions, feelings, and emotions hidden from outside observation and are not inclined to get close to others. They are often self-satisfied, view others with suspicion, and are self-absorbed. They place great value on their skills and everything they've invested in. They do not consider anyone else's opinion on life matters, always believing they are right. Those who disagree with them are regarded as enemies.

Psychological Portrait of Bidzina Ivanishvili

A soft (velvet) power shift is occurring in Georgia. Bidzina Ivanishvili's "Georgian Dream" party has won a narrow majority, surpassing President Saakashvili's party, and is now set to form a new Georgian government.

To assess the impact of Bidzina Ivanishvili's entry into Caucasian politics, it is essential to consider the implications of this event for Azerbaijan and Russia.

Analyzing Ivanishvili's childhood and adolescence, we observe that he grew up in a very poor and modest family. Family values and financial hardship constantly drove him to struggle, to prove himself to those around him, and to assert his place in life.

He began his working life with a difficult job and decided that obtaining a higher education was essential to surpassing those around him. In Russia, Ivanishvili began engaging in scientific activities, eventually defending his dissertation to become a candidate of sciences. Afterward, he returned to Georgia, aspiring to join the political elite as a means of demonstrating his superiority. As he ascended the ranks, he was never satisfied with his achievements and continually aimed higher.



Bidzina Ivanishvili

Realizing that material well-being alone was insufficient to validate himself, Ivanishvili ventured into business, establishing a cooperative and engaging in the sale of plastic pipes. He also built connections with Georgian Jews living abroad and facilitated the sale of electronic equipment to the Georgian Academy of Sciences. However, he faced bankruptcy, marking his first significant business failure.

Ivanishvili was arrested for financial fraud. After his release from prison, he realized that he had no job and that his reputation in the country had been tarnished. With only 100 rubles in his pocket, he moved to Russia, where he began living under the name Boris to pursue new opportunities.

Ivanishvili's personality is reminiscent of modern-day Germany. Despite losing two world wars, Germany managed to emerge as the leader of Europe. Ivanishvili entered Russia during a time when criminal gangs were rampant. Here, he began

engaging in business that flourished under the protection of criminals. At that time, Georgian "thieves-in-law" were dominant in Russia. Ivanishvili climbed the criminal hierarchy, replacing one scheme with another, and forged connections with members of the special services, as well as with Boris Gryzlov. Over time, Ivanishvili and Gryzlov became partners and, with the backing of businessmen, established a charity foundation to support retired military personnel and police officers. In this way, a new form of "protection" was legalized.

Following a shift in Russian leadership, Vladimir Putin began dismantling criminal organizations and neutralizing Russian oligarchs. Ivanishvili realized that his turn would eventually come, so he resigned from the board of the foundation and appointed Malshev as head of his "Creditbank." Ivanishvili gradually transferred his assets to the United States, eventually relocating there himself.

This demonstrates that Ivanishvili is adept at assessing and adapting to changing circumstances, skillfully navigating out of dangerous situations. When necessary, he knows how to connect and align himself with the right people.

In Georgian society, it was believed that after selling his business in Russia, Ivanishvili would sever all ties with the country. However, this assumption is incorrect. One of his key traits is his ability to make decisions, even those not well-received by the public, in his own best interest. This is precisely Ivanishvili's guiding principle in life.

If the Georgian mentality required Saakashvili yesterday, then he had to step forward. Power changes every person, and Saakashvili changed too. Although he was a democrat, he was forced to govern the people according to the Georgian mentality. To govern a country effectively, it is essential to understand all administrative methods. It is incorrect to compare Georgians to Scandinavians or Americans. Each nation has its unique mental code.

Furthermore, Georgia will always face the Russian factor and will be compelled to respond adequately to all of Russia's challenges, no matter how harsh they may be. Ivanishvili is neither president nor prime minister, and everything could change at any moment with the emergence of a new powerful politician on Georgia's political scene. He will observe events and the struggle of geopolitical forces. In many cases, the fate of small states is determined by these geopolitical powers.

What distinguishes Ivanishvili from Saakashvili is that, while Mikheil would take risks, Bidzina knows how to wait and retreat when necessary.

Psychological Portrait of Recep Tayyip Erdogan

Although Recep Tayyip Erdogan has won all recent parliamentary and municipal elections, there are still many negative views about him among political analysts. Both domestically and internationally, many refer to him as a “sultan” or even a “dictator.” In fact, the Western media often compares Erdogan to General al-Sisi, who carried out a military coup in Egypt.

However, during his time as Turkey’s prime minister, Erdogan’s request to Vladimir Putin, in front of journalists, to have Turkey accepted into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and his discussion of joint efforts to establish a free trade zone with the Eurasian Economic Union had a “cold shower” effect on many analysts. With this statement, Erdogan seemed to propose a new Turkish political strategy to the world.

The Turkish prime minister’s statement sparked lively discussions in analytical circles in the United States, Russia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. Many were particularly curious as to how genuine he was when making this statement. In this regard, psycho-portraitological analysis, one of the best tools for understanding a personality, allows us to view the former Turkish prime minister—now an experienced president—from a different angle.



Recep Tayyip Erdogan

Recep Tayyip Erdogan was born on February 26, 1954, in the Kasimpasa district of Istanbul, into the family of a coast guard. According to Milliyet newspaper, in one of his interviews, he mentioned that his family had migrated from Adjara to Rize. During his visit to Georgia on August 11, 2004, Erdogan said, “I am also Georgian, my family is a Georgian family that migrated from Batumi to Rize.”

According to an interview, in his teenage years, he sold lemonade on the dangerous streets of Istanbul. In 1965, he graduated from Piyalepasa Primary School. That same year, he entered Imam Hatip High School (a religious school) and graduated in 1973. This period of his life would be etched in his memory and influence his political worldview. From a portraitological analysis perspective, this period is significant for every person. Where future leaders are born, their nationality, native language, childhood experiences, and foundational education are all crucial elements. Portraitologists use the traces left by this period to explain

some typical traits in the lives and activities of political leaders. To understand the typical characteristics of leaders, it is insufficient to rely solely on stereotypical judgments.

His humble family background clearly weighed on him, and it was evident that he looked enviously at his wealthier peers. In fact, these feelings drove him to become even more determined. He sought to fill the distressing void created by his financial difficulties through serious dedication to his studies. However, his family's limited budget forced him to work as well. But young Erdogan wanted to study, study, and study in order to get an education and lift his family out of their difficult circumstances. He was very stubborn; he spent part of the day working and part of it at school. Even when selling lemonade on the streets of Istanbul, he carried his books in his backpack. He would quickly open his books, look over his homework, and try to learn the assignments. Sometimes he would repeatedly recite the text to memorize it along the way, which made him appear, as if he was talking to himself. In this environment, Erdogan completed his teenage years. Yet the hardships he experienced in childhood had already left their mark on him. That is why power would always serve as a tool for achieving success for him.

Erdogan represents the ideal of the masses who live modestly and are connected to spiritual and Ottoman traditions, much like his own youth, and these people are indeed the majority in Turkey. Unlike many other Turkish politicians, he spoke to them in a way they wanted to hear. Each of his words was met with great admiration.

After his activities in the National Turkish Union (an organization close to Alparslan Turkes), Erdogan became the head of the Beyoglu Youth Branch of the National Salvation Party (MSP), known for its commitment to Islamic values, in 1976. That same year, he was elected head of the MSP's Istanbul province. In 1977, he met Emine at a conference, and they married on July 4, 1978. Until 1980, Erdogan worked in Istanbul's transportation organizations. On September 12, 1980, there was a military coup in the country, and all political parties were banned. That year, the head of the municipal transportation council demanded Erdogan shave his mustache, and he was dismissed when he refused. After the military coup, Erdogan worked as a manager in the private sector. In 1981, he graduated from Marmara University's Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences.

After the 1980 coup in Turkey, Erdogan resumed his political activities with the Welfare Party (RP), established in 1983, which continued the line of the dissolved National Salvation Party (MSP). In 1984, he became the head of the party's Beyoglu district branch and was elected to its high administrative council. In 1986, he ran as a candidate for parliament in additional elections. In 1989, he

stood as a candidate for mayor of the Beyoglu district. The Welfare Party took second place in the 1989 elections. In 1991, he again ran for parliament and was elected as a member of parliament, but the Central Election Commission annulled his mandate under various pretexts. His political views were strongly influenced by Necmettin Erbakan, considered the founder of “political Islam” in modern Turkey.

During Erdogan’s rule, Turkey offered Muslim countries a new model of governance. Erdogan proved to be a strong political strategist and transformed Turkey into a regional player.

At the core of Erdogan’s political appeal is his ability to go against the general flow. He eliminated his political rivals and neutralized the generals. This was evident once again during the Gezi Park protests in Istanbul. At first, Erdogan did not take the protests seriously and even left for a trip to African countries. Upon returning, he looked even more confident, as if savoring an imminent victory.

He displayed a similar aura when he expressed intentions for Turkey to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In general, the more he opposed existing rules and established political systems, the more charismatic he appeared. Furthermore, economic and analytical centers began to suggest that Turkey be represented in a unified geopolitical alliance with Russia.

Many Turkish media outlets are under government control and regularly promote a new lifestyle aligned with Erdogan’s ideas and standards. These standards aligned with the desires of superpowers seeking to expand the Turkish-Islamic state model in the region. At the same time, Erdogan managed to strengthen Turkey’s cooperative relations with Russia. In this regard, Erdogan, who openly clashed with the U.S. and Western nations, projected an image of a stronger and more self-assured leader.

Many analysts say that the economic potential of both Russia and Turkey is such that they could become one of the leading economic systems globally by 2050. The U.S. has become seriously concerned about the closer ties between Russia and Turkey. It is no coincidence that recently we have seen Moscow and Ankara aligning more closely on the Syrian issue. After this alignment, the White House understood that the outlook for the Middle East conflict had shifted. Despite efforts in Washington to maintain a unipolar dominance, it became evident that they would not succeed because history had turned a page, marking the beginning of a new era. Enveloped in this fear, they halted the so-called “Arab Spring” process and began encouraging Arab rulers to unite against Russian and Turkish influence.

The hostile attitude towards Erdogan from pro-American Gulf countries and Israel led to subtle and psychodynamic changes in the Turkish prime minister’s

perspective, influencing his judgments. This factor would eventually lead him to turn towards the Kremlin. Another major influence on Erdogan's worldview came when Washington silently backed the military coup in Egypt. For Erdogan, this was a warning signal—a clear message that if a Turkish military junta were to seize power in the future, they would act as they had with Egypt. This was a real disappointment for Erdogan.

In reality, the rapprochement between Israel and Turkey has created a Washington-Tel Aviv-Ankara triangle, which limits Turkey's room for maneuver. Although Russia-Turkey relations are improving, the current geopolitical reality suggests that their relationship will not return to its former state. Turkey remains an instrument of leverage for Washington and Tel Aviv against Iran and other regional states. Israel, too, is invested in preserving the region's existing political landscape. Turkey is entering a new era.

One of the main reasons for the rapprochement between Russia and Turkey is the strategic partnership alongside economic potential. In fact, after the Russian plane was downed, Russia gained new maneuvering opportunities and shifted its primary focus toward the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Russian experts noted that the SCO serves mainly China's interests. To counterbalance China's influence, Russia brought India and Pakistan into the organization. By doing so, Russia both blocked China's economic expansion in Central Asia and created balancing players. New players emerged on the Eurasian landscape, and while Turkey previously had some alignment in Eurasian cooperation, that is no longer the case. The Kremlin now stands as the strategic hub of Eurasia.

In the future, there will be a Slavic-Turkic concentration in the Eurasian region, but without Turkey's involvement. There is a plan for China, Russia, India, Pakistan, and potentially a few European countries to unite economically to reduce dependency on the dollar. China does not want Turkey to have influence in the Eurasian region, nor does it favor Turkey's membership in the SCO. The geopolitical structure of Eurasia is taking shape, and Turkey does not have a place within it.

Turkey is a NATO country and a strategic ally of the U.S. in the region. Given Turkey's NATO membership, the idea of a strategic Russia-Turkey partnership in Eurasia is not feasible. Erdogan might attempt this, but there are limits. The current realities strategically prevent a true Russia-Turkey rapprochement.

Ideologies based on geopolitical realities

The idea of a new national ideology was voiced by the President of Azerbaijan, Mr. Ilham Aliyev. The head of state called for discussions specifically on the national idea. Following this, intellectuals, individuals with knowledge of socio-political processes, and representatives of non-governmental organizations began holding discussions in various forums.

Medianews.az interviewed a participant in these discussions, the well-known writer and author of numerous studies on psychogeopolitics, Adgezal Mamedov.

— Mr. Mamedov, we would like to start a discussion with you on national ideas and delve into the details. What standards and realities should Azerbaijan’s ideological concept reflect?

— In fact, I refer to the modern Republic of Azerbaijan as the third Azerbaijani Republic. The first was during the republican period of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918–1920). The second was the Azerbaijani SSR, which, despite being influenced by communist ideology, still represented a form of Azerbaijani statehood. The third is the current Republic of Azerbaijan, which aligns with historical justice and the realities of the new era and has been established by our great leader Heydar Aliyev. The core ideological principle of this republic is the idea of Azerbaijanism. Today, the most optimal and unifying ideological concept for the Azerbaijani people is Azerbaijanism. It is not accidental that President Ilham Aliyev emphasized this during his inauguration.



Ilham Aliyev

The head of state noted that this concept was founded by the national leader Heydar Aliyev, and the ideology of Azerbaijanism has already been accepted by everyone in society as an ideological framework. Therefore, today, this ideology should apply in our reality to the family, the home, and specifically to its cultural code, in contrast solely to theoretical knowledge. In my opinion, I can

conclude that ideological concepts must also correspond to geopolitical realities. There is a saying by Harun al-Rashid, though sometimes attributed to Napoleon: "The fate of nations is determined by geography." Thus, the national ideology, representing a set of national ideas, must, first and foremost, be aligned with the realities of our area. National security policy is the concept of the state’s “existence.” Both current geopolitical realities and responses to the tectonic shifts in global politics lie behind this concept of “existence.” In other words, the

national idea, the national ideology, cannot remain stagnant. If we remain static, we will have to base our geopolitical interests on the ideology of states like Aq Qoyunlu or the Safavids. This would lead to very serious consequences, namely, conflict with neighboring states. The idea of Azerbaijanism has already taken root in our souls, in the consciousness of the nation. This absorption has led to today's victory, namely, the restoration of 86,600 square kilometers of our territory.

— In your view, what should be the goal, direction, and priority in the next phase?

— I would emphasize that geopolitics has a tremendous influence on national ideology. Let me give an example. I have close ties with Uzbekistan and the political elite of that country. In general, Uzbekistan is the largest state in Central Asia in terms of population and resources. Kazakhstan may be larger geographically, but from a geopolitical standpoint, Uzbekistan is at the center of Central Asia. In recent years, the world has been talking about the drying up of the Aral Sea. One of the main reasons for this is that the Central Asian republics depend on two major rivers. The tragedy is that Central Asia is landlocked and lacks access to open seas, making them inevitably dependent on neighboring states. On the other hand, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers, considered vital arteries for this region, flow through Central Asia. One originates from the Tian Shan mountains to the North, partly on Chinese territory, whereas the other, the Amu Darya, flows from the mountains of Afghanistan. Uzbekistan's very existence depends on these water sources, as agriculture accounts for about 74% of the country's gross domestic product. Recently, with financial support from neighboring regions, Taliban authorities in Afghanistan began constructing a large dam at the source of the Amu Darya. Taking into account that even in the current situation, these rivers do not meet 70% of Uzbekistan's agricultural sector needs, the construction of such a dam would significantly impact the country's economy. Thus, Tashkent is forced to seek new water sources, now looking to the Volga and Ural rivers, as there is no other choice. Naturally, this geopolitical factor will inevitably impact the national policy and ideology of these states. It is no coincidence that, in Central Asia, there is now more talk of Slavic-Turkic unity than Turan unity. There is no other way! Either you lean towards China, or you engage more actively with a geographic region you have been connected to for centuries to ensure geostrategic security. For this reason, in recent years, considerable attention has been given in Central Asia to Lev Gumilyov's teachings.

In this context, I believe that new concepts need to be developed in Azerbaijan in response to these recent processes occurring in our geographic space. In terms of full stability, Azerbaijanism, as an ideology, serves as a unifying factor. But there are also geopolitical realities. This will, of course, affect our national policy. My point in stating this is that, as the world's geopolitical environment changes from time to time, we are compelled to reassess our national ideological framework,

which stems from the demands of geography itself or the advantages our geography offers to us. These, so to speak, are geographical features that tie our hands. However, our advantage is that an additional part of Azerbaijan's national ideological concept is closely connected to the geography of the Turkic world.

— Thus, the Turkish line prevails here with Azerbaijan playing the role of a “generator,” am I correct?

— Yes, we play the role of a unifying locomotive. We know that President Ilham Aliyev has played a crucial role in bringing together various geopolitical forces for the sake of common interests. Certainly, Azerbaijan has its own interests in this context. For example, the convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Each state signing this convention has certain obligations and responsibilities. Without a defined legal status for the Caspian Sea, who knows, perhaps there would have been an attempt to alter the direction of the Volga River. That could happen, too. There is the Volga-Don Canal. As one of the main sectors of our economy, shipping has no access to open waters without the Volga-Don Canal. Moreover, according to the terms of the convention, no strategic project related to the Caspian Sea may be implemented without mutual agreement. Thus, we must leverage the advantages offered to us by geography and cooperate. Naturally, this cooperation will influence our ideological concepts to a certain extent. On the other hand, to avoid problems faced by Uzbekistan, I believe it is necessary to sign a convention on the legal status of the Kura and Aras rivers. Honestly, this work is essential to prevent the pollution of the Kura and Aras. In recent years, Azerbaijan has also started experiencing a shortage of fresh water, which has significantly affected agriculture. New dams are being built at the sources of these rivers. Over the last few years, these water resources have begun impacting seriously on the overall capacity of the Kura, and especially the Aras River. There are future projects to redirect the Kura stream and direct it to Nokhudlu Lake, which is being constructed in Artvin. From this perspective, I believe cooperation should be achieved in these matters, and a mutual collaboration environment should be established.

— What can you say about national identification and the anthropological map?

— Our adversaries say to us: “You are a nomadic people; you came here during the Seljuk period,” “You arrived in this geographical space and moved to Anatolia after Manzikert.” But even before the Seljuks, Caspian Turks were represented in this region. Azerbaijan had a rich and ancient history long before Islam. In other words, there were states under different names on the territory of modern Azerbaijan, and we are carriers of the ethnogenetic and anthropological characteristics of these peoples. According to my estimates, the ancient Kura-Aras culture dates back 5,000 years. Our late scholar Rabiyya Gasimova, who became Azerbaijan's only specialist in this field, conducted anthropological research at that time. For instance, when the Mingachevir Hydropower Station was being built, Mir Jafar Baghirov was informed that ancient anthropological

materials were found in pottery from the area. It was suggested to retrieve these materials so they wouldn't be lost to the reservoir. Rabiyya Khanum worked on this issue, and her research was published in Soviet historical and anthropological journals. It became clear that they date back thousands of years.

— As far as I remember, you mentioned this in a television program. At that time, you stated that similar research was conducted in the Goychay district of Western Azerbaijan, near Lake Goycha...

— Yes, Russian researchers worked there. They discovered anthropological materials, and later it became clear that these findings had no connection to Armenians or other neighboring peoples. In fact, we are the indigenous people of this land and possess the genetic code of our ancestors. The history presented by Armenians is entirely fictional. The only factual source is anthropology. Let them present anthropological material. Our history is much older and deeper.

Yes, Azerbaijan is located in a geographic region that underwent extensive migration. Azerbaijan is a migration hub of Eurasia. For example, it was during the Caliphate period when Arabs and later Seljuks, Timurids, and Hulakids converged, and we carry traces of each one. However, this does not give anyone cause to state that we arrived here in the 11th century. The Azerbaijani people have a Christian period and a Totemic period. We must regard our history from this perspective, through the lens of Azerbaijani identity. And the strategic goal in Azerbaijani identity should be Azerbaijani unity in the name of Greater Azerbaijan.

Note: This interview was prepared with the financial support of the Media Development Agency of the Azerbaijan Republic and in accordance with the conditions of the competition on the topic “Promotion of the History of Azerbaijani Statehood, National Traditions, Science, and Culture.”

Psychogeopolitics of Eurasia or conclusion

Based on the above factors, it is possible to conclude that, alongside undeniable objective socio-political and economic phenomena, "history is driven" by subjective factors, rooted in psychology, morals, upbringing, and the characters of political leaders. The primary aim of psychological portraiture is to examine the psychological profiles of leaders from various countries to assess their capacity to influence the foreign policy of their respective nations. The developed system of psychological evaluations of leaders enables the assessment and forecasting of political processes within countries.

The personality structure of a politician, in each specific instance of psychological portraiture, is modeled by the portraitist to achieve specific pragmatic goals. Only in this way can the researcher predict the behavior of political leaders, including the impact of these factors on everyday politics within the life of the studied country.

By that time, it seems likely that the post-Soviet countries will have developed common approaches and shared visions on key issues. The concept of Eurasian integration itself is not new, either for Russia or the world; however, it is now assuming a new meaning, defined by the geopolitical arrangement that emerged after the collapse of the USSR. Today, Russia plays one of the most significant roles in the creation of a multipolar world and has a considerable influence on the formation of Greater Eurasia. Simultaneously, we are witnessing a trend toward the decline of European civilization, which allows us to suggest that, in time, its place may be taken by other civilizations. Undoubtedly, among them will be Far Eastern civilizations: Chinese and Indian, but also, unquestionably, Russian. Furthermore, it seems likely that we will witness a new dawn for Turkic civilization.

In this regard, it is sensible for Russia not only to establish contact with this civilization and its primary centers but also, if possible, to understand the direction of further joint evolution. The participation of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and other Slavic-Turkic states is crucial for initiating the process of establishing a new geopolitical entity. This is particularly important considering that our countries are already beginning to develop a new understanding of what self-sufficient Eurasian states should be and how these states can strengthen their interactions, thereby creating a common and powerful Eurasian economic base and a new mega-civilizational community—the “people of Eurasia.”

When the book *The End of History and the Last Man* by American philosopher and political scientist Francis Fukuyama was published in 1992, it seemed to many that the competition had ended, that there was no alternative to the American way of development, and that consequently, geopolitical struggles and

related contradictions would gradually fade into the past. As we see now, this was not the case.

Therefore, it is not surprising that under the new conditions, Russia has undertaken a course to create a geopolitical construct based on the shared economic interests and cultural and historical orientations of the countries of the Eurasian continent. It is also understandable that modern Eurasians are reconsidering the role of Turkic peoples in Russian history. Their contribution lies not only in the fact that they incorporated the Turkic world into its history but also in the way they viewed history—not from the perspective of the West, through the eyes of Europeans and from the position of Eurocentrism, but from another world altogether—Turkic, steppe, and Asian.

In other words, from the natural environment of thousands of years of Eurasia, as the cradle of the world. This has enriched Russian science, making it possible to realize certain aspects of the formation of the Russian national character, the Russian historical process, and, in particular, a number of aspects of the relationship between Russia and Turkic cultures, where Azerbaijani culture is an integral part.

In this context, proponents of the Russian concept of modern Eurasianism have placed significant emphasis on the geographical factor, particularly the expansive steppe regions of Eurasia (which, it should be noted, is the ancestral homeland of all Turkic peoples). At the same time, they introduced a new concept, the “steppe factor,” which they considered central and decisive in the life of society. It was in the steppe, rather than in the “forest” or “river” zone, that forms of power, thinking, and psychology were developed that were unique to this culture, as evidenced by the Turkic peoples (according to the Eurasians).


It can be observed that the Russian national character displays Turkic influences in its behavior, including the mass and irrationality of political movements, which can still be observed today. All of these factors influenced the national character of the Russians, with the formation of the nation occurring alongside the formation of the empire across the vast expanses of the continent, which left an imprint on Russian history.

Since ancient times, the nomadic tribes of the Turks formed strong state organizations, which were not only engaged in frequent battles with their neighbors, such as the Chinese, but also, as historical records show, were highly educated and had their own written language. The Turks absorbed major world religions into their history, some of which persist to this day. Although the majority of them are followers of Islam, other religions are also practiced, including Christianity by the Chuvash and Gagauz, Buddhism by the Tuvinians, and Judaism by the Karaites, among others.

Looking at Russia's history, it is difficult to overstate the influence of the Turkic nobles who converted to Orthodoxy. However, some even retained their Muslim faith, which did not prevent them from faithfully serving the Russian throne. Turkic languages were known not only by many prominent figures in Russia, including military commanders like Alexander Suvorov and Mikhail Kutuzov, writer Leo Tolstoy, diplomat Nikolay Ignatyev, and general Lavr Kornilov, but also by entire classes of Russian society, such as the Cossacks, whose daily lives and activities were significantly influenced by Turkic steppe cultural traditions. The Cossacks, who frequently interacted with the Turks, never held anti-Turkish sentiments, nor did Russian society as a whole.

In my recently published book *"Slavic-Turkish-Aryan Areal and its Geostrategic Imperatives"*, I outline the fundamental ideas of our unity and continuity within the states existing within the Eurasian space: Scythia – Sarmatia – the Hunnic Empire – the Turkic Kaganate – Khazaria, Great Bulgaria – the Mongol Empire (more accurately called the Tatar Empire) – the Russian Empire – the USSR.

The ruling peoples changed, with the Turks and Slavs rising to prominence, but the state borders always remained the same—from the Vistula and Carpathians in the west to the Pacific Ocean in the east. This empire, which has existed since ancient times, continues today as a union of Turkic and Slavic peoples. If we consider the ideas of Slavic-Turkic unity from a historical perspective, it is first essential to recall the prominent orientalist scholar Mirza Kazem-Bek (Alexander Kasimovich Kazem-Bek, 1802–1870).



Mirza Kazem-Bek

Mirza Kazem-Bek, an Azerbaijani Turk and son of the renowned religious figure Haji Gasim, became one of the founders of oriental studies in Russia. It was his initiative that led to the teaching of the Azerbaijani Turkic language at the university level, alongside other Oriental languages, at St. Petersburg University. In 1868, Kazem-Bek initiated an academic movement within Russian scholarly circles to study the linguistics and ethnography of Turkestan. He was also a friend of the celebrated Russian writer Leo Tolstoy and taught him Arabic and Persian languages. Kazem-Bek maintained friendships with prominent Russian writers such as Chernyshevsky and Nekrasov. His most significant works were focused on Islam, including *Complete Concordance of the Quran*.

This topic was also explored in the works of great Russian poets and writers, such as Alexander Pushkin's *"The Prisoner of the Caucasus"*, Mikhail Lermontov's *"Ashik Kerib"* and *"The Hero of Our Time"*, Leo Tolstoy's *"The Raid"*, *"The Cossacks"*, and *"Hadji Murat"*, Alexander Bestuzhev-Marlinsky's *"Mulla-nur"* and *"Ammalat-bek"*, and others.

The foundations of Eurasianism and its connection to Turkic civilization were laid down in the works of linguist Prince Nikolay Trubetskoy (*“Europe and Mankind”*), musicologist Pyotr Suvchinsky, economist and geographer Pyotr Savitsky, scientist and writer Lev Gumilev, critic and publicist Sergei Efron, and other writers and researchers. All of them believed that the roots of Russian statehood could be traced back to the Scythian era, indicating a deep connection with the Turkic world.

The idea of Slavic-Turkic unity was also put forward by Russian diplomat, philosopher, writer, and literary critic Konstantin Leontiev. It is also important to acknowledge that the ideas of Eurasian integration and Slavic-Turkic unity are currently being resisted by some geopolitical players.

Another significant country that plays with the Turkic factor is Israel, which is often overlooked in discussions of the Turkic theme. Historically, the Khazars, a former Caucasian people, were associated with Judaism. In fact, shortly before 860, under Hagan Bulan, the Khazars, after temporarily converting to Christianity, partially adopted the Jewish religion. As the Arab historian Al-Masudi wrote: “There are seven judges—two for the Khazar Muslims, who follow Sharia law, two for the Khazar Jews, where the court is made according to the law of Moses, two for the Khazar Christians, where judgments are made according to the Gospel, and one for the Slavs, Russians, and other pagans, who are judged according to pagan laws.”

We should not overlook Hungary, whose Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a “Turanian direction,” managed by the head of the Department of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Every year, the Magyar-Turan Foundation organizes a Kurultai, and its chairman, anthropologist András Zsolt Bíró, has been researching the history of Turkic peoples for many years. He believes that Hungarians have Turkic origins: “The ancestors of the Hungarians roamed what is now the territory of Kazakhstan. At that time, the ethnonyms ‘Hungarians’ and ‘Kazakhs’ did not exist. By the way, we call ourselves Magyars.”

There are several theories regarding the origin of this name. It could refer to a tribe or group of tribes. It is known that the Magyars lived in the territory of Kazakhstan, and today they are part of the Middle Zhuz. It could also be the name of one of their leaders, given that Kazakhs have the name Madiyar. Or perhaps it was a title, similar to sultan or amir.

Additionally, significant changes in the political landscape of Uzbekistan have drawn attention from international political experts and financial institutions. Unlike the traditional paths followed by other Central Asian states, these changes have become more noticeable due to the economic and political reforms introduced by Uzbekistan’s new president, Shavkat Mirziyoyev.



Shavkat Mirziyoyev.

Many experts wonder what compelled Shavkat Mirziyoyev to break with traditional paths and implement such reforms. Many attribute this shift to Mirziyoyev's unique worldview and his deep understanding of the region's root problems, as well as to his personal qualities shaped by his life experiences. Indeed, Shavkat Mirziyoyev is a politician skilled at navigating difficult situations.

His distinctive qualities were undoubtedly shaped by his upbringing, which was rooted in a family of medical professionals. His father, Miramon Mirziyoyev, was known for his kindness and generosity. Shavkat Mirziyoyev has a talent for listening to people and, while concealing his emotions, tries to discern whether his interlocutors are sincere or not. One of his most significant recent moves has been the restoration of ties with Turkey, which has been a vital step for Uzbekistan's economic development.

One of Mirziyoyev's most crucial historical and strategic goals is to turn Bukhara and Samarkand into centers of the Turkic and Islamic worlds through donor investments. The Bukhara Institute will be established here, and Turkish Airlines, alongside tourism operators, has committed to organizing tours to these cities from various countries. This initiative offers Uzbekistan the opportunity to become a center of the Turkic world in the coming decades.

Shavkat Mirziyoyev is a prominent statesman of international stature, advocating for policies aimed at bringing Eurasian peoples closer together.

Finally, the Turkic factor on the political stage in China cannot be ignored. The Uyghurs, the Turkic-speaking people in China, make up the majority of the population in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Prominent Kazakhstani sinologist Konstantin Syroezhkin states: "Many activists of the Uyghur diaspora abroad are advocating for the creation of an independent state, either 'East Turkestan' or 'Uyghurstan.' The Uyghur diaspora abroad is well-organized and maintains close ties with international organizations and compatriots in XUAR, as well as with the governments and politicians of the countries in which they reside."

We can see that a number of geopolitical players on the global stage may potentially exploit the Turkic factor to achieve their strategic objectives. However, it is clear that Russia will continue to be the dominant power in the region, where Slavic and Turkic ethnicities have merged. The vast area between

Lake Baikal and the Black Sea has always been home to both Slavic and Turkic peoples.

The Slavic-Turkic world is not an artificial construct; it is deeply rooted in history and bloodlines. It is crucial to recognize the value of collaboration between Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan, based on a long history of relations. This collaboration is beneficial for each participant and for the broader association. In this context, the most significant factor is the level of conscious historical, humanitarian, and cultural ties between the peoples of the Eurasian civilization.

Eurasian civilization is the product of cultural, ethical, ethnic, political, trade, military, and other interactions among our peoples. The accumulated historical and cultural heritage is so impressive that we can rely on it as a solid foundation, which can be rightfully called the legacy of our ancestors. The current situation requires a new approach to this issue, which involves objectively understanding what is happening and studying the new challenges facing our region in an unbiased manner.

This process is already underway, with growing support for the idea of a sovereign Eurasia. The peoples of our region have a clear interest in strengthening relations between our countries, which reflects the social order of our societies. Therefore, we have no doubt that the Slavic-Turkic Union is not just a geopolitical hypothesis, but one of the most promising integration associations in the near future.

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Information about the Author

Adgezal Nuru oglu Mamedov is an Azerbaijani researcher and lecturer at the Faculty of International Relations at Western Caspian University. As an analyst, he has been a leading figure in the fields of psychoportraitology, mental portraitology, and psychogeopolitics for many years. His extensive research into psychogeopolitics and its components—spanning political science, the psychology of peoples, and the mental and psychological states of political leaders—provides valuable tools for analyzing and interpreting complex geopolitical issues and scenarios.

Since 2020, Mamedov has been teaching in the Department of International Relations at Western Caspian University, where he developed and teaches a course titled “Mental and Psychological Factors in International Relations.”

Mamedov is the author of more than 500 analytical articles, commentaries, and interviews on topics such as psychological and mental factors in international relations, the ethnogenesis of the Caucasian peoples, and national security. Additionally, four documentary films have been produced based on his research.

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His books are available at the Library of Congress, 101 Independence Avenue, S.E. Washington, D.C. 20540-4830, and in many university libraries around the world.

Contact Information:

- Email for the author: adgezalmamedov@mail.ru
- Email for the assistant: leyla.camalzade06@mail.ru